HTTP 200 OK
Allow: GET, PUT, PATCH, HEAD, OPTIONS
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Accept
{
"resource_uri": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"id": 153994,
"site_url": "https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/153994-fer-jo-focal-points-2019-sea/",
"title": "FER - JO Focal Points 2019 Sea",
"slug": "fer-jo-focal-points-2019-sea",
"description": "",
"published_at": null,
"num_pages": 70,
"public": true,
"listed": true,
"allow_annotation": false,
"pending": false,
"file_url": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/fer-jo-focal-points-2019-sea.pdf",
"file_size": 1308491,
"cover_image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p1-small.png",
"page_template": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p{page}-{size}.png",
"outline": "- [1.1. Operational aim](#page-3)\n- [1.2. Period of implementation and operational areas](#page-3)\n - [1.2.1. Period of implementation](#page-3)\n - [1.2.2. Operational areas](#page-3)\n- [1.3. Participants](#page-4)\n- [1.4. Financial information](#page-4)\n- [I. Evaluation of Specific Activity](#page-5)\n- [Operational Activities in Cyprus](#page-5)\n- [1. Background information](#page-7)\n - [1.1. Brief risk assessment](#page-7)\n - [1.2. Specific operational aim](#page-8)\n - [1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas](#page-8)\n - [1.4. Participants](#page-8)\n - [1.5. Financial information](#page-8)\n- [2. Achievement of objectives](#page-9)\n- [3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices](#page-11)\n- [4. Assessment of joint operational activities](#page-11)\n - [4.1. Supporting Response](#page-11)\n - [4.1.1. Operational concept](#page-11)\n - [4.1.2. Operational results](#page-12)\n - [4.1.3. Operational coordination structures](#page-12)\n - [4.1.4. Resources deployed](#page-13)\n - [4.2. Situational Awareness](#page-15)\n - [4.2.1. Threats and Risks, modus operandi and trends identified](#page-15)\n - [4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange](#page-16)\n - [4.3. Development](#page-17)\n - [4.3.1. Operational cooperation](#page-17)\n - [4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing](#page-19)\n- [5. Main conclusions and recommendations](#page-19)\n- [FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS](#page-22)\n- [1. Time schedule](#page-22)\n- [2. Participation](#page-22)\n - [2.1. Participating MS resources](#page-22)\n - [2.2. Frontex owned / leased / co-owned technical equipment](#page-22)\n- [3. Financial information](#page-23)\n- [4. List of acronyms](#page-26)\n- [1. Background information](#page-29)\n - [1.1. Brief risk assessment](#page-29)\n - [1.2. Specific Operational aim](#page-31)\n - [1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas](#page-31)\n - [1.3.1. Period of implementation](#page-31)\n - [1.3.2. Operational areas](#page-31)\n - [1.4. Participants](#page-32)\n - [1.5. Financial information](#page-32)\n- [2. Achievement of objectives](#page-32)\n- [3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices](#page-35)\n- [4. Assessment of joint operational activities](#page-35)\n - [4.1. Supporting Response](#page-35)\n - [4.1.1. Operational concept](#page-35)\n - [4.1.2. Operational results](#page-36)\n - [4.1.3. Operational coordination structures](#page-37)\n - [4.1.4. Resources deployed](#page-37)\n - [4.2. Situational Awareness](#page-38)\n - [4.2.1. Threats and Risks, modus operandi and trends identified](#page-38)\n - [4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange](#page-39)\n - [4.3. Development](#page-40)\n - [4.3.1. Operational cooperation](#page-40)\n - [4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing](#page-41)\n- [5. Implementation of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council](#page-41)\n - [5.1. Disembarkation in Third Countries](#page-41)\n - [5.2. Assessment of the general situation in TCs](#page-41)\n - [5.3. Communication and cooperation channels](#page-41)\n- [6. Main conclusions and recommendations](#page-42)\n- [FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS](#page-44)\n- [1. Time schedule](#page-44)\n- [2. Participation](#page-44)\n - [2.1. Participating MS resources](#page-44)\n - [2.1.1. Human resources](#page-44)\n - [2.2. Frontex owned / leased / co-owned technical equipment](#page-44)\n - [2.3. Host MS Resources](#page-44)\n - [2.3.1. Human resources](#page-44)\n - [2.3.2. Technical Equipment](#page-45)\n - [2.4. Third Country Observers](#page-45)\n- [3. Financial information](#page-45)\n- [4. List of acronyms](#page-46)\n- [III. Evaluation of Specific Activity](#page-48)\n- [Prevention and detection of cross-border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean (Azores)](#page-48)\n- [1. Background information](#page-50)\n - [1.1. Brief risk assessment](#page-50)\n - [1.2. Operational aim](#page-50)\n - [1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas](#page-50)\n - [1.3.1. Period of implementation](#page-50)\n - [1.3.2. Operational areas](#page-50)\n - [1.4. Participants](#page-50)\n - [1.5. Financial information](#page-51)\n- [2. Achievement of objectives](#page-51)\n- [3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices](#page-51)\n- [4. Assessment of joint operational activities](#page-51)\n - [4.1. Supporting Response](#page-51)\n - [4.1.1. Operational concept](#page-51)\n - [4.1.2. Operational results](#page-52)\n - [4.1.3. Operational coordination structures](#page-52)\n - [4.1.4. Resources deployed](#page-52)\n - [4.2. Situational Awareness](#page-52)\n - [4.2.1. Threats and Risks, modus operandi and trends identified](#page-52)\n - [4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange](#page-52)\n - [4.3. Development](#page-52)\n - [4.3.1. Operational cooperation](#page-52)\n - [4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing](#page-52)\n- [5. Main conclusions and recommendations](#page-53)\n- [FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS](#page-54)\n- [1. Time schedule](#page-54)\n- [2. Participation](#page-54)\n - [2.1. Participating MS resources](#page-54)\n - [2.1.1. Human resources](#page-54)\n - [2.2. Host MS Resources](#page-54)\n - [2.2.1. Technical Equipment](#page-54)\n- [3. Financial information](#page-54)\n- [4. Maps](#page-55)\n- [5. List of acronyms](#page-55)\n- [IV. Evaluation of Specific Activity](#page-56)\n- [Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II)](#page-56)\n- [1. Background information](#page-58)\n - [1.1. Brief risk assessment](#page-58)\n - [1.2. Operational aim](#page-59)\n - [1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas](#page-59)\n - [1.4. Participants](#page-60)\n - [1.5. Financial information](#page-60)\n- [2. Achievement of objectives](#page-60)\n- [3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices](#page-61)\n- [4. Assessment of joint operational activities](#page-62)\n - [4.1. Supporting Response](#page-62)\n - [4.1.1. Operational concept](#page-62)\n - [4.1.2. Operational results](#page-62)\n - [4.1.3. Operational coordination structures](#page-62)\n - [4.1.4. Resources deployed](#page-63)\n - [4.2. Situational Awareness](#page-63)\n - [4.2.1. Systematic database checks help track down suspects linked to terrorism](#page-63)\n - [4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange](#page-64)\n - [4.3. Development](#page-64)\n - [4.3.1. Operational cooperation](#page-64)\n - [4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing](#page-64)\n- [5. Main conclusions and recommendations](#page-65)\n- [FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS](#page-66)\n- [1. Time schedule](#page-66)\n- [2. Participation](#page-66)\n - [2.1. Participating MS resources](#page-66)\n - [2.1.1. Human resources](#page-66)\n- [3. Financial information](#page-66)\n- [4. Maps](#page-67)\n- [5. List of acronyms](#page-67)\n- [ANNEX – Observations of Fundamental Rights Officer](#page-69)\n",
"properties": {
"title": null,
"author": null,
"_tables": [],
"creator": null,
"subject": null,
"producer": "Adobe Acrobat Pro 2020 20 Paper Capture Plug-in",
"_format_webp": true
},
"uid": "9e6859b8-946a-4954-8f68-59f44e17b754",
"data": {},
"pages_uri": "/api/v1/page/?document=153994",
"original": null,
"foirequest": null,
"publicbody": null,
"last_modified_at": "2022-05-09 12:26:26.053327+00:00",
"pages": [
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 1,
"content": "LIMITED ==: FRONTEX Iii EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY - Warsaw, 18/05/2020 LIMITED1 FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT JO Focal Points 2019 Sea Approved by / /2020 ....................................... Signature Fabrice Leggeri Executive Director 1 Information which is sensitive and limited for use within the European Union institutions, other offices and agencies established by virtue or on the basis of the Treaties, EU Member States and public administrations; distribution on a need to know basis. Not for public dissemination.",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p1-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 2,
"content": "- Limited FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT JO Focal Points 2019 Sea Contents General part 3 I. Evaluation of Specific Activity Operational Activities in Cyprus 5 II. Evaluation of Specific Activity Multipurpose Maritime Operation in the Black Sea 27 III. Evaluation of Specific Activity Prevention and detection of cross- border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean (Azores) 48 IV. Evaluation of Specific Activity Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II) 56 Annex - Observations of Fundamental Rights Officer 69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p2-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 3,
"content": "- Limited FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT JO Focal Points 2019 Sea GENERAL PART 1. Background information In 2019, the Joint Operation (JO) Focal Points Sea was used as a platform for the implementation of specific and independent activities (the “Activities”) covered by the mandate of European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, in specific and distinct maritime areas (“Focal Points”), within the territory of the participating Member States (MS). The Frontex Evaluation Report of JO Focal Points 2019 Sea is composed of the General Part and the Evaluation of each separately implemented Specific Activity. During the implementation period of the JO, 4 different Activities have been implemented by activating various Focal Points, in locations not covered by the regular JO, as follows: • Operational Activities in Cyprus. • Multipurpose Maritime Operation in the Black Sea, in Bulgaria and Romania. • Prevention and detection of cross-border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean (Azores), in Portugal. • Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II), in Italy and France. 1.1. Operational aim The operational aim of the joint operation (JO) was to provide increased technical and operational assistance to the host MS by implementing coordinated operational activities in the areas at the external sea borders, which were not covered by permanent large-scale maritime joint operations or complementing them in order to control illegal immigration flows towards the territory of the EU MS, to tackle cross-border crime and to enhance European cooperation on coast guard functions and law enforcement activities. The operational aim was implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU and international law, guaranteeing the protection of fundamental rights, in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum and the reports and observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer. 1.2. Period of implementation and operational areas Commented [KB1]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing 1.2.1. Period of implementation operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details Commencement 07 May 2019 of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, Termination 29 January 2020 enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature 1.2.2. Operational areas would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and During the implementation period of the JO, 6 Focal Points were activated within 4 different Activities, as unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the follows: protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No • Focal Point Nicosia within Operational Activities in Cyprus. 1049/2001 . 3/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p3-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 4,
"content": "- Limited FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT • JO Focal Points 2019 Sea Focal Point Burgas (Bulgaria) and Focal Point Constanta (Romania) within Multipurpose Maritime Operation in the Black Sea. • Focal Point Azores (Portugal) within Prevention and detection of cross-border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean (Azores). • Focal Point Genova (Italy) and Focal Point Marseille (France) within Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II). Commented [KB2]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide 1.3. Participants smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would The JO was hosted by Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania. ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature 9 Participating MS with 11 different authorities took part in the JO, namely: Austria, Bulgaria, France, would be hampered by depriving the operations of any Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romanian and Slovenia. strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1.4. Financial information 1049/2001. The estimated operational budget of JO Focal Points 2019 Sea amounted to 487,303 EUR. 4/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p4-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 5,
"content": "LIMITED i:S: FRONTEXIII EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY I. Evaluation of Specific Activity Operational Activities in Cyprus JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p5-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 6,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Contents 1. Background information 7 2. Achievement of objectives 9 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices 11 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 11 5. Main conclusions and recommendations 19 FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 22 1. Time schedule 22 2. Participation 22 3. Financial information 23 4. List of acronyms 26 6/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p6-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 7,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 1. Background information The Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea (JO) Sea is the platform for the implementation of specific and independent activities covered by the mandate of European Border and Coast Guard Regulation in specific and distinct maritime areas (Focal Points). The Operational Activities in Cyprus was implemented under the Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea. •'·1 ----1-------· 1.1. Brief risk assessment Irregular migrants traveling to Cyprus arrive mainly via Turkey, therefore this route is considered a sub- route of the Eastern Mediterranean route. Usually, the total number of arrivals to Cyprus is lower than on the other sub-routes in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, the impact of illegal immigration on Cyprus is high, given its small population, its vulnerability related to limited resources available to deal with incoming migratory flows arriving by sea or across the green line and the sensitive political situation, limiting the implementation of effective border measures. Moreover, irregular migrants who go to Cyprus tend to stay Commented [KB3]: The information related to this variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its for a long term, which increases the administrative burden of the local authorities. mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain insights into this decision making The geopolitical situation and the possibility to easily access the areas which are not under the effective process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, have made Cyprus attractive for illegal immigration. depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses Smuggling networks are taking advantage of this, by promoting Cyprus as a desirable and feasible wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information destination. Between 1 January and 31 December 2019, 7 730 migrants arrived in Cyprus. This equates to a would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making- 66% increase compared to 2018, when 4 662 migrant arrivals were reported. processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from In 2019, 31% of the main nationalities arriving in Cyprus were Syrians, 15% Cameroonians, 12% Pakistanis and individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present case, information 12% Bangladeshis. In addition, a wide range of other nationalities (26%) were reported, among the most pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on numerous being Georgian, Nigerian, Iranian, Congolese and Somali nationals. Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Up until June 2019, Syrians were by far the main reported nationality, usually arriving to the occupied areas The non-disclosed part contains detailed information of the Republic of Cyprus, by flying from Turkey. However, the introduction of visas for Syrian nationals regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human flying from Turkey to the occupied areas, led to a dramatic drop in the number of Syrians arriving by plane beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law to this part of the island. In June, the Cypriot authority reported 479 Syrian arrivals, while in July, there enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the were only 65. activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as Since stricter conditions were imposed on Syrians flying to the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure they have started arriving to the island, on board of fishing boats, departing from Turkey (Mersin) and would thus undermine the protection of the public interest Lebanon. Since they started travelling by sea, their number started to increase again. In September 2019, as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 114 Syrians were reported by the Cypriot authority, 120 in October (5% increase) and then 314 in November (162%). In December 2019 and January 2020, Cypriot authority reported 126 and 152 Syrian migrants ---------- respectively, showing a seasonal decrease in line with the sea wintry conditions. The increasing trend in arrivals to Cyprus is likely to continue along 2020. In January 2020, 152 Syrian migrants arrived to the island with 100 of them disembarking directly in the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Despite the fact that the number of Syrian arrivals is currently moderated, as soon as weather conditions allow for a safe travel by sea, a significant increase in Syrians arriving by boats from Turkey and Lebanon is expected. In 2019, a sharp increase in arrivals of irregular migrants from Africa was reported. With 1 124 arrivals, Cameroonians were the second-ranked nationality arriving in Cyprus, after Syrians. In 2019, the number of Cameroonians increased by 139% compared to 2018. The number of Nigerians increased as well by 286%, from only 84 arrivals in 2018 to 328 in 2019. Other African nationalities showed similar increasing trends. In addition, Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals more than doubled their numbers in 2019 compared to 2018. All these nationalities (with the exception of Syrians, after the introduction of the new visa policy) arrive by plane to the areas which are not under the effective control of the government of Cyprus (at Ercan airport). Later, they can easily cross the green line into the territories under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. Routes to Cyprus for these nationalities are safe, quick and cheap, which has resulted in an increase 7/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p7-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 8,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA in arrivals. The situation may continue in the future with more migrants from Africa adding their increasing number to the Pakistani and Bangladeshi migration flows. Commented [KB4]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of The presence of Frontex Screening experts, Advanced Level Document Officers (ALDO), Debriefing experts, criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would and Interpreters helped Cyprus increase its capacity in terms of verifying the real nationality of migrants, jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a in data and intelligence collection, training and the production of analytical documents, allowing for a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed better situational picture on the illegal immigration. This may also contribute to reduce the country’s at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross- vulnerabilities in the light of its Schengen accession procedure. border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as 1.2. Specific operational aim laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. To provide technical and operational assistance to Cyprus in migration management and information / Commented [KB5]: The non-disclosed part contains intelligence gathering activities. sensitive information obtained in cooperation with a Member State of the European Union regarding the effectiveness of The operational aim was implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU and international law, border security measures. The disclosure of such information guaranteeing the protection of fundamental rights, in particular the access to international protection and would reveal existing vulnerabilities which, once public, could be explored by criminal networks involved in migrant the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the smuggling, trafficking in human beings and thus undermine Frontex Consultative Forum and the reports and observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer. the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . 1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas 1.3.1. Period of implementation Commencement 14 August 2019 12:00 (local time) Termination 29 January 2020 11:59 (local time) I I The Operational Activities in Cyprus started on 14 August 2019, with an initial duration of three months. The Activity was later extended until the end of the operational year of 2019. 1.3.2. Operational area Commented [KB6]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details In order to implement the Operational Activities in Cyprus, Focal Point (FP) Nicosia was activated within of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing the Headquarters of the Aliens and Immigration Unit, in Nicosia. operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details Nonetheless, the operational activities were performed by the deployed experts in other locations as well, of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide in the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, such as landing smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, locations or local Alien and Immigration units. enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any 1.4. Participants strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and The Activity was hosted by Cyprus. unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the 5 Participating MS took part in the Activity, namely: Greece, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No During the Operational Activities in Cyprus, 7 experts from 7 different authorities of the listed participating 1049/2001. MS were deployed to the operational area, delivering a total of 698 man-days. Commented [KB7]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information 1.5. Financial information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their A budget of 162,832.00 EUR was allocated by Frontex, for the implementation of Operational Activities in effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future Cyprus in 2019. similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. , , - - - - - - - - - - - -~ --___J 8/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p8-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 9,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 2. Achievement of objectives • Enhance operational cooperation - High level of MS participation in the operational activities; Enhanced cooperation between the national authorities of the host MS as well as on an international level; Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations in the frame of Activity. Achieved The Activity was the first time Frontex provided technical and operational support to Cyprus since the launch of the Agency. In this respect the activity provided new form of enhancing operational cooperation between Cyprus and other EU MS. Since Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea was not a part of the annual operational planning process, the resources which were needed for the implementation of the Operational Activities in Cyprus were redeployed from other maritime Joint Operations. Representatives from the European Commission, EASO and Europol cooperated actively in the framework of the Activity, thus enhancing the inter-agency cooperation. • Support to migration management - Assisting in screening of nationality, document checks and debriefing of third-country nationals. Partly Achieved The absence of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) dedicated to registration and identification Commented [KB8]: The non-disclosed part contains procedures for third-country nationals in Cyprus, along with the existence of national measures in place, detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast requiring Cypriot authority to focus mainly on Syrian nationals arriving to the island, were the two main guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the challenges faced by Frontex experts, when supporting migration management activities in the area. Given working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- the reasons above, the support to migration management could have been further enhanced by additional border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In resources and support to the Cypriot authorities in creating the SOP and its implementation processes. consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be In terms of screening of nationality, only a limited number of irregular migrants detected on the island disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. were screened during the implementation of the Activity. Most of the migrants screened with the support of Frontex experts were only those apprehended in Nicosia district, who entered illegally in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus and then crossed the buffer zone (green line), as well as those arriving by boats directly from Turkey to the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic Cyprus. Similar challenges were faced in terms of debriefing activities, which were mostly focused on Syrian nationals, particular during the first implementation period of the Activity. Documents checks were performed by the deployed ALDO, who supported the local authority in verifying the authenticity of travel and other identity documents. The documents were inspected using also the light document checking devices provided by Frontex. • Enhance collection and exchange of information, including personal data - Collection of operational information in a timely manner from all operational actors involved, in particular information on incidents reported in JORA; Processing of personal data relating to individuals suspected of involvement in the migrants’ smuggling, traffic of human beings (THB), terrorism or other cross-border crimes at the EU level; Distribution of operational information to all operational actors through the respective authorized channels; Seeking standardized format and quality of the including debriefing interviews; Use of the “Guidelines for JORA Incident Template” giving detailed information on definitions and establishing a sets of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes 9/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p9-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 10,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Partly Achieved With more than 48% of the incidents being reported in JORA with a delay of up to two weeks from the Commented [KB9]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law moment of occurrence, there is significant room for improving the timely transmission of operational data enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast to Frontex. In addition, 94% of the data was reported in JORA starting from November, which can be mostly guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the attributed to the activity of the Frontex Information Management Officer (FIMO) deployed in the area. working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- Even so, the information inserted in JORA was not always satisfactory, especially the information related border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the to migrants’ nationalities, place of departure and results of the screening activities. public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Personal data was collected during the debriefing activities with the use of PeDRA template in cases of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. suspects of cross–border crime such as migrant smuggling, trafficking of human beings (THB) or terrorism. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related During the implementation of the Activity, Frontex transferred to Europol a total of 31 personal data to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement packages involving personal data related to 64 suspects of migrant smuggling and 49 means of officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal communication, however, the transmitted data generated 0 hits in the Europol databases. activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus The debriefing information was inserted and validated in JORA, with significant delays at “Team Leader” facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be and “Intelligence Officer” level, requiring, on average, 40 days for the information to reach Frontex. This significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would delay is eight times higher than the average for all other Frontex joint operations, where debriefing undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article interviews are performed. 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. • Identify possible risks and threats - Carrying out debriefing interviews to collect operational information and personal data related to suspects of cross border crimes, to be further processed and analysed; Operational analytical products will be shared with relevant stakeholders to maintain and improve situational awareness and support operational planning and implementation; Detecting and reporting relevant cases of document and identity fraud, frauds concerning stolen transportation means and parts as well as modi operandi. Achieved Although the data collected in the framework of the Activity did not provide an accurate picture of the irregular migration situation in the island, the implementation of the Operational Activities in Cyprus facilitated the collection of important operational information. As such, valuable data on suspected FTF persons detected among the irregular migrants reaching the island was collected, particularly through high quality debriefing interviews. The information collected, together with the input provided by the Cypriot authority, was used to define basic indicators for irregular migration related threats in Cyprus. During the implementation of the Activity, the delivery of regular analytical reports was not possible due to difficulties in collecting reliable data in JORA, nonetheless, an analytical report, summarizing the migratory trends to Cyprus was produced and disseminated to all participants in the Activity. Even though forged documents were detected during the Activity, Frontex Document Alert (FDA) were not produced, mostly due to the low quality of the forgeries. • Establish and exchange the best practices - Delivering and supporting workshops, meetings, other networking events to participants; Delivering and supporting operational briefings/debriefing to all participants of the Activity, including information on the fundamental rights and access to international protection; Building on MS operational capacity by implementing other supporting activities; Supporting targeted training activities. Partly Achieved During the implementation of the Activity, four operational briefings were provided to the participants. The operational briefings were complemented by Europol and EASO representatives. All TMs were debriefed at local level, at the end of their deployment. Moreover, during each rotation, the experts were briefed by Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) representatives, via video-conference sessions and, to a lesser extent, in the field. In addition, the Debriefing Advisor and the 10/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p10-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 11,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Consultant conducted 9 workshops in the operational area.II However, time constrictions and lack of Commented [KB10]: The non-disclosed part contains personnel limited the mentoring capacity in debriefing and screening activities provided by Operational detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast Team (OT). guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Additionally, on job trainings for drafting operational reports were provided by the deployed experts to thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- the local officers. border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the Exchange of best practices should be significantly enhanced, particular through the implementation of Staff public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Exchange activities, which were not possible in 2019, due to national constraints. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices • To facilitate the organisational arrangements and logistics related to the deployment of resources, information about the hosting MS and the operational area of the Activity was uploaded on FOSS. 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 4.1. Supporting Response 4.1.1. Operational concept During the implementation of the Activity, Frontex provided support in migration management activities to Cyprus through screening of nationality and documents checks of irregular migrants arriving to the island, including information gathering from the operational area. Commented [KB11]: The non-disclosed part contains sensitive information obtained in cooperation with a Member Due to the absence of a SOP regarding the migration management process in Cyprus, the operational State of the European Union regarding the effectiveness of border security measures. The disclosure of such information activities were performed with various rates of success influenced by factors such as: timeline set for the would reveal existing vulnerabilities which, once public, process upon disembarkation of migrants, rigid and exhaustive format of the national screening form, etc. could be explored by criminal networks involved in migrant In order to address some of these challenges, a Working Group involving representatives from Frontex, smuggling, trafficking in human beings and thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public Europol and EASO, was assigned to develop, in close cooperation with the Cypriot Authority and under the security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of coordination of the European Commission, an SOP regarding the first reception capacities and procedures Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . in Cyprus. Additional challenges were also imposed by the expansion works done in the Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia (Pournara) aiming to ensure an adequate infrastructure, improved accommodation and working conditions in the Centre. Under these circumstances, the registration and identification procedures were mainly carried out at the premises of the Aliens and Immigration Unit in Nicosia, at landing locations and only partially, at the Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia (Pournara). In these conditions, the deployment of Screening experts and Interpreter with extensive experience in migration management activities at the hotspots in Italy and Greece had a high positive impact on the activities implemented, assisting and advising the local authority to enable an adequate level of operational response. Thorough document checks were performed by the ALDO in order to support the detection of forged / falsified documents in the possession of irregular migrants arriving to Cyprus, thus providing significant support to the host MS’s forensic/investigation teams. Concerning the debriefing activities, the Debriefing experts supported by the Interpreter were able to collect valuable information from the operational area in terms of identifying current migratory threats towards the island, thus contributing to an improved situational picture on the Eastern Mediterranean Route. 11/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p11-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 12,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Daily and ad-hoc exchange of information was carried out between Frontex, the operational actors and external stakeholders involved, with valuable support provided, in particular by Europol officers present on spot. All participants in the Activity were instructed by the OT to pay particular attention to the identification of persons in vulnerable situations and to refer them to the Cypriot Team Leader (TL). 4.1.2. Operational results Since the beginning of the Activity on 14 August 2019 until 29 January 2020, the Cypriot authority reported 3 574 irregular migrants (approx.) in the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN), while only 1 440 irregular Commented [KB12]: The non-disclosed part contains migrants have been reported in JORA. This means that only 40% of the actual figures reported during the detailed information related to reporting tools and methods implementation of the Activity were inserted in JORA. In addition, 94% of the data was reported JORA used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would starting from November. For these reasons, the data below does not indicate the real picture of the illegal jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future immigration in Cyprus nor the operational results during the implementation of the Frontex Operation. operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law During the implementation of the Activity, the Cypriot authority reported a total of 238 incidents, as enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As follows: disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is Detections related to illegal immigration: not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. • 238 incidents of illegal border-crossing, involving 1 434 migrants. The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational • No people smugglers were arrested. area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to • 1 280 irregular migrants were detected inside the national territory (meaning they cross the green cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational line from the occupied areas to the territories under the effective control of the Government of areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of the Republic of Cyprus), while 4 irregular migrants were detected crossing the Green Line. play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their Cross-border crime: modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and • No incidents of smuggling of goods were reported. future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of Moreover, 407 travel and other identity documents were examined by the ALDO. Out of these documents, surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border 9 ID Cards were considered forged (Syrian and Cameroon ID Cards). crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection In addition, as a result of the extensive cooperation work of the Cypriot authority with Europol and Frontex, of the public interest as regards public security in the sense potential foreign fighters have been detected by the Cypriot authority, raising concerns about the impact of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No of illegal immigration on the security at the EU external borders. Nonetheless, these cases were not inserted 1049/2001 . as incidents in JORA. Commented [KB13]: Information cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop EU added value of the Activity risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and The added value of the Activity was reflected in the vital support provided to the migration management Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external activities and building the operational capacity of the Cypriot authority in light of the increased migratory borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially pressure in the island. those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Cooperation with the European Commission and other EU Agencies, such as EASO and Europol was enhanced Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public and further developed throughout the implementation of the Activity. interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 4.1.3. Operational coordination structures Commented [KB14]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers The operational coordination structures were established in accordance with the Specific Activity Plan. deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and The FP Nicosia situated in the premises of the Alien and Immigration Unit, in Nicosia played a key role in strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future the daily cooperation, allowing operational activities to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating the Specific Activity Plan. their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure The Cypriot authority appointed one FP Coordinator responsible for leading and coordinating the daily of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article operational activities to ensure the proper implementation of the Activity. 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . 12/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p12-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 13,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA A Cypriot TL was nominated to ensure the coordination of migration management support activities in the area, including document checks and debriefing activities. Commented [KB15]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers Regular meetings were organised between the FP coordinator, the TL and Frontex staff, in order to provide deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and information and updates on the latest incidents, findings and operational developments and to address any strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their particular operational challenge, thus contributing to the proper implementation of the operational effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future concept. similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Two rented mobile offices were deployed by Frontex to the Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the (Pournara), serving as premises for Frontex staff to perform their activities on the spot. public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 4.1.4. Resources deployed The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Human resources Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and During the Activity, a total number of 6 officers and 1 Interpreter were deployed by Frontex, amounting in capabilities of the equipment and would enable third total 698 deployment days. parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and Participating MSs: movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations • 1 Advanced-Level Document Officer / 143 deployment days are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit • 2 Debriefing Experts / 170 deployment days criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus • 1 Frontex Information Management Officer / 75 deployment days operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course • 1 Interpreter / 161 deployment days of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to • 2 Screening Experts / 149 deployment days counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would Assessment of capacity and performance of human resources undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of The FP coordinator was an experienced Cypriot officer who, as former head of the Cypriot NFPoC was highly Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. familiar with Frontex operational cycle and requirements, thus ensuring the effective implementation of The non-disclosed part contains detailed information the operational activities on spot. regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control [and/or coast guard duties]. The appointed TL was responsible of the coordination of migration management activities, including Disclosing such information would expose the working debriefing activities. Since the TL was not entirely dedicated to the Activity and had to attend concurrent methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border tasks, on occasion his availability to support the deployed Team Members, along with additional English crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it language communication difficulties, affected to some extent the integration of the deployed experts into would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed the overall migration processes (especially in the absence of an SOP for migration management activities). pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. In order to properly support the local authority and ensure the effective implementation of the operational activities, experienced sTMs with extensive knowledge were selected. Their experience proved valuable in assisting the local authority in managing the activities. The Screening experts, assisted by the Interpreter contributed to the establishment of the presumed nationality of the irregular migrants apprehended in Nicosia district after having crossed the buffer zone (green line) as well as those having arrived by boats directly from Turkey. However, the experts often did not have sufficient time to collect the necessary data to fill in the extensive screening form used by the national authority and, since an SOP in this regard was not established, the screening activities depended largely on the Team Leader’s guidance. In terms of debriefing activities, the collection of preliminary information after the disembarkation or apprehension of irregular migrants, supported the national efforts in terms of criminal investigations. The first Debriefing expert deployed by Frontex in the area was a highly experienced Greek Seconded Team Member, with extensive knowledge in irregular migration issue. The performance of the Greek Debriefing expert was highly valued by the Host MS since, apart from overcoming the language barrier he was able to use his skills and knowledge not only in collecting valuable information but also in familiarizing the local officers with the migration management practices implemented at the Greek hotspots. With the support of the Interpreter, the Debriefing experts assisted the local authority in collecting relevant operational information oriented towards the identification of migratory risks and threats in the area, along 13/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p13-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 14,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA with numerous evidences regarding the human smuggling networks. Valuable work was also done in terms Commented [KB16]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law of collection of information on a number of suspected Foreign Terrorist Fighters identified among the enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast irregular migrants arriving to Cyprus, which was reflected also in detailed landing reports provided by the guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Debriefing experts. thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In Nonetheless, the lack of an initial proper coordination during landings hampered the activity of the consequence, it would undermine the protection of the Debriefing experts. Moreover, due to the national procedures in place, the Debriefing experts were public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be requested by the national authority to focus mainly on Syrian nationals and their possible links to Foreign disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), aspect which reduced Frontex’s efforts in gaining a complete picture in terms of situational awareness on the island. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement These limitations were often mitigated by the OT through field visits, meetings and awareness sessions. officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the The OT and the Cypriot authority successfully addressed these challenges by allowing the Debriefing experts implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings to choose candidates, under the mentoring of the Cypriot TL and perform interviews with irregular migrants as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be of various nationalities. significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards The Debriefing experts cooperated closely with the Europol staff present on the spot in regards to the public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article detection former Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF). It should be highlighted that Cyprus faces significant 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . challenges regarding security since the share of ex-fighters from Syria targeting the island is relatively high. The information related to this variable is also used for the In light of the recent developments in the Syrian conflict, the number of ex-fighters and radicalised jihadists development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the arriving to Cyprus may increase in the future. intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and The deployment of the Arabic – Kurdish Interpreter was highly appreciated in the frame of the Activity due future operations. Being an important base for determining to his extensive support provided in both screening and debriefing activities. the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for The ALDO was deployed in the operational area to support the detection of forged / falsified documents in Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain possession of the irregular migrants arriving in Cyprus, reporting on a weekly basis throughout the insights into this decision making process and, with implementation of the Activity. The expert assisted in the examination of 407 travel and other identity ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the documents detecting 9 forged ID Cards (Syrian and Cameroon ID Cards). possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In The deployment of one FIMO was done in the mid-implementation period in order to address the JORA sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making-processes. As no overriding reporting challenges faced at local level. The FIMO provided trainings and constant guidance to the local public interest that is objective and general in nature and staff in terms of JORA reporting procedures. Considering the increased number of data reported in JORA, not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present his work provided significant added value in the framework of the Activity. case, information pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No The Frontex Support Officer for Logistics and Deployment deployed in the frame of JO Poseidon was 1049/2001. appointed to provide remote support for logistic related issues for the Operational Activities in Cyprus. The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational Technical Equipment area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex During the implementation of the Activity, Frontex deployed two fully equipped mobile offices at the operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia (Pournara), in order to ensure proper working conditions hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and for the deployed experts. prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information Some challenges were identified during the installation process of the mobile offices, due to the different would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first electric system used on the island. Therefore, even though the mobile officers were deployed on time, they indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. were not fully operational from the beginning of the JO. As a result, within 15 days from the effective deployment date, the Agency amended the contract and ensured the instalment of a second electrical line The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by inside the mobile offices. Due to further local technical requirements, the Electricity Authority of Cypriot Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information could not connect immediately the mobile offices to the Cypriot electric network, leaving them out-of-use would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third for a period of approximately 3 months. It should be highlighted that, the representatives of the Alien and parties, e.g. by combining this information with other Immigration Unit provided their full support in facilitating the process and, while the mobile offices were sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and not fully operational, an adequate office space was assigned to Frontex team members in the headquarters movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations of the Alien and Immigration Unit, in Nicosia. are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit Once operational, the mobile office were effectively used by the Frontex staff when performing activities criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus in the Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia. operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to ... 14/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p14-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 15,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4.2. Situational Awareness 4.2.1. Threats and Risks, modus operandi and trends identified Between 1 January and 31 December 2019, 7 730 irregular migrants arrived in Cyprus. This equates to a 66% increase compared to 2018, when 4 662 irregular migrant arrivals were reported. In terms of nationalities reported, 31% of the arrivals were Syrians, 15% Cameroonians, 12% Pakistanis and 12% Bangladeshis. In addition, a wide range of other nationalities (26%) were reported. The vast majority of irregular migrants arrived to the territories under the effective control of the Commented [KB17]: Information cannot be released as it Government of the Republic of Cyprus by crossing the green line from the occupied territories. Arrivals in refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Cyprus reached a peak in May and June, when Syrians could fly from Turkey directly to the occupied Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop territories. risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and The introduction of visas for Syrian nationals flying from Turkey to occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus, jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external led to a dramatic drop in the number of Syrians arriving. Constrained by the visa restrictions, smuggling borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially networks adapted to the new situation and started to promote trips via the sea route for Syrians. By the those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. end of 2019, all Syrians arriving to Cyprus travelled by boat, disembarking both on the occupied area and in Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this the territories under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused The routes from Syria to Turkey are the same as those used by Syrians heading to the Greek islands. The based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No main illegal immigration hub in Syria is Idlib and its vicinity (i.e. Bab Al Hawa and Khirbet Al Jawz) from 1049/2001. where they arrange their illegal border-crossing into Turkey. Once in Turkey, smugglers transport the The non-disclosed part contains detailed information irregular migrants in taxis, vans or trucks to Mersin and its districts. regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human Smuggling networks organise trips from Mersin to Cyprus, by boats or ferries. Smugglers usually disembark beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of the migrants in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus and return to Turkey. Regarding ferry trips, ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the there are two ferry companies operating daily from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus. Migrants usually activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their hide in containers or vehicles loaded onto the ferries. Once reaching the occupied area of the Republic of purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure Cyprus, migrants only have to cross the Green Line. From Lebanon to Cyprus, migrants travel by boats, would thus undermine the protection of the public interest which are usually bought by the migrants themselves. As a common practice, one of the migrants pays his as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . share by skippering the boat (no facilitation involved). The main points of departure from Lebanon are the beaches near Tripoli (i.e. Qalamoun beach). Boats from Lebanon usually head directly to Cyprus. Fees for crossing the Turkish-Syrian border range from USD 500 to 700 (same as the ones reported in JO Poseidon). In addition, migrants must pay USD 4 500-5 000 to reach the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus. Despite the high prices this is seen as a very popular route. For this reason, people smugglers continued to find alternatives for reaching Cyprus, despite the introduction of visas for Syrians. The efforts of the national authority, supported by Frontex and Europol resulted in the detection of a significant number of former foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). Cyprus faces significant challenges regarding security due to the relatively high share of ex-fighters from Syria targeting the island. In light of the recent developments in the Syrian conflict, the risk of ex-fighters and radicalised jihadists arriving to Cyprus may increase in the future. The rest of the nationalities arrived in Cyprus by plane. Even though there are some differences between the documents or modi operandi of different nationalities, approximately all of them arrive at Ercan airport, situated in the occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus from which they are facilitated across the Green Line. Cameroonians are facilitated by a specific network which seems to have connections with universities in the occupied territories. The smuggling network arranges fake university diplomas and academic records from Cameroonian universities to be used to obtain a student visa thus allowing them to get into the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus. The total smuggling fee (EUR 3 800) includes documents and all arrangements needed to reach the occupied territories. 15/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p15-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 16,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA As migrants tend to stay in Cyprus, local smuggling networks are continually developing new strategies. For Commented [KB18]: The non-disclosed part contains instance, marriages of convenience between Cameroonians (and other African migrants) and Romanian or detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants Bulgarian nationals (mainly of Romani ethnicity) or even Cypriot drug addicts were reported. and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a People-smuggling networks promote the route to Cyprus and provide detailed information about the hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed advantages, including the asylum procedure and other official support programs (i.e. that the Identification at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross- and registration procedures are fast, the asylum policy in Cyprus is favourable or that migrants are entitled border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border to a generous subsidy during the examination period and until the final decision on their asylum claim). crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the ----------- protection of the public interest as regards public security as It is expected that the number of irregular migrants arriving in Cyprus from Syria, Cameroon and/or other laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . African countries, as well as from Pakistan and Bangladesh will increase, as there are well established criminal networks organising the illegal travel and stay of these nationalities in Cyprus. 4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange Operational reporting and information exchange During the Activity, constant information gathering and monitoring of the situational picture was provided, using standardized reporting forms and channels. The deployment of human resources in the frame of the Activity enabled the collection of operational -- Commented [KB19]: The non-disclosed part contains information and intelligence through operational reports, providing overviews on the daily and weekly detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast activities performed on spot, however, with inherent difficulties. guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Thus, some challenges were experience when collecting the overall statistical data through the operational thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- reports, in particular for the daily activity reports regarding the migration situation on the island (total border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the number of migrants detected, total number of asylum claims, etc.) since the information made available by public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be the Cypriot authority was centralised and updated only on a monthly basis. disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. At the same time, the data provided in the screening reports reflected only the information available as a result of the screening interviews performed by the Frontex deployed experts, which was occasionally The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement hampered by the national focus mainly on Syrians by the authorities. officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the During the implementation of the Activity, there were no Fronted Document Alerts issued, mostly due to ---------- implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus the low-quality of the forgeries detected. facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be Debriefing and landing reports were produced by the Debriefing expert. The deployment of an experienced significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards Debriefing expert resulted in high qualitative information gathered through debriefing and landing reports. public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . Based on the information collected through the operational reports, RAU issued analytical findings and recommendations related to the resources deployed. The document was uploaded to FOSS and disseminated among the participants in the JO. Reporting of personal data related to suspects of crime The collection of personal data was carried out using the standardized JORA reporting templates. Personal data were processed and transmitted to Europol in accordance with the process defined within the Specific Activity Plan. During the implementation of the Activity, Frontex transferred to Europol a total of 31 personal data packages containing personal data, related to 64 suspects of migrant smuggling and 49 means of communication, however, the transmitted data generated 0 hits within the Europol databases. Reporting in JORA JORA was used to report operational information within the Activity, making use of a standardized Incident Report. 16/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p16-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 17,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA The Activity in JORA along with the incident template for the data collection were created and used but significant challenges were experienced in regards to reporting in JORA throughout the implementation of Commented [KB20]: The non-disclosed part contains the Activity. detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast One specific issue was that an intermediate validation level for incidents, equivalent for “JORA ICC level”, guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the was not assigned by the Cypriot authority. As a temporary solution, FSC was assigned to validate the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- incidents from the \"JORA ICC\" level. In addition, significant delays were recorded on the local level border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In validation of debriefing reports, averaging at 40 days. These delays can be largely attributed to the lack consequence, it would undermine the protection of the of staff allocated for the validation of debriefing interviews at the local level. public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of At the same time challenges were raised due to the lack of consistency in reporting data in JORA, since Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. most of the data reported in the frame of the JO was based on the incidents detected only within Nicosia The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related district, while information from other districts was not systematically reported. This resulted in to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal discrepancies revealed when comparing the JORA data with the information available via FRAN. The activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the information inserted in JORA was also, at times, incomplete and not always satisfactory, especially the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus information related to migrants’ nationalities, places of departure and results from the screening activities. facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be In order to address these specific challenges, the Cypriot authority was asked to provide information significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards regarding the detections of all irregular migrants using an excel file template provided by Frontex. On the public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article mid-term, Frontex and the Cypriot authority agreed on, and delivered, training for several local JORA 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. officers from each of each reporting station. Starting with 15 November 2019, a Frontex Information Management Officers (FIMO) was deployed in the operational area to further support the local officers with JORA reporting. As a result, the Cypriot authority started delivering data to the FIMO, on a monthly basis. Thus, significant improvements in terms of JORA reporting were noted since in November 2019, 66% of the monthly data had been reported in JORA; 88% in December 2019 and 80% in January 2020. During the Activity, remote support in regard to JORA application was also provided by JORA Product & Service Management from Information Fusion Centre (IFC). Enquiries related to Incident Template or validation of incidents were timely directed to relevant units within the Agency. Frontex-One-Stop-Shop (FOSS) During the implementation of the Activity, FOSS was used as the main platform for sharing operational- related information between all participants involved. Serious incidents reporting (FSC - overview) FSC was responsible to provide a prompt response on serious incidents, based on information received through JORA, operational reports and open source information, however, during the implementation of the Activity, no Serious Incident Reports (SIR) were reported. 4.3. Development 4.3.1. Operational cooperation Cooperation between Hosting and Participating MS The cooperation between hosting and participating MS was performed on a very good level. The participating MS showed a strong level of commitment in supporting the implementation of the Activity and reached the required flexibility in case of urgent needs. The host MS demonstrated strong commitment in hosting the Activity and the deployed experts, along with high flexibility and dedication in addressing any challenges raised during the implementation of the Operational Activities in Cyprus. 17/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p17-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 18,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations The cooperation with the Commission, EASO and Europol has been developed as follows: Commented [KB21]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law • The European Commission: The Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs of the enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the European Commission (DG HOME) deployed a staff member in Nicosia, to support the Cypriot working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, authority in migration management activities, with whom Frontex has maintained regular contact thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- and worked in close cooperation on the ground. A working Group (WG) reuniting representatives border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the from Frontex, EASO and Europol was also established under the coordination of the European public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be Commission, to support the Cypriot Authority in developing an SOP for first reception capacities disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. and procedures in Cyprus, with Frontex providing specific technical support in drafting the document. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement • EASO: The commonly developed tool on access to asylum procedures (guide, booklets, leaflets officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal and posters) was published on Frontex website, presented to the participants and distributed to activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus the operational areas. The representatives of both Agencies met regularly at the deployment sites facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings and exchanged information. In addition, an EASO representative attended regularly the Frontex as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would operational briefings organised on spot in order to present the mandate of EASO and the activities undermine the protection of the public interest as regards implemented on spot. public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. • Europol: Cyprus has been hosting Europol guest officers since April 2019, in order to assist the national authority in secondary checks of irregular migrants arriving on the island. In this regard, the ALDO and Debriefing expert deployed by Frontex cooperated intensely with Europol representatives, exchanging information in accordance with the Specific Activity Plan. Frontex transmitted to Europol all operational personal data received from the Cypriot authority. In 2019, Europol provided Frontex with limited information related to the cross-border crime threats affecting the operational area of Operational Activities in Cyprus 2019. Europol shared with Frontex weekly intelligence notifications that contained mostly basic information about migrant smuggling events detected and reported by Europol. Europol representative attended regularly the Frontex operational briefings organised on spot, presenting the mandate and the activities of the Europol officers in the area. In addition, Frontex in close cooperation with Europol, initiated the development of a set of joint advices for daily cooperation, which is expected to be finalised on 2020. Cooperation with Third Countries Cooperation with Third Countries was not foreseen during the implementation of the Activity. Frontex coordination role The Operational Team (OT) was composed of members from Field Deployment Unit, as follows: 1 Senior Commented [KB22]: The non-disclosed parts contain Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO) and 1 Operational Manager (OM) from Operational Planning and information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information Evaluation Sector (OPES) and 1 FCO and 1 OM from Operational Implementation Sector (OIS). would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their The team was completed by the Operational Analyst (OA) and the Debriefing Advisor (DA) from Risk Analysis effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future Unit. similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Moreover, staff from the Operational Divisional Support Office supported the overall financial management unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the of the Activity. public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. The OM from OPES was responsible for the overall planning, monitoring and evaluation of the Activity, occasionally visiting the operational area in order to assess the situation on spot from the planning perspective, while the OM from OIS was responsible for the implementation of the Activity, according to the provisions of the Specific Activity Plan. The FCO (OIS) ensured the implementation of the Activity through constant cooperation with the host MS, occasionally travelling to Cyprus, in order to facilitate the communication with the national authority, 18/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p18-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 19,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA maintaining links with the local officers and addressing particular challenges faced during the ongoing operational activities. Commented [KB23]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers OA monitored the performance of the debriefing and screening activities and issued an analytical product, deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and presenting analytical findings and making recommendations related to the resources deployed, aiming to strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their enhance the operational results. effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating During the implementation of the Activity, the Operational Analyst have been in regular contact with the their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and debriefing and screening experts, the FIMO and the TL, actively cooperating, advising and guiding the unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the participants in regard the information gathering and reporting. Moreover, the TMs have been also briefed public interest as regards public security as laid down Article on specific topics by the OA and the DA, via regular video-conferences. 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing Four operational briefings were provided to all participants of the Activity, during the first day of the deployment, by Frontex and the Host MS representatives. All participants were debriefed at the end of their deployments, at local level, either by the FCO or the FP coordinator. The report from participant also facilitated to obtain feedback from the deployed experts. EASO and Europol representatives complemented the Frontex operational briefings by providing up-to-date information on their activities in the area, thus maintaining the awareness of the agencies’ mandates and responsibilities in the island. 5. Main conclusions and recommendations Conclusions Recommendations Supporting Response Commented [KB24]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Via the established Focal Point in Cyprus, Frontex The Activity should continue to be implemented in enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the provided operational and technical support, 2020. working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, including operational capacity building to Cyprus. thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the Considering the dynamic of the migration situation For the upcoming operational year, any additional public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be in the islands, there is a need for a flexible deployment of resources should be based on the disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of approach in terms of increasing the hosting evolution of the operational situation in the area. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. capacity of the Host MS. Insufficient knowledge of the situation in the area Close cooperation with the Host MS to be lead to a challenging and difficult planning process, maintained throughout the planning and considering also that no operational framework has implementation process, in order to expand the been developed prior to the implementation of the operational framework according to the actual JO. needs and address any potential challenges. All the experts were redeployed from other JO, due To ensure a sufficient level of participation in the to the very tight timeframe for setting up the Activity, via the regular operational planning cycle. Activity. The deployment of experienced sTMs provided To guarantee a minimum level of sTMs deployment constructive support to the local authorities, in the area, in order to effectively support the Host particularly in terms of gaining knowledge on MS authority, in terms of operational knowledge Frontex operational procedures. and exchange of best practices. 19/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p19-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 20,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA The lack of an SOP for the migration management The SOP currently under development, under the activities led to the challenging practical coordination of the European Commission and in implementation of the Activity. close cooperation with the EU Agencies present in the area, should be put into force as soon as possible, in order to effectively manage the migration related process in the island. The nominated TL was not fully dedicated to the Cypriot authority should assign a permanent English operational activity, facing high workloads and speaking Team Leader, fully dedicated for the subsequent language communication issues, which coordination of the operational activities on spot. affected the integration of the deployed experts in the migration management process. In order to expand the hosting capacity, the Frontex to continue the deployment of two fully Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia furnished mobile offices in the Temporary (Pournara) underwent extensive reconstruction Reception Centre, in order to provide adequate works which generated certain difficulties in terms working conditions for the deployed experts. of working conditions for the deployed experts. Even though 9 forged documents were detected CED to contribute to the operational briefings and during the implementation of the Activity, Frontex perform operational field visits on spot, in order to Document Alert were not produced, mostly due to guide and provide specific information to the deployed ALDOs. In case of fraudulent detected the low quality of the forgeries. documents, Frontex Document Alert should be produce, in order to report the type and quality of the forgery as well as Modus operandi cases. Situational Awareness Commented [KB25]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law The information inserted in JORA was incomplete To monitor, advise and support Cyprus authority on enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the and not always satisfactory, especially the JORA reporting. The FIMO should compare the data working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, information related to migrants’ nationalities, inserted in JORA with the actual irregular migrants’ thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In place of departure and results from the screening arrivals. Cypriot authority should continue to send consequence, it would undermine the protection of the activities, which hampered the analysis of the to RAU the data in the excel format, as collected public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be data. Efforts from both Frontex and the Cypriot and reported in FRAN. This will allow the OA to disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. authority notably improved the reporting in JORA. double check the data reported in JORA. However, it was still not sufficient enough to get a The information related to this variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific complete situational picture. form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing Cypriot authority concentrated their efforts on The Cypriot authority should continue using best activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and debriefing Syrian migrants thus affecting the practises for debriefing activities, such as future operations. Being an important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to process of selective the participants for the supporting the Debriefing experts on conducting conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for debriefing interviews. After the mid- interviews, allowing Debriefing experts to choose Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain implementation period, however, the debriefing candidates and conduct interviews with flexibility, insights into this decision making process and, with experts were given complete access to the allowing them to prepare other situational reports ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the migrants and were able to conduct interviews in a such as landing reports and monthly debriefing possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In flexible manner. reports. sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making-processes. As no overriding The flexibility of Cyprus authority in implementing The implementation of landing reports, which is public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for information collection in different reports (i.e. considered a best practice, should continue in the the release of this information is ascertainable in the present landing reports) resulted in high quality and framework of the Activity. case, information pertaining to this variable cannot be relevant information collected. released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The total number of interviews reported in PeDRa During the operational period, the Cypriot (43) should be further increased in 2020, by authority transmitted to Frontex a total of 43 20/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p20-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 21,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA debriefing reports via JORA and nearly 70% of deploying Debriefing experts with wide experience them contained personal data. This represents the in information collection. highest percentage of interviews containing personal data from all Frontex joint operations where debriefing activities are implemented. The personal data collected during debriefing The collection of personal data must be expanded Commented [KB26]: The non-disclosed part contains interviews and transmitted to Frontex, allowed the beyond the debriefing activities, in order for detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast Agency to develop a better understanding of the Frontex to develop a wide and deep understanding guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the criminal organisations involved in migrant of the cross-border crime threats affecting the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- smuggling. This knowledge was used for risk operational area. border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In analysis purposes and translated into an improved consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be operational response. disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Even though several cases of persons suspected of RAU to provide further awareness sessions and being FTF were detected, there were no incidents additional workshops dedicated on FTF reporting. The information related to this variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific inserted in JORA in this regard. As such, the data form of internal decision-making processes based on the extracted from JORA did not reflected a complete intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing and accurate picture in terms of operational activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an important base for determining results. the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for Long delays in the validation and transmission to The Cypriot authority should assign the roles of Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain Frontex of debriefing interviews had a negative “team leader” and “intelligence officer” for insights into this decision making process and, with impact on the Frontex risk analysis by generating validating purposes to more than one person. ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the difficulties in assessing and describing the ongoing possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In situation on the Eastern Mediterranean. sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making-processes. As no overriding The language barrier especially when it comes to To consideration the possibility of co-financing 1 public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the facilitation of the reporting process was FIMO from the home MS, in the framework of the the release of this information is ascertainable in the present considered one of the negative factors in managing Activity that could efficiently support the local case, information pertaining to this variable cannot be the overall flow on information. staff in terms of JORA reporting. released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Development Taking into consideration the challenges faced in Workshops and targeted trainings addressing the implementation of the Operational Activities in various issues in terms of migration management Cyprus, Host MS in-depth familiarization with and Frontex operational practices, should be Frontex operational practices and procedures is organised at local level for the participants in the essential in achieving high operational results. Activity. The coordination of operational activities on spot from the OT should be maintained and enhanced when needed. Although the implementation of the Operational Staff exchange activities to be planned in Activities in Cyprus contributed to building on the accordance with the availability of the Cypriot operational capacity of the Host MS, still further authority and the hosting capacities of Italy under steps need to be taken in order to develop and JO Themis and Greece under JO Poseidon, in Staff implement best practices. Exchange Activities for 2020, in order to gain first- hand knowledge on migration management activities implemented in other JO. 21/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p21-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 22,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 1. Time schedule Planning meeting with Host MS 23/07/2019 Operational briefing for the participants In first days of each deployment Commented [KB27]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Implementation of the joint operation 14/08/2019 – 29/01/2020 enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Evaluation meeting (All-in-one) 27/11/2019 thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be 2. Participation disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 2.1. Participating MS resources Commented [KB28]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information Participating MS Human resources Number of Total would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and officers man-days strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future - GRC (Hellenic Coast Guard) Debriefing expert similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating I1 85 ■ their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Frontex Information Management unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure GRC (Hellenic Police) I1 75 Officer ■ of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article • 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. (NLD) IND Immigration & -■ Interpreter I1 161 Naturalisation Service • -- (POL) Border Guard Advanced Level Document Officer I1 143 (ROU) General Inspectorate for Screening Expert I1 63 Immigration ■ (ROU) General Inspectorate for Debriefing Expert I1 85 Immigration ■ (SVN) Ministry of the Interior - Police Screening Expert I1 86 ■ 2.2. Frontex owned / leased / co-owned technical equipment Technical equipment No TE / Asset-days Commented [KB29]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in Container/mobile office (rented equipment) 2 350 the operational area by Frontex and Member States. I • Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment In addition to the two mentioned containers, the Agency delivered also light technical equipment to the and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions area, as listed below: regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment -•• used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information Light Technical equipment No TE / Asset-days - would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in Laptop plus Data SIM Card I6 1050 hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of Printer I2 350 such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the Shredder I2 350 disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment • deployed would undermine the protection of the public Compact document inspection equipment I2 350 interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Mobile phone plus SIM Card I3 • 525 22/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p22-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 23,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 3. Financial information Focal Point concept and JO Focal Points Sea Cyprus 2019 – budget Approved/Estimated on Source of data Amount Approved on 26 September 2019 Activity Initiation and Financial Commitment for 5,727,827.53 € Focal Points concept Estimated on 20 February 2020 JO Focal Points Sea Cyprus 2019 Estimated 162,832.00 € Operational Budget * The amounts are reflecting the state of financial settlements with MS/SAC and Third Countries on 20 February 2020 4. Statistics Figure 1: Monthly number of migrant arrivals to Cyprus (by sea or thought the Green Line) in 2019 compared to 2018. (Figures based on FRAN data). 1,000 ■ Green line 2018 900 800 700 600 SOO 400 300 200 100 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV OEC Figure 2: Total number of arrivals in Cyprus in 2019 compared to 2018. Main nationalities. 1111 8 000 7 000 6 000 5 000 4000 3 000 2 000 1000 0 2018 2019 23/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p23-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 24,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Figure 3: Initial insertion of incidents into JORA The reporting performance shown below measures the timely transmission of operational data to Frontex: the time from the occurrence of an incident until insertion into JORA, validation on national level and acceptance by FSC. The timeframe given is 24 hours (1 day). During the operational phase 238 incidents were reported in JORA. Number of incidents Reportin1:1 in 12!J.·In / Out ■ 1 day ■ 1 day - 1 week ■ 1 week - 2 weeks ■ Over 2 weeks Figure 4: Intermediate validation on national level (LCC/ICC) Reportin1:1 in l.R.!.1.- In / Out ■ 1 day ■ 1 day - 1 week ■ 1 week· 2 weeks ■ Over 2 weeks Figure 5: Summary of the entire reporting sequence, from insertion until FSC validation Reportingi n!Qu.• I n/Out ■ 1 d1y 1 d■y - 1 w e.e.k ■ 1w ■■ k·Zw ■■ k ■ ■ Ove. r 2 w eeks 24/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p24-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 25,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Figure 6: Summary of documents examined per month Figure 7: Documents detected with fraud Commented [KB30]: The information related to this variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous Number of Documents Examined Documents examined and detected with Fraud and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an 279 important base for determining the strategic orientation of 156 the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without 128 interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its 128 mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would 80 enable third parties to gain insights into this decision making process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in 6 3 depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses 26 17 N.Docs Examined N. Docs Detected with Fraud wholly independently, free from any external pressure or 0 third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making- Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 2020 2019 Jan-20 processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present case, information Figure 8: Passports examined in 2019 per nationality pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Passports Nationality Examined in 2019 61 46 28 24 14 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 ARM BGD CMR EGY IND HTI IRN IRQ LBN NGA PAK SYR YEM Figure 9: Summary of type of documents examined Nationality ID Cards Examined in 2019 Supporting Document Examined in 2019 51 8 32 6 1 1 1 SYR PAK NIG LBN CMR SYR IRQ 2020 - Type of Documents Examined 2020 - Documents examined 71 57 63 33 9 3 2 2 6 5 3 0 Passports ID Cards SYR IRN BGD PAK CMR Passports ID Cards 25/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p25-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 26,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4. List of acronyms Abbreviation Spelling A ALDO Advanced-Level Document Officer C D DSR Daily Situation Report E EASO European Asylum Support Office EU European Union F FCO Frontex Coordinating Officer FER Frontex Evaluation Report FIMO Frontex Information Management Officer FLO Frontex Liaison Officer FOSS Frontex-One-Stop-Shop FP Focal Point FSC Frontex Situation Centre FRO Fundamental Rights Officer Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency H HR Human resources I IFC Information Fusion Centre J JO Joint Operation M MS Member State N NFPOC National Frontex Point of Contact O OA Operational Analyst OIS Operational Implementation Sector OM Operational Manager OPES Operational Planning and Evaluation Sector Opera Operational Resources Management System OPLAN Operational Plan OT Operational Team P PeDRA Personal Data for Risk Analysis R RAU Risk Analysis Unit S SAC Schengen Associated Countries SAP Specific Activity Plan SI Serious Incident SIR Serious Incident Reporting SOP Standard Operating Procedure T TE Technical Equipment TL Team Leader TM Team Members sTM Teams Members seconded to the Agency W WG Working Group 26/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p26-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 27,
"content": "LIMITED S FRONTEX Ill EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY II. Evaluation of Specific Activity Multipurpose Maritime Operation in the Black Sea JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p27-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 28,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Contents 1. Background information 29 2. Achievement of objectives 32 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices 35 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 35 5. Implementation of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 41 6. Main conclusions and recommendations 42 FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 44 1. Time schedule 44 2. Participation 44 3. Financial information 45 4. List of acronyms 46 28/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p28-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 29,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 1. Background information The Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea (JO) Sea is the platform for the implementation of specific and independent activities covered by the mandate of European Border and Coast Guard Regulation in specific and distinct maritime areas (Focal Points). The Multipurpose Maritime Operation in the Black Sea (MMO Black Sea 2019) was implemented under the Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea. 1.1. Brief risk assessment The efficient cooperation between the countries in the Black Sea, in particular between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey allows for cooperation and information sharing between the participating countries. Although the cooperation at operational level related to maritime safety and security issues is effective in the Black Sea, the political situation turns to be precarious. Following the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the failed coup in Turkey, the political situation in the Black Sea basin has become challenging. Commented [KB31]: The information related to this variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, Migratory flows in the Black Sea which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous Since 2018, the Western and Eastern Mediterranean routes have been the most important entry points for and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an migrants to the EU. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the sea route from Turkey to the Greek Islands is the important base for determining the strategic orientation of most active route with over 33 000 irregular migrants in 2018, and almost 6 000 in the first quarter of 2019, the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without whereas the Black Sea route remains inactive. interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would According to Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) data, the Black Sea route was inactive in 2018 and 2019. enable third parties to gain insights into this decision making process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in In 2017, several incidents related to illegal immigration were reported in the Black Sea by Romanian and depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses Turkish authorities. Romanian authorities reported six boats involving 537 irregular migrants, most of them wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information nationals from Iraq (495), and to a lesser extent from Iran (35) and Pakistan (3). In several cases, the Turkish would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making- criminal networks used fishing vessels and passenger motor boats to smuggle migrants from Turkey to processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective Romania and Bulgaria. The detections were reported between August and November, most probably due to and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this the difficult sailing conditions in the Black Sea, in particular during winter. Therefore, the smuggling of information is ascertainable in the present case, information migrants across the Black Sea is mostly related to seasonality and requires the availability of seaworthy pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. vessels. Despite low overall figures in the Black Sea, this route should be taken into consideration with regards The non-disclosed part contains detailed information ----■------ migratory flows from Turkey, as Turkey remains the main transit country for migration, with a high number regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved of migrants stranded in this country. in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of As occurred in previous years, criminal networks based in Turkey are frequently testing new migration ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the routes, and one alternative route is across the Black Sea. The Black Sea route remains an alternative route activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their to the Eastern Mediterranean, although the likelihood and vulnerability levels in the Black Sea basin are purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure low. The current Eurosur Impact Level Assessment (March 2019) assessed the sea border sections in Bulgaria would thus undermine the protection of the public interest and Romania as low level. as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . Cross-Border Crime & Unlawful Activities Smuggling of drugs Concerning the maritime cross-border crimes in Bulgaria and Romania, the smuggling of drugs is one of the main activities of concern. The level of risk related to smuggling of drugs in the current operational area is assessed as low/moderate, in particular the smuggling of cocaine and heroin. To a lesser extent, the precursors are also of interest as several cases of precursors arriving from China were reported. Although, there is a well-functioning maritime surveillance and coordination systems in Bulgaria and Romania, which mitigates the chance of undetected crossings, the unknown figure concerning undetected cases of smuggling of drugs is estimated as high. 29/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p29-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 30,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA In March and April 2019, dozens of packages of cocaine were detected floating in the Black Sea. The amount of cocaine seized until April is estimated over 1.5 tons. According to the national authorities most of those Commented [KB32]: The non-disclosed part contains packages could be part of a one single cocaine shipment that lost the merchandise after capsizing. detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would In the last two years, some global assessments issued by international organizations that monitor the world jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a drug markets have pointed out the increase in the drug trafficking across the Black Sea. In particular, the hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed use of the ports in Romania as the entry point of drugs into Europe, and later the transport through the at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross- Balkan route. According to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) - border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border European Drug Report 2018, the largest quantities of drug seized were reported in: Bulgaria (heroin and crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as amphetamines), and Romania (cocaine). laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . Despite low overall figures in the amount of drug seized in Bulgaria and Romania in 2018, it is worth mentioning that in previous years some cargo vessels travelling from South-America were reported. For example, in 2016 a cargo of bananas from Colombia with over 2.5 tons of cocaine was seized in the port of Constanta. The smuggling of cocaine and heroin has also been reported by other countries in the Black Sea Region. According to open sources, in March 2019, Ukrainian authorities reported in the port of Odessa, the interception of a banana shipment from South America and the seizure of 257 Kg of cocaine. Smuggling of other types of illicit goods Other types of illicit goods smuggled reported in the Black Sea region are mainly: cigarettes, tobacco, stolen vehicles (full car) and counterfeit objects, In addition, there are many cases of undeclared goods. The number of detections decreased in 2018 compared to previous year. Most of the products are smuggled by container ships, which represents a high threat due to the large number of containers transported and the challenge to inspect a sufficient percentage of them. Concerning cigarette smuggling, in 2018, the number of cases at the Romanian sea borders was higher than - the previous years, whereas the number of pieces seized (over 2.6 million pieces) was lower than in 2017 (almost 20 million pieces). Most of the smugglers involved in the smuggling of cigarettes are Romanian nationals. In 2018, the number of cigarettes seized in Bulgaria sea borders was over 2 million pieces, which represents a decrease compared to previous year. The neighboring countries to the Black Sea with high risk related to smuggling of cigarettes are Greece, Ukraine, Turkey and Georgia. Unlawful activities The continuous increase in the maritime traffic of cargo ships increases the environmental pollution in this region. The oil pollution threatens the Black Sea coastal ecosystems and impacts on the fishing sector. In this regard it is worth mentioning the shipping jam reported in February 2019 in the Bosporus Strait. The waiting time to cross the Strait has increased from 5-6 days up to 16 days, which generates long queues of merchant vessels. A special threat comes from the large number of petrol tankers crossing the Black Sea, mostly carrying Russian oil. The Black Sea is one of the world's busiest waterways, with an estimated annual number of 55 000 ships (e.g. almost 6 000 oil tankers transiting through the Bosporus Strait on yearly basis). In addition to the regular merchant shipping, environmental crimes are reported in the region, such as the dumping of solid waste, waste oil, trash and grey water, and oil spills. Concerning the threat of oil spilling in the Black Sea, it is worth mentioning some of the latest incidents occurred in the eastern part of this sea basin. In January 2019, two oil tankers went on fire while bunkering outside Russian territorial waters (see figure 3). These two tankers were burning for more than a month, and as a result of the fatal accident several fatalities were reported. According to open sources, the Russian authorities initiated an administrative violation case. 30/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p30-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 31,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA In October 2018, a vessel loaded with scrap metal sank in the Black Sea (~50 miles from the Bulgarian coast), most probably due to a cargo displacement. According to open sources, the Bulgarian authorities took seawater sample to investigate if there is a case of oil spilling after the accident. Blacklisted flag vessels The blacklisted flag vessels (BLV) not only pose safety concerns due to the identified safety deficiencies but also pose security concerns. BLVs have been involved in 22.3% of the maritime illicit activities detected worldwide over the past four years, although they comprise only 1.1% of the world’s fleet population. Thus, BLVs can have a major impact on EU security through their links to countries and their ports where they make port calls. The number of port calls as well as their geographical distribution is therefore relevant when describing these vessels and in combination with other risk indicators. As a result of studying the pattern of port calls made by BLVs in Europe in 2018 (January to December), it was found that 844 BLVs (mostly cargo vessels) made at least one port call in Europe. By breaking the list of port calls down further, it can be seen that the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea were more exposed to cargo BLVs’ visits, being Romania the first in all Europe with over 1 600 port calls, while Bulgaria was the tenth with 700 (see figure 4). However, not even the ports of the same country were affected homogenously. For instance, three seaports in Romania registered over 90% of the ports calls made by BLVs in 2018: Constanta (57%), Sulina (17%), and Navodari (16%), while other Romanian ports were less exposed, such as Braila and Tulcea. In Bulgaria the main three seaports were Varna, Burgas and Balchic. 1.2. Specific Operational aim The specific operational aim was the implementation of coordinated multiagency multipurpose maritime operational activities (MMO) at the EU external sea borders focused on combating illegal immigration, illegal fishing activities and marine pollution by providing relevant coast guard functions related services to Bulgarian and Romanian Border Police as well as Eurosur Fusion Services (EFS) and Maritime Analysis Tools in order to support risk and intelligence analysis and to provide and enhanced situation awareness. The MMO Black Sea 2019 was focused on the implementation of the following Coast Guard functions: • Border surveillance at sea, including support to Search and Rescue (SAR); • Fisheries control by surveillance and joint checks following European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) Black Sea Joint Deployment Plan (JDP); • Environmental protection. 1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas 1.3.1. Period of implementation Commencement 7 May 2019 12:00 (local time) Termination 15 June 2019 24:00 (local time) 1.3.2. Operational areas Operational activities were conducted in Romanias and Bulgaria’s territorial sea, contiguous zones and Economic Exclusive Zones) with the following coordinates: 31/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p31-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 32,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA ID Op. AreaI IY IX Latitude Longitude ■ I - 1-- Commented [KB33]: The non-disclosed parts refer to - details of the operational area and cannot be released. As IA MMO Black Sea 2019 45.149444 29.959444 45 08 58.0N 029 57 34.0E ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as IB MMO Black Sea 2019 45.088889 30.039167 45 05 20.0N 030 02 21.0E the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to IC MMO Black Sea 2019 45.055 30.156667 45 03 18.0N 030 09 24.0E disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, ID MMO Black Sea 2019 44.777222 30.976944 44 46 38.0N 030 58 37.0E enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would IE MMO Black Sea 2019 44.736944 31.174167 44 44 13.0N 031 10 27.0E ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature IF MMO Black Sea 2019 44.678889 31.194167 44 40 44.0N 031 11 39.0E would be hampered by depriving the operations of any - - IG MMO Black Sea 2019 44.048056 31.409722 44 02 53.0N 031 24 35.0E strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and IH MMO Black Sea 2019 43.600923 31.361356 43 36 03.3N 031 21 40.9E unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the II MMO Black Sea 2019 42.8 30.75 42 48 00.0N 030 45 00.0E protection of the public interest as regards public security in IJ MMO Black Sea 2019 42.116667 29 ■ 42 07 00.0N 029 00 00.0E the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . IK MMO Black Sea 2019 41.997778 28.323889 41 59 52.0N 028 19 26.0E IL MMO Black Sea 2019 41.981111 28.040278 41 58 52.0N 028 02 25.0E 1.4. Participants The MMO Black Sea 2019 was hosted by Bulgaria and Romania. Commented [KB34]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers In total, six national authorities dealing with coast guard functions (Frontex, EFCA and EMSA communities) deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and participated for the operational activities and SAR workshops. strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future 19 maritime and aerial assets and its crews took part in the operation. Five experts were deployed in the similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating International Coordination Centre established in Frontex premises and in Bulgaria and Romania. - their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure Two Ukrainian observers attended the SAR activities implemented within the MMO Black Sea 2019. of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article During the SAR workshop implemented in Constanta, a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . (UNHCR) from Romania representative attended as observer. The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and 1.5. Financial information capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other A budget of 193,789.87 EUR was allocated by Frontex for the implementation of Multipurpose Maritime sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as Operation in the Black Sea. numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course 2. Achievement of objectives of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information • Enhance border security - Carrying out maritime border surveillance in order to detect, identify and regarding the technical equipment deployed would intercept the suspicious objects of interest and persons within the operational area, to prevent undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of unauthorized border crossings, also taking into account that some situations may involve humanitarian Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . emergencies and distress situations at sea; Contribute to preventing and detecting crime with a cross- border dimension, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings as well as reporting other illegal activities detected to the competent authorities; Fostering MS operational structures (FP Sea). Achieved During the MMO Black Sea 2019 there were no incidents related to illegal migration. High level of technical and operational support and assistance to maritime border surveillance was provided by 19 surveillance means deployed in the MMO, especially by the deployment of the Frontex MAS FWA which 32/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p32-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 33,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA performed 154 border surveillance missions (133 maritime and 21 aerial) with a total of 2553:26 running hours (2475:51 maritime assets and 77:35 aerial asset). Commented [KB35]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to • Technical and operational assistance in SAR - As a part of joint maritime operations concept assist disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this MS respective authorities in conducting search and rescue operations in order to render assistance to information with other sources, to draw conclusions persons found in distress at sea, whenever and wherever so required. regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment Achieved: used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information The operational coordination structures were created in accordance with the Operational Plan (OPLAN) and would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to can be considered as generally effective, however, the ICC staff should be increased (by nominating an ICC change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a coordinator (Frontex staff) and deploying an European Coast Guard Functions Officer (ECGFO) to support similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of the ICC coordinator) and Frontex presence in the Focal Points Burgas and Constanta as well (by deploying such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the ECGFO in the FP Sea Burgas and Constanta in order to cover the entire implementation period). disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public Two SAR incidents occurred inside operational area with 6 persons rescued (1 BGR fishing boat and 1 UK interest as regards public security in the sense of Article sailing yacht). SAR cases were not linked to illegal immigration. 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . Commented [KB36]: The non-disclosed parts refer to Deployed assets were always ready to assist during SAR incidents when required by the competent Maritime details of the operational area and cannot be released. As Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to • Support MS on carrying out coast guard functions - Establish and enhance cooperation with European disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, Fishery Control Agency (EFCA) and European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and with the national enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would authorities carrying out coast guard functions responsible for maritime safety, security, search and ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature rescue, fisheries control, customs control, general law enforcement and environmental protection, would be hampered by depriving the operations of any to increase maritime situational awareness and to support coherent and cost-efficient action; Provide, strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their in cooperation with EFCA and EMSA, services, information, equipment and training; To produce purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of common risk analysis involving EFCA, EMSA and Frontex for emerging risks at maritime domain. documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Partly Achieved: 1049/2001 . Cooperation was established between Frontex EMSA and EFCA (nomination of dedicated Liaison Officers) for the practical implementation of coast guard functions at sea. Total inspections of fishing vessels/boats: 121; Joint patrols with EFCA community (BGR and ROU national fisheries control authorities): 14; EFCA had access to BGR and ROU border police/coast guard planning of the assets in real time. Commented [KB37]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law EFCA attended as observer to the SAR workshop in ROU and one boat from BGR National fisheries control enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the authority was involved in the SAR workshop in BGR. EMSA community was involved for the both SAR working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, workshops following the invitation from BGR and ROU border police, not from EMSA. thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In The cooperation between Frontex and EMSA was implemented within the use of Eurosur Fusion Services consequence, it would undermine the protection of the (EFS) to improve the common maritime situational picture. public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Operational cooperation with EFCA and EMSA, and respective communities’ needs to be enhanced in order Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. to achieve stronger synergies and EFCA/EMSA communities should be involved in the MMO from the planning The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to implementation phase. to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal No common (EFCA, EMSA and Frontex) risk analysis regarding emerging risks in the maritime domain were activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus delivered but separate risk analysis were provided by the EU Agencies. From Frontex side, MIC-RAN team facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings provided support with 14 Brief Analytical Reports and one Black Sea area of Interest Analysis Report; as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article • Enhance operational cooperation - High level of MS participation in the operational activities; 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . Enhanced cooperation between the national authorities of the host MS as well as on an international 33/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p33-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 34,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA level; Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations in the frame of MMO; Seeking an active involvement of Third Countries in the MMO Black Sea 2019. Partly Achieved A high level of participation was achieved, according to MMO Black Sea concept, involving EFCA, EMSA and six BGR and ROU national authorities dealing with Coast Guard Functions (CGFs). Cooperation between the main national authorities of the host MSs involved in the MMO Black Sea (Bulgaria: Border Police, Executive Agency for Fisheries and Aquacultures (EAFA), Maritime Administration; Romania: Border Police/Coast Guard, National Agency for Fishing and Aquaculture (NAFA), Romanian Naval Authority border police, ROU Coast Guard, Guardia Civil and National Police) can be considered as fruitful. ---------- UNHCR Representation in ROU attended as observer during the implementation of the SAR workshop in ROU. Even that BGR and ROU agreed to receive Third Countries and Non EU Countries (EGY, GEO, TUR and UKR) Commented [KB38]: The non-disclosed part contains as observers, only UKR performed visits in BGR and ROU. detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- • Enhance collection and exchange of information, including personal data - Collection of operational border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In information in a timely manner from all operational actors involved, in particular information on consequence, it would undermine the protection of the incidents reported in JORA; Processing of personal data relating to individuals suspected of public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of involvement in the migrants’ smuggling, traffic of human beings (THB), terrorism or other cross-border Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. crimes at the EU level; Distribution of operational information to all operational actors through the respective authorized channels; Use of the “Guidelines for JORA Incident Template” giving detailed information on definitions and establishing a sets of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes. Partly Achieved In relation to the JORA template, the reporting of incidents was generally done according to the JORA Guidelines and in a timely manner, although there were issues regarding the validation of the incidents. According to the OPLAN, BGR and ROU NCCs had the validation role but in reality the NCOs were responsible with the task. No personal data collected during the MMO Black Sea; relevant personal data (e.g. TUR FV crew members) has been further processed by the national authorities. • Identify possible risks and threats - Operational analytical products will be shared with relevant stakeholders to maintain and improve situational awareness and support operational planning and implementation. Achieved RAU Maritime Analysis (MIC-RAN) provided support with 14 Brief Analysis Reports and one Black Sea area of Interest Analysis Report; the analytical information was disseminated among BGR and ROU border police/coast guard, according to the provisions of the Operational Plan. • Establish and exchange the best practices - Delivering and supporting workshops, meetings, other networking events to participants; Delivering and supporting operational briefings to all participants of the MMO including information on the fundamental rights and access to international protection; Building on MS capacity by implementing activities related with administrative solutions, standardization, fleet management and operational technologies as well as technical solutions/best practices linked with EUROSUR and/or EU CG Functions and other cooperation; Supporting targeted training activities. 34/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p34-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 35,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Achieved Before and during the implementation period, Frontex organised 7 operational briefings for all participants Commented [KB39]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law to the MMO Black Sea, either centrally (ICC Warsaw) or at the concrete locations (Burgas, Constanta), enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast together with local authorities. At the same time, 2 JORA/EFS trainings guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, ✓ 5 EFS requested: MAS, Coastal Monitoring Service, Anomaly Detection, Vessel Detection Service and thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- Tracking Vessels of Interest border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the ✓ 2 Debriefing activities public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be ✓ 2 SAR workshops with participation of different national authorities dealing with CGFs and speakers disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. from ITA, GRC and ESP The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be • To facilitate the organizational arrangements related to the implementation of the MMO Black Sea, hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and the information about the new Focal Point Sea concept, MMO concept and operational plan were prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border available on the Frontex One Stop Shop (FOSS). crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as • 2 JORA/EFS training activities conducted by IFC were held in the FP Sea Burgas and Constanta. regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . • 2 European Coast Guard Functions Officers (ECGFO) were re-deployed from JO Poseidon and JO Themis to Burgas and Constanta and 2 UKR observers attended the SAR workshops. • Two-day-SAR workshops were organized during the MMO under the lead of Bulgarian Border Police (Burgas, 20-21 May) and Romanian Coast Guard (Constanta, 12-13 June) with the support of Frontex Coast Guard Sector. The following resources were involved in: - SAR workshop in Bulgaria: 27 persons in the conference (including speakers from Hellenic CG and Spanish Guardia Civil, and observer from Ukrainian SBGS), 35 crewmembers and 5 technical means during the practical exercise. • SAR workshop in Romania: 43 persons in the conference (including speakers from Hellenic CG, Italian and Spanish Guardia Civil, and observers from Ukrainian SBGS, EFCA and UNHCR Romania), 61 crewmembers and 4 technical means during the practical exercise. • During the SAR workshops (for the rescue part) and during the operational activities, boarding operations (125) were conducted according to Boarding in Frontex coordinated Joint maritime operations: Best Practices and Guidelines providing up to date technical elements for the Frontex Boarding Handbook. • Eurosur Fusion Services requested and activated: MAS, Anomaly Detection, Vessel Detection Service and Tracking Vessels of Interest. In addition, Meteo and Maritime Simulation Module services available in JORA were used by BGR and ROU authorities. 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 4.1. Supporting Response 4.1.1. Operational concept The operational concept of the MMO Black Sea consisted especially in offering support to Bulgaria and Romania in carrying out coast guard functions, with priority on border surveillance at sea including support to SAR operations led by Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres, combating of illegal fisheries activities and environmental protection. 35/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p35-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 36,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA The surveillance assets, which consisted in Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV), Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPV), Commented [KB40]: The non-disclosed parts contain Coastal Patrol Boats (CPB) and Fixed Wing Aircrafts (FWA), were deployed in order to achieve the earliest information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. detections, as well as the highest rate of interceptions possible. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment The patrolling area of the maritime assets took into consideration the past cases as regards migration flow and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this from TUR and the illegal fishery activities, the vessels endurance, as well as their SAR capacity. The entire information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would operational area was well covered with assets deployed in Sozopol, Varna, Mangalia, Constanta and Sulina. open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers The MAS FWA was deployed to Burgas airport and because it was a long range FWA, has being assigned to and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information cover the entire operational area, with flights performed within BGR and ROU FIR areas; would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in All the participating assets were coordinated by the respective Focal Points Sea – Burgas for BGR and hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of Constanta for ROU assets, and the planning of the FWA flights were performed according to the joint BGR such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and ROU planning based on the risk analysis, with the assistance and support of European Monitoring Team and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the (EMT), including BGR/ROU NCOs and BGR OLO-TE. The ICC Warsaw had a supervision role, according to MMO disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public concept and the operational plan. interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . All the participating assets were always available to support any SAR incident in the area upon request of MRCC Constanta or Varna. The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to Support in border surveillance activities, the activated use of EFS contributed to an improved and updated cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational situational picture in the respective areas of the EU external border. Daily and ad-hoc exchange of areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of information between Frontex, all operational actors and external stakeholders involved was carried out. play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their Cooperation has been carried out in various coast guard functions among Frontex, EFCA, EMSA and 6 national modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and authorities. In addition to border surveillance, these included: SAR, fisheries control, law enforcement and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by environmental protection. As a multi-purpose multi-agency operation, vessels and aircrafts deployed depriving the operations of any strategy and element of cooperated in the detection of possible illegal fishery activities, sea pollutions and other violations of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border maritime conventions which were further communicated to EFCA and EMSA, according to the provisions of crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents the specific activity plan. containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . 4.1.2. Operational results During the implementation period of the MMO Black Sea, 4 incidents were reported in the operational area, - as follows: - Detection related to migration: 0. - Illegal fishing activities: 1 incident with a TUR fishing vessels (crew: 8 TUR) detected in ROU Economical Exclusive Zone (EEZ) and intercepted in BGR EEZ. - - SAR: 2 operations for a BGR fishing boat having 2 people on board (POB) and an UK sailing yacht • with 4 POB. - - Oil pollution: 1 possible oil pollution detected by MAS FWA. - Navigation safety: floating buoy and navigational warning by BGR maritime administration for the TUR FV partly (24 hours) sunk. Joint patrolling with EFCA community performed by the maritime assets: 14. Total inspections of fishing vessels/boats: 121. Total boarding operations performed by BGR and ROU border police/coast guard: 125. During the MAS activities 2 (two) Fishing Vessel Sighting Forms concerning 2 (two) fishing vessels were submitted to EFCA. Because before the starting of the operation, in the operational area was discovered approximately 2 tons of cocaine, MIC RAN team support was requested by the BGR and ROU authorities; MIC RAN prepared an Analysis of a dedicated area in the Black Sea and 14 Brief Analytical Reports for designated vessels of interest (VoI) based on BGR/ROU requests. 36/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p36-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 37,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA During the implementation period FSC provided to BGR/ROU National Coordination Centres (NCC) and FP Commented [KB41]: The non-disclosed part contains Sea Daily Overview for eight (08) VoI monitored by Frontex. detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- 4.1.3. Operational coordination structures border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the The operational coordination structures functioned in accordance with the Specific Activity Plan. The ICC public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be was established in the premises of Frontex/Frontex Situation Centre, In Warsaw (Poland). In accordance disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of with the MMO on European Cooperation on Coast Guard Functions concept, the ICC has a supervision role Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. and a weekly Joint Coordination Board (JCB) was held in the ICC. BGR and ROU deployed a National The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational Coordinator Officer (NCO) in the ICC. There were no major shortcomings identified in that regard. area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted - Focal Point Sea were activated in: in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of - Burgas, in the premises of Regional Coordination Centre (RCC) / Regional Directorate Border Police- play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their Burgas. modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of - Constanta, in the premises of Integrated System of Observation, Surveillance and Control (SCOMAR) migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by Centre/Romanian Coast Guard. depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and The coordination of the TE deployed in the OA was ensured by the FP Sea Burgas for BGR assets and FP Sea prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border Constanta for ROU assets. crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection Operational Liaison Officers for Technical Equipment (OLO-TE) from BGR supported the border surveillance of the public interest as regards public security in the sense activities conducted by MAS FWA from MAS Operational room, during the flights. From ROU side, NCO took of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. over the OLO-TE role for MAS. The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to 4.1.4. Resources deployed disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, During MMO Black Sea a total number of 284 officers including crewmembers, FP Sea coordinators, NCOs, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be OLO-TE and ECGFOs were involved in the operational activities. The total man-days accounted were 6 586. hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border Human resources crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as • 4 National Coordinating Officers / 80 man-days regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. • 2 FP Sea Coordinators / 80 man-days • 1 Operational Liaison Officer for Technical Equipment / 13 man-days The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by • 2 European Coast Guard Officers / 6 man-days Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information • 270 Crew members / 6320 man-days (100 crew members ROU/ 4000 man-days, 58 crewmembers would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and BGR/ 2320 man-days) capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other • 5 Crew MAS FWA / 87 man-days sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as In general the level of contribution of HR can be rated as very good, however, there were some challenges numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations at the beginning of the MMO Black Sea, because the deployments in the ICC started with small delays. are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit The coordination between ICC Warsaw – FP Burgas and Constanta and the assets was very good, during the criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course entire implementation period. of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to Technical equipment counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information During MMO Black Sea Frontex deployed 19 units of technical equipment: regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards • 1 Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) / 40 asset-days public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of • 11 Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPV) / 440 asset-days Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . • 6 Coastal Patrol Boats (CPB) / 240 asset-days • 1 Fixed Wing Aircrafts (FWA) / 29 asset-days The total number of assets-days was 29 for aerial assets and 720 for maritime assets. The co-financed assets were suitable for conducting Coast Guard Functions related activities, focusing on border control, SAR operations, illegal fisheries and oil pollution. 37/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p37-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 38,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA The assets were deployed in Sozopol, Burgas, Varna, Mangalia, Constanta and Sulina. In all locations were Commented [KB42]: The non-disclosed parts refer to deployed at least one vessel with high patrolling autonomy and one vessel with higher speed in order to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as better cover the entire operational area and to tackle in due time the incidents. the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to Some unperformed patrolling hours of the assets were typically related to the bad meteorological disclosing the current state of play. This would provide conditions and sea state, as well as unexpected and non-scheduled maintenance needs due to the intensive smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would use in the operation. ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature In general, the level of contribution with TE to the MMO Black Sea can be rated as very good. would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and 4.2. Situational Awareness unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 4.2.1. Threats and Risks, modus operandi and trends identified 1049/2001. According to FRAN data, in April (one month before starting the JO), Romania reported one case related to illegal border-crossing (IBC), the first case detected in the Black Sea since November 2017. In 2017, Romania reported the largest number of IBC detections (over 500) ever recorded in the Black Sea since 2009 (first FRAN data collection). Despite low overall figures in the Black Sea, and the ‘low level’ of risk assessed in the ‘EUROSUR Impact Level Assessments’ in 2019, the threat in this route remains medium with regards to migratory flows from third countries, and especially from Turkey where a new policy on illegal migration has been recently endorsed. In July, three months after the elections, the Turkish Minister of Interior presented the new migration strategy. The new strategy will affect around 4.9 million people, of which over 3.6 million are Syrian nationals registered as being under temporary protection in Turkey as of May 2019. In July, several police Commented [KB43]: The information related to this operations took place in Istanbul resulting in the apprehension of thousands of migrants, most of them variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making Afghans, Pakistanis and Syrians. Migrants who had arrived in Turkey illegally (not Syrians) and did not register processes based on the intelligence derived from previous are detained and sent to removal centres outside Istanbul. Syrians are returned to the respective provinces and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an of Turkey where they registered. Unregistered Syrians are taken to the camps as well. important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without According to third country intelligence, the current operations in Istanbul may cause non-Syrian migrants to interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its fear possible deportations and look for ways to reach the EU faster. In general, the stricter approach towards mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain insights into this decision making migrants already present (especially in Istanbul) might increase outflows from Turkey. At the same time, process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in rumours of forced returns of Syrians, even if dismissed by the authorities, might still act as a push factor depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses for Syrians. This is particularly likely if increased numbers of voluntary returns to safe areas in Syria are wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information misinterpreted as forced returns. would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making- processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective Therefore, Turkish criminal networks might test the migration route across the Black Sea and might use it and general in nature and not indistinguishable from again as an alternative route. individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present case, information With regards the cross-border crime and unlawful activities, most of the incidents reported during the pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. operational period were related to illegal fishery activities. Despite the level of risk related to smuggling of drugs is assessed as low/moderate at these border sections and the maritime surveillance systems in both MSs are fully operational, the unknown figure concerning undetected cases of smuggling of drugs continues to be estimated as high. Concerning the maritime traffic in the area, the main maritime corridor from Bosphorus Strait to the Ukrainian ports of Odessa and Chornomorsk, accounts for most of the marine traffic in the Black Sea. This heavy traffic crosses the MMO operational area, especially in its eastern side. Therefore, in a joint operation of the kind of MMO, a maritime area analysis would be valuable, as this analysis provides an assessment on the maritime traffic trends and on the type of vessels sailing across the regional basin, spotting possible maritime threats (potential areas of risk and high-risk vessels). Due to the high volume of maritime traffic of cargo ships and the high number of ports calls recorded in Bulgaria and Romania, the activation of the Focal Points Sea is considered to be pertinent and complementary, providing a wider range of operational activities in the area (e.g. seaports, territorial 38/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p38-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 39,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA ---------- waters, and exclusive economic zones). The seaports can be activated either independently, or in parallel to the MMO JO. Concerning Maritime Intelligence, Romanian and Bulgarian authorities requested Frontex 15 maritime 1 analysis reports during the operational period: one maritime area analysis (specific area of interest located in Romanian EEZ), and 14 brief analysis reports concerning the risk assessment of vessels of interest requested by both host MSs. Out of the 14 brief analysis reports, seven identified high and significant-risk Commented [KB44]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and vessels that might be of investigative interest, and one was recommended for vessel tracking. trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection 4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Operational reporting and information exchange Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. During the MMO Black Sea, constant information gathering and monitoring of the situational picture was The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials provided using standardized reporting forms and channels as well as the execution of several surveillance - performing border control and/or coast guard duties. services including EFS Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance (MAS) creating actionable information in real-time. Disclosing such information would expose the working Weekly reporting package was composed of various operational reports and distributed by the FOC in ICC methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border Warsaw to all recipients in accordance with the Operational Plan. crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as FOC reports from ICC provided weekly information from the operational area, in particular, outcomes of regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed JCB meetings, performance of assets, statistics on fisheries and pollution sightings, etc. pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. BGR and ROU border police/coast guard were responsible to inform and plan all patrolling activities performed in common with other national authorities. ■---------- EFCA POC has been informed by FOC, close to real time, with all changes occurs to initial schedule of the assets. The ‘incident template’ implemented within the framework of the FPS/MMO operations, requires a review in order to collect and provide information in line with the operational and surveillance activities described in the objectives of the Activity Plan of the MMO operations. The specificity of the MMO operations, compared to other Frontex sea operations, requires the collection of data and information on incidents observed during the patrolling and surveillance activities that are not fully considered in the current incident template, which focus basically on migration incidents. For example, several fishery sightseeing reports, some of them with potential illegal fishing activities, were issued, however this information was not inserted in the “JORA Incident Template”. In addition, some assets participating in this JO were reporting in two different ‘incident templates’. In order to facilitate the monitoring of the operation and its further analysis, as well as to avoid either losing information or duplication of data, the gathering of information about incidents occurred should be reported in the same template. In accordance with the Operational Plan, the exchange of operational information through the Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA) was carried out without problems. Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) had the responsibility to manage close to real time data processing by collecting operational information, validating incident reports and providing a prompt response on serious incidents, based on information received through JORA, operational reports and open source information. During the operational phase of MMO Black Sea, a total of 4 JORA incidents were reported to the FSC. Out of these, 2 incidents completed initial and intermediary reporting levels and reached FSC for final validation within 24 hours from the first reporting in JORA. The remaining 2 incidents reached final JORA validation within 4 and 20 days respectively. The timeliness of reporting operational information in JORA should therefore be further improved and delays in the validation of incidents, particularly at intermediate validation levels, minimised to further enhance the exchange of information. During the operational phase of MMO Black Sea, no Serious Incidents were reported to FSC. FSC provided a daily vessel tracking report to BGR and ROU authorities executing Eurosur Fusion Services. Additional Meteo and Maritime Simulation Module services were made available directly within JORA. 39/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p39-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 40,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4.3. Development 4.3.1. Operational cooperation Cooperation between Hosting MSs (Bulgaria and Romania) - IDifferent activities dealing with Coast Guard Functions were implemented by Frontex in Romania (May Commented [KB45]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As 2017) with a BGR OPV deployed in Constanta and in Bulgaria (October 2017) with a ROU CPV deployed in ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as Varna. In the same time, BGR and ROU authorities are actively cooperating within Black Sea Cooperation the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing Forum. So, BGR and ROU are experienced and familiar with operational requirements and procedures, thus details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide the cooperation between BGR and ROU was performed on a very good level. BGR border police and ROU smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, border police/coast guard (national authorities in the lead of the MMO Black Sea), were strongly committed enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would in the planning and implementation of the MMO. ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any The activated Focal Points Sea Burgas and Constanta showed an excellent commitment to carry out their strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their tasks and responsibilities within the MMO Black Sea and reached the required flexibility in case of urgent purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and needs. The close collaboration between the ICC staff, NCOs deployed at ICC Warsaw and FP Sea unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the coordinators ensured the operational cooperation and flexibility at all times. protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No The staff of the Focal Points Sea Burgas and Constanta and National Frontex Point of Contacts (NFPoCs) 1049/2001. supported in the logistic and administrative procedures both during the field visits as well as during the The non-disclosed part contains detailed information ------ deployments. regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Tactical cooperation between hosting MS assets was conducted via NCOs/OLO-TE deployed in MAS Disclosing such information would expose the working Operational Room and FP Sea Coordinators. This facilitated the communication between regional methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus commanding structures and the link with ICC Warsaw. obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed Cooperation between national authorities of hosting MSs (Bulgaria and Romania) pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The BGR border police and ROU border police/coast guard are direct partners of Frontex and have been responsible for all border control activities within the MMO Black Sea. Cooperation between border police, fishery authorities and maritime administrations at regional and local level was very good. Maritime and aerial surveillance planning were made by border police authorities and shared with above mentioned authorities. - Cooperation with other Union agencies or international organizations • EFCA. Cooperation between Frontex and EFCA was established for the practical implementation of coast guard functions at sea and according to the provision of the Specific Activity Plan. EFCA has given access to MAS FWA live streaming. EFCA community – BGR and ROU national fishery control authorities – was actively involved in the operational authorities by performing 14 joint patrolling activities and performed 121 inspections of fishing vessels/boats. The EFCA expert (BGR Executive Agency for Fisheries and Aquacultures) delivered fishery related part to the MAS crews during the operational briefing held on 09 May in Burgas. In addition, BGR national fishery agency was involved with experts and one CPB during the SAR workshop implemented in Burgas/20-21 May and EFCA attended the SAR workshop implemented in Constanta 12-13 June. • UNHCR RO representative attended as observer during the SAR workshop in Constanta 12-13 June. • EMSA. Cooperation between Frontex and EMSA was established for the practical implementation of coast guard functions at sea and according to the provision of the Specific Activity Plan and - consisted by providing Copernicus services via EFS/FSC. - EMSA community – BGR maritime administration and ROU naval authority – were both involved with HR and TE (1 CPB in BGR and 1 CPB in ROU) during the SAR workshops organised in Burgas (20-21 May) and Constanta (12-13 June). 40/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p40-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 41,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Cooperation with Third Countries As agreed with BGR and ROU authorities, TC observers from TUR and UKR were invited for the implementation of the SAR workshops but only UKR attended both events (1 expert for each SAR workshop). Frontex coordination role The Operational Team (OT) was composed of members from CGS sector as follows: 1 Frontex Coordinating Commented [KB46]: The non-disclosed parts contain Officer (FCO) and 1 Operational Manager (OM). The team received support from MIC-RAN team, FSC and information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information --------- IFC. Moreover, one staff-member from the Operational Divisional Support Office was supporting financial would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and management of the JO. strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future The OM was responsible for the overall planning and implementation of activities of the MMO Black Sea similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and according to the Specific Activity Plan. The implementation of the MMO was monitored and supported by unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure the FCO who occasionally travelled to Focal Points Sea Burgas and Constanta. Additionally, a Senior FCO of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article from CGS performed a field visit to Bulgaria and Romania to facilitate the operational coordination with 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. the hosting MS authorities. FP Sea coordinators and FOC, supported by BGR and ROU NCOs were crucial operational players to ensure the proper coordination of deployed resources, maintaining links with local authorities and timely reporting the ongoing operational activities. The operational cooperation between BGR, ROU authorities and CGS OT members was excellent. 4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing I7 operational briefings were provided to all participants of the MMO by Frontex (General part) and Host MS (National Briefing) officers. NCOs/OLO-TE were briefed at central level in the ICC Warsaw. I2 debriefing meetings were held in the FP Sea Burgas (FOC) and Constanta (FCO) at the end of the MMO. Report from participant facilitated to obtain feedback from the deployed sTMs/FP Sea Coordinators/NCOs/OLO-TE/staff of FP Sea and Master of the Vessels. 5. Implementation of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 5.1. Disembarkation in Third Countries The BGR and ROU maritime assets, were authorized to disembark the persons intercepted and apprehended in the Operational Area in Bulgaria, respectively in Romania. Disembarkation in third countries was not carried out during the implementation period of the MMO. 5.2. Assessment of the general situation in TCs The assessment of the general situation in a third country was conducted by Host MSs and made available to Frontex on 12 June by Bulgaria (assessment on TUR) and on 1st July by Romania (assessment on TUR and UKR). 5.3. Communication and cooperation channels The Focal Point Sea (Maritime Centre) in Burgas (BGR) and Constanta (ROU) facilitated the communication flow between different entities. In case of search and rescue, the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres 41/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p41-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 42,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA in Varna (BGR) and Constanta (ROU) took over the coordination and, in case of need, cooperated with each other. 6. Main conclusions and recommendations Conclusions Recommendations Supporting Response Good level of contribution with resources from To encourage Host MS as well as other EU MS/SAC to Commented [KB47]: The non-disclosed part contains Host MS that enabled to achieve a notable have a high level of participation in the MMO. detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast enhancement of the border security. guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Moderate level of incidents related to coast With reference to risk analysis, to extend the thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In guard functions despite the closure period for implementation period from 5 weeks to minimum 90 consequence, it would undermine the protection of the fishery activities (especially Turbot) in the Black days, to include the maritime BCPs and the port areas public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be Sea. in the MMO. In this way, other CGFs (e.g. law disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. enforcement and customs cooperation) can be implemented. High volume of maritime traffic of cargo ships It is recommended to activate, either in parallel or and the high number of ports calls recorded in independently, Focal Points Sea in the main seaports Bulgaria and Romania. (e.g. Constanta, Varna, Burgas) to complement the operational activity in the area and to support the Bulgarian and Romanian authorities at the seaports with different team member profiles (e.g. first-line officers, cross-border crime, coast guard functions, debriefing experts). Situational Awareness High level of performance of the Frontex MAS To continue with the deployment of more FWA/RPAS for FWA Challenges for a full use of aerial asset the entire implementation period of the MMO. (Backup deployed in the MMO solution in case hard maintenance). Two different ‘JORA incident templates’ were It is recommended that all the assets involved in the JO observed for this JO FPS 2019 – MMO Black Sea. are reporting all the incidents and using the same ‘JORA MMO Incident Template’ in order to facilitate the monitoring of the operation and its further analysis, as well as to avoid either losing information or duplication of data. The particularities of the MMO operations It is recommended that RAU, as template creators, require the collection of data and information initiates the discussion on the update of the incident of incidents observed during the patrolling that template focusing on the needs to collect data on cross- are not fully considered in the current incident border crime and unlawful activities at sea, and other template, which focus basically in migration maritime activities where sea patrolling are involved. • incidents. Significant criminal activities are taking place in It is recommended to conduct further maritime risk the Black Sea (e.g. multi-ton cocaine analysis. smuggling). Developments 42/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p42-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 43,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA The bilateral cooperation between Bulgaria and To try to integrate staff exchange project within the Romania facilitated the implementation of the MMO with deployments of the officers from FP Burgas to MMO. FP Constanta and from Constanta to Burgas. To involve EFCA/EMSA communities from the planning Operational cooperation with EFCA and EMSA, to implementation phase. and respective communities needs to be enhanced in order to achieve stronger synergies. Good participation of different national It is crucial for the MMO to maintain and to increase the authorities from EU/non EU MS and EU Agencies number of national authorities dealing with coast guard in the operational area, especially during the functions from EU MS/SAC. SAR workshops. Operational cooperation with non EU MS To involve non EU MS neighbouring countries of Black neighbouring countries of Black Sea is crucial for Sea in MMO as active observers. complete success of MMO. 43/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p43-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 44,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 1. Time schedule Planning meeting with Host MS 21/02/2019, in Constanta, Romania 20-21/03/2019, in Warsaw, Poland Operational briefing for the participants In first days of each deployment Commented [KB48]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Implementation of the Activity 07/05 – 15/06/2019 enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Evaluation meeting (All-in-one) 27/11/2019 thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of 2. Participation Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 2.1. Participating MS resources 2.1.1. Human resources Commented [KB49]: The non-disclosed parts contain - information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information Participating MS Human resources Number of officers Total man-days Greece 1-ECGFO 2.2. Frontex owned / leased / co-owned technical equipment I1 I3 would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure - - of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article Technical equipment No TE / Asset-days Patrolling hours 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. MAS FWA I1 29 77:35 ■ The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third 2.3. Host MS Resources parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and 2.3.1. Human resources movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as - numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding Host MS Human resources Number of officers Total man-days years. Releasing such information would thus benefit - criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus Crewmembers 58 2320 ■ -- operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This FP Sea coordinator I1 40 Bulgaria ■ would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized NCO I2 40 border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information ■ regarding the technical equipment deployed would OLO-TE undermine the protection of the public interest as regards I1 13 ■ public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . - Romania Host MS Human resources Crewmembers -- FP Sea coordinator NCO ECGFO Number of officers • 100 I1 I2 I1 - Total man-days 4000 40 ■ 40 ■ I3 44/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p44-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 45,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 2.3.2. Technical Equipment Commented [KB50]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in -- the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to - I : Host MS Technical equipment No TE / Asset-days Patrolling hours disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this CPV I2 80 561:35 information with other sources, to draw conclusions Bulgaria regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment CPB I5 200 828:53 used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to - - change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a Host MS Technical equipment No TE / Asset-days Patrolling hours similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of - -- • - such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime OPV I1 40 472:40 ■ and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the - disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public Romania CPV I8 320 429:33 interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. CPB I2 80 183:10 ■ The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational 2.4. Third Country Observers areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of -- play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal Participating TC Location of deployment Human resources Deployment dates networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and Ukraine Burgas, Bulgaria I1 21-22 May 2019 (Burgas, Bulgaria) future operations of similar nature would be hampered by ---- depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and Ukraine Constanta, Romania I1 12-13 June 2019 (Constanta, prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents Romania) containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . 3. Financial information MMO Black Sea 2019 – budget per MS participating MS Amount Romania € 71,474.87 Bulgaria € 122,315.00 TOTAL € 193,789,87 45/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p45-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 46,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4. List of acronyms Abbreviation Spelling B BGR Bulgaria BLV Blacklisted Flag Vessels C CG Coast Guard CGF Coast Guard Functions CPB Coastal Patrol Boats CPV Coastal Patrol Vessels E EAFA Executive Agency for Fisheries and Aquacultures ECGFO European Coast Guard Functions Officer EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EFCA European Fisheries Control Agency EFS Eurosur Fusion Services EGY Egypt EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency EMT European Monitoring Team ESP Spain EU European Union EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System F FCO Frontex Coordinating Officer FER Frontex Evaluation Report FIR Flight Information Region FLO Frontex Liaison Officer FOC Frontex Coordinating Officer FOSS Frontex-One-Stop-Shop FP Focal Point FSC Frontex Situation Centre FRAN Frontex Risk Analysis Network Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency FWA Fixed Wing Aircraft FV Fishing Vessel G GEO Georgia GRC Greece H HR Human resources I IBC Illegal Border-Crossing IFC Information Fusion Centre ICC International Coordination Centre ITA Italy J JCB Joint Coordination Board JDP Joint Deployment Plan JO Joint Operation JORA Joint Operations Reporting Application M MAS Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance MIC-RAN Maritime Intelligence Community & Risk Analysis Network MMO Multipurpose Maritime Operation MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre MS Member State N NAFA National Agency for Fishing and Aquaculture NCC National Coordination Centre 46/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p46-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 47,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA NCO National Coordinating Officer NFPOC National Frontex Point of Contact O OA Operational Area OLO-TE Operational Liaison Officers for Technical Equipment OPLAN Operational Plan OPV Offshore Patrol Vessels OT Operational Team P POB People on Board R RAU Risk Analysis Unit RCC Regional Coordination Centre ROU Romania RPAS Remotely Piloted Air System S SAP Specific Activity Plan SAR Search and Rescue SBGS State Border Guard Service T TC Third Country TE Technical Equipment THB Traffic of Human Beings TM Team Members sTM Teams Members seconded to the Agency TUR Turkey V VoI Vessel of Interest W U UK United Kingdom UKR Ukraine UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 47/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p47-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 48,
"content": "LIMITED S FRONTEX Ill EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY III. Evaluation of Specific Activity Prevention and detection of cross-border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean (Azores) JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p48-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 49,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Contents 1. Background information 50 2. Achievement of objectives 51 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices 51 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 51 5. Main conclusions and recommendations 53 FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 54 1. Time schedule 54 2. Participation 54 3. Financial information 54 4. Maps 55 4. List of acronyms 55 49/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p49-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 50,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 1. Background information The Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea (JO) Sea is the platform for the implementation of specific and independent activities covered by the mandate of European Border and Coast Guard Regulation in specific and distinct maritime areas (Focal Points). The cross-border crime operation in the Atlantic (Azores) was implemented under the Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea. 1.1. Brief risk assessment ---------------- Frontex is developing operations related to prevention and detection of cross-border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean as from 2019. The experience gained in previous concrete cases under ISA-CBC Pilot Project and the engagement in EMPACT “Cocaine, Cannabis and Heroin”, both in provision to the expansion of cross- border crime activities related to drugs trafficking, contributed to develop the action in the Atlantic face of EU external borders. This operation reinforces the implementation phase of Operational Action 2.7 in the framework of EMPACT Drugs “Cocaine, Cannabis and Heroin”, which is classified as EU RESTRICTED, therefore some information Commented [KB51]: Information cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. has been partially restrained and the whole document is considered as LIMITED. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused 1.2. Operational aim based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The specific operational aim of the Activity was to provide increased technical and operational assistance in cross-border crime operations in the framework of EMPACT drugs priority by implementing coordinated operational activities in Azores Islands, due to the strategic location in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. The operational aim has been implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU and international law, guaranteeing the protection of fundamental rights, in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum and the reports and observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer. 1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas Commented [KB52]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing 1.3.1. Period of implementation details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would Commencement 21 May 2019 12:00 (local time) ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature Termination 07 June 2019 12:00 (local time) would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of 1.3.2. Operational areas documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in During the Activity, the operational area covered the southwestern zone of the subarea Azores of the the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Portuguese Economic Exclusive Zone. The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational 1.4. Participants area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex The Activity was hosted by Portugal. operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be Three Cross-Border Crime Detection Officers (CBCDO) from Netherlands were deployed in Horta (Faial hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border Island, Azores Archipelago). crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 50/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p50-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 51,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 1.5. Financial information The budget for the Activity was initially planned at the level of € 152,444.00. After adjustments, the estimated operational budget amounted to € 114,685. 2. Achievement of objectives • Enhance border security - Contribute to preventing and detecting serious crime with a cross- border dimension; Provide technical and operational assistance at the external borders in the fight against organised cross-border crime and terrorism; Targeting high risk pleasure crafts/crew members in the Atlantic. Commented [KB53]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in Achieved the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to One aircraft from Força Aerea Portuguesa was deployed to perform missions in Azores, delivering 22 hours disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this and 30 minutes in the frame of the Activity. The aircraft performed targeted surveillance missions. information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would The deployed CBCDO were tasked to perform profiling of vessels at the Port premises, they have supported open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment national authorities and contributed to identify and detect possible threats. used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information Relevant flow of boats arriving in Horta Port in comparison with previous years, which has received most of would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to the arrivals from the Caribbean and South America. Regular inspections were performed according to the change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a Customs regulation based on risk indicators. similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment • Enhance operational cooperation - Enhanced cooperation between the national authorities of the deployed would undermine the protection of the public host Member State as well as on an international level. interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Achieved The non-disclosed part contains detailed information Focal Point Sea is the platform with which Frontex has participated in EMPACT operation, contributing to regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. achieve wider goals. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus The inter-agency cooperation between Portugal, Frontex, MAOC-N and Europol, was active during the obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border mission. crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational ------------~- ISA-CBC Pilot Project (Investigation Support Activities – Cross-Border Crime) was available to support area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted operations from national Investigation Units by using Frontex’ services and resources. The Pilot is regularly in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational used to provide technical and operational assistance to intercept concrete targets with areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal intelligence/investigation background and reinforce concrete sectors at EU external borders. networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by 4. Assessment of joint operational activities depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents 4.1. Supporting Response containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 4.1.1. Operational concept Focal point was activated at the first authorized seaport entering in Schengen Area and the most recurrent stop for targeted boats crossing the Atlantic (Azores Archipelago). The Host Member State was responsible for all operational activities related to that location. 51/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p51-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 52,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4.1.2. Operational results Commented [KB54]: Information cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the Reported under EU RESTRICTED document due to the sensitivity of the case. external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would 4.1.3. Operational coordination structures hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and The coordination structure was reduced to the minimum extent as Frontex was taking part in an Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external international operation with a wider scope. One officer from the national authority (Portuguese Policia borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human Judiciaria) acting as Focal Point Sea Local Coordinator and one FOC were deployed on permanent basis. beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public 4.1.4. Resources deployed interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Three team members from Netherland, with the profile of Cross-Border Crime Detection Officer (CBCDO), 1049/2001. were deployed on rotation basis to perform profiling of vessels arriving at Port premises as instructed by The non-disclosed part contains detailed information national authorities. regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. The aerial asset, one aircraft Portuguese Forca Aerea, was deployed to perform targeted surveillance under Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus request. A total of 22:30 hours were consumed (90%) in two missions targeting vessels at Sea. obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed 4.2. Situational Awareness pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational 4.2.1. Threats and Risks, modus operandi and trends identified area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex In line with the need to reinforce the EU external borders and Frontex‘s commitment with EU Policy operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, Cycle/EMPACT, Frontex is supporting Member States in prevention and detection of cross-border crimes at the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be external borders, including drugs trafficking, as one of the emerging threats in EU. hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first 4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. Taking into account that Focal Point Sea Azores was focused on supporting a concrete Operational Action The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the under EMPACT “Cocaine, Cannabis and Heroin”, activity related to a restricted environment, further technical equipment deployed in the operational area by operational information must be circumscribed to the EMPACT framework. Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other 4.3. Development sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding 4.3.1. Operational cooperation years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus The cooperation between participants in Focal Point Sea raised a very good level, good synergies and operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course smooth and proactive participation between the actors involved in this small operation. of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information 4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards Netherland officers received the Operational Briefing in each rotation. The last implementation day, a final public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Debriefing took place with all participants and Portuguese authorities presented the outcomes of the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. operation. 52/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p52-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 53,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 5. Main conclusions and recommendations Conclusions Recommendations Supporting Response Commented [KB55]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Focal Point Sea Azores created good synergies to Consider the extension of Focal Point Sea enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the prevent and detect cross-border crime activities in Azores 2020 covering a longer period (May- working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, the Western face of EU external borders. This August), settling the basis for border control, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- specific operation in which Frontex provided regular checks and collection of information border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In practical contribution, even that was limited, can that can be reinforced in concrete periods or consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be be evaluated as positive and will support to the with EMPACT operation, in case of interest of disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of developing and implementation of future national authorities. The deployment of means Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. operations in the Atlantic. may consist in: o Regular aerial patrolling to detect boats at sea in the operational area, detection of vessels avoiding Azores, border control including SAR, multipurpose operation concept. o Cross-Border Crime Detection Officers deployed in different Islands with border check, profiling and inspections tasks. Situational Awareness FP Sea concept as it is still does not fully If the activity is tailored to support EMPACT corresponds with the requirements resulting from drugs activities in concrete periods, it is more the practical needs in EMPACT operation. suitable and cost/efficient the activation of ISA-CBC Pilot Project as flexible tool to support concrete operations with intelligence/investigation background: o Co-financed assets with specific targets ensuring discreet surveillance and interception. o Delivery of ISA-CBC technical equipment for inspection of boats. Further conclusions are EU RESTRICTED to EMPACT framework 53/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p53-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 54,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 1. Time schedule Planning meeting with Host MS 07/02/2019 Commented [KB56]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Operational briefing for the participants 20/05/2019, 24/05/2019 and 01/06/2019 enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Implementation of the Activity 21/05 – 07/06/2019 thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In Evaluation meeting (All-in-one) 27/11/2019 consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 2. Participation 2.1. Participating MS resources 2.1.1. I Human resources I Commented [KB57]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and Participating MS Human resources Number of Total strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their officers man-days effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating (NLD) Royal Marechaussee Cross-Border Crime Detection Officers 3 21 their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 2.2. Host MS Resources 2.2.1. Technical Equipment Commented [KB58]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. - Host MS Technical equipment No TE / Asset- Patrolling Disclosing such information would be tantamount to days hours disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions Portugal FWA (P-3C) 2 22.3 regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to 3. Financial information change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of Focal Points Concept and JO Focal Points Sea 2019 Azores – budget such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public Approved/Estimated on Changes Amount interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Approved on 26 September 2019 Activity Initiation and Financial Commitment 5,727,827.00 € (amendment 2) for Focal Points concept Approved on 19 December 2019 Activity Initiation and Financial Commitment of 73,580.23 € (amendment 5) Law Enforcement Sector (logistics for meetings) Estimated 18 March 2019 152,444.00 € JO Focal Point Sea 2019 Azores (Op. Azul) Actual costs 114,685 € 54/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p54-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 55,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4. Maps Commented [KB59]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 5. List of acronyms Abbreviation Spelling C CBCDO Cross Border Crime Detection Officer E EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats EU European Union Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation F FOC Frontex Operational Coordinator FER Frontex Evaluation Report FP Focal Point Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency H HR Human resources I ISA-CBC Investigation Support Activities – Cross-Border Crime (Pilot Project) M MAOC-N Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre – Narcotics MS Member State S SAR Search and Rescue T TE Technical Equipment 55/69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p55-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 56,
"content": "LIMITED S FRONTEX Ill EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY IV. Evaluation of Specific Activity Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross- border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II) JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p56-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 57,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Contents 1. Background information 58 2. Achievement of objectives 60 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices 61 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 62 5. Main conclusions and recommendations 65 FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 66 1. Time schedule 66 2. Participation 66 3. Financial information 66 4. Maps 67 5. List of acronyms 67 57/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p57-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 58,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 1. Background information The Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea (JO) Sea is the platform for the implementation of specific and independent activities covered by the mandate of European Border and Coast Guard Regulation in specific and distinct maritime areas (Focal Points). The Operational Activities Prevention and Detection of FTFs and Cross-border Crime Activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II) was implemented under the Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea. 1.1. Brief risk assessment FTFs – A complex global and omnipresent threat The United Nations (UN) reports that the number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) 2 that have not returned to their countries of domicile or else are unaccounted for remains high. Of the over 40 000 foreigners that joined Islamist extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, the number of returnees remains lower than expected. According to the UN, up to 30 000 of those who travelled to these conflict zones may still be alive. No other predominant conflict zone has emerged. The same reporting indicates that many fighters have melted back into the local population and have stayed there, while others lie low in certain neighbouring countries. Many FTFs are still active in conflict zones or other less intensive areas of operations like Libya and the Sahel. Still, depending on developments, some may seek to move elsewhere or else be directed so. Irrespective of whether such travelling is sanctioned by the relevant groups’ structures, the use of regular or irregular movements – or a mixture of both – is assessed to depend on a variety of chances and constraints. Travelling terrorists – Exits, returns, relocations Over the past three years the number of FTFs departing from Europe has decreased. In turn, FTFs have been returning home sporadically. Da’esh’s loss of ground in Syria and Iraq - plus other factors - has contributed to over 30% of the ~5 500 FTFs, who left from Europe, to return. A few hundred FTFs are in detention in north-eastern Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Furthermore, about 1 400 FTFs are dead or unaccounted for. FTFs wanting to return to their European countries of origin or domicile, after Da’esh’s territorial defeat over the past year and a half, have resorted to both illegal border-crossings and document fraud. This is also due to the loss or forfeiture of travel documents, legislative changes criminalising fighting Commented [KB60]: The information related to this abroad, the expiry of the validity of travel documents, or the fear of criminal prosecution for criminal acts variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making committed before leaving and/or while active in a conflict zone. processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the Revocation of citizenship and refusal to repatriate detained or convicted FTFs is also likely to have led conduct of current and future operations. Being an to an increased interest in illegal options. This is even more complicated in the case of women and minors, important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without particularly for the latter, who often do not have any travel documents or citizenship. interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would Reliable information from practitioners indicates that an undisclosed number of returning FTFs were enable third parties to gain insights into this decision making detected attempting to enter Europe amid irregular migration movements or via specialised crossings. process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses Others have reported instances where travel documents belonging to close relatives of prospective wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information returnees have been dispatched by mail or delivered via unwitting or witting couriers for impostor use. would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making- processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present case, information 2 For a better understanding of the term, please vide UNSCR 2178 (2014) and the EU Directive on Combating Terrorism (2017/541). pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 58/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p58-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 59,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA The threat from travelling terrorists is not solely posed by European FTFs. Many non-European FTFs originate from neighbouring regions and countries that benefit from EU visa liberalisation agreements. Given the dynamics of the phenomenon, Member States ought also to take cognizance of Council conclusions (10152/17) recommending security checks in case of irregular migration, adopted on 8 June 2017. Nonetheless, it is logical to deduce that certain irregular migration routes present inherent risks due to their proximity to conflict zones and other reasons. Hence, these considerations: • Eastern Mediterranean: Proximity to active conflict zones (Syria, Iraq) and adjacent to countries with a high transiting risk and/or from where FTFs entry/exit conflict zones (Turkey). • Central Mediterranean: Proximity to an active conflict zone (Libya) and adjacent to countries with a high transiting risk and/or from where FTFs entry/exit conflict zones (Tunisia). • Western Mediterranean: Adjacent to countries with a high transiting risk and/or from where FTFs move to conflict zones (Morocco, Algeria). • Western Balkans: Relatively high numbers of FTFs from the WB region and/or inherent spill over effects from the Eastern Mediterranean route. While much of the focus on security related to travelling FTFs has been on airports and air travel, security threats may also come from the sea and via seaports. The threat to the maritime industry is of continuing concern especially from drug and firearms smugglers, human smugglers, human trafficking and currently more worrisome, the issue of the returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters. Therefore, as a follow up of the positive outcomes of the INTERPOL coordinated Operation Neptune, it has been decided to re-launch the operation under the name Operation Neptune II. 1.2. Operational aim To provide operational assistance to Italy and France, in order to target the movement of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) from neighbouring North African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria) during the implementation of the Interpol’s ‘Operation Neptune II’, as well as to strengthen border controls at identified key Mediterranean Sea ports that handle passenger ships (e.g. ferries, cruise ships etc.) to and from North Africa. 1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas 1.3.1. Period of implementation The Implementation period (“activation”) of the Activity was as follows: Commented [KB61]: The non-disclosed parts refer to Commencement 24 August 2019 00:00 (local time) details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing Termination 8 September 2019 23:59 (local time) details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, 1.3.2. Period of implementation the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any In order to implement the operational activities the Focal Points (FPs) in the port of Marseille (France) and strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their in the port of Genoa (Italy) were activated. purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . 59/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p59-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 60,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 1.4. Participants The Activity was hosted by France and Italy. Commented [KB62]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers 2 Participating MS with 2 different authorities took part in the Activity, namely: Austria (Ministry of deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and Interior/Police) and Italy (Polizia di Stato). strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future INTERPOL deployed 12 officers for 2 weeks in 5 countries (France, Italy, Morocco, Spain, and Tunisia). Algeria similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating participated in the INTERPOL coordinated action but did not host any INTERPOL officers. In most cases, the their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and nationality of the officers deployed by INTERPOL corresponded to the countries of their deployment to unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the increase trust and improve routine cooperation. Furthermore these INTERPOL officers provided their public interest as regards public security as laid down Article support to the local authorities in terms of expertise and providing ready access to Interpol databases and 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. products and services. The Frontex Team Members interacted with the INTERPOL officers in the same way. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working 1.5. Financial information methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border A budget of 8,202 EUR was allocated by Frontex for the implementation of Prevention and detection of FTFs crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea. regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 2. Achievement of objectives • Enhance border security – Carrying out border checks of all persons crossing the external maritime borders including means of transport and objects in their possession at Border Crossing Points enabling to intercept persons, refusing entry for third country nationals not fulfilling entry conditions; Contribute to preventing and detecting FTF and those persons potentially linked to serious crime with a cross-border dimension, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and taking measures against persons, who have crossed the border illegally as well as reporting other illegal activities detected to the competent authorities. Achieved Despite the fact that the level of deployment was very low, the officers that were deployed performed their tasks effectively, delivering a total of 17 (Marseille) and 16 (Genoa) man-days during the entire JO. Of the incidents reported, there were 16 cases were linked to criminal offences, refusals of entry, hits in databases, and administrative/minor offences. Moreover, 15 persons suspected of being Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) were detected. (see 4.2.2 for further details) • Enhance operational cooperation - High level of MS participation in the operational activities; Enhanced cooperation between the national authorities of the host MS as well as at an international level; Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations in the frame of JO. Achieved 3 authorities from 2 MS took part in the JO. Italian Polizia di Stato, French National Police and Customs. INTERPOL deployed 12 officers simultaneously within the framework of Interpol Operation Neptune II for 2 weeks in 5 countries (France, Italy, Morocco, Spain, and Tunisia) • Enhance collection and exchange of information, including personal data - Collection of operational information in a timely manner from all operational actors involved, in particular information on incidents reported in JORA; Distribution of operational information to all operational 60/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p60-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 61,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA actors through the respective authorized channels; Use of the “Guidelines for JORA Incident Template” giving detailed information on definitions and establishing a sets of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes. Partly achieved JORA was used as the primary statistical reporting channel, followed by incident validations that were Commented [KB63]: The non-disclosed part contains carried out in due time. Moreover, officers deployed by the Agency in this operation were sending daily detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control reports via e mail as indicated in the respective chapter of the Specific Activity Plan. tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law • Identify possible risks and threats - Detecting and reporting important cases of document and enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As identity fraud as well as fraud concerning stolen transportation means and parts. disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is Achieved not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . In the course of the implementation phase of this activity officers were able to identify potential routes of travelling FTFs and stolen vehicles, thus confirming that passenger ferries operating in Mediterranean Sea are being used to facilitate criminal activities and terrorism. • Establish and exchange best practices - Delivering and supporting operational briefings/debriefing to all participants of the JO, including information on the fundamental rights and access to international protection. Achieved The Operational Briefing delivered to all participants of the JO the day before the JO started, allowed all participants to have a general overview of the operational area and procedures. Additionally, the booklet on Operationalisation of Common Risk Indicators on travelling FTFs has been provided to deployed sTMs and local officers. . The specific sessions on JORA Application and Utilities and on the Guidelines for the Incident Template provided the basic knowledge to the reporting officers on how to use the application and how to standardise the information inserted in JORA. • Support the protection and compliance with fundamental rights in activities encompassed by the Commented [KB64]: The non-disclosed parts refer to JO FPs 2019 Sea - Support the implementation of procedures whereby the persons in need of details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as international protection, medical assistance, unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking in human the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing beings, and other persons in a vulnerable situation, are referred to the competent protection details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide mechanisms; Refer persons in a vulnerable situation to the competent national authorities for smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, appropriate assistance via Team Leaders/Local Coordinators; Share expertise and best practices enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, related to the protection and compliance with fundamental rights in the performance of border guard the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature tasks; Provide information on Frontex complaint mechanism established under Article 72 EBCG would be hampered by depriving the operations of any Regulation and Frontex Serious Incident Reporting. strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Achieved unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the Information on fundamental rights and access to international protection was provided to the deployed protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No experts by Frontex officers during the operational briefings held on 23-24 August 2019 at the BCPs in the 1049/2001 . ports of Genoa (Italy) and Marseille (France). The Team Members and hosting authorities confirmed that The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the they had understood the information and would act upon it in line with international law. number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information The detection of FTF and those persons suspected of involvement of cross-border crime is embedded within would undermine the protection of the public interest as Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Air, Sea and Land and JO Coordination Points 2019 Land Sea and Air and regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 61/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p61-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 62,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA is considered as a regular activity. This activity also provided an additional platform for the operationalisation of the Common Risk Indicators provided by Frontex Risk Analysis Unit for the identification of FTFs. 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 4.1. Supporting Response 4.1.1. Operational concept Commented [KB65]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As Focal points were activated 1 111111111ii il - ------::; .;.;;;;;; at two seaports in France and Italy identified as potentially relevant from the perspective of FTFs movement in this period of the year. Frontex deployed two sTMs to seaports in Marseille ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to and Genoa who supported national authorities of the Host Member States which were responsible for all disclosing the current state of play. This would provide operational activities related to those locations. Deployed officers were conducting detailed documents smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would checks of the travellers during embarkation/disembarkation of the passenger ferries operating in this area. ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature 4.1.2. Operational results would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their The overall operational results as conducted by Interpol in cooperation with the 3 MS purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of and the 3 Non-EU countries delivered the following results across the whole operational area of Neptune II documents containing such information would undermine the in which the Frontex contributed (see 4.2.2 for information provided by the Frontex deployed Team protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Members): 1049/2001 . - 1,213, 577 searches in INTERPOL databases, (350000 searches in 2018) The non-disclosed part contains detailed information - 31 Nominal hits (15 terrorism related) –5 nominal hits in 2018 regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. - 134 SLTD hits (23 SLTD hits in 2018) Disclosing such information would expose the working - over 500 vessels checked methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus - (15) Terrorism Hits obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it ▪ Spain - (2) Alicante, (4) Motril would undermine the protection of the public interest as ▪ Morocco - (4) Tangier regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No ▪ Italy - (2) Genova, (1) Palermo 1049/2001. ▪ France - (1) Marseille ▪ Tunisia - (1) Tunis 4.1.3. Operational coordination structures The operational coordination structures were established in accordance with the Specific Activity Plan. The FP in Genoa (Italy) and Marseille (France) played a key role in the daily operational cooperation, allowing operational activities to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Specific Activity Plan. The Italian and French authorities appointed one FP Coordinator for each respective Focal Point responsible for leading and coordinating the daily operational activities, in order to ensure the proper implementation of Activity. The TL nominated by the FP Coordinator was responsible of the coordination of duties and tasks performed by deployed sTMs, including advanced level document checks. Regular meetings were organised between the TL and Frontex staff, in order to provide information and updates on the latest incidents, findings, risk factors, operational developments and addressing any particular operational challenges, thus contributing to the proper implementation of the operational concept. 62/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p62-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 63,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4.1.4. Resources deployed Two seconded Team Members with the profile of Second Line Officer (SLO) were deployed to perform Commented [KB66]: The non-disclosed parts contain profiling at Port premises supporting national authorities. Both deployed seconded Team Members and local information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information - officers gave positive feedback in gaining knowledge from each other by sharing experiences and expertise would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and - on subjects related to maritime cross-border crime activities. strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future The contribution from Frontex through deployments of officers in BCPs in Italy and France (Genoa and similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Marseille) was highly appreciated by INTERPOL. France and Italy underlined the very good cooperation with unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure Frontex and the high quality nature of the contribution from the deployed officers, their skills and of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article commitment towards the detection of the FTFs. 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials 4.2. Situational Awareness performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus 4.2.1. Systematic database checks help track down suspects linked to terrorism obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it The European Border and Coast Guard Agency has supported Operation Neptune II. The sea border operation would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed coordinated by Interpol resulted in the detection of individuals with links to terrorism and other crimes, pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No travelling on regular scheduled maritime connections across the Mediterranean. 1049/2001. Building upon the Agency’s involvement in the first operation in 2018, this year Frontex deployed experts at selected sea ports in France and Italy. At the same time, Frontex provides tailored assistance to Algeria, Commented [KB67]: Information cannot be released as it - Morocco and Tunisia in detecting suspect FTFs. refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Operation Neptune II was conducted between 24 July and 8 September and was limited to seven maritime Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would ports in six participating countries, i.e. Algeria, France, Italy, Morocco, Spain and Tunisia. hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Officials at these seaports carried out more than 1.2 million searches against Interpol’s databases for stolen Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external and lost travel documents (SLTD), nominal data*3 and stolen vehicles. These resulted in 31 active borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human investigative leads, with 12 of these cases related to suspects linked to terrorism. beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this Despite the short operational phase and its limited scope, the operation resulted in a notable number of variable would undermine the protection of the public ‘hits’ against Interpol databases. Checking SLTD alone led to at least 130 confirmed matches, although most interest as regards public security and has to be refused were linked to documents that were later used again by their rightful owners. based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The number of matches against nominal data, which resulted from running ferry and cruise ship passengers’ ■ details against Interpol’s databases, was also significant. This exemplifies the need for Interpol member countries to systematically consult Interpol databases. The Schengen Borders Code’s (SBC) requirement to run systematic checks against the SLTD database was an essential development. However, travel documents that have been sold or given to others to be misused, i.e. document fraud, are unlikely to be reported to the authorities as stolen or lost. When implementing the SBC, Member States and Schengen Associated Countries ought to consider the findings of this short operation, especially when applying the various derogations of the SBC, in particular Annex VI on specific check procedures for certain types of shipping. Counter-terrorism efforts require that the international community collectively makes best use of all the systems that we have in place now. UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) emphasises this. Interpol databases provide member countries with an international reach that complements Member States’ national databases and other regional ones, such as the Schengen Information System. 3 personal data and the criminal history of people subject to request for international police cooperation 63/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p63-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 64,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange A total of 16 JORA incidents were reported over the course of the specific activity: 14 incidents were 11 Commented [KB68]: The non-disclosed part contains inserted by Reporting Unit Marseilles, with a further two incidents reported by Reporting Unit Genoa. detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would The overall quality of incident reporting was good, particularly at LCC level, however, the timeliness of jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future incident validation in JORA could be further improved. operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law The daily reports containing overview of the daily activities in which deployed sTMs were involved including enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As operational results were communicated to respective TLs and Frontex on a daily basis as stipulated in disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is Specific Activity Plan. not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Throughout the operational activity, no Serious Incidents were reported in JORA. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. 4.3. Development Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it 4.3.1. Operational cooperation would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Cooperation between Hosting and Participating MS 1049/2001. The cooperation between hosting and participating MS was performed on a very good level. The The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational participating MS showed a strong level of commitment in supporting the implementation of the Activity area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted and reached the required flexibility in case of urgent needs. in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal Cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of It is noted that during the implementation period, INTERPOL coordinated Operational Neptune II in the migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and operational area. Operation Neptune II (Mediterranean Sea) is an initiative led by INTERPOL’s Terrorist future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of Networks Sub-Directorate targeting the movement of FTFs utilizing the maritime route across the surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and Mediterranean Sea, in the framework of the INTERPOL Global Counter-terrorism strategy. prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents INTERPOL deployed officers to 3 EU MS (Spain, France and Italy) and 2 Non- EU countries (Morocco and containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense Tunisia). The officers deployed by INTERPOL and Frontex were closely cooperating on a daily basis while of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No performing border checks including relevant databases and screening passenger manifest data as well as 1049/2001. travel documents. The cooperation with Interpol and the hosting authorities was excellent and it is hoped that this will continue during future implementations. Neptune III planned for 2020 has been cancelled due to Covid-19 but it is expected to take place in 2021. 4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing All relevant documents for the implementation of the activity (SAP, template for daily report…) were uploaded onto FOSS before the beginning of the activity. All participants of the Activity received operational briefings by Operational officers from Law Enforcement Sector along with the deployed Interpol officers on 23rd August 2019 in Marseille and 24 August 2019 in Genoa. During the operational briefing Frontex provided all participants with booklet on Operationalisation of CRI on travelling FTFs. The Operational briefing was complemented by an Interpol representative by presenting their mandate and tasks within the area where the Frontex and Interpol are operating. A full evaluation meeting for Operation Neptune II was organised by Interpol and held at Palermo on 26 September 2019 which Frontex attended. A debriefing was held with the respective seconded Team Members the end of their secondment. 64/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p64-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 65,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 5. Main conclusions and recommendations Conclusions Recommendations Supporting Response Commented [KB69]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law The specific objectives of the operational activity The specific objectives set for the operation were enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the were met. suitable and should be repeated in future working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, implementations. thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the The operational results were extremely good and The exceptional results indicate that the scale of public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of impressive and were far beyond expectations. the problem is significant and the operational area Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. and duration should both be expanded in 2021. The operational coordination structures were The structure should remain the same in 2021 as it found to be very suitable in order to support the has been assessed as being very much fit for activities of the MS authorities involved. purpose. The feedback with regards to the performance of Every effort should be made to recruit either the the Frontex Team Members was very positive and same Team Members as in 2019 or those with a provided great added value. similar background and level of experience in order to maintain the same high level of operational cooperation and esprit de corps as in 2019 Situational Awareness This operation highlights the importance of running Frontex needs to promote and implement EBCG systematic checks against the relevant databases, Agency Regulation Article 40(8) that provides for including ‘nominal data’ via I24/7. Member States to allow access to team members to consult databases. This also in light of Council conclusions (10152/17) on security checks in relation to irregular migration. Development The operational cooperation was excellent and It would be an optimal situation if all the involved the national authorities of the two MS, as participating MS in the Interpol activity could also well as Interpol. agree to host Team Members in the future and every effort should be made to facilitate this. The operational briefings were conducted on It is hoped that next year the briefings will be location at the BCPs concerned and they were conducted in Frontex HQ as it is our intention to conducted in conjunction with the Interpol and expand the level of deployments significantly in the local briefings. future. Due to the short time between the preparatory The preparatory meeting should be held a minimum meeting and the agreement with countries for of 3 months before the operational phase in order operational phase it was more difficult to fully to give all the participants, sufficient time for execute the operational phase in terms of the necessary arrangements prior to implementation of allocation of Team Members and to ensure they the activity. Frontex shall seek to ensure that this were fully briefed and prepared for what was a approach is adopted by INTERPOL unique and unusual operational activity. 65/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p65-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 66,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 1. Time schedule Planning meeting IwithIHost MS 11 - 12/06/2019 Commented [KB70]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Operational briefing for the participants In first days of each deployment enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Implementation of the joint operation 24/08 - 08/09/2019 thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In Evaluation meeting (All-in-one) 27/11/2019 consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 2. Participation 2.1. Participating MS resources Commented [KB71]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information 2.1.1. Human resources would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their Participating MS Human resources Number of Total effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating officers man-days their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure (ITA) Polizia di Stato Second-Line Officer 1 17 of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article (AUT) Ministry of Interior/Police Second-Line Officer 1 16 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . 3. Financial information Focal Point concept and Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea – budget Approved/Estimated on Source of data Amount Approved on 26 September 2019 Activity Initiation and Financial Commitment for 5,727,827.53 € Focal Points concept Estimated on 20 February 2020 Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross- 8,202 € border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea – budget * The amounts are reflecting the state of financial settlements with MS/SAC and Third Countries on 20 February 2020 66/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p66-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 67,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4. Maps Commented [KB72]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 5. List of acronyms Abbreviation Spelling A ALDO Advanced-Level Document Officer C CED Centre for Excellence for Combatting Document Fraud CGLEU Coast Guard and Law Enforcement Unit CRI Common Risk Indicators on Traveling Foreign Terrorist Fighters D DSR Daily Situation Report E EASO European Asylum Support Office EU European Union F FCO Frontex Coordinating Officer FDA Frontex Document Alert FER Frontex Evaluation Report FIMO Frontex Information Management Officer FLO Frontex Liaison Officer FOSS Frontex-One-Stop-Shop FP Focal Point FSC Frontex Situation Centre FRO Fundamental Rights Officer Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency H HR Human resources I 67/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p67-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 68,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA IFC Information Fusion Centre J JM JORA Management JO Joint Operation JORA Joint Operation Reporting Application M MS Member State N NFPOC National Frontex Point of Contact O OA Operational Analyst OIS Operational Implementation Sector OM Operational Manager OPES Operational Planning and Evaluation Sector Opera Operational Resources Management System OPLAN Operational Plan OT Operational Team P PeDRA Personal Data for Risk Analysis R RAU Risk Analysis Unit S SAC Schengen Associated Countries SAP Specific Activity Plan SI Serious Incident SIR Serious Incident Reporting SIS Schengen Information System SOP Standard Operating Procedure T TL Team Leader sTM Teams Members seconded to the Agency 68/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p68-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 69,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA ANNEX – Observations of Fundamental Rights Officer Warsaw, 19.05.2020 FRO Obs. 12/2020 Joint Operations Frontex Evaluation Report JO Focal Points 2019 Sea FRO Observations ➢ No reference to the implementation of Frontex complaints mechanism ➢ Lack of comprehensive fundamental rights related information in order to ensure assessment of compliance with fundamental rights related obligations ➢ No information as to how often referral procedures were activated by deployed officers related to potential victims of THB, children, persons in need of international protection and other persons in a vulnerable situation ➢ No gender and age disaggregated data with regard to migrants and refugees, including undocumented passengers 1. Implementation of JO FPs 2019 Sea 1.1. Frontex complaint mechanism The Frontex complaint mechanism obliges the deployed officers to inform about the complaints mechanism, including information on the complaint form, the privacy statement and relevant leaflets on the applicable procedures to any person who expresses a wish to report an alleged fundamental rights violation against the staff involved in an activity coordinated or organized by Frontex as well as to ensure availability and using the hard copy of the complaint form in operational areas. However, the evaluation report does not make reference to the implementation of Frontex complaints mechanism (leaflets, complaint forms, posters available in the operational areas, information provision, etc.) which would allow FRO to assess its effectiveness and address potential gaps. 1.2. Data collection and fundamental rights related information One of the specific objectives in the specific activity plans is “Delivering and supporting operational briefings/debriefing to all participants of the JO, including information on the fundamental rights and access to international protection”. Except for the reference to the provision of fundamental rights related information during operational briefings in the Specific Activity Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II), the evaluation report does not contain more data which would allow to evaluate impact on fundamental rights of the operation based on comprehensive data collection and not limited only to external and scattered information. 1.3. Identification and referral of vulnerable persons The evaluation report does not contain any information as to how often referral procedures for potential THB victims, children, persons in need of international protection and other persons in a vulnerable situation were activated by deployed officers. It is of particular importance given that, according to the evaluation report, there were incidents related to trafficking in human beings during operational activities. 1.4. Gender considerations FRO notes that the evaluation report does not reflect on gender composition of the Team members nor groups of refugees and migrants arriving at the EU external borders. Having in mind low numbers of women officers in other operations, FRO constantly encourages the respective entities to take and implement measures, including with regard to gender sensitive post vacancies for Frontex operational staff, in order 69/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p69-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/153994/?format=api",
"number": 70,
"content": "JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA to address gender specific concerns as provided in the Handbook to the Operational Plan, Sea Border Joint Operations. 1.5. Assessment of general situation in non-EU countries FRO notes that the assessments of the general situation in Turkey and Ukraine were made available to Frontex. Unfortunately FRO was not a recipient of these documents, therefore cannot refer to their content. Nevertheless FRO is aware of worrisome human rights situation in these countries from external sources.4 In this context, FRO welcomes the fact that disembarkation in the non-EU countries was not carried during FX operational activities (within the MMO). 2. FRO recommendations - To conduct an assessment on the extent of the obligations related to the complaints mechanism in the evaluation report as set by EBCG Regulation and operational plan; - To find suitable means for host Member States to collect and report on data in order to reflect in the evaluation reports information based on fundamental rights related indicators, including on the number of referral procedures activated by deployed officers related to victims of THB, children, persons in need of international protection and other persons in a vulnerable situation as well as on sex/gender and age disaggregated data of migratory flows in the Agency’s operational areas and in the ICT tools; - To guarantee that detailed information on national referral mechanisms is provided during the national operational briefings conducted prior to operational activities, in addition to the information available on FOSS; - To support activities of gender mainstreaming of deployment policies with specific awareness sessions to ensure a special attention for gender specific concerns and cultural differences in the Agency’s operational activities. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OFFICER 19 May 2020 4 In particular in Turkey, according to several reports of the independent human rights international organisations, including UN institutions, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/turkey, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/10/turkey-syrians-illegally-deported-into-war-ahead-of-anticipated-safe-zone/, https://www.refworld.org/country,,,,TUR,,5e1732e216,0.html. 70/70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3509,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/9e/68/59/9e6859b8946a49548f6859f44e17b754/page-p70-{size}.png"
}
]
}
