HTTP 200 OK
Allow: GET, PUT, PATCH, HEAD, OPTIONS
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Accept
{
"resource_uri": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"id": 154232,
"site_url": "https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/154232-oplan-themis-2020-main-part_blackpdf/",
"title": "OPLAN Themis 2020 - Main part_black.pdf",
"slug": "oplan-themis-2020-main-part_blackpdf",
"description": "",
"published_at": null,
"num_pages": 35,
"public": true,
"listed": true,
"allow_annotation": false,
"pending": false,
"file_url": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/oplan-themis-2020-main-part2.pdf",
"file_size": 12865475,
"cover_image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p1-small.png",
"page_template": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p{page}-{size}.png",
"outline": "",
"properties": {
"title": "OPLAN Themis 2020 - Main part_black.pdf",
"author": "BugajK",
"_tables": [],
"creator": null,
"subject": null,
"producer": "Adobe Acrobat Pro 2020 20 Paper Capture Plug-in",
"_format_webp": true
},
"uid": "0414a385-9a73-45a1-901b-c7ba1f9261f5",
"data": {},
"pages_uri": "/api/v1/page/?document=154232",
"original": null,
"foirequest": null,
"publicbody": null,
"last_modified_at": "2022-05-09 12:28:38.777635+00:00",
"pages": [
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 1,
"content": "- i=: FRONTEX• EUROP EA N BO RD ER AN D COA ST G UA RD AG EN CY Warsaw, 28 / 01 / 2020 Operational Plan (Main part) JO Themis 2020 This document is not to be disclosed to any third party without the prior consent of the European Border and Coost Guard Agency (Frontex) Approved by Signature Fabrice Leggeri Executive Director 1/ 35 Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www .frontex.europa .eu I Pl. Europejski 6, 00 -844 Warsaw, Poland I Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 I Fax +48 22 205 95 01",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p1-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 2,
"content": "INDEX Contents 1. INTRODUCTION 4 2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 4 2. 1. Frontex 4 2.2. EU and international law 4 2.3. Fundamental Rights 5 3. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION 6 4. OPERATIONAL AIM, OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES 7 (OPERATIONAL CONCEPT) 7 4.1. Operational aim 7 4.2. Operational objectives 8 4.3. Operational activities (Operational concept) 8 5. IMPLEMENTATION 15 5.1. Period of implementation 15 5.2. Operational areas 15 5.3. Host and Participating Member States, third countries, other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations 15 5.4. Operational briefings / debriefings 16 6. COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, OTHER UNION BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 16 6. 1. Cooperation with third countries 16 6.2. Cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organizations 17 7. COORDINATION STRUCTURE 17 7.1. Partnership 17 7.2. Hotspots 17 7.3. Main operational structures/ actors and their tasks 18 8. COMMAND AND CONTROL 19 8.1. Technical equipment 19 2/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p2-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 3,
"content": "8.2. European Border and Coast Guard Teams (Team Members and other relevant staff) 19 8.3. Command and control scheme 20 9. COMMUNICATION 20 9.1. Operational communication 20 9.2. Communication with Press 21 10. REPORTING 21 10.1 . Reporting in JORA 21 10.2. Operational reports of participants 22 10.3. Daily reporting package 24 10.4. Serious incident reporting 24 10.5. Intelligence Report 24 10.6. Frontex Document Alerts 25 10. 7. Reference Manual 26 10.8. Frontex reports 26 11. WORKING CONDITIONS AND LOGISTICS 28 11. 1. Working conditions and working environment of the operational area 28 11. 2. Working time 29 11. 3. Safety and health 29 11.4. Logistics 30 12. EVALUATION 33 12. 1. Member States and Third Countries 33 12. 2. Frontex 33 13. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 33 14. CONTACT DETAILS 34 15. ANNEXES 35 3/ 35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p3-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 4,
"content": "1. INTRODUCTION This Operational Plan, composed of the Main part and Annexes, was agreed with the authorities of the host Member State 2 (MS), in consultation with the participating MS. The Operational Plan, following its approval, shall be immediately distributed by Frontex to the host and participating MS via Frontex-One-Stop-Shop (FOSS). Updates related to the participation in the joint operation (Main part, chapter 5.3.) and the Initial Plan of deployed resources (Annex 7) and contact details are not deemed amendments to the Operational Plan. The Handbook referred to in the Operational Plan contains the guidelines and complementary information regarding Frontex operational activities, services and products, reporting platforms and other joint maritime operations' related matters. References to the Handbook are made in the Main part and Annexes of the Operational Plan. The Handbook to the Operational Plan is uploaded on FOSS. 2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 2. 1. Frontex The European Border and Coast Guard Agency ('Frontex'), based on the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation' (hereinafter 'the Regulation'), ensures, together with national authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, the effective implementation of European integrated border management with a view to managing the crossing of external borders efficiently. Frontex is responsible for organising the appropriate technical and operational assistance for the EU Member States and, in particular, for coordinating joint operations, deploying European Border and Coast Guard teams and technical equipment at the external borders. The Regulation prescribes that Frontex shall provide technical and operational assistance to Member States and third countries, in support of search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea, which may arise during border surveillance operations at sea. The main legal framework, objectives, tasks and responsibilities of Frontex are laid down in the Regulation. 2. 2. EU and international law The following non-exhaustive legal framework applies to the implementation of the activities foreseen in the present Operational Plan: 2 For the purposes of the present document , the term \"Member State\" includes also the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union, that is , Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. 3 Regulation (EU) 2019 / 1896 of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1) 4/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p4-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 5,
"content": "Regulation (EU) 2019 / 1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052 / 2013 and (EU) 2016 / 1624. Regulation (EU) 2016 / 399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) Regulation (EU) 656 / 2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union Regulation (EU) 2018 / 1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45 / 2001 and Decision No 1247/ 2002 / EC General Data Protection Regulation 2016 / 679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95 / 46 / EC (General Data Protection Regulation). Directive 2016 / 680 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention , investigation , detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties , and on the free movement of such data. Directive 2013 / 32 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land , Sea and Air The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms The International Covenant on Ci vil and Political Rights The United Nations Con vention against Torture and Other Cruel , Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child The United Nations Con vention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 2.3. Fundamental Rights 2. 3.1. Frontex's obligations Frontex guarantees the protection of fundamental rights in the performance of its tasks in accordance with the relevant EU law , including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union , the relevant international law, including the Con vention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 , the respect for fundamental rights , in particular the access to international protection , and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement , and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum on fundamental rights. 5/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p5-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 6,
"content": "2.3.2. Obligations of all persons involved in operational activities coordinated by Frontex All persons involved in Frontex activities are obliged to maintain the highest standards of integrity, ethical conduct, professionalism and respect for fundamental rights. They are expected to meet obligations imposed upon them by the provisions of the present Operational Plan and are obliged to comply with the rules of their mandates. They are obliged to comply with European law, international law, fundamental rights and also the national law of the host Member State. 2.3.3. Complaints Mechanism Any person , who is directly affected by the actions or failure to act on the part of staff involved in a joint operation, pilot project, rapid border intervention, migration management support team deployment, return operation, return intervention or an operational activity of Frontex and who considers him or herself to have been the subject of a breach of his or her fundamental rights due to those actions or that failure to act, or any party representing such a person , may submit a complaint in writing to Frontex. The Code of Conduct is available as Annex 1. General instructions on how to ensure the safeguarding of fundamental rights during the operational activity including complaints mechanism are provided in Ann.ex 2. 3. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION As of 31 October 20194, a total of 9 768 migrants have been reported within JO Themis 2019. This represents a 55% decrease compared to the same period in 2018. Roughly 730 out of all migrants arriving in 2019 were reported as secondary movements from Greece inside the EU territories. The number of migrants using the Central Mediterranean route to reach Italy has been decreasing every _ year since 201 ~ -c__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1_ .- ~ ~ Commented [KBl): The information related to this part is also used for the development of risk analyses, which The decreasing trend of arrivals in the Central Mediterranean 1 constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an important in the number of arrivals from Libya in 2019 compared to 2018 can be attributed base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, mainly to the following factors: the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. • The main countries affected by the migration flow from Libya assumed their Consequently, releasing this information would enable third responsibilities in their respective SAR areas. parties to gain insights into this decision making process and, with ascertainable likelihood , result in depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making-processes. As no This approach has reduced the number on NGO vessels performing SAR overriding public interest that is objective and general in operations in the Central Mediterranean route and consequently, the number of disembarkations nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in Italian territory. in the present case, information pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) In 2019, migratory flows affecting the Central Mediterranean from different routes have fallen compared No 1049/2001. to 2018. 4 This assessment refers to the period 1 January - 31 October of 2018 compared with the same period in 2019. 6/ 35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p6-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 7,
"content": "Arrivals ~rom Algeria remain at a similar level as the previous year although the instability in the country Commented [KB2]: Information cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of The top five migrant nationalities registered in the Central Mediterranean region in 2019 were Tunisian ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the (28%) and Pakistani (12%), lvoirians (11 %), Algerians (10%) and Bangladeshi (5%). activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . Th<1 thorough assessm<1nt of the situation can be found as Annex 3. 4. OPERATIONAL AIM, OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES (OPERATIONAL CONCEPT) 4. 1. Operational aim The operational aim of the JO is to provide increased technical and operational assistance to the host MS by coordinating operational activities at the external sea borders in order to control illegal immigration flows , to tackle cross-border crime and to enhance European cooperation on coast guard functions. The operational aim will be implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU and international law, guaranteeing the protection of the fundamental rights in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum and the reports and observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer. The operational plan takes also into consideration the overall Final Frontex Vulnerability Assessments (Baseline Assessment - Emerging Threat Assessment - Simulation Exercise). 7/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p7-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 8,
"content": "4. 2. Operational objectives Enhance border security Technical and operational assistance in SAR Support MS on carrying out coast guard functions (maritime safety, security, SAR, border control, customs control , environmental protection, fisheries control , and general law enforcement) Enhance operational cooperation Support to migration management Enhance collection and exchange of information Identify possible risks and threats Establish and exchange best practices Detailed information regarding operational objectives is provided as Annex 4 . 4. 3. Operational activities (Operational concept) The objectives of the JO will be achieved by combining different types of operational activities, particularly: Border surveillance at sea Supporting SAR operations Preventing and detecting serious crime with a cross-border dimension that is committed or attempted at , along or in the proximity of the external borders with the focus on migrant smuggling , trafficking in human beings, stolen vehicles, smuggling of drugs, weapons, document fraud and terrorism. To support national authorities and EU agencies dealing with fisheries control and environmental protection in the frame of European cooperation on Coast Guard Functions activities. Supporting screening, fingerprinting, registration and documents checks of migrants Reporting relevant document and identity fraud cases (Frontex Document Alerts) under the coordination of the Italian Authorities Collection of information through operational activities. Providing a clear and updated situational picture related to the JO Supporting the identification of special needs of children, unaccompanied minors, persons with disabilities, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons in need of medical assistance, persons in need of international protection, and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation Refer and provide initial information to persons who are in need of, or wish to apply for , international protection Sharing experiences and exchange expertise Facilitating the cooperation with Union agencies , bodies or international organizations, and Third Countries The aforementioned activities will be implemented by the deployed technical equipment and human resources , under the control and command of the operational structures of the Host MS. Data protection requirements for processing of operational personal data are defined in Annex 72 . Commented [KW3]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in 4.3.1. Border surveillance the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Border surveillance shall be carried out by using technical equipment as follows: Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a Aerial assets: Detection / tracking / identification / verification of objects of interest; result , the course of ongoing and future similar operations Maritime assets 11111111111 Detections I tracking / identification / interceptions / would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized ~uppor in the transfer of migrants to the disembarkation areas in emergency circumstances, to be border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such assessed on case by case basis , if requested by ITA Mai and under the coordination of the Italian information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) NCC via ICC Rome first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049 / 2001 . 8/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p8-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 9,
"content": "Maritime assets ( Detections / tracking / identification / pnterceptionL.---- Commented [KW4]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in / support in the transfer of migrants to the disembarkation areas, if requested , under the the operational area. Disclosing such information would be coordination of the Italian NCC via ICC Rome tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations The main tasks of the assets are: would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized Detect, identify, report, track and , when needed, intercept all vessels suspected of carrying border crossin gs. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public persons crossing, circumventing or intending to cross the sea border in an irregular manner, interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) circumvent checks at border crossing points or of being engaged in the smuggling of migrants by first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049 / 2001 . sea in the operational areas, including detections and interceptions of the landed migrants at the disembarkation points Support SAR operations Provide situational awareness in the area of operation by identifying normal and abnormal navigation Respond to witnessed or/ and suspected unlawful activities at the maritime domain (e.g. smuggling of goods; illegal fishing; illicit drug trafficking; environmental pollution) in compliance with the applicable international and national legislation and report to the ICC / LCC all relevant information on the suspected or / and detected unlawful activity , including type of activity (e.g. illegal fishing), as well as other important information such as: position, route, track, speed , identification , allowing the national authorities' prompt reaction and predisposition of tailored countermeasures Prevent and detect cross-border crime In compliance with the national legislation, including the applicable national provisions on data protection , the assets must properly document all actions (detection , tracking and interception) and submit all available materials to the ICC and Frontex as soon as possible. The ICC is responsible to deal with the information received from participants and to channel it to appropriate national and / or international stakeholders in agreement and coordination with the MOI. In each case, Frontex should be informed about the outcome of the actions , after the information has been submitted by participant of the JO. Commented [GDC[S]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations , thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence , it would At the local level Operational Liaison Officer-Technical Equipment (OLO-TE) of the respective Italian undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to authorities will be assigned to each asset executing patrols. LO-TE support the Commanding Officer Article 4(1 ) (a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001. within their area of expertise and serve as link with the coordination centres. The patrolling schedule must be flexible and prepared taking into account the capabilities of the participating assets, the analytical findings presented in the operational area, the contribution by the 10, the sea and the weather conditions. - 9/ 35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p9-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 10,
"content": "Flexibility in the patrolling schedule is a key element ; participating assets can be requested by the ICC to by each participating asset regarding the activities carried out during the previous 24 hours will be presented e very day Commented [KB6): The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and ~aritime and aerial assets~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As Maritime assets should be deployed to patrol daily disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 . Commented [GDC[7): The non-disclosed parts contain The host MS specifies the measures of control and constraints to be taken by the maritime assets of the detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. participating MS in the frame of interceptions based on its legislation related to the control of migrants Di sclosing such information would expose the working and the relevant provisions of international and EU law. methods applied in ongoing and future operation s, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this were to happen , public security would be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties , e. g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual position s and movement Terrestrial assets patterns. This would open way for abuse , as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years . Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks , enabling them to change their modus operandi and , consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operation s: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (E C) No For the purposes of the JO , Frontex can deploy \"Frontex vehicles\" , which are: 1049 /2001. Frontex owned vehicles: specialized vehicles such as I or any other type of vehicles purchased by Frontex. Frontex leased vehicles: patrol cars or any other type of vehicles leased by Frontex. Frontex co-owned vehicles: vehicles jointly owned by Frontex and a MS Authority / EU Agency. Frontex Patrol Cars Standard Operating Procedures are available on FOSS and distributed to TM along with taking over Frontex vehicles in the operational area . 4. 3.2. Technical and operational assistance to SAR operations Member States shall observe their obligation to render assistance to any vessel or person in distress at sea and they shall ensure that their participating units comply with that obligation , in accordance with 10/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p10-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 11,
"content": "international law and respect for fundamental rights under the coordination of the responsible RCC. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found. 4.3.3. Advanced documents checks Advanced-Level Document Officers (ALDOs) can be deployed for thorough examinations of all kinds of documents relevant to border control tasks. The ALDO will collaborate with the local authorities - The main task of deployed ALDOs is to support local authorities on assessing the authenticity of inspected documents, to establish whether those are presented by the rightful holder and to provide support to the first and second line officers or screeners. In line with the applicable Standard Operating Procedures on the reporting, validation and dissemination of Frontex Document Alerts, deployed ALDOs might be requested by the hosting authorities to produce document alerts with the aim of reporting information on relevant cases to the Agency for further dissemination. Commented [GDC[S]: The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Disclosing such information wou ld expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this were to happen , public security would be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 4.3.5. Collection of information through debriefing of migrants and operational reports In view of the multi-purpose 11 /3 5",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p11-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 12,
"content": "Commented [GDC[9]: The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Di sclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this were to happen , public security would be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. - 4. 3.6. Preventing, detecting and combating cross-border crime including the cooperation within the EU Policy Cycle / EMPACT Given its activities at the external borders , Frontex operational activities should contribute, where it is appropriate for it to act and where it has obtained relevant information through its activities, to preventing , detecting and combating serious crime with a cross-border dimension, such as migrant smuggling , trafficking in human beings and terrorism , All operational activities of the agency contribute to the detection , prevention and combating of various types of serious crime with a cross-border dimension that is committed or attempted at , along or in the proximity of the external borders. Those activities include Coast Guard Functions at the maritime domain. 12/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p12-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 13,
"content": "Operational activities by Frontex support the implementation of the strategic and operational objectives of the EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime related to European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). This could include, inter alia, implementation of the EMPACT Operational Actions by means of different activities by Frontex entities, Frontex's support in initiating, organising and facilitating of the planning, implementation and evaluation of Joint Action Days (JAD) and EMPACT Action Days (EAD) as well as Frontex's participation in their implementation by Joint Operations. Additional support could be provided by Frontex in facilitating and organising visits of relevant experts other than Members of the Teams . For JADs/EADs implemented within this framework, an Action Plan will be prepared and disseminated to the participants. In the framework of the above mentioned Joint Action Days and EMPACT Action Days Frontex may cooperate with the variety of eligible partners, especially law enforcement agencies from EU Member States, other EU Agencies and relevant international organizations. JADs may be implemented under two or more of the respective EMPACT Priority Operational Action Plans (OAP) 2020 in which Frontex participates (Facilitated Illegal Immigration; Trafficking in Human Beings; Cocaine, Cannabis and Heroin ; Synthetic Drugs and New Psychoactive Substances; Environmental Crime; Organised Property Crime; Firearms; Excise Fraud; Non Cash Payment Fraud) as identified as operationally necessary during the Joint Operation. JADs may also be implemented under the cross-cutting Document Fraud EMPACT Priority in combination with at least one of the above priorities. The aforementioned activities shall be planned in close cooperation with the Italian Mai. 4.3.7. Multinational border and coast guard teams/ crews During the JO the multinational border and coast guard teams I crews composed of the officers from several MS may be deployed to the operational area, if agreed by the respective MS and Frontex.The multinational coast guard crews would be deployed on the asset of the respective participating or host MS. In addition, the European Coast Guard Functions Officers deployed by Frontex, and/or representatives of other Agencies engaged in implementation of European cooperation on coast guard functions (EMSA, EFCA) can be deployed in the International Coordination Centre (ICC) or on board of the respective assets to facilitate the implementation of the European cooperation on coast guard functions. 4.3.8. Contributing Frontex projects, products and services The JO will serve as a platform for implementation and integration of other Frontex activities and capacity building initiatives contributing to the operational activities, after consultation and approval by the host MS. 4.3.8.1. Staff exchange Staff exchange will be implemented in the framework of the JO in order to enhance netwo rking of the officers from the MS and TC to acquire knowledge, experiences and best practices abroad by familiarizing / working together with the respective personnel of the host MS and TC and the deployed officers. Commented [GDC[lO]: The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this we re to happen, public security would be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 13/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p13-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 14,
"content": "4.3.8.3. VEGA Handbook: Children at sea borders - Children at risk on the move - Guidelines for Border Guards More emphasis to be put on protecting children and unaccompanied minors rights at the external maritime borders as well as ensuring special needs of persons in need of international protection , persons in distress at sea and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation. In this regard , \"VEGA Handbook: Children at sea borders - Children at Risk on the Move. Guidelines for Border Guards\" to be fully utilized. This Handbook focuses on how to detect children at risk of being trafficked or smuggled through seaports or following the rescue operations at sea, aiming to identify the best practices and recommendations for the border guards in this regard and to refer the respective children to welfare and child protection agencies by applying the standard operational procedures at seaports , landing points and Identification and Registration Centres. VEGA Handbook: Children at sea borders - Children at risk on the move - Guidelines for Border Guards are available on FOSS . 4.3.8.4. Handbook on Risk Profiles on Trafficking in Human Beings More emphasis to be put on victims of trafficking arri ving at the external maritime borders as well as increase the possibilities of Team Members to identify potential cases of THB. The Handbook is developed to support officers deployed to the JO , with the early identification of victims of THB , but also perpetrators crossing an external border together with the victims. The aim is to support local authorities in the identification of victims of these nationalities, and provide the overview of the trafficking process, starting with the information on the recruitment of victims , modus operandi of the criminal networks, and the victims ' situation in the EU . The Handbook on Risk Profiles on Trafficking in Human Beings is available on FOSS. Commented [KWll]: The non-disclosed part contains 4.3.8.5. detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Eurosur Fusion ~ervice ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties . Disclosing such information would e xpose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, The Eurosur Information Services thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of c ross- are available via the Eurosur Network and the JORA Visualization Module. border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public may be activated to support the maritime surveillance activities after interest as regards public security and thu s, cannot be consultation and approval by the host MS. disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )( a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001. Commented [GDC[12]: The non-disclosed part contains 4. 3.8.5.1. Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance services. detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of thi s information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and In 2020 and in the broader context of European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) , Frontex will harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at continue to guarantee an appropriate level of situational awareness in the EU pre-frontier areas, by curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks in volved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in ensuring the provision of common application of surveillance tools - Eurosur Fusion Services. human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as Among others , one of the aims of these surveillance tools is to provide an early warning mechanism , in regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No order to facilitate / enhance the reaction capability put in place by the adjacent JO. 1049 / 2001 1• The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the One of these services with particular relevance for the pre-frontier surveillance , is the technical equipment deployed in the operational area. - - service. Using Frontex aerial surveillance capacities , Frontex shares the information Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing collected - in real-time with the neighbouring Member States via the official EUROSUR channels. the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result 1 the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered , In case of sighting of a distress situation , the SAR Convention 1979 is applied and the responsible Maritime ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) is directly notified. In addition, the neighbouring MRCCs may be Consequently, the disclosure of such information would informed. undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/ 2001. Additional information on EFS can be received [via email and is available in the Handbook. 14/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p14-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 15,
"content": "More information on other Frontex projects, products and services is available in the Handbook . 4.3.8.6. Pilot Project on testing a new model for the deployment of members of European Border and Coast Guard teams to external borders The JO may serve as a platform for implementation of the Pilot Project on testing a new model for the deployment of the Team Members of the European Border and Coast Guard, seconded to the Agency (sTMs). The deployments of the sTM shall be accomplished in accordance to the provisions of the operational plan and the rules for the deployment of sTM. 5. IMPLEMENTATION 5.1. Period of implementation Commencement 29 January 2020 12:00 (local time) Termination 27 January 2021 11 :59 (local time) REMARK: The Regulation provides for the establishment of a European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps. The deployment of the operational staff of the Standing Corps in the operational areas (in MSs and! or in TCs) shall take place as of 1 January 2021. The relevant provisions shall be introduced as an amendment to this operational plan before their deployment. 5.2. !operational areas.L_________________________~~ Commented [GDC[13]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature wou ld be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1 1049 /2001 • ■ Detailed information regarding operational areas is provided as Annex 5. 5.3. Host and Participating Member States, third countries, other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations Host Member State Italy Participating Member States Austria, Belgium , Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia , Finland, France , Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway , Poland , Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain , Switzerland Third Countries Not foreseen 15/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p15-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 16,
"content": "The European Commission (COM), European Asylum Support Office (EASO) , the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) , the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) , the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL) , the Other Union institutions, bodies , European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) , the offices and agencies European Union Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) , the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) , European External Action Service / Common Security and Defence Policy Mission (EEAS / CSDP Mission) EUNAVFOR MED International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), United International organisations Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) REMARK: Any changes related to the involvement of the entities above, with t he exception of the Host MS , occurring in the course of the JO do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan . Any change will be agreed between Frontex , the host MS and the respecti ve new parties during implementation phase of the JO. It is noted that the United Kingdom may withdraw from the European Union in 2020. Detailed information regarding the initial plan of deployed resources is provided as Annex 7. 5.4. Operational briefings / ldebriefing_' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----- Commented [KW 14]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tool s and methods All participants taking part in JO will receive the Operational briefing (during the first days of used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal acti vities . Its disclosure would deployment) and debriefing (last day of deployment) delivered by rep resentatives of Frontex and national jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future authorities of host MS. The debriefing can be covered by filling and sending the template operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of Detailed information regarding operational briefing and debriefing is provided os Annex 8. the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001. 6. COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, OTHER UNION BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 6. 1. Cooperation with third countries Frontex may invite border guards / coast guards / police officers etc. from third countries (TC) , to be deployed as TC observers in the JO , after the prior consultation and agreement of Italian authorities and according to Article 78(2) of the Regulation. TC observers , who have no executive powers and , who are not authorised to take any measures , will recei ve appropriate operational briefing and debriefing delivered by Frontex. TC observers shall not transmit to the deploying TC authorities' personal data to which they had access while acting in their observer role. Staff Exchange (4 .3.8.2) contains a possibility to invi te TC border guards / coast guards / police officers etc. to attend short-term visits to the operational area , without operational tasks . 16/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p16-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 17,
"content": "6. 2. Cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organizations Detailed information about cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or International organizations within maritime domain is provided as Annex 9. 7. COORDINATION STRUCTURE 7. 1. Partnership Frontex coordinates the JO via a Coordinating Officer who is acting on behalf of the Agency in all aspects of the deployment of the European Border and Coast Guard teams. The Ministry of Interior, as National authority in charge for the coordination of the Italian Polizia di Stato, Guardia di Finanza , Guardia Costiera , Arma dei Carabinieri and Marina Militare as regards immigration matters , is the direct partner of Frontex and responsible for all border related activities within the JO. The mentioned national law enforcement authorities are directly responsible for their operational implementation within the mentioned coordination. The participating MS will support the achievement of operational objectives and implementation of activities by deploying their resources to the defined locations of the operational area in particular periods of time. All the acti vities are coordinated by the International Coordination Centre (ICC), according to the allocation of tasks by the NCC in accordance with the Regulation and existing agreements and national law provisions in matter of fisheries control and environmental protection , without prejudice to the prerogatives of the national operational chain of command and control specific to each participating MS. In case of SAR incidents, the activities will be executed under the planning, coordination and guidance of competent Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC). 7. 2. Hotspots Commented [KW15]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As A Hotspot means an area in which the host MS, the European Commission , relevant Union agencies and ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as participating MS cooperate with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory the operations conducted in preceding years , disclosing challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arri ving at the external details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide borders. smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi , which would The European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF), coordinated by the European Commission, f ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature established in - • Italy, and serves as a platform for the European Commission, EASO, Europol, would be hampered by depriving the operations of any Eurojust and Frontex to coordinate their actions in close cooperation with the national authorities. strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of document s containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information 7. 2.1. Migration management support teams regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties. Migration Management Support Teams (MMST) , composed of experts from MS and deployed by Frontex, Di sclosing such information would expose the working the EASO , Europol or other relevant Union agencies , are deployed at the hotspots. methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effecti veness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence , it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus , cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)la) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001. 17 / 35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p17-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 18,
"content": "7. 3. Main operational structures/ actors and their tasks 7. 3. 1 . Member States National Coordination Centre (NCC) - International Coordination Centre ( I ~ ICC Coordinator - Officer of Italian Guardia di Finanza (GdF) National Official (NO) - Officer of home MS deploying maritime and aerial assets Intelligence Officer (10) - Officer of Italian Polizia di Stato (PdS) Intelligence Officer (10) dedicated to PeDRA - Officer of Italian Polizia di Stato (PdS) Joint Coordinating Board (JCB) - ICC Coordinator, 10, NO , OLO , FOC, etc. Team Members (TM) - officers deployed by the participating MS Officers of the host MS - at the central and local levels Commanding Officer (CO) - Commander of assets JST I JDT Team leaders - Officers of Polizia di Stato (PdS) Interpreters Local Coordination Centre [(LCC) ~ --- Commented [GDC[16]: The non-disclosed parts refer to LCC Coordinator - Officer of Italian Guardia di Finanza (GdF) details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as Italian Guardia Costiera Operational Liaison Officer (OLO) - Officer of Italian Guardia Costiera the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing (GC) details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide Italian Navy Operational Liaison Officer (OLO ) - Officer of Italian Navy (Marina Militare ) smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, Italian Carabinieri Operational Liaison Officer (OLO) - Officer of the Italian Carabinieri (CC), in enabling them to change their modus operandi , which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, case of need. the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature Operational Liaison Officer for Technical Equipment (OLO/TE) - Officer of Italian Guardia di would be hampered by depriving the operations of any Finanza (GdF) and if necessary from the Guardia Costiera (GC). strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Team Leaders - Officers of Polizia di Stato unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in 7.3.2. Frontex the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Frontex Coordinating Officers (FCO)- Field Deployment Unit (FDU) 1049/2001 Operational Managers (OM) of 015 and OPES and Operational Team (OT) - FDU Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC) Frontex Support Officer (FSO) Frontex Information Management Officer (FIMO) FSO for Logistics and Deployments (FSO-FLD) European Coast Guard Functions Officer (ECGFO) Operational Analyst (OA) - Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) Personal Data Analyst (PDA) - RAU Debriefing Advisor (DA) - RAU Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) Information Fusion Centre (IFC) Centre of Excellence for Combating Document Fraud (CED) Field Press Coordinator (FPC) Frontex Liaison Officer in Italy (FLO) Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) Operational Liaison Officer at the EUNAVFOR MED Operational HQ (OHQ) in Rome European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF) in - Team Members Seconded to Frontex (sTM) Descriptions of the tasks and specific instructions to the members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams including Rules on Use of Force are defined in Annex 6. General tasks and roles of operational structures I actors are defined in the Annex 10. Contact details of main operational actors are available on FOSS . 18/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p18-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 19,
"content": "8. COMMAND AND CONTROL Commented [GDC[17]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1) (a) first indent of Regulation (EC ) No 1049/2001. In case of requested support from a competent Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) during a SAR event, the coordination of the participating unit is transferred from the ICC to the responsible RCC. The participating units shall inform ICC as soon as possible about any contact with the RCC and actions taken by them. ITCG Fisheries Control Centre will send instructions to the participating units during a fisheries control activity via ICC Rome. In case of pollution report, the competent National Authority (Operational Room of ITCG HQs) shall be informed promptly by ICC Rome. - based in the ICC, as regards to the deployment of the maritime and aerial assets in the operational area, are under the command and control of the respective participating MS. 8.2. European Border and Coast Guard Teams (Team Members and other relevant staff) Command and control of Team Members remain with the competent national authority of the host MS. The host MS nominates officers (Team Leaders) who are in command of the teams. Team Members will carry their duties under the instructions of the officers of the host MS, who have the operational responsibility for the teams assigned. EBCGT members under perform their tasks under the instructions , command and control of Frontex in close cooperation with the host [Msc.·__________________ Commented [KW18]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 19/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p19-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 20,
"content": "Commented [GDC[19]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 9. COMMUNICATION 9. 1. Operational communication Communication flows for operational activities in the operational area communication flow is as follow~:LI- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --~---- Commented [KB20]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information Communication betw een the ICC and Frontex w ill be accomplished via videoconference, e-mail , would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and mobile and fixed line phones and with satellite phones . harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks Communication between all participants of the JO will be accomplished via e-mail, mobile and involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in fixed line phones and video-conferences. human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as Communication between the actors within the central (ICC) and local authorities (LCC / TL) will be regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid accomplished via e-mails, mobile and fixed line phones as well as through video-conferences . down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Communication betw een all assets deployed as well as betw een assets and operational structures 1049/2001 . will be accomplished in accordance with the International Radio Procedure. Furthermore, any other available tool enabling communication among all participants and coordinating structures will be used. Access to the respective JO area on FOSS is granted according to the FOSS access procedure : o Team Members receive access to FOSS after their introduction in Opera; o other participants, who are not introduced in Opera, receive access after submission and authorization of the FOSS User Access Request Form; o sTM to Frontex are granted FOSS access by default, unless otherwise is requested by the . . . FCO/Operational Manager. Detailed information about communication and FOSS is provided in the Handbook . 20/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p20-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 21,
"content": "9. 2. Communication with Press Frontex is strongly committed to the principle of transparency. Therefore , as a rule, media should be granted access to operational areas. Participants of the JO are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by specific guidelines for the participating officers and following a briefing by Frontex Media and Public Relations Office. Each team participant taking part in the operation shall receive a laminated card with the specific guidelines. A network of responsible Media and Public Relations officers of all involved authorities will be established and all contact details shall be sent to the press.office@frontex.euro pa.e u email address . A compiled list will be distributed to all parties involved. The approach to communication on border control activities on the territory of Italy is common for Frontex and the host MS. Frontex and Italy shall nominate Media and Public Relations officers , who will be entirely responsible for coordination of all matters related to interview requests, press visits to the operational area and any other press-related matter related to JO . Press visits of international media will be facilitated by Frontex in coordination with the Italian authorities following established procedures with the Italian NFPOC. Frontex Media and Public Relations Office may arrange, upon agreement with the host MS , the deployment of a Field Press Coordinator. Embedment of journalists on board of Frontex assets will be planned in ad vance between Frontex Media and Public Relations Office , Ministry of Interior of Italy and JO Themis Operational Team, giving priority to the operational needs. Frontex communication policy , rules and guidelines for handling media requests are available in the Handbook . The contact details of Frontex Media and Public Relations Office members (Spokesperson) and the relevant Media and Public Relations Officers of the national authority of the host MS are available on FOSS . 10. REPORTING 10.1 . Reporting in JORA The information is collected within the framework of the joint operation via JORA by officers assigned by the host MS or deployed in the operation by other participating MS, as follows: Border-related incidents occurred in the operational areas are reported via the Incidents template; Incidents outside the operational area , but particularly relevant for implementation of Frontex mandate; Screening, registration , fingerprinting and documents forgeries' detections are reported via the Identification and Registration template; Debriefing interviews are reported via the debriefing template. Intelligence report template for information and operational personal data related to suspects of cross-border crime, including terrorism, that are collected in operational activities, other than debriefing 21 /35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p21-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 22,
"content": "In case the system is unavailab le to users, the ICC shall immediately report the unavailability to the FSC. A decision will be promptly made in Frontex and communicated back to the users. JORA actors, reporting structure and timelines are described in Annex 11 . JORA incident template attributes list, comprehensive information on JORA and the examples of reporting templates are provided in the Handbook . JORA Guidelines and the reporting templates in Microsoft Office Word format are available in FOSS . Commented [KB21] : The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would - jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law ■ enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. - 22/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p22-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 23,
"content": "Commented [GDC[23]: The non-disclosed part contains - detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as -- regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid - down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Commented [KB22] : The non -disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 . - -■ - Reporting Procedure for Incidental Sightings of Potential Marine Pollution from Ship Source and/or Offshore Installations during Frontex Maritime Joint Operations is available on FOSS . All templates of operational reports of participants are available on FOSS . 23/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p23-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 24,
"content": "Commented [KB24]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods The Daily reporting package shall be prepared by the ICC Staff and shall consist of the reports indicated used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would in the chapter above. jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and The ICC is responsible for the dissemination of the Reporting Package trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a ) first indent of Regulation 10.4. Serious incident reporting (EC) No 1049/2001 . The reporting of serious incidents (SI) must be in line with the reporting structure of the operation. Type of report Description Responsibility Initial Serious Incident A Serious Incident All participants of Report the JO caused by human action , may negatively affect, or be relevant to a particular Frontex activity, the safety and security of participants in Frontex activities , the Agency's mission and reputation , or any combination thereof. Sis also include situations of possible violations of European Union (EU) acquis or international law, in particular related to Fundamental Rights (FR) and international protection obligations. Finally, Sis include any violation of the Frontex Code of Conduct (CoC) applicable to all persons participating in Frontex operational activities. A formal SIR shall be reported in JORA and sent as soon possible, and at the latest within 24 hours, via Commented [KB25]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by email to the law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials ' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks The Serious Incidents Reporting procedure including Serious Incidents Catalogue is available in the involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in Handbook . human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid 10. 5. Intelligence Report down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 /2001. The Intelligence Report allows officers deployed in the JO to report to Frontex information and operational personal data related to suspects of cross-border crime, including terrorism, that were collected during the operational activities. The report can be produced by any participant of the JO for the exception TC Observers. Frontex and Italy as the host MS have agreed that the TM deployed in this JO will be able to use the Intelligence Report on the categories of operational personal data that will be collected and reported to Frontex. All experts using the Intelligence Report will collect information only in accordance with the activities assigned for their profile and only under the supervision of the host Member State authorities. 24/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p24-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 25,
"content": "Commented [KB26]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law . The enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As reports containing operational personal data will undergo a Legality check conducted by the PeDRA team. disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not Depending on the results of the checks, the reports will be either accepted and the data will be further disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation processed or rejected back to the Intelligence Officer with the request to remove the operational personal (EC) No 1049/ 2001 . data that are not in line with the annex on the operational personal data collection Annex. The operational personal data will be processed by Frontex for the following purpose 10.6. Frontex Document Alerts Frontex Document Alerts (FDA) shall be reported by the FDA Initiator, acting on authorisation from the hosting authorities. The FDA initiator can be any participant of the JO from host and participating MS, as f,.,el as TC Observers under instructions from and in the resence of the relevant officer of the host MS , Commented [KW27]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers who meets the requirements of deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information Document experts from the Frontex Centre of would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and Excellence for Combating Document Fraud may also act as FDA Initiators when deployed to Joint strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result , the course of ongoing and future Operations or field missions. similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049 / 2001. Commented [GDC[2B]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings . In con sequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation In order to determine the existence of the aforementioned conditions, the FDA initiator shall consult the (EC) No 1049/ 2001. 1 respective local officer of the host MS, check existing alerts and databases and assess the case using his / her personal experience , knowledge and skills (expert judgement). There are three categories of Frontex Document Alerts that shall be reported using the following three templates: 25/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p25-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 26,
"content": "Commented [GDC[ 29]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working met hods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public secu rity and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 1 FDAs shall be completed only in English and shall not contain any personal data (those shall be redacted). The FDA is reported in accordance to chapter 10.2. Compiled FDAs are vali dated by the Frontex Centre of Excellence for combating Document Fraud. The FDA HelpDesk is available via phone and via email to support FDA initiators. All templates for reporting FDA are available on FOSS . Contact details of the FDA HelpDesk are available on FOSS . ·s the Frontex document specimen and forgery library containing up-to-date infor mation on travel and identity documents and border stamps to first and second line officers. More information on FDA and is available in the Handbook 1°. 10.8. Frontex lrepor -c__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~~ - Commented [KB30]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing th is information would undermine the protection of - the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement -- officials ' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) fi rst indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. '° More information is available in the Handbook. 26 / 35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p26-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 27,
"content": "-- Commented [KB31]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not -- disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' wo rk in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 . - - 27 /35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p27-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 28,
"content": "11. WORKING CONDITIONS AND LOGISTICS 11. 1. Working conditions and working environment of the pperational are.,__ _ ____ Commented [GDC[32]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As The working conditions and environment vary according to the place of deployment (ICC, EURTF, hotspots ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing and other deployment areas within the operational area). details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to • disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001 1• The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence , it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus , cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001. I The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result , the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/ 2001. Detailed information on each of the workplaces of all main locations within the operational area of the JO are available at FOSS. 28/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p28-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 29,
"content": "11 . 2. Working time 11.2.1. Team Members The working time of the Team Members (TM) of the JO is managed by the host MS, which is in charge of issuing instructions to the participants of the JO during their deployment to the operational area, according to the Regulation. The working time rules shall be in full compliance with the relevant EU legislation. Host MS prepares the duty rosters or equivalent defining the working time and the days off and keeps the relevant records. These records shall be made available to Frontex and the respective participating MS upon request in accordance with the relevant data protection provisions. Taking into account the nature and scope of the JO, the deployed TM are requested to acknowledge the need for flexibility in case of unprecedented migratory flows or other unforeseen operational needs. 11.2.2. Interpreters The number of wo rking days and conditions for interpreters directly contracted by Frontex is reflected in the Framewo rk Contract (FWC) for provision of interpretation and cultural expertise services. For Interpreters deployed directly from participating MS the rules for Team Members apply. Taking into account the nature and scope of the JO, the deployed Interpreters are requested to acknowledge the need for flexibility in case of unprecedented migratory flows or other unforeseen operational needs . 11. 3. Safety and health 11.3.1. Frontex \"'Occupational health and safety - deployment information\" Basic sanitary behaviour is crucial especially for avoiding the exposure to infectious diseases. Therefore , each participant of the JO should follow the eight 'Golden Rules' defined in Frontex provided brochure \"Occupational health and safety - deployment information\" available on FOSS. Participants of the JO are expected to show up on duty physically and mentally fit for duty, in order not to jeopardise the safety and health of themselves or others. Frontex closely monitors any development in the field of safety and health and will provide additional information in case of need. Frontex brochure \"Occupational health and safety - deployment information\" available on FOSS . 11.3.2. Usage of Frontex provided sanitary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) While on duty, participants of the JO should use Frontex provided sanitary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) including basic First Aid kit. Each participant of the JO has to be aware about their personal responsibility as a last resort of ensuring proper occupational safety and health protection , including the usage of PPE and service gear. 11.3.3. Vaccination Vaccination is a basic tool in the prevention of contagious and infectious diseases. Based on the epidemiological situation, international recommendations and experience gathered from operational areas, vaccination against the following diseases is highly recommended for all participants of the JO: 29 / 35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p29-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 30,
"content": "Poliomyelitis, Diphtheria , Tetanus, Pertussis, Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, seasonal Influenza , Measles / Mumps / Rubella, Varicella / Chickenpox and Neisseria meningitis ACWY. For duties with increased risk of contact with Tuberculosis (e.g. hotspots, mass-migration-management settings) also vaccination against Tuberculosis is recommended. 11.3.4. Access to health care and public health events Sick and / or injured Frontex deployed personnel shall have equal access to all necessary medical and psychological support , regularly facilitated by the European Health Insurance Card scheme (EHIC ) or equivalent , as equally provided to the host MS officers. Participating MS / TC are responsible for adequate insurance coverage for their respective deployed personnel, while Frontex covers such costs via the applicable financing scheme based on daily rates / unit costs , in accordance with chapter 11.3.6. For seconded Team Members the European Commission complementary mission insurance is applicable (CIGNA/ AIG policy No 2.004.760). Host MS shall guarantee that in case of any potential public health event , also Frontex deployed personnel is taken into account for any envisaged measure (e.g. vaccination campaigns, health risk awareness campaigns). 11.3.5. Medical evacuation Medical evacuation of the deployed personnel falls under the responsibility of the participating MS/TC. Participating MS / TC are responsible for adequate insurance coverage for their respective personnel, covering medical evacuations. For seconded Team Members the applicable European Commission complementary mission insurance (CIGNA/ AIG policy No 2.004.760) is covering medical evacuation. 11.3.6. Safety and health related costs The daily rates paid by Frontex to the participating MS include inter alia the costs for health care , insurance and additional vaccinations. Participating MS are , therefore , encouraged to utilise them also for this purpose. 11.4. Logistics Prior arri val, Team Members and Interpreters deployed by the MS, via respective NFPOC , are advised to contact their colleagues already deployed in the operational area to arrange the transfer to the hotel. If this solution is not possible the NFPOC should contact the respective FSO and request support. The Interpreters deployed under the Frontex Framework Contract (FWC) by the contractor shall follow the provisions of the relevant contract. FSO contact details can be obtained via the [operational team at L------ Commented [GDC[33]: The non-disclosed part contains or accessible on FOSS. detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and 11.4. 1. Registration of deployed resources in Opera harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information Prior to the deployment the participating MS shall introduce all information required for issuing would undermine the protection of the public interest as identification document for participants as well as relevant information for the deployment of TE in the regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid Operational Resources Management System (Opera). In addition , when deploying assets, NO , CO , down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 /2001. crewmembers and BSO for terrestrial assets have to be registered in Opera , too (respective HR and TE pools). TC deploying observers shall provide information required for issuing identification document via e-mail , unless they have access to the OPERA system . 30/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p30-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 31,
"content": "More information about Opera can be found in the Handbook . 11.4. 2. Field visits Prior to the deployment of aerial and maritime assets , it is recommended for the participating MS to perform a field visit to familiarize with the operational area , local authorities and service providers. The field visit should be approved by the Operational Manager and agreed with the Italian Ministry of Interior (MOI) and ICC Coordinator in advance. The participating MS may request the Host MS to provide a security assessment regarding the deployment of the TE via Italian NFPoC. 12 11.4. 3. Heavy equipment, firearms and ammunition No later than 20 working days before their arrival, the National Embassy of diplomatic office in Italy has to send an official statement to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting the authorization for an asset (aerial or maritime) carrying their service weapons enter into Italian territo r,l.lc __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~---- Commented [KB34]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would e xpose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thu s, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001. Italian competent authorities will , prior to the arri val of such assets, issue the necessary authorisations to be communicated to relevant authorities. The same information shall be sent also o the National Coordination Centre and to ----- Commented [GDC[35]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by the International Coordination Centre by the National competent law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information Authority. would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and A formal communication will be sent by the Italian Authorities indicating if the request has been accepted harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks or not and the eventual conditions that are to be respected. involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in In any case , even if authorized , after their arrival on board of the assets the operators are not allowed to human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as bring / carry the weapons on the Italian territory and they have to keep on board. regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid As regards the modalities of transportation of the weapons, it will be defined directly between the down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No National Authority competent and the air / sea line company. 1049 /2001. Detailed information regarding transportation of firearms and ammunitions can be found in the Handbook . 11.4.4. Change of crew Before executing the change of crew of asset deployed , the participating MS shall inform Operational Team in due time in order to ensure delivery of the operational briefing / debriefing for the crew members. 11.4. 5. Diplomatic clearance The participating MS deploying aerial and maritime assets should make all necessary arrangements in ad vance to obtain the diplomatic clearance to allow the state aircraft and / or government vessels operated for non-commercial purposes to enter the territory and have access to all airports / ports of Host MS for the duration of the entire deployment. 12 During the field visit , it can be defined what kind of special equipment should be carried by the personnel/crew of the TE, in order to maintain the maximum le ve l of security, al ways according to the legislation of the Host MS and following the instructions of its officials. 31 /35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p31-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 32,
"content": "The participating MS deploying aerial assets must request the needed diplomatic clearances to enter air space of neighbouring Countries (Malta, Greece, Albania and Montenegro). The participating MS should respect the time needed for issuance of diplomatic clearance according to national procedures and submit clearance request for the diplomatic clearance in time in order not to jeopardise the timely start of the mission. The Naval assets must inform in due time the appropriate Italian authorities regarding their planned port visits . Port visits coinciding with celebration periods should be planned well in advance for avoiding issues of lack of place in the port desired. 11.4. 6. Transport, rental cars and accommodation Rental cars shall be approved in ad vance by the Coordinating Officer and related expenses to be included in the respective financial documents. The Coordinating Officer decides on the number of the rental cars per deployment location. The number of the rental cars shall be sufficient to ensure the mobility of the deployed officers within the operational area. Each participant is strongly ad vised to bring his / her driving licence since he / she could be assigned as a second driver within the car rental contract, if such need occurs. Seeking to ensure the effective use of rental cars , the accommodation for all deployed TMs should be arranged as close as possible to the working place and each other (the list of suggested accommodation is available on FOSS). All practical / logistic issues have to be arranged by participants themselves in ad vance. Frontex will not make any bookings or reservations of the flights, accommodation , etc. Information on recommended accommodation is available on FOSS . 11.4. 7.Refueling of deployed assets Host MS guarantees, to the extent possible, to get the needed clearance from the Customs Office in order the fuel provided to the participating MS deployed assets is tax free. Commented [KB36]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law In addition , upon request, Frontex letter proving participation of the asset in the JO can be provided to enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the the respective MS to facilitate the procedures. working methods applied in ongoing and future operations 1 thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public 11.4.8.Frontex distinctive flags and insignias for the technical equipment interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be Distinctive flags and insignias are affixed to technical equipment (TE) deployed by MS where such disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001. deployment is (co)financed by Frontex as well as TE (co)owned or leased by Frontex as follows: • Frontex flag and insignia to be fixed to the maritime assets • Frontex insignia to be fixed to the terrestrial assets • Frontex insignia to be fixed to Frontex offices and /or other structures where Frontex coordinated operational activities take place 32 / 35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p32-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 33,
"content": "Distinctive flags and insignias will be provided by Frontex in the operational areas. 12. EVALUATION 12. 1. Member States and Third Countries Reports Deadlines Shall be submitted to Frontex within 7 calendar days after deployment via distributed to TRU. . email: ■■■■■■■■■- Relevant sections of the report will lb Commented [KW37]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control The template far the report is available on FOSS and in the Handbook tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future Final Operational Report Shall be submitted to Frontex within 15 calendar days after the end of the operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and from Member State trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law set of deployments of the HR and / or light and heavy TE financed under the enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As Grant Agreement. The Report shall be submitted via email address indicated disclosing this information would undermine the protection of in the Grant Agreement for a given MS. the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation Template for the reporting is available on FOSS and Handbook (EC) No 1049/2001. Final Operational Report Shall be submitted to Frontex within 7 calendar days after the end of the last from Third Country deployment of the TC resources financed under the Grant Agreement. The Report shall be ~ubmitted via email Commented [GDC[38]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of thi s information Template for the reporting is available on FOSS and Handbook would put law enforcement official s' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operation s aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks in vo lved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in The final payment will not be processed as long as the Final Operational Reports from MS and TC are not human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information submitted to Frontex. would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 /2001. 12. 2. Frontex Reports Benchmarks Frontex Evaluation The results of the JO will be evaluated and the Frontex Evaluation Report Report (FER) will be transmitted within 60 calendar days after the termination of the JO to the Management Board together with the observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer referred to in Article 47 of the Regulation. FER will be accomplished in line with the indicators of objectives defined in the Annex 4 of the OPLAN and uploaded on FOSS. 13. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS In accordance with the applicable legal framework, Frontex will co-finance the joint operation. Frontex will reimburse eligible costs incurred by participating MS authorities in relation to deployments of human and technical resou rces. 33/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p33-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 34,
"content": "Frontex will be responsible for the preparation of all necessary financial commitments and the preparation of the legal commitments on the basis of the outcome of ABN. Funds will be allocated by means of Grant Agreements (GA) of 1 year duration for the deployment of human resources or of shorter duration (3-4 months) for the deployment of technical resources . Once the grant agreement is issued by Frontex, the grant beneficiary is obliged to countersign it and send it back to Frontex. It is then possible to request pre-financing of 60 % of the estimated budget. Interim payment may be requested after consuming 70 % of the pre-financing. The request for final payment is submitted within 75 days after the end of the activity covered by a grant agreement. Payments shall be made by Frontex within 60 days from the receipt of the request for final payment , notwithstanding any suspension period due to incomplete or incorrect information provided by the beneficiary. Accordingly, Frontex will co-finance the deployments of the Third Country observers within the joint operation , in accordance with Frontex ' s financial rules. For the purposes of legal and financial commitment , Frontex and the Third Country authority mutually sign a Grant Agreement along with the Estimated Budget and General Conditions. Further co-financing details , eligible costs and payment rules for Grant Agreements are analogical to the scheme for EU MS. 14. CONTACT DETAILS Names and ranks of the border guards of the host MS responsible for cooperating with the members of the teams and the Agency are available on FOSS. Contact details of the Frontex coordinating Officers, Operational team members and other Frontex staff involved in the JO are available on FOSS. The contact details of Frontex and host MS staff involved in the coordination , command and control of the JO are integral part of the Operational Plan. Due to evolving nature of the information included , the constantly updated document is stored on FOSS. 34/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p34-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/154232/?format=api",
"number": 35,
"content": "15. ANNEXES Annex 1 Code of Conduct applicable to all persons participating in Frontex operational activities Annex 2 General Instructions on how to ensure the safeguarding of Fundamental Rights during the operational activity including complaints mechanism Annex 3 Thorough assessment of the situation Annex 4 Operational objectives Annex 5 Operational area Annex 6 Description of the tasks and specific instructions to the members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams including Rules on use of force Annex 7 Initial plan of deployed resources Annex 8 Operational briefinQ and debriefinQ Annex 9 Cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international orn.anizations Annex 10 Coordination structure Annex 11 JORA Annex 12 Data protection requirements for the Joint Operation 35/35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/04/14/a3/0414a3859a7345a1901bc7ba1f9261f5/page-p35-{size}.png"
}
]
}
