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"content": "........ ~ FRONTEX -Reg. No - OPERATIONS DIVISION Joint Operations Unit Air Border Sector Annexes of the Operational Plan Joint Operation Alexis 2014 2014/ABS/06 - European Agency for the Management of Operationa l Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union www.frontex .europa.eu Rondo ONZ 1, 00 -124 Warsaw , Poland Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 Fax +48 22 205 95 0 1",
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"content": "........ :::::: FRONTEX INDEX ANNEX 1 - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION 3 ANNEX 2 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS 12 ANNEX 3 - STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES (SOP) ON THE BASIS OF VEGA HANDBOOK 14 ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING 22 ANNEX 5 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME 23 ANNEX 6 - JORA 24 ANNEX 7 - CONTACT DETAILS - FRONTEX 27 ANNEX 8 - OPERATIONAL AREA - LIST OF PARTICIPATING AIRPORTS AND AIRPORT CONTACT DETAILS 28 ANNEX 9 - INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES (DEPLOYMENT LIST) 30",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX ANNEX 1 - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION 1. 1. Introduction Joint Operation Alexis 2014 has been conceived to support EU and Schengen Associated Country airports in respect of their own perceived vulnerabilities/needs concerning operational activities. The process by which airports have identified these and the methodology for the selection of common vulnerabilities needs to which Frontex provides the requisite operational support is described in detail in the Operational Plan. Airports in conjunction with Frontex decided to select the following as their vulnerabilities /needs where a joint activity could be launched in participating airports with the provision of appropriate human assets:· ■ Undocumented passengers ■ Transit without Visa Abuse ■ No shows at departure gates ■ Documents Swapping in Schengen and non Schengen airports ■ Interception and interviewing of inadequately documented passengers on being removed or refused entry by a non EU country This briefing document has been created in order to provide an overview of the risks and threats presented at the external air borders of the EU in respect of the above identified vulnerabilities/ needs. The document will assess the general threat and risks as well as the more specific ones associated with the airports which have agreed to participate or are considering their participation in the operation at the time of the drafting of this document. 1. 2. Airports in the operational area The foll owi ng a re the airports that have agreed or a re considering ta king part in the operation a t the tim e tha t t his docume nt was created : ■ Am ste rd a m (AMS) • Athe ns (ATH) ■ Barcelon a (BCN) ■ Be rga mo (BGY) • Bratislava (BTS) ■ Brusse ls (BRU ) ■ Bucha rest (OTP) ■ Buda pest (BUD) • Geneva (GVA) ■ Lisbon (LIS) ■ Luxembourg (LUX) ■ Lyon (LYS) ■ Madrid (MAD) ■ Milan (MXP) ■ Paris · Charles De Gaulle (CDG) 3/27",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX ■ Paris - Orly (ORY) ■ Prague (PRG) ■ Riga (RIX) ■ Rome (FCO) ■ Sofia (SOF) ■ Timisoara (TSR) ■ Vienna (VIE) ■ Vilnius (VNO) ■ Warsaw (WAW) 1. 3. Data sources and measurable indicators The following indicators can be measured by reference to Pulsar Data for all the above airports except Lyon and Timisoara which do not report in Pulsar: ■ Undocumented migrants/ Failure to detect airport of embarkation All Pulsar Data is taken for the whole period 01.01.2014 to 06.04.2014 The following data cannot be measured from Pulsar Data and can only be obtained by reference to operational information reported in JORA and only when an airport is taking part in an operation: ■ Transit without Visa Abuse ■ Documents Swapping The source of information in relation to t he above two indicators is therefore JORA. • No shows at departure gates Is not measu red in the collection process , but is effectively a consequence of documents swapping a nd transit with out visa abuse. 1.4. General overview of the external EU air border in respect to identified vulnerabilities/needs • Undocumented Passengers Migrants seek to arrive at airports undocumented in order to disguise their own nationality and routing, t hereby making the ability of t he borde r authorities a nd immigration services harder in seeking to identify the origin of t he migrant a nd to seek t heir late r repat ri ation when or if req uired. In gene ral t he number of undocumented arrivals recorded at airports is generally low ac ross Sche ngen airports with about 20 recorded a week. This is probably due to the fact t hat border authorities are generally good at identifying local high risk flig hts and usi ng ma nifest profiling and surveillance activities to be able to ide ntify passengers a nd t he fl ights on which they have arrived . • [Failure to detect airport of embarkation[ Commented [Al]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information rega rding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU' s ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 4 / 27",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [A2]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. • Document Swapping Involves a migrant arriving with one set of travel or identity documentation and then using another set of documentation to seek entry to the Schengen area, or instead to enter into the transit area to 5/ 27",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX use documentation that allows them to appear to be eligible for entry to another country and therefore to board a flight to that country. Document swapping can also relate to migrants choosing to switch documentation at airports outside of the EU whilst in transit. As mentioned, Frontex does not habitually gather statistical information from airports in respect of the phenomena essentially because it is hard to prove and is usually only apparent after debriefing of the migrant, enquiries made with Check In staff and also possible examination of visual surveillance recording in the transit area. A result of the fact that data is not habitually obtained means that it is not possible to clearly identify the extent or level of the threat posed by the phenomenon. In general most cases where a forged or counterfeit passport is used or documents abuse takes place may be an indicator that document swapping has taken place. Where incidents have been detected, information suggests that large hub airports outside of the EU have been associated with migrants being provided with alternative documentation whilst in transit to board flights to the Schengen area. ~his Commented [A3]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. • [T'our group~ Commented [A4]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's ext ernal borders. Its disclosure wou ld jeopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of f uture and ongoing operat ions, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected . In light of the above, the t ext is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in t he first i ndent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. • Interception and interviewing of inadequately documented passengers on being removed or refused entry by a non EU country - 1. 5. Airpo rts • !Amsterdam (AMS)L 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Commented [AS]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migratio n. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 /2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 6/ 27",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [A6] : The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A7]: The blanked out part s contain detailed info rm ati on regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU' s ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoi ng operat ions, and thus facili tate irregular migrati on. Therefore, public securi ty will be affected. In light of the • :earcelona (BCN)[ above, th e t ext is not disclosed pursuant t o t he exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating t o th e prot ect ion of th e public int erest as regards public security. Commented [AS] : The blanked out part s cont ain det ailed informati on regarding vulnerabilit ies and needs at th e EU' s external borders. It s disclosure would jeopardize the work of - • :eergamo (BGY)[ law enforcement officials and harm the course of futu re and ongoing operations, and t hus facili tat e irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affec ted. In light of the above, t he text is not disclosed pursuant t o the exception laid down in the first indent of Arti cle 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating t o th e protection of th e public interest as regards public security . Commented [A9]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the - above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 7/27",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [AlO]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 /2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [All]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . > < Commented [All]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the • :e udapest (BUD)! above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . > Commented [A13] : The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of • ~eneva (GVA)[ law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . >Commented [A14]: The blanked out parts contain detailed ' information regarding vu lnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 /2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 8/ 27",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [A15]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. C Commented [A16]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 /2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A17]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A18]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of • !Paris - (COG) Charles De Gaulle [ law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest >as regards public security . c=; Commented [A19]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU 's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus faci litate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the • !Paris • Orly (ORY)l above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to th e protection of the public interest as regards public security . c=; Commented [A20]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . C =Commented [A21]: The blanked out parts contain detailed ~ • prague (PRGI) information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. C 9/ 27",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [A22]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A23]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure wou ld jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A24]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vu lnerabilities and needs at the EU 's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. ~ Commented [A25]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would j eopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migrati on. Therefore, public security wi ll be affected. In light of the above, th e t ext is not disclosed pursuant to the exception • [T\"imisoara (TSR)[ laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to th e protection of the public interest >as regards public security. c=; Commented [A26]: The blanked out part s contain detailed information regarding vulnerabili ti es and needs at the EU 's • ~ienna (VIE)] ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoi ng operati ons, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Th erefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the t ext is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Ar ti cle 4(1 )(a) of Regulati on No 1049/2001 relating t o th e protection of th e public interest as regards public security. Commented [A27]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize th e work of • ivHnius (VNO)[ law enforcement officials and harm th e course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migrati on . Therefore, public securi ty will be affected. In light of the above, th e t ext is not disclosed pursuant to the exception - laid down in the first indent of Ar ti cle 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. =Commented [A28]: The blanked out parts contain detailed = information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and • iwarsaw (WAW)~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. C 10/27",
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"number": 11,
"content": "_..... ~ FRONTEX 11/ 27",
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"content": "~ FRONTEX ANNEX 2 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS Under the umbrella of the Frontex Programme of Work 2014 this activity is going to contribute to the following corporate goals and prioritized key objectives, as set in the Frontex' Strategy and Multi Annual Prog ramme 2014 - 2017 as well as in concrete in Programme of Work 2014: ■ Goal 2: Supporting response, Key Objective nr. 1: Coordinate activities sustaining an operational presence in areas at the external borders exposed to specific and disproportionate pressure as well as facing significant uncertainties; including the implementation of procedures for operational response based on the impact levels on EUROSUR; ■ Goal 3: Emergency response, Key Objective nr . 1: Develop operational contingency modules to shorten the response time in case of emergency situations; The objectives of the activity are, as follows: 1. Enhance exchange of knowledge among officers (Frontex and MS & SAC) 2. Enhance border security (Frontex and MS & SAC) 3. Enhance efficiency of border security (Frontex and MS & SAC) 4. Enhance operational cooperation (Frontex and MS, SAC & Third Countries) This activity is expected to deliver the following main benefits: ■ Tailored operational support and capacity building strengthening MS/SAC operational capabilities at perceived vu lnerabilities/needs ■ Effective and efficient operational response at perceived vulnerabilities corresponding to European Situational Awareness indications (existing threats) enhancing security of external air borders ■ Increased response capaci ty to e mergency situations The objectives are meant to be achieved by the following activities: Goals/Key Objectiv objectives es of the Activity Indicators of achievement activity Deployme nt of officers wit h specific Number of man-days deployed profile' during the operation Number of ma n-days deployed 1,2,4 De ployme nt of SGOs Supporting during the operation Response Key Objective Number of man-days deployed Deployme nt of TC observers during the operation nr. 1 Number of reinforcing actions (e.g. gate check, doc checks Supporting targeted response with Ref Man experts or any 2 focusing on perceived other action what the vulnerabilities / needs particular vulnerability req ui res) Implement coordinated operational Number of airports 3 actions according to the operational participating plan 1 Corresponding to the tackled vulnerabiliti es and in line with the MB decision nr. 11 12012 . 12/ 27",
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"number": 13,
"content": "~ FRONTEX Emergency Further develop quick response Response elements Number of new quick response 4 elements learned with the use of Key Objective SGO mechanism nr. 1 13/27",
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"number": 14,
"content": "~ FRONTEX ANNEX 3 - STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES (SOP) ON THE BASIS OF VEGA HANDBOOK The aim of JO Alexis I 2014 is to enhance capabilities of EU airport border guards to detect and react on abuses made by irregular passengers and facilitators within the transit areas of Schengen and non- Schengen airports (Third Country airports inclusive) by applying Alexis I Standard Operational Procedures according to the needs. 1. 1. [Transit area abuses at Schengen and non-Schengen airport ~ - - - - - - - - - Commented [A29]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding document abuse at Schengen and the ■ Undocumented passengers non-Schengen airports with detailed data on modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A30]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding document abuse at Schengen and non- Schengen airport s wi t h detailed dat a on t he modus operandi of cri minal networks. Its disclosure would j eopardize t he work of law enforcement officials and harm t he course of future and ongoi ng operat ions, and t hus facilitat e irregu lar migration. Therefo re, public securit y will be affect ed. In light of t he above, t he text is not disclosed pursuant t o t he excepti on laid down in t he fi rst indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulati on No 1049/2001 re latin g t o the prot ection of t he public interest as regards public security. Commented [A31]: The blanked out part s contain det ailed information rega rding document abuse at Schengen and non- ■No Schengen airport s and non-Schengen airpo rts with det ailed Show~ dat a on t he modus opera ndi of criminal net works. Its disclosure would j eopardize t he work of law enfo rcement officia ls and harm t he course of future and ongoing operat ions, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public securi ty will be affec ted. In light of t he above, t he t ext is not disclosed pursuant t o the excep ti on laid down in th e first indent of Arti cle 4( 1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to t he protect ion of t he public int erest as regards public securi ty. Commented [A32]: The blanked out pa rts cont ain detailed info rm ation rega rding document abuse at Schengen and non- Schengen airports and non-Schengen airports with detailed data on the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the cou rse of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the e xception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/ 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 14/27",
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},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 15,
"content": "~ FRONTEX --- Commented [A33]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding document abuse at Schengen and non- Schengen airports and non-Schengen airports with detailed data on the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 1. 2. Basic l ndicatorsj relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . Commented [A34]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding criteria to identify migrants' facilitators and traffickers of human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. - 15/27",
"width": 2481,
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},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 16,
"content": "~ FRONTEX Alexis I Standard Operational Procedures (SOP) Whatever type of border control is carried out, it should be done fully respecting human dignity. Based on the VEGA handbook (uploaded in FOSS) the following recommended operational procedures and countermeasures enhance capabilities to detect the above listed transit area abuses in the short term period. Commented [A35]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/200 1 re latin g to the protec tion of the public interest as regards public security. ' Legal Basis: Council Directive 2004 / 82 / EC af 29 April 2004 an the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. At this stage, it should be highlighted that since the Council Directive required Member States to enact legislation in order to adopt and brins this Directive into force, its implementation may vary from Member State to Member State. 16/27",
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},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 17,
"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [A36]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A37]: The blanked out part s contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders . Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected . In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 17/ 27",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/53/62/ff/5362ff5c6aa1442ba9839d83ae6ca460/page-p17-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 18,
"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [A38]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations , and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A39] : The blanked out parts contain detailed info rm at ion rega rding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during bord er cont rol at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcemen t officia ls pa trolling t he area and harm t he course of f uture and ongoing operat ions, and t hus f acilit ate irregular --- migrati on. Therefore, public securit y will be affect ed . In light of the above, t he text is not disclosed pursuant t o t he except ion laid down in the first indent of Art icle 4( 1)(a) of Regulati on No 1049/200 1 relat ing t o t he prot ecti on of th e public interest as regards public security. Commented [A40]: The blanked out parts cont ain det ailed informat ion regarding t he modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border contro l at the air borders. It s disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling t he area and harm t he course of futu re and ongoi ng operat ions, and thus facilit at e irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the except ion laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 18/ 27",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/53/62/ff/5362ff5c6aa1442ba9839d83ae6ca460/page-p18-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 19,
"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [A41] : The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected . In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . Commented [A42]: The blanked out part s cont ain detailed info rmati on regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials pa trolling t he area and harm t he course of futu re and ongoi ng operations, and t hus facilit ate irregular migrat ion. Therefore, public securi t y will be affect ed. In light of t he above, t he t ext is not disclosed pursuant t o th e except ion laid down in the first indent of Art icle 4(1)(a ) of Regulati on No 1049/200 1 relat ing t o t he prot ecti on of th e public interest as regards public security. Commented [A43]: Th e blanked out parts contain det ailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security wi ll be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 19/27",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/53/62/ff/5362ff5c6aa1442ba9839d83ae6ca460/page-p19-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 20,
"content": "~ FRONTEX --- - Commented [A44]: The blanked out parts cont ain det ailed informat ion rega rdin g the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border contro l at t he air borders . It s disclosure would expose law enfo rcemen t officials pat rolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoi ng operati ons, and thus facilitat e irregu lar migrat ion. Therefore, public security will be affec t ed. In light of th e above, th e t ext is not disclosed pursuant t o t he excepti on laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 20/27",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/53/62/ff/5362ff5c6aa1442ba9839d83ae6ca460/page-p20-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 21,
"content": "~ FRONTEX Commented [A45]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid dow n in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Referral of vulnerable groups and people in need if international protection Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. GOs and SGOs should refer persons in need of international protection to the respective authorities mandate to deal with asylum procedures in each airport. They should also familiarize themselves with the procedures in place to refer vulnerable persons to the adequate authorities in charge of providing protection and assistance to unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking or other forms of serous violence, pregnant women, etc. JA person who is refused entry in to, or transit throush the Territory of a State by the authorities of that Stat. 4 Airline Liaison Officers 21/ 27",
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},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 22,
"content": "~ FRONTEX ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING During the first days of deployment all participants from MS and observers from Third Countries will receive the Operational Briefing delivered by Frontex and national authorities of the host MS. General briefing delivered by Frontex The General briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by Frontex. All participants of the joint operation will be briefed by an Air Border Sector team member at the beginning of their deployment. In exceptional cases, if respective participants are not available for the centralized Operational briefing, the briefing will be delivered on the spot. National briefing delivered by host MS and host TC The National briefing is a part of Operational briefing carried out by national authorities of host Member State and Third Country (airport representatives) based on the deployment overviews provided by Joint Operations Unit (JOU). The National briefers (airport representatives) are responsible for carrying out National briefings, based on the Common Briefing Pack, for all participants deployed within JO. The content and the structure of the Common Briefing Pack are provided by Frontex Training Unit. The National briefers should deliver the National briefing at their airport to the guest officers, seconded guest officers and observers from Third Countries during the first day of the deployment National briefer shall: Deliver briefings as requested by the deployment overviews Report to the project manager (Frontex Training Unit) any irregularities regarding briefings carried out; Support the develo pme nt process of training courses, tools and materials, including the imple mentation process of such activities; Prepare Re port of Nationa l Briefer after each activity and submit it to t he proj ect manage r (Fro ntex Train ing Unit); Assist in prepa ring assessments and eva luations of the operation al activiti es. Standa rd plan for operational briefi ng and de briefi ng is availa ble in Ha ndboo k. 'll. / 27",
"width": 2481,
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},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 23,
"content": "~ FRONTEX ANNEX 5 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME Commented [A46]: The blanked out part contains personal Operational Management and Operational ~eam.c_____________________~ data. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individual. Therefore, its disclosure is precluded pursuant Operational Manager (OM): ■■■■■■■ (Air Border Sector) to the exception laid dow n in Article 4(1 )(b) of Regulation Operational Team (OT): 1049 /2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents. Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO): Operational Analyst (OA): Pooled Resources: OPERA team Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) o Senior Duty Officer (SDO) o Frontex Support Officer (FSO FSC) o FOSS Service Managers o JORA Service Managers 23/27",
"width": 2481,
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},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 24,
"content": "~ FRONTEX ANNEX 6 - JORA 1. µoRA Actor Commented [A47]: The blanked out parts contain t he names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex -- activi ties. The disclosure of such info rmation would Role Name FX/MS Entity E-mail Phone undermine t he protection of the privacy and t he integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance wit h EU laws regarding the protection of personal data. In th is rega rd those ■ JORA parts are not disclosed pursuant to t he exception laid down in Admini strator / Article 4(1 )(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. Service ■ The blanked out parts contain detailed info rmati on related to - Management - - means of co mmunication used by law enforcement of ficia ls. Their disclosure would lead to possible abusive usage and harm the cou rse of future and ongoing operations, and thus Frontex Access ■ facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will Manager be affected. In light of t he above t he text is not di sclosed pursuant to t he exception laid down i n t he first i ndent of Delegated Article 4( 1 )(a) of Regu lation No 1049/2001 relating to t he protection of the public in terest as regards public security. Frontex Access ■ - Manager • - Template Creator National Access Manager National Access -- - --- ■ ■ -• - Manager Nati onal Access Manager National Access Manager ■ Nati onal Access Manager -I National Access Manager Natio nal Access Manager -- ■ ■ ■ National Access Manager -- ■ .. - National Access Manager ■ ■ Nationa l Access Manager ■ 24/27",
"width": 2481,
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"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/53/62/ff/5362ff5c6aa1442ba9839d83ae6ca460/page-p24-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 25,
"content": "~ FRONTEX National Access Manager National Access Manager -- - ■ ■ ... National Access Manager National Access ■ - Manager National Access ■ I - - - Manager National Access Manager ■ National Access ... - - ■ Manager National Access Manage r National Access Manager ■ National Access ■ ----- Manager National Access Manager ■ NOTE: Detailed roles and responsibilites of the different actors are described in t he JORA Policy and Process busi ness documentation 2. f) ORA Incidents Reporting Structurel Commented [A48] : The blanked out parts contain detailed information regardi ng the reporting mechanisms of law enforcement officials. Its disclosure would expose law AUSTRIA enforcement officials engaged in the operation and harm the course of future and ongoing operat ions, and thus facilitate BELGIUM irregular migrat ion. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of BULGARIA Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relat ing to the prot ect ion of th e public int erest as regards public security. CZECH REPUBLIC FRANCE 25/27",
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},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 26,
"content": "_..... ~ FRONTEX GREECE HUNGARY ITALY LATVIA LITHUANIA LUXEMBURG The NETHERLANDS POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA SLOVAKIA SPAIN SWITZERLAND 3. JORA INCIDENT TEMPLATE ATTRIBUTES' LIST I• • • Description [In cide nt Numbe r] (' ) Data set by the JORA [Re po rting Unit] (') Information set by the JORA [Date of Re porting] (' ) Date set by the JORA Corresponds to the date of the actual activity [Date of Activity] YES (') performed To be selected when a GO/SGO/TC Officer/Observer [Guest Officer Involved] [Comments] [Modus Operandi] IYES (' ) was deployed Free text for comments Free text (mandatory) for Modus Operandi and operational data [Activity Performed YES (' ) Collection of attributes for all the !! reporting points Information] [Attachments] To upload documents, pictures and other files (TAB) 26/27",
"width": 2481,
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"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/53/62/ff/5362ff5c6aa1442ba9839d83ae6ca460/page-p26-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153946/",
"number": 27,
"content": "~ FRONTEX ANNEX 7 - CONTACT DETAILS - FRONTEX 1. General Authority Address !Email address Commented [A49] : The blanked out parts contain detailed information related to means of communication used by law enforcement officials. Their disclosure would lead to possible Frontex (HQ) Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland frontex@frontex.europa.eu abusive usage and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, Frontex Situation Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw , Poland public security will be affected. In light of the above the text Centre is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid dow n in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/ 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards Alexis Operational Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw , Poland public security. Team OPERA team Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw, Poland JORA team Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw , Poland FOSS team Rondo ONZ 1, 00-124 Warsaw , Poland 2. Commented [ASO] : The blanked out parts contain the .. [F ronte names and contact details of actors participating in Frontex activities. The disclosure of such information would Role Name Phone nu mber Email address undermine the protection of the privacy and the integrity of the individuals, in particular in accordance with EU laws Operational regarding the protecti on of personal data . In thi s regard those parts are not disclosed pursuant to t he except ion laid down i n •- Manager Article 4(1 )(b) of Regulat ion (EC) 1049/2001• Front ex Coordinating Officer Operational Analyst Spokesperson lza bella +48 667667292 izabella.coope r@f ro ntex.europa.eu Cooper Press Officer Ewa +48 785001374 ewa . moncure@ frontex. europa. eu Moncure REMARK: Any changes rela t ed t o t he contact details of t he participants i n the course of the joi nt operat ion do not require t he amendment of t he Operationa l Plan. The updat ed con t act details will be available and shared with the participant s durin g implementation phase on a need to know basis. 27 / 27",
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}
