HTTP 200 OK
Allow: GET, PUT, PATCH, HEAD, OPTIONS
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Accept
{
"resource_uri": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"id": 155453,
"site_url": "https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/155453-lbs-guidelines-final_pad-version/",
"title": "LBS Guidelines final_PAD version",
"slug": "lbs-guidelines-final_pad-version",
"description": "",
"published_at": null,
"num_pages": 110,
"public": true,
"listed": true,
"allow_annotation": false,
"pending": false,
"file_url": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/lbs-guidelines-final_pad-version.pdf",
"file_size": 5330039,
"cover_image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p1-small.png",
"page_template": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p{page}-{size}.png",
"outline": "",
"properties": {
"title": null,
"author": null,
"_tables": [],
"creator": "Microsoft® Word for Office 365",
"subject": null,
"producer": "Microsoft® Word for Office 365",
"_format_webp": true
},
"uid": "0ba7f36a-a36e-451a-ab41-f5b3f2a4bf3d",
"data": {},
"pages_uri": "/api/v1/page/?document=155453",
"original": null,
"foirequest": null,
"publicbody": null,
"last_modified_at": "2022-05-09 14:49:14.488892+00:00",
"pages": [
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 1,
"content": "Land BorderiSurveillance\nLulu reiiitt:\n\n= FRONTEX\n\nEUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p1-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 2,
"content": "EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD TEAMS LAND BORDER SURVEILLANCE OFFICER TRAINING Guidelines for Trainers BORDER GUARD – DIPLOMAT IN UNIFORM __________________________________________________________________________________ 2",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p2-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 3,
"content": "1. Introduction 1.1. General 1.2. Participants of the course 1.3. Trainers of the course 1.4. Training outline 1.5. General assessment strategy and re-sit procedures 2. Practical Guide / Weekly schedule of the course 2.1 General 2.2 Training Logistics 2.3 First training day – Introduction Exercise 2.4 Second training day – Briefing, radio communication 2.5 Exercise in a shift as a Joint Team 2.6 Exercise in a shift with other Joint Teams involved – Complex Scenario 3. ANNEXES ANNEX I – Operational Plan (artificial JO EUROPIA ANNEX II – Handbook of best practice ANNEX III – Scenario I – Checkpoint - THB case (trainers pack) ANNEX IV – Scenario II – Left suitcase – Smuggling case (trainers pack) ANNEX V – Scenario III – Asylum seeker –first aid (trainers pack) ANNEX VI – Complex scenario – Asylum seekers and first aid trainers pack ANNEX VII – Radio communication exercise trainers pack ANNEX VIII – SIR template ANNEX IX – Shift report template ANNEX X – SQF Alignment __________________________________________________________________________________ 3",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p3-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 4,
"content": "1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. General Information These guidelines will explain the idea, content and structure of the course from a trainer’s perspective. It will combine all elements of the Sectoral Qualification Framework, assessment and supporting documents of the training activity. The idea of these guidelines are to ensure that newly assigned trainers or activity managers are able to deliver the course with the same quality standard. It will enhance the understanding of the role as a trainer in a practical, operational and interdisciplinary training approach in a Frontex coordinated training activity. In order to ensure professionalism of the border surveillance officers, it is essential to have high quality, standardized training. The initial developed training has therefore undergone a process of improvements during the recent years, which also takes into consideration the received feedback and recommendations from participants, who have successfully passed this course. __________________________________________________________________________________ 4",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p4-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 5,
"content": "The aim of this document is, to provide trainers a practical guide in every step of the training, and to ensure that the training is delivered equally in every Frontex Partnership Academy location, by adopting the stipulated standards set by Frontex. In these guidelines, trainers will find all documents in order to conduct the training accordingly This document is composed of three elements – introduction, practical guide and annexes. For the delivery of this course it should be taken into consideration that all participants are already trained and experienced border guards on national level. This course is about a Frontex “Joint Operation” with the emphasis on good communication in English and collaboration with team members from other Member States that may have been trained in slightly different ways. The course is about finding best practices in typical land border related activities in a Joint Team under Frontex umbrella. Having in mind that Joint Operations are performed by border guards coming from different Member States, improving and harmonization of knowledge about the EU common rules and procedures is targeted by this training activity. 1.2. Participants of the course By the Management board decision, No: 38/2016, a land border surveillance officer (BSO) is an official of a competent national authority of a Member State, who carries out border surveillance related tasks at the EU external land border. Tasks and Functions of BSO is: • to carry out border surveillance in a designated area at the EU external land • to operate relevant technical equipment • to apprehend persons having crossed or having attempted to cross the border irregularly • to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors • to refer persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation to the competent national authorities of the host Member State • to document all relevant actions by using methods and technology (reports, videos, photos, etc.) • to take part in identification SAR situations and apply necessary measures where SAR measures and actions must be taken. __________________________________________________________________________________ 5",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p5-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 6,
"content": "Required Job Competences for a Border Surveillance Officer (BSO) A BSO has a knowledge and understanding of: • land border surveillance technology, tactics and identification methods • specific national, EU and international legislation, policies, procedures including documentation related to carrying out border surveillance and fundamental rights. A BSO is able to: • conduct border surveillance, selecting appropriate methods, tactics and techniques at land or maritime borders • have and use necessary communication skills and techniques specific to land borders • continuously assess situation and determine the need for further actions • operate border surveillance technology and equipment at land borders. A BSO takes responsibility for: • acting in accordance with the legal frameworks and the guidelines included in the operational plan • ensuring, that interviewed persons in recognisable or claimed need of international protection or special needs as listed in art. 34 (3) of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation are identified and referred to the competent authorities. Eligibility Criteria To be eligible to become a Border Surveillance Officer in the European Border and Coast Guard Teams, a candidate should: • Possess knowledge, skills and competence as described in the “Required Job Competences” • Have an adequate knowledge of English language (equivalent to CEFR level B1) • Prove at least 2 years of professional experience of border surveillance • Have participated in training in relevant Union and international law, including fundamental rights and access to international protection and guidelines for the purpose of identifying persons seeking protection and directing them towards the appropriate facilities. 1.3. Trainers of the course The EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer training is a simulation of a Frontex Joint Operation “in a nutshell”. The role of the trainers should be understood as moderators during the entire learning process of the course, rather than being an “instructor”. __________________________________________________________________________________ 6",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p6-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 7,
"content": "The trainer should keep in mind and respect during the entire activity that participants of the course are experts on national level and nominated by their national authority, fully in alignment with the eligibility criteria for this profile. Assigned trainers should promote a practical, interactive, problem solving and participant centred approach during the entire learning process, which fits to the expertise and experience of the participants. Eligibility Criteria for a trainer in this course • Have an adequate knowledge of English language (equivalent to CEFR level B2) • Experience in participating a Joint Operation - Land Border • Knowledge, understanding and experience of work as a Team Member and ability to teach / instruct new Team Members under this profile • Ability to work in a team • Experience as trainer on national and international level • Preferably participated in EBGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Training provided by Frontex in order to have an understanding of the methodology of this training • Preferably already trained in „train the trainers“ provided by Frontex Important tasks of a trainer • Understand and apply in this course the role as moderator, rather than instructor • Understand the training needs of the trainees; • Apply suitable variations of training methods; • Manage the work of the training group • Arrange the training infrastructure, especially the scenarios in most realistic way • Conduct the training within its constraints and proper time-management • Provide a profound feedback to the performance of the trainees without “only looking for mistakes”. 1.4. Training Outline The course consists of two phases: - Independent learning phase - Contact-learning week. Independent Learning Phase The independent learning phase starts approximately two weeks before the contact week and consists of the European border and coast guard team (EBCGT) pre- deployment online course with an additional chapter for land border surveillance officers, which takes approximately 8 working hours in total. __________________________________________________________________________________ 7",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p7-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 8,
"content": "This independent learning phase enables participants to gain basic information to build upon during the contact phase. Successful completion of online course is needed in order to access contact week. The independent learning phase provides the learners with basic theoretical knowledge for their deployment. Topics like Frontex Code of Conduct, Reporting procedures, complaint mechanism and other relevant information are provided in an interactive way with an assessment. The online course is the essential fundament for the contact-learning phase. During the contact-learning phase, the learners can apply their knowledge in a simulated Joint Operation. Contact-learning phase The contact-learning phase is delivered at a Frontex Partnership Academy over five consecutive working days. This phase is delivered via scenario-based exercises as a simulation of a joint operation (from briefing to debriefing), combining theoretical knowledge and practical exercises. This contact-learning phase is established in an artificial joint operation named “Europia”. The methodology of the contact-learning phase is going from easy to more complex tasks of the Joint Teams: • Briefing of the Team Members • Radio communication exercise • Tactical training in a Joint Team • Exercising in Joint Teams • Exercising in a Shift with Other Joint Teams Involved • Exercising in a Night Shift with Other Joint Teams Involved • Debriefing 1.5 General assessment strategy and re-sit procedures The independent learning phase and the contact-learning phase are taken into account for the assessment of the learner. The successful participation of the independent learning phase enables the learner to participate the contact-learning phase. In case the participant has not passed, or couldn’t get access to the online course (technical reasons, invitation for course came late, legitimate personal reasons), the participant is allowed to finish the online course in the beginning of the contact-learning phase in exceptional case. This is in general regarded as a failure of the course and the additional time is regarded as a re-sit. During the contact-learning phase, the theory of the online course will be brought into practice and the learner has to act in a Joint Team in order to solve typical border related tasks in an artificial joint operation. __________________________________________________________________________________ 8",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p8-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 9,
"content": "Following aspects will be taken into consideration for the assessment during the contact-learning phase: 1. Radio communication exercise 2. Three scenarios related to exercising in a joint team 3. Exercising in a shift with other joint teams involved 4. Exercising in a night shift with other joint teams involved 5. Report writing and reporting procedures Assessment 1. Each scenario shall be assessed on both critical mistakes and minor mistakes. These are in general identified for each scenario. A single critical failure point will be an automatic scenario fail. However, a participant will be allowed to have a number of “minor faults” before they all add up to a fail. For the current scenarios three minor mistakes lead to one critical mistakes, which means failure of the scenario. 2. There should always be at least two trainer/assessors with each team of 3 to ensure that each team member is being assessed at all times. The trainer/assessors will have to take care to be able to observe their designated participants at all times. Feedback 3. Feedback must be on an individual basis. Team feedback is also valuable to cover general performance issues that all should receive feedback on. Individual feedback is essential to identify areas each individual is doing well or is failing to achieve over. It should be given immediately following each scenario so that the participant has the chance to improve in the next exercises. The feedback of the trainer / assessor follows following rules: The trainer encourage the team to discuss all positive and all negative aspects in their performance during the scenario. __________________________________________________________________________________ 9",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p9-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 10,
"content": "Each Team Member should get individually the opportunity to explain why he/she acted in the scenario in the way he/she did. Feedback rules for assigned trainers: The course is all about working in a Joint Team in typical border related scenarios. These scenarios are managed by the trainers and should be organized in most realistic way. After each performance of a team in a scenario, the trainers provide a feedback to the team by respecting following rules: I. After the scenario the team will have a few minutes to reconsider their performance and how they have managed the scenario from their perspective; about what went well and what they would do better in future in a similar case. II. The team presents their conclusion to the trainers without interruption of the trainers; it is important that the team detects misconduct by themselves in order to reach best learning effect. III. Afterwards the trainers will, based on the presentation of the team, provide the team with further tips and hints in order to improve the performance of the team. IV. The feedback should always end positive for a better acceptance of the learning process. Pass-mark 4. Participants can fail one of the scenarios and improve over the next few scenarios so that they pass at the end of the course. 5. The failure of two or more scenario assessments is recorded as a “referred pass”, (which is a kinder way of recording a fail). Intense re-training 6. Once the “Referral” decision (fail) is given to the participant he/she shall be given targeted briefing/re- training on what they need to do in order to pass the re-sit. Re-sits 7. Participants who fail should be able to re-sit the scenario they failed during the week’s course. There is spare time built into the course that should be used to allow this to happen. 8. Re-sits should be about the same scenario subject area (eg smuggling, or human trafficking, or first aid, etc), but it should be a new different scenario from the one originally undertaken. __________________________________________________________________________________ 10",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p10-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 11,
"content": "There is a set of critical and minor mistakes designed for assessment purposes and used by the trainers during the specific scenario. General critical mistakes related to all exercises are: • Officers safety and security, which will lead to life endangerment (examples: transportation of an unchecked person • Un-safe approach to the clients • Misuse of coercive or authority/ exceeding the use of force or violation of individual fundamental rights • Not separating searched from unsearched persons • No checks of ID in database General minor mistakes related to all exercises are: • Reporting to Command Centre in front of a client – discrete surveillance • Un-proper reporting • Neglecting internal and external communication • Without delegation of tasks / division of tasks within the team • Evidence gathering and protection • No dialog/communication with the opponent – not explaining measures or actions to the opponent. Trainers assess participants individually, but also take into consideration the performance of the team. __________________________________________________________________________________ 11",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p11-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 12,
"content": "2. PRACTICAL GUIDE 2.1 General Joint Teams perform preventive and repressive tasks, by respecting the main purposes of the surveillance of external borders at places other than border crossing-points and surveillance of these crossing-points outside opening hours: • to prevent, and discourage, unauthorised border crossings • to counter cross-border criminality • to apply or take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally. Border surveillance duties are performed in full compliance of the relevant EU and international law, national laws of the Host Member States, obligations related to access to international protection and fundamental rights. As stated before, the contact-learning phase is organized over five consecutive working days as an extensive simulated joint operation, with a variety of exercises aimed to show the participants how to best perform these tasks and fulfil their duties. __________________________________________________________________________________ 12",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p12-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 13,
"content": "During the contact-learning phase, the trainers and trainees are in national uniform, ready for border guarding (fully equipped, without real weapons, but with artificial training weapons). Working days are organized from 9:00h to 17:00h (4x1,5 hour timeslots) with two coffee breaks and lunch break. Due to organizational issues with availability of training logistics, the agenda could be slightly amended, but it should be announced in advance to participants. The training is conducted at premises of a Partnership Academy. It is necessary to create and provide each team with a map of the area. When selecting locations for specific exercises, it is important that the locations are suitable to the content of the exercise and allows to achieve the respective learning outcomes. __________________________________________________________________________________ 13",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p13-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 14,
"content": "Example of the weekly schedule: EBCGT LBS Training 2019 First day Second day Third day Fourth day Fifth day 09:00 Operational 09:00 Exercising 09:00 Exercising in 09:00 - Briefing - in Join - a shift with - Debriefing 10:30 (only for training) 10:30 Teams 10:30 other Join 10:30 - General Specific Teams part shift involved- - National schedule parallel part available feedback of reports Coffee break 11:00 11:00 Exercising 11:00 Exercising in 11:00 - Radio - in Join - a shift with - Debriefing 12:30 communication 12:30 Teams 12:30 other Join 12:30 exercise Specific Teams shift involved- schedule parallel available feedback of reports Lunch break 13:30 13:30 13:30 Exercising 13:30 13:30 - Arrival - Radio - in Join - Compensation - Intercultural 15:00 15:30 communication 15:30 Teams 15:30 time off 17:30 Awareness exercise Specific shift schedule available Coffee break Introduction 15:30 Tactical training 15:30 Exercising 19:30 Exercising in 18:30 Official 18:30 and - in - in Join - a nightshift - Dinner with welcome 17:00 Joint Teams 17:00 Teams 23:00 with other Join 23:00 closure Specific Teams ceremony shift involved and schedule handover available of certificates __________________________________________________________________________________ 14",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p14-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 15,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Example of a training map (in this caseThe the disclosure wouldinundermine training facility the protection of privacy and Valbandon/Croatia): the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with European Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data and therefore has to be precluded pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 15",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p15-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 16,
"content": "2.2 Training logistics In order to create an artificial Joint Operation in a training environment, following logistics are required for this activity: Personal - Minimum 7 trainers (1 in operational centre + 6 for observing the joint teams in the operational scenarios) - 8-10 actors for scenario based role-play exercises Premises - Minimum 2 classrooms (1 for operational centre and 1 for report writing) - Compound for radio communication exercise and 3 scenarios for typical border related situations - Wider area outside of compound for exercising in a shift with other Joint Teams involved - Premises and training area suitable for night shift, low-light exercises Equippment - The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of 7 laptops - law enforcement officials Copy-print-scan device performing border control. Disclosing such information would - expose 18 setstheof working basic methods appliedequipment border guard in ongoing and future (belt, operations, baton, thus handcuff, obstructing artificial weapons, pepper spray, torches, etc.) their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border - crossings. ProjectorIn consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as - 3 service and 1 civilian vehicles regards public - 14 radio sets security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. - Trainer vests, 12x Frontex blue armbands, red armbands for actors - Other equipment described in the scenarios (check Annexes with Trainers packs) 2.3 First training day The first day is scheduled for the arrival of trainers and trainees and the introduction exercise in the evening. During the introduction exercise, the training plan and program are presented to the participants. The intention of the introduction exercise is not only to get acquainted to each other, it is also important to get background information about each participant in order to set up the Joint Teams for the week. It should be a balance between experienced and not experienced officers in each team and it should be ensured that they are not coming from the same country or speak the same native language. This will ensure that all participants have to communicate in English the entire week. The best way to conduct this exercise is to use an “icebreaker game” (quiz, group game, interview,). Basic information, which are relevant for forming teams, are: - country of origin - working experience - gender __________________________________________________________________________________ 16",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p16-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 17,
"content": "- previous participation in Frontex training activities and / or Joint Operations Based on received information trainers will compose 6 patrols (Alfa 1, Alfa 2…. Alfa 6). Participants will work the whole week in the same patrols in order to build a up a team spirit. 2.4 Second training day General and national briefing Second day of the training starts with general and national briefing like in a real Joint Operation. The topics for the briefing are taken from an original Operational Plan and adjusted for the invented artificial country Europia. The aim of this session is also to explain to all participants that a briefing is mandatory and after each briefing all logistical and/or legal issues should be clarified with host Member State in order to be fully operational after the briefing. For example, are there any specific procedures in the host country for using coercive? Where is the storage for the weapon organized? Who are my points of contact? At the end of the briefing, all participant will be divided into the teams (6 patrols). Radio communication exercise starts after the briefing. For this purpose, command center of the JO “Europia” will be established, with minimum 1 trainer as operator. Radio communication exercise For law enforcement officers, communication and reporting are essential tasks in daily duty to: • inform colleagues about an incident or emergency case • gain intelligence • share intelligence with colleagues in order to initiate actions • request support • fulfil obligations to reporting procedures (Serious Incident Report, JORA, etc) • Initiate follow-up procedures like criminal investigations, prevention actions, etc. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials In practice, an performing officer border of the host control. Member Disclosing State alwayssuch informationthe accompanies would expose the deployed working methods applied team members. However, in ongoing and future in emergency operations, cases, a teamthus obstructing member shouldtheir effectiveness be able to communicate and to report in an appropriate way. General instruction for transmitting in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would messages, as well as International Phonetic Alphabet and radio communication undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be procedures are written down in the Land Border Surveillance Officer Handbook of Best disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Practices. For this exercise, participants are divided into six patrols (Joint Teams) – Alpha 1 - Alpha 6 – which are sent to six different locations in the training area. On four locations, trainers will supervise their activities. Two locations are without trainer. __________________________________________________________________________________ 17",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p17-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 18,
"content": "First tasks for the patrols is to locate and move to appointed locations and to report to command centre, transmitting their location. Second task for patrols is to reach specific locations given by the Command Centre and to complete tasks at the spot. After finishing one task, they receive the next task from command centre, and have to move to a new position. During the radio communication exercise there is the possibility to move 5 times and receive five tasks, depending on the time schedule. After completing all tasks patrols move back to the command centre for feedback session. Through this exercise, participants should be aware about the importance of delivering accurate information via radio and how a lack of communication could have impact in a real life situation. Radio communication exercise is more detailed in Annex VII. For the assessment, following aspects are of importance: - Usage of NATO Alphabet - Radio communication procedures - Communication and interaction among the team Average use of all three benchmarks is required for passing the exercise. If one of the benchmarks is continuously misconducted, it will lead to failing the exercise. Generally, radio communication exercise is considered as a minor mistake and only in combination of failing in report writing will be considered as critical mistake. Tactical training in Joint Teams - workshop The aim of this workshop is to enhance team spirit, exchange best practise and establish common procedures in a team for typical border related actions like establishing identity, search of a person, usage of handcuffs, etc. There is no separate assessment, but trainers will observe: o Procedures during security search of a person in a team and usage of handcuffs o Communication before and during the measures. __________________________________________________________________________________ 18",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p18-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 19,
"content": "2.5 Third training day The patrols have to work in a day shift in the Joint Operation Europia as a Joint Team. During this day, they have to pass three scenarios on three different locations. In the morning before the shift starts, they receive first their shift briefing. The Joint Teams have to be in a specific time at a specific location where the scenario takes place. After each scenario, the trainers provide their feedback to the trainees according the feedback rules. Time for the necessary reporting procedures is foreseen between each scenario. There are three scenarios for each team o Vehicle checkpoint - trafficking in human beings, o Rucksack at the border line – intelligence gathering, smuggling case o First aid – asylum seeker Every team will go through every scenario. All scenarios were developed in close cooperation with Frontex Operational Response Division. A team of two trainers manages every scenario. Shift schedule Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Patrol 1 09:00 – 09:45 11:00 – 11:45 14:00 – 14:45 Patrol 2 14:00 – 14:45 09:00 – 09:45 11:00 – 11:45 Patrol 3 11:00 – 11:45 14:00 – 14:45 09:00 – 09:45 Patrol 4 09:45 – 10:30 11:45 – 12:30 14:45 – 15:30 Patrol 5 14:45 – 15:30 09:45 – 10:30 11:45 – 12:30 Patrol 6 11:45 – 12:30 14:45 – 15:30 09:45 – 10:30 Duty time Patrol 1, 2 and 3: 08:30 – 16:00 (reports submitted to Command Centre) at 08:30 at the HQ conference room for briefing Duty Time Patrol 4, 5 and 6: 09:00 – 16:30 (reports submitted to Command Centre) at 09:00 at the HQ conference room for briefing 16:30 hrs all patrols are at BG HQ (conference room) __________________________________________________________________________________ 19",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p19-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 20,
"content": "Tips for trainers for the management of the scenarios Choose a proper location for the scenario, which reflects reality as much as possible. Create a check-list for the necessary equipment and ensure that the equipment is maintained and functional. Arrive early. Give yourself time to arrange and to check all logistics with your scenario and get yourself mentally geared up for the training session. Ensure that you brief the involved actors and that they fully understand the scope of the training. Explain the participants what you’re going to cover. Introduce your exercise with a brief overview of the training subject’s main points, or simply start the exercise with arrival of the Joint Team (depends on the scenario). Ensure that participants understand the influence of stress in this particular exercise and how it can have impact on their decision making process. Do not stop or influence a running exercise / scenario! The scenario shall run without any interruption by trainers. Therefore, it is necessary that the trainers do their notes about their observations for the feedback afterwards. . __________________________________________________________________________________ 20",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p20-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 21,
"content": "2.6 Fourth training day Exercise in a shift with other Joint Teams involved – Complex Scenario On the fourth day a more complex exercise is foreseen, which involves three patrols in one scenario. The location of the scenario should reflect the reality as much as possible. The exercise should be conducted in real populated area, with all security measures ensuring the safety of participants, trainers, actors and civilians. This scenario focuses on communication and interaction between Joint Teams, but also on: • Closing an area (border guard tactic skills) • Searching an area (border guard tactic skills) • First aid skills • Initiating asylum procedures Exercise in a night shift with two other Joint Teams involved – Complex Scenario The evening of the fourth day is dedicated for an exercise in night shift with three joint teams involved. This too is a complex exercise which involves three teams in one scenario. Location of the scenario should demonstrate reality as much as possible. Topic is border crossing of a group of people with transport organized by facilitator. This scenario focuses on communication and interaction between joint teams in condition of low light, but also on: • Closing an area (border guard tactic skills) • Searching an area and premise (border guard tactic skills) • First aid skills Patrols are assigned to patrol in the green border area and to carry out surveillance duties. In a case of any irregularities, patrol should take necessary actions immediately Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border crossings in the area, especially clandestine entry and some smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol). Several times during the last week local citizens informed BG authority about the presence of unknown people in the area. During the fourth training day and the more complex scenarios it is essential that one patrol is taking the lead on the spot as multi-patrol leader. __________________________________________________________________________________ 21",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p21-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 22,
"content": "2.7 Fifth training day The fifth training day is dedicated for the debriefing like in a real joint operation. Trainers and trainees will have an opportunity to give personal feedback about the training. The trainees can state their opinion and propose further improvements of the course and how the course meets their expectations. Inventory of all equipment, which was used during the course. After debriefing and closing of official part of training, time is dedicated for team building and cultural awareness workshop. At the last evening the official common dinner with closure ceremony and handover of certificates takes place. __________________________________________________________________________________ 22",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p22-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 23,
"content": "ANNEX I OPERATIONAL PLAN __________________________________________________________________________________ 23",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p23-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 24,
"content": "Field Deployment Unit (FDU) Operational Plan ONLY FOR TRAINING PURPOSE LBS Joint Operation EUROPIA 2019 The non-disclosed part contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. The disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with European Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data and therefore has to be precluded pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Prepared by Approved by ....................................... ....................................... Signature Signature Lars Kowalik Berndt Koerner Operational Manager Deputy Executive Director Attention This Operational Plan is only for training purposes. It indicates an invented Joint Operation as part of the training methodology of the EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Training. It is a supporting document and should be regarded as training material. Therefore this document is leant on an original Operational Plan, but the content is for supporting the training course. The invented country EUROPIA is the Police Academy in Zagreb (this time in Valbandon / Croatia). __________________________________________________________________________________ 24",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p24-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 25,
"content": "Contents 1. INTRODUCTION 26 2. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION 26 3. OPERATIONAL AIM AND OBJECTIVES 27 3.1. Operational aim 27 3.2. Operational objectives 27 4. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 27 5. IMPLEMENTATION 28 5.1. Period of implementation 28 5.2. Additional information 28 5.3. Operational Briefings / Debriefings 28 6. COORDINATION STRUCTURE 28 6.1. Partnership 28 6.2. Main operational structures / actors and their tasks 29 7.2.1. Member States 29 7.2.3. Frontex 29 7. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND REPORTING 29 7.1. Command and control 29 7.2. Operational communication 29 7.3. Communication with Press 30 7.4. Reporting 30 7.4.1 Reports from participants 30 7.4.2 Serious incident reporting 30 8. ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGMENTS AND LOGISTICS 31 8.1. Composition of the teams 31 8.2. Transport and lodging 31 8.3. Safety and Security Rules 31 8.4 Legal aspects of EUROPIA 31 9. EVALUATION 32 __________________________________________________________________________________ 25",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p25-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 26,
"content": "1. INTRODUCTION The Operational Plan has been agreed with the authorities of the host Member State ,1 in consultation with the authorities of the home Member States participating in the joint operation coordinated by Frontex. It covers all necessary elements for a proper and timely organization of the joint operation coordinated by Frontex. The Operational Plan contain detailed and specific information related to the particular joint operation, while the Annexes enclose operational information applicable to all joint land borders operations. Annexes complement the Main part of the Operational Plan by providing complete and comprehensive description of the implementation of the joint operation. (This training document has no Annexes) The Main part and Specific Annexes of Operational Plan are marked as “Limited” without prejudice to the public right of access to documents as laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, while the General Annexes to the Operational Plan have no classification mark indicated. Operational Plan shall only be made available to the authorities referred in each MS as “Law Enforcement”. This document shall be made available to other interested parties only on a need-to-know basis and in accordance with European and national rules on the protection of sensitive/classified information. Such dissemination of this document shall be done only on a case-by-case basis. This Operational Plan may be revised at any time in order to correspond with the new operational developments. A copy of the amended Operational Plan shall be immediately distributed by Frontex to the participating MS via FOSS. 2. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION EUROPIA is a country, which has joint the Europan Union in 2014 and has fully implemented the Schengen Acquis. During the last months a significant increase of irregular migration has been detected from neighbouring country USANSKI, which is used as transit. Irregular migrants were crossing the green border mainly in the south-east. Due to political crises in North African countries, further increase of irregular migration is expected in near future. EUROPIA has therefore reinforced border control measures at the border to USANSKI and detected in coherence to these measures criminal activities an increased number of trafficking of human beings and smuggling as well. 1 For the purposes of the present document, the term “Member State” includes also the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union. __________________________________________________________________________________ 26",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p26-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 27,
"content": "In order to tackle the current situation, EUROPIA has requested human support for border control from the European Union. 3. OPERATIONAL AIM AND OBJECTIVES 3.1. Operational aim The operational aim of the joint operation is to implement coordinated operational activities at the EU external land borders in order to control irregular migration flows towards the territory of the MS of the European Union (EU) and to tackle cross border crime. The operational aims will be implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the relevant international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951, the respect for fundamental rights in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum. 3.2. Operational objectives • Enhance border security • Enhance operational cooperation • Enhance exchange of information • Identify possible risks and threats • Establish and exchange best practices 4. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT • Provide support to local authorities in border surveillance activities at land borders; • Share experiences and exchange expertise as well as to constantly update knowledge on the irregular migration trends in order to adopt countermeasures to tackle the phenomena; • Collect and assess information in order to improve the detection of human smuggling and trafficking in human beings facilitation by individuals and/or criminal networks and assist wherever possible identification and detention of facilitators; • Provide a clear and updated situational picture concerning the operational areas, modus operandi, main trends and possible rapid changes in this respect; __________________________________________________________________________________ 27",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p27-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 28,
"content": "5. IMPLEMENTATION 5.1. Period of implementation 2 Commencement 18:00 Termination 24:00 5.2. Additional information A detailed duty schedule will be provided before the activity and updated on daily base. 5.3. Operational Briefings / Debriefings All participants taking part in joint operation will receive the operational briefing and debriefing delivered by representatives of Frontex and national authorities of host MS. The operational briefing will take place on Tuesday morning in the operational area; the debriefing will take place on Friday at HQ conference room. 6. COORDINATION STRUCTURE 6.1. Partnership Frontex is the EU coordinator, initiating, promoting and facilitating the EU MS synchronized efforts to control the external borders. The local authorities are the direct partners of Frontex and responsible for all border related activities within the joint operation. The home MSs will support the achievement of operational objectives and implementation of activities by deploying their resources to the defined locations in particular periods of time. 2 Foreseeable duration of the joint operation as indicated in the Article 3a (1) (b)- of the Frontex Regulation. __________________________________________________________________________________ 28",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p28-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 29,
"content": "6.2. Main operational structures / actors and their tasks 7.2.1. Member States • Members of the teams • Local staff of the hosting MS 7.2.3. Frontex • Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC) 7. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND REPORTING 7.1. Command and control Command and control of members of the team remain with the competent national authority of the host MS. 7.2. Operational communication Communication plan Joint Operation Europia: __________________________________________________________________________________ 29",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p29-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 30,
"content": "7.3. Communication with Press Frontex is strongly committed to the principle of transparency, therefore, as a general rule, media should be granted access to operational areas. Members of the teams are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by specific guidelines for the participating officers below. Each team member taking part in the operation shall receive a laminated card with the specific guidelines. The communication strategy on the Border Control Operational Actions is common for Frontex and the Host Members States. 7.4. Reporting 7.4.1 Reports from participants During Joint Operation Europia all patrols are requested to prepare and submit following reports according to Annex 1 and 2 of the EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Handbook of best practice: - Incident reports - Shift report Command Centre will daily announce deadline for submission. 7.4.2 Serious incident reporting A Serious Incident Report (SIR) is an alert message aimed at informing Frontex, and other relevant stakeholders, as soon as possible (within 2 hours after recognition), about the occurrence of a SI as defined in the “Frontex Serious Incident Catalogue” . 3 The production and timely dissemination of a SIR contribute to improve situational awareness and increase the reaction capabilities of Frontex related to incidents occurred in the frame of activities coordinated or led by Frontex. Type of report Description Responsibility Serious Incident The non-disclosed part contains An alert message that shall be reported detailed All participants Report information immediatelyregarding the modus (within 2 hours operandi of of the JO after recognition) law to FSCenforcement officials incident in case a relevant performing border occurs control. that needs Disclosing such information urgent attention would as the incident expose may affect theor be working relevant methods applied in to, the Frontex ongoing mission, itsand futureimage, obligation, operations, thus the safety and obstructing their effectiveness security of participants in prevention in activities of cross-border coordinated or led crime and orunauthorized by Frontex, any border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, 3 Serious Incident Cataloguecannot beindisclosed is available the Generalpursuant Annexes to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 30",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p30-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 31,
"content": "combination thereof, including any allegation of =violation of Fundamental Rights. 8. ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGMENTS AND LOGISTICS 8.1. Composition of the teams The Threenon-disclosed border guards part contains will operate as onedetailed information patrol. Preferable regarding all border guardstheof one modus patrol willofhave operandi law different nationality. enforcement Theperforming officials patrol will have always border one border control. guard Disclosing such acting as hostMS officer and two members of the teams. The patrol information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future will stay during the entire Joint Operation, but the role will change member of the teams to hostMS operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border officer during different scenarios. The border guard, who is acting as hostMs officer, crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would is patrol leader and in charge. Acting members of the teams will wear the blue undermine the protection armband. of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 8.2. Transport and lodging All transportation will be provided by the host MS Europia. All deployed staff will be accommodated at HQ in Europia. 8.3. Safety and Security Rules - All communication will be in English language - All participants will follow strictly the Frontex Code of Conduct - Trainers will be visible by vests “Frontex Trainer”; all orders by trainers shall be strictly followed - Participants will wear their proper national uniform; personal equipment is allowed after consulting trainers; NO WEAPONS 8.4 Legal aspects of EUROPIA International Protection: People who are in need of International Protection will be referred to the reception centre of the national office for asylum seekers. As a first measure the border authority establish identity and takes evidence before referring to reception centre. Trafficking in Human Beings: EUROPIA has recently launched its national program in preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, which is based on the EU Directive 36/2011. Victims of trafficking receive, after establishing identity, legal status for staying in EUROPIA till __________________________________________________________________________________ 31",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p31-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 32,
"content": "the case is closed by court. The border authority takes all measures for proper investigation against traffickers. 9. EVALUATION Evaluation of the Joint Operation will be done with all participants during the debriefing on Thursday. __________________________________________________________________________________ 32",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p32-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 33,
"content": "ANNEX II HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICE FOR LAND BORDER SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS __________________________________________________________________________________ 33",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p33-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 34,
"content": "Content INTRODUCTION 3 CHAPTER 1 – BORDER SURVEILLANCE BASICS 6 Principles of green border surveillance 6 Technical equipment for successful land border surveillance 8 Security and safety aspects of border surveillance 9 Joint Teams 10 CHAPTER 2 – COMMUNICATION/REPORTING 11 Internal communication in practice 12 International phonetic alphabet (NATO/ ICAO) 12 Radio procedure words 13 Report writing 15 Serious Incident Report (SIR) 15 External communication in practice 19 CHAPTER 3 – PREPARATION FOR DUTY/TEAM BRIEFING 20 Equipment Check 20 Team briefing 21 CHAPTER 4 – PERSONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY WHILE IMPOSING BORDER GUARD MEASURES 22 Check of a person 22 Check of a vehicle 24 Search tactics and techniques – general approach 31 __________________________________________________________________________________ 34",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p34-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 35,
"content": "As law enforcement, you must first know the law! Introduction A Border Surveillance Officer is facing daily challenging and demanding tasks. The spectrum of action and reaction has to be adopted to the situation, environment and local circumstances. In this regard, a Team Member deployed to any Frontex Joint Operation or Pilot Project has to rely on certain standards in cooperation with host Member State officers and vice versa. This handbook is not replacing any national law or regulation; it should be understood as best practice in various typical Border Guard situations in order to facilitate, on one hand the enforcement of the national law of the host Member State, but also to ensure self- protection of deployed Guest Officers and their colleagues. Worst case scenarios occur by the combination of avoidable minor mistakes, for example the misinterpretation of information received, improper use of equipment, insufficient equipment check prior to the start of duty, lack of proper briefing of the staff involved. __________________________________________________________________________________ 35",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p35-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 36,
"content": "Diplomat in Uniform You are the first impression a foreigner receives by entering your or the host country! We expect behavioral standards aligning the Frontex Code of Conduct and this reflects appearance, communication and professionalism in all your measures. The respect of Fundamental Rights 1 is the main approach of this handbook and, as mentioned in the headline: “As law enforcement you must first know the law!”. The enjoyment of Fundamental Rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations. In order to show you how much the Charter of Fundamental Rights affects your work, here is an example of a border related case: Example: Your patrol stops a vehicle close to the border and you check the identity of the driver. You recognize a forged document presented by the driver and you decide to bring the person for further clarification about his identity to the nearest field office. After one hour at the field office you have established the real identity and by checking the database you have found out an existing European Arrest Warrant issued by German authorities. The reason for the arrest warrant is that the person has been sentenced for trafficking in human beings. Task: Discuss and try to find out which articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are applicable to this case3. 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2 Taken from the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 3 Example: To stop the person and transfer to the field office; to keep the person at the field office for one hour; arrestment due to arrest warrent – Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Establishing identity, and check with database – Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Using forged documents by the person as criminal act – Article 47 and Article 48 of the Charter of Fudamental Rights. European Arrest Warrant by court decision – Article 47 and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. __________________________________________________________________________________ 36",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p36-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 37,
"content": "There is no need to commit the whole law to memory, but if you follow some general rules within all your actions, you will comply with general legal requirements: • adapt the use of force according to the situation; • follow the principle of proportionality in all your actions and measures, especially when using force or dealing with vulnerable people; • any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be provided for by law and respect 4 the essence of those rights and freedoms. Use of Force Model 5 Proportionality In all your measures you should respect proportionality between the aim you want to achieve and the means you are using. Simply spoken, do not use a sledgehammer for cracking a nut! 4 Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 5 Ontario Use of Force Model (2004). 2nd July 2014,12:23 hrs, taken from internet: http://ottawa. ca/calendar/ottawa/citycouncil/opsb/2008/02- 25/item7.htm __________________________________________________________________________________ 37",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p37-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 38,
"content": "Keep proportionality of all your measures! Chapter 1 – Border surveillance basics Principles of green border surveillance Within the border surveillance duties along the EU external land borders joint teams comprising officers from the border guard services of the host MSs and guest officers (EBGTs) perform preventive and repressive tasks, which are carried out following the operational plan by respecting the main purposes of the surveillance of external borders at places other than border crossing-points and surveillance of these crossing-points outside opening hours6: • to prevent, and discourage, unauthorised border crossings; • to counter cross-border criminality; • to apply or take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally. Border surveillance duties are performed in full compliance of the relevant EU and international law, national laws of the Host Member States, obligations related to access to international protection and fundamental rights. 7 The surveillance of the land borders may be carried out 8 by : • patrolling • stationing at places known or perceived to be sensitive 6 Schengen Handbook, Brussels, 06/XI/2006, C (2006) 5186 final, p. 75 7 Schengen Borders Code (SBC), Art. 3a. 8 Schengen Handbook, Brussels, 06/XI/2006, C (2006) 5186 final, p. 75 __________________________________________________________________________________ 38",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p38-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 39,
"content": "Joint Team’s tasks are done practically through various forms of work, most frequently as patrolling, observation, intensified control and ambush (stationary and mobile units). 9 Patrolling Patrolling is a form of work usually done in motor vehicles and other means of transport at those operational areas (sections) of the EU external land borders where local border guards and GOs presence is required due to the operational needs, defined base on the risk assessment. 10 The main tasks of patrolling are: The non-disclosed part contains • monitor the terrain they operate detailed in information regarding the modus• operandi of law ensure that there enforcement is no risk officials to public policy and internal performing border control. security Disclosing such information in the patrolling area would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, • check documents of persons being in the area, who are not thus obstructing their effectiveness in known to the patrol team prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, • stop all suspected persons who do not have any documents and it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public ask them to explain in detail their reasons for being in that area security and thus, •cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) stop and bring to the nearest border guard’s station persons who first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. crossed or tried to cross the border illegally Patrols might be reinforced with the technical means and/or dog handlers with service dogs (sniffer dogs in forest areas). Patrolling is also done on foot, especially where the terrain and landscape is not allowing patrolling by patrol vehicles or other types of technical means. Stationing The main tasks of stationing are to: • observe the places which are perceived to be sensitive to illegal border crossing or smuggling • stop and bring to the nearest border guard’s station persons who crossed or tried to cross the border illegally Observation Observation is a form of work the purpose of which is to spend a short or long period of time observing certain operational area(s) and it is usually done on foot by use of different technical means. Observation is carried out in places where illegal crossings of the EU external borders and other criminal activities related to THB are more frequent or where they can be expected based on risk assessment and previous operational findings. __________________________________________________________________________________ 39",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p39-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 40,
"content": "Intensified control Intensified control is the form of work where, according the risk assessment joint teams caring out tasks in a certain area at a certain time based on common plan. In surveillance of the land border intensified control is performed in order to detect and prevent illegal crossings, to detect forged or altered passports and abuse of genuine documents, to detect and prevent trafficking in firearms, to detect and prevent illicit drug trafficking and to detect stolen vehicles. Ambush Ambush is form of work where, according the risk assessment joint teams caring out tasks at designated place(s) in order to detect illegal crossings with main aim to apprehend the facilitators involved in people trafficking. Areas for ambushes are predefined and selected based on the risk assessments and relevant information provided. Combined border surveillance operational activities includes various forms of work and activities presented above (as example: patrolling + observation + intensified control) based on the threat and risk assessment for the particular border area with the aim to perform preventive and operative tasks related to with the main purpose to prevent unauthorised border crossings and to counter cross-border criminality at EU external land borders. Technical equipment for successful land border surveillance Different technical equipment for successful surveillance of the land borders is used by local authorities and GOs during Joint Operations. Technical means 11 which are mainly used for land border surveillance during the Joint Operations at land borders - with the aim to apprehend individuals crossing the land borders illegally - are: The• non-disclosed part contains thermal vision-cameras detailed (vehicles: vans information and all-terrain vehicles): regarding the modusequipped operandi with IRofcameras, law enforcement officials long-range daylight cameras performing and laser border control.range Disclosing finders; such information would expose the working methods applied • stationed in ongoing thermal and future vision-cameras operations, (also combined thus obstructing with long-range their camera); effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized • handheldborder crossings. thermal vision cameras In consequence, it would undermine the• protection night visionof the public interest as regards public security and goggles thus, • cannot binoculars be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation • service(EC) patrolNovehicles, 1049/2001. • all-terrain service vehicles, • helicopters or fix wing aircrafts for border surveillance. __________________________________________________________________________________ 40",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p40-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 41,
"content": "The non-disclosed Thermal vision devices part are usedcontains detailed for observation of theinformation regarding territory/landscape on the the modus operandi Host Member State inof law order enforcement to prevent unauthorized officials performing border crossings and withborder control. Disclosing such information would expose aim to detect illegal crossings of the EU external borders and other criminal the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing activities that might be expected in the operational area base on risk their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and assessment and previous operational findings (THB). When the irregular unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine migrants and facilitators are spotted with use of the thermal the protection of the public interest as regards public security and vision cameras the thus, cannot information on thebe disclosed movement pursuant to is communicated tojoint Article teams 4(1)(a) who are first indent of patrolling Regulation the operational(EC) Noarea 1049/2001. in readiness to immediately react on detection/location of any kind of suspected illegal activities by the observation teams. The irregular migrants are apprehended accordingly. Night vision goggles and binoculars are used with the main aim to provide additional technical support to border guards while performing border surveillance duties at EU external land borders – to observe the operational area with the use of technical means. Helicopters or fix wing aircrafts carrying out surveillance are used as additional support to local authorities performing border surveillance duties on the ground. 12 Helicopters or fix wing aircrafts and are used according the threat and risk assessment for the particular border area and real operational needs (as for example for search and rescue missions). In additional to above presented border surveillance of land borders might be supported also with fixed cameras and sensor alarm systems, portable infrared 13 alarm/camera and other sensor systems. Such systems are managed and used by Home Members States authorities. Security and safety aspects of border surveillance Security and safety aspects of the border surveillance as such shall be also taken into account, due the fact that the irregular migrants are often put into dangerous situations while trying to cross the EU external land borders since the terrain (landscape as such, woods, areas without inhabitants) and other circumstances (severe weather conditions, flooding, etc.) at the border areas are quite often putting them in situations requiring search and rescue measures to be taken from local authorities. Measures taken for purpose of the border surveillance shall be conducted in the way that does not put at risk of safety of the persons apprehended or rescued. Joint Teams Joint Teams (comprising officers from the border guard services of the host MSs and Team Members (EBCGTs) - are obliged to maintain the highest standards of integrity, ethical conduct, professionalism and respect for and promotion of __________________________________________________________________________________ 41",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p41-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 42,
"content": "fundamental rights. While patrolling at the EU External land borders they are obliged to comply with the European, international law, fundamental rights and national law of the Member State. While performing their duties at EU external land borders (observation, patrolling) they shall not discriminate persons on grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, belief, age or sexual orientation and they are expected to treat every person with courtesy, respect and due consideration for the nature of any legitimate activity in which they are engaged. __________________________________________________________________________________ 42",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p42-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 43,
"content": "Chapter 2 – Communication/Reporting The strongest weapon for law enforcements is communication! In this chapter we will focus on communication and reporting as one of the most important tasks of law enforcement. We will generally distinguish between internal and external communication. As “internal communication” we regard the communication between Border Guards and within the respective Border Guard authority, which could be used, but not limited to: • inform colleagues about an incident or emergency case; • gain intelligence; • share intelligence with colleagues in order to initiate actions in border control; • request support; • fulfil obligation to report (Serious Incident Report), so that senior management can react accordingly; • prepare criminal investigations; etc. 14 The main language in any Frontex activity is English , therefore it is necessary for the staff deployed to be familiar with common standards in reporting and communication. As “external communication” we regard the communication between the law enforcement authority (in this case you as Border Guard) and any other member of the public who could be a traveler, perpetrator, victim of trafficking, witness, irregular migrant or anybody else approaching you in respective situations. Always adjust your behavior and communication to the situation and the person in front of you. __________________________________________________________________________________ 43",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p43-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 44,
"content": "Examples: • communication with children differs from communication with adults; • communication with victims differs from communication with perpetrators. Internal communication in practice Radio communication skills The non-disclosed In practice part Members the deployed Team contains aredetailed information always accompanied by hostregarding Member Statethe modus operandi officers who of radio will manage law communication enforcementwith officials performing local authorities. However,border in control. emergencyDisclosing cases, a Guestsuch Officerinformation should be able towould expose communicate and tothe reportworking in an methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus appropriate way. Please, find below some useful information about radio obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and communication reflecting international standards. unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 44",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p44-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 45,
"content": "International phonetic alphabet (NATO/ ICAO): A Alpha B Bravo C Charlie D Delta E Echo F Foxtrott G Golf H Hotel I India J Juliette K Kilo L Lima M Mike N November O Oscar P Papa Q Quebec R Romeo S Sierra T Tango U Uniform V Victor W Whisky X X-Ray Y Yankee Z Zulu 15 General instruction for transmitting messages : • Decide in advance what you are going to say, ensuring it will be clear and brief. • Make sure no one else is speaking on the net when you start. • Remember to divide your message into sensible phrases, make pauses and maintain a natural rhythm to your speech. • Avoid excessive calling and unofficial transmissions. • Use standard pronunciation. Emphasize vowels sufficiently. • Avoid extreme pitch, speak in a moderately strong voice, do not shout. • Keep a distance of about 5 cm between the microphone and your lips. __________________________________________________________________________________ 45",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p45-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 46,
"content": "• Shield your microphone from background noises and wind Radio procedure words 16 PROWORD MEANING ACKNOWLEDGE! Confirm that you have received my message and will comply. AFFIRMATIVE Yes/Correct NEGATIVE No/Incorrect ALL AFTER … Everything that you (I) transmitted after … (Keyword) ALL BEFORE … Everything that you (I) transmitted before … (Keyword) CORRECT (THAT IS What you have transmitted is correct. CORRECT) CORRECTION An error has been made in this transmission. It will continue with the last word (group) correctly transmitted. An error has been made in this transmission. The correct version is … That which follows is a correct version in answer to your request for verification. WRONG Your last transmission was incorrect. The correct version is … DISREGARD THIS This transmission is an error. Disregard it. TRANSMISSION –OUT SILENCE – SILENCE – SILENCE Cease all transmissions on this net immediately. Will be maintained until lifted. SILENCE LIFTED Silence is lifted. The net is free for traffic. END OF MESSAGE – OVER This concludes the message just transmitted (and the (OUT) message instructions pertaining to a formal message). END OF TEXT The textual part of a formal message ends. Stand by for the message instructions immediately following. FETCH the shift-leader! I wish to speak on the radio to that person (in this case the shift-leader) …SPEAKING Requested person is now using the radio by him or herself. FIGURES Numerals or numbers will follow. MESSAGE I have a message for you. OVER This is the end of my turn of transmitting. A response is expected. OUT This is the end of my transmission to you. No answer or acknowledgment is expected. SAY AGAIN! Repeat all of your last transmission. __________________________________________________________________________________ 46",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p46-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 47,
"content": "SEND YOUR MESSAGE! Go ahead with your transmission. SPEAK SLOWER! Reduce the speed of your transmission. SPELL I shall spell the next word, group or equivalent phonetically. (Normally used in connection with request for repetition) RELAY TO … Transmit the following message to all addressees or to the address designation immediately following. MESSAGE PASSED TO … Your message has been passed to … ROGER I have received your message, understand it and will comply. ROGER SO FAR? Have you received this part of my message satisfactorily? WILCO I have received your last transmission satisfactorily. UNKNOWN STATION The identity of the station calling or with whom I am attempting to establish communication is unknown. VERIFY Verify entire message (or part indicated) with the originator and send correct version. To be used only at discretion of or by the addressee to which the questioned message was directed. I VERIFY That which follows has been verified at your request and is repeated. WAIT – OUT I must pause for a few seconds Example of radio conversation : 17 The proword THIS IS or FROM is used to indicate the calling station. • ALFA – THIS – IS – CHARLIE – MESSAGE – OVER • FROM – ALFA – SEND – OVER • THIS–IS-CHARLIE–WATCH–FOR–FALLEN–ROCKS–ON–ROAD–BIRKET–I – SPELL - BRAVO – INDIA – ROMEO – KILO – ECHO – TANGO – BIRKET – OVER • FROM – ALFA – WILCO – OUT Report writing A report is a key element in the Border Guard work. It is a documentation of your performance and could be the basis for follow-up decisions like criminal investigations, preventative measures, risk assessment, etc. A report also ensures gathering of intelligence for your authority. In general, a report should provide answers to following questions: • Who? • What? • When? __________________________________________________________________________________ 47",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p47-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 48,
"content": "• Where? • How? • Why? In the Annexes of this handbook you can find examples of a case and shift reports. Serious Incident Report (SIR) 18: The non-disclosed A Serious part contains Incident Report is an alert detailed information message that relatedimmediately shall be reported to reporting tools (withinand methods 2 hours used by law after recognition) enforcement to FSC officials and the host to conduct MS’ authorities, border in case a control tasks occurs relevant incident and counter that needs criminal activities. urgent attention, Itsincident as the disclosure would may affect jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, or be relevant to the Frontex mission, its obligation, image, the safety and security and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the of participants in activities coordinated or led by Frontex, or any combination effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly thereof, having special regard to any violation of Fundamental reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection Rights. of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Template with requested content if available: Serious Incident Report Subject The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of Joint Operation ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in Incident date/timehuman beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not Finding date/time disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Location of the incident Reference to operational Inside area Outside Involved Frontex ressources; HR / TE __________________________________________________________________________________ 48",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p48-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 49,
"content": "Source of information Reporting unit/person 1. Fact of the case What happened; when and where did it happen; who was involved/affected; why did it happen; how did it happen; with what did it happen (which means were used); Source of information 2. Measures Actions taken: Frontex actors and actions from Host/Home MS or others (intended, initiated, completed) 3. Assessment Brief description of possible consequences, effects, reactions, further comments Example: Serious Incident Report The non-disclosed part contains Subject detailed Dead migrantinformation found related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter Joint Operation criminal activities. Its disclosure JO Poseidon Land 2012 would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law Incident date/time . . / 00:10 a.m. – 10:45 a.m. enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent Finding date/time . . / 10:30 a.m. of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Location of the incident Kraynovo village, Bulgaria Reference to operational Inside area Outside __________________________________________________________________________________ 49",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p49-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 50,
"content": "Involved Frontex 2 NLD GO ressources; HR / TE 1 AUT TVV Source of information BGR RCC Coordinator Reporting unit/person FOC 1. Fact of the case . . 00.10 a.m. - An emergency call from people in distress in the area of Kraynovo was received on the emergency number 112. - Immediately after receiving the call, 4 border police patrols (1 TVV) were dispatched in the area of BPU Bolyarovo. 09.15 a.m. - An emergency helicopter was launched. 10.10 a.m. - A group of 5 persons (irregular migrants) was detected north of BM219 in the area of Kraynovo village by the helicopter. 10.45: - A patrol from BPU Bolyarovo arrived at the spot and found a group consisting of 3 children and 2 women. - One of the women was found lifeless. 11:15: - After an initial medical examination, the death of the person was confirmed by the alerted doctor. - The body of the woman was transported for an autopsy to Yambol hospital. - The reason for the death is under examination. - The migrants claimed to be from Syria. 2. Measures The non-disclosed part contains detailedfrom - Patrols information regarding BPU Bolyarovo and the modus a HELI wereoperandi dispatchedof in lawtheenforcement area. officials performing border control. Disclosing - Dead such bodyinformation would was transported to expose Yambolthe working hospital methods applied in ongoing and for autopsy. future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness - The migrants were broughtintoprevention of cross-border the police station crime and unauthorized in Bolyarovo. border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public 3. Assessment security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. - The case is under investigation. __________________________________________________________________________________ 50",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p50-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 51,
"content": "The autopsy External communication in practice Basics: • present friendly and appropriate appearance; • build trust; • show empathy; • explain the reason for your measures; • be patient; • listen actively; • always reduce own dominant behavior to a minimum; • be clear to avoid any misunderstanding; • communicate constantly to gain information about the situation, and for your personal risk assessment; • be attentive; • use your body language; • follow tit-for-tat strategy/survivability. Being attentive is a corner stone in the behavior of law enforcement officers. Obviously harmless situations could lead to an unexpected reaction of the person addressed, with serious consequences for you or your colleagues. Sample pictures – Body language/non-verbal communication Hands during conversation: in front and ready for action, depending on behaviour and reaction of the interlocutor. __________________________________________________________________________________ 51",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p51-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 52,
"content": "Chapter 3 – Preparation for duty/team briefing Equipment Check The professional use of your equipment is a prerequisite for a successful operation. This includes means of communication as well as means of coercion. Before starting your duty, you should check your equipment properly: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law mobile/radio charged? enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the handcuffs? working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border baton? crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection tearofgas/pepper the publicspray? interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article weapon 4(1)(a) and first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. ammunition? ensure that equipment is always available and not covered by your jacket or other clothes! First Aid Kit (i.e. Ambu LifeKey mask)? hand gloves? writing utensil? body armour vest? Patrolling by vehicle The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working map/GPS of operational area? methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. technical check of the vehicle? Please be aware: The meaning of a weapon could be, from legal perspective, interpreted in different ways in certain Member States, with different legal consequences (i.e. for obligatory warning procedures or storage of a weapon)! Belt Configuration equipment always available according to graduation of force; attention: protection of backbone! First Aid/hygiene Always use hand gloves! Are you aware on how to react in case of • i.e. how to treat person in shock? • How to use first aid kit? Is it available? • Do you have number of ambulance available? __________________________________________________________________________________ 52",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p52-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 53,
"content": "Team briefing A proper preparation for each operation requires a thorough briefing by the team leader. The following aspects should be the minimum taken into consideration for a briefing prior each shift/patrol: The non-disclosed Operational Areapart• contains detailed The operational areainformation and the routesregarding the activities for surveillance modus operandi of law enforcement officials should performing border be clear control. for each team Disclosing member. Use such information a map for would expose the working methods appliedallinaspects introducing ongoingtoand future operations, thus obstructing the team. their effectiveness Situation/risk in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized • What was the situation in the operational area the last border crossings. Inassessment consequence, it would undermine the days/weeks/months?protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent • What kind of situation can the team expect for the upcoming shift? of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. • Is the patrol equipped according to the expected situation (i.e. body armour vests)? • Assessment of own capacities. Task • What is the specific task of the team within operational concept? • What are the tasks of neighbouring forces/authorities? • Who will do what within the team/responsibilities? Communication • Perform a radio check. • Communication plan and call signs clear and available for all team members? • Stipulated codes for certain actions? • Contact to other authorities involved in IBM and/or emergency cases (i.e. ambulance). Emergency case • Is the team prepared for an emergency case? __________________________________________________________________________________ 53",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p53-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 54,
"content": "Chapter 4 – Personal safety and security while imposing Border Guard measures General rules If you discover traces of illegal activities (e.g. footprints indicating illegal border crossing): The non-disclosed part contains detailed information • immediately report to coordination centre; regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing • and secure futurethe area andthus operations, evidence; obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized • waitborder crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public for guidelines; interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of • act Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. in accordance with instructions from the coordination centre. Check of a person The non-disclosed • agree parton contains actions withdetailed information regarding the modus operandi of your partner(s); law enforcement officialsprofiling • conduct performing of the border person(s)control. checkedDisclosing such information would (physical condition, expose the working methods applied psychological condition, etc.) ; in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border • adopt safe tactical position (triangle); option “Z” if you need to separate crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as persons (see pictures); regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first • keep(EC) indent of Regulation No 1049/2001. a distance of at least two arm’s lengths; • keep your hands in front and ready for action during conversation; • the hands of the person checked should always be visible to you (out of pockets); • introduce yourself in a polite way and explain what you are going to do next; • choose a suitable place to check the person(s) before you stop them (consider light, traffic, etc.), if possible; • check the person’s identity properly (e.g.: documents, database); • should the person refuse to cooperate, warn them about the possibility to use legal measures including the use of force; consider asking for assistance; • in case you are checking more than two persons, consider the possibility to put them in line or in sit down position; • never turn with your back to the person you want to check. Triangle position __________________________________________________________________________________ 54",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p54-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 55,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. “Z” position for controlling 2 controlling officer Triangle position for controlling 2 people __________________________________________________________________________________ 55",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p55-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 56,
"content": "Check of a vehicle The non-disclosed partrules General contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the O PPORTUNITY working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness choose the place of control; • consider in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized weather, light and border roadcrossings. conditions;In consequence, it would undermine the protection • of thevisibility take publicintointerest account. as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article S AFETY 4(1)(a) of patrol first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. member; • of passengers; • of traffic. O PERATING communication (external & internal); • division of tasks (patrol leader & safeguard); • positions while controlling (the leader is always behind the B- pillar); • no one is allowed to exit the vehicle without the patrol’ permission. In case the vehicle doesn’t stop, follow the procedure of the host Member State! A. Vehicle check at a post The non-disclosed part contains detailed Watch out for the traffic information regarding the modus operandi of from the other direction law enforcement officials performing border and overtaking vehicles. control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in Give signal to reduce speed! ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention Take care that you are visible! of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 56",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p56-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 57,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness Move tointheprevention safe side ofofthe cross-border road. crime and Showunauthorized border crossings. In the place to stop. consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future By going around the car, operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in check the body, the windows, prevention of cross-border crime and the back seats and the unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it number plates. would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention The photo indicates the way of of cross-border crime and unauthorized border the leader to her/his final crossings. In consequence, it would undermine position. the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 57",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p57-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 58,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would Keep a safe distance expose the working methods applied in ongoing from the vehicle. and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border Stay behind the B-pillar. crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the The safeguard’s task is to protection of the public interest as regards protect the patrol leader. public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Three options for a safeguard’s position The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such A typical mistake resulting information wouldfromexpose the working a safeguard’s routine. methods applied in ongoing and future Weapon covered by vest and operations, thus notobstructing their ready for reaction. effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 58",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p58-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 59,
"content": "B. Vehicle check with a patrol car 1. Patrol car behind of the controlled vehicle The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Use the blue lights to make the Disclosing such information would expose the car pull over, and warn the working methods applied in ongoing and future approaching traffic. operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in the Use prevention of cross-border blue lights during the crime and unauthorized whole procedureborder crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing Pull over behind the other vehicle border control. Disclosing such information would expose Use yourtheown working methods applied in light to flashlight ongoing the car youand stoppedfuture at night operations, thus obstructing time. their effectiveness in prevention ofUsecross-border crime the patrol car to protect and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would yourself from following traffic. undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1) (a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding Turn the into the wheels modus operandi the direction of of law enforcement officials the road, toperforming avoid crashing border control. Disclosing such the vehicle information you would stopped in case of aexpose collision. the working methods applied Never stepinintoongoing and future the area between the operations, thus obstructing patrol car andtheir effectiveness the controlled vehiclein prevention of cross- border as long ascrime and ofunauthorized the driver the checked border crossings. In consequence, vehicle it would is inside the car. undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first __________________________________________________________________________________ indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 59",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p59-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 60,
"content": "2. Patrol car in front of the controlled vehicle The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Use theDisclosing such blue lights to makeinformation would expose thepull the car working over, andmethods warn applied in ongoing and the future operations, approaching traffic. thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus Never step into the area obstructing between thetheir patrol effectiveness car and in prevention of cross-border crime and the controlled vehicle while unauthorized approaching border the stoppedcrossings. In consequence, vehicle. it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working Before themethods applied leader reaches the in car,ongoing and future operations, the safeguardthus asks obstructing their effectiveness in the driver to stop prevention the engine and putof the vehicle cross-border key to crime and unauthorized the dashboard. border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 60",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p60-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 61,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and At unauthorized border reaching the B-pillar, crossings. In watch out consequence, it would for the range undermine the protection of the door. of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 3. Car boot check The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Stay inDisclosing a V-position.such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and Don’t stay withinfuture the range operations, of thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of the boot door. cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. ControlIn theconsequence, movement of it would undermine the the protection boot doorofwith theyour public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed hand. pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 61",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p61-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 62,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness Secure the driver near the car. in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working The leader checks themethods boot. applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing theirone Always keep effectiveness of your in prevention of hands cross-border crime and unauthorized at the door. border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1) (a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 62",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p62-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 63,
"content": "Search tactics and techniques – general approach 1) Person a) man – man; b) woman – woman; c) woman (if possible) – child. 2) Equipment The non-disclosed a) protectivepartgloves; contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement b) mask; officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus c) flashlight; obstructing theirdetector; d) metal effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. e) protective glasses; In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed f) mirror; pursuantg)to Article service4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. dogs, etc. 3) Types of reaction The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcementa) officials regularperforming border control. Disclosing such information would expose the (fully cooperative); working methods applied (suspicion b) sensitive in ongoing indicators); and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would c) threatening (uncooperative, aggressive, dangerous) undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 4) Engagement protocol The non-disclosed a) announce part contains to engagement detailed information coordination centre; regarding the modus operandi b) of law chooseenforcement and secureofficials the placeperforming border control. Disclosing such (suitable, safe); information c) would establish expose the working appropriate methods communication applied (verbal, in ongoing non-verbal, and future internal, operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime external); and unauthorized d) inform border and explaincrossings. In consequence, to the person it would undermine the about the search/reasons; protectione)ofgivetheclear public interest as regards instructions/orders to the public person;security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant f) warn the to person Articleabout 4(1)(a) thefirst indent use of of Regulation coercive measures if (EC) No not they are 1049/2001. cooperative; g) ask the person if they are in possession of any dangerous items; h) conduct the search; i) prepare a report/documentation. 5) Tactical variations to consider a) time, place, number of officers/persons, and the condition of persons; __________________________________________________________________________________ 63",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p63-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 64,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information b) position (standing, leaning, lying, etc.); regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. c) possibility to use environment (buildings/walls, vehicles); Disclosing such information would expose the working methods d) in handcuffs/without handcuffs. applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized 6) Secureborder crossings. dangerous In consequence, items (appropriate place,itremove wouldfromundermine a person, the etc);protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot should you find crime evidence (e.g.: drugs) don’t touch it, pass the case to be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) the host officer). first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 7) Be aware about: The non-disclosed part contains a) inappropriate detailed information regarding the modus environment/vehicle; operandi of b) lawlackenforcement of interculturalofficials competences;performing border control. Disclosing such information c) would expose(hair, hiding places themouth, working methods hidden applied pockets, shoes, in ongoing and future etc.); operations,d) thus obstructing non-verbal signstheir (bodyeffectiveness language); in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized e) excessive border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the empathy; protectionf) of injured the public personinterest (artificialaslimbs, regards blood,public etc.); security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article g) unconscious 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. person. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Standing enforcement positionofficials – step 1: performing fix border control. an armDisclosing and a leg such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing (cooperative). and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 64",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p64-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 65,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their Standing – step 2: in prevention effectiveness position of cross-border crimebyand unauthorized destabilize position borderbending crossings. In consequence, the person forward it would undermine the protection of the public (cooperative). interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1) (a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing andposition Standing future – stepoperations, 3: pat thus obstructing down bytheir effectiveness gliding (do not tap) thein prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border clothes (cooperative). crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- Mistake 1. Never border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In expose your consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, head under the persons’ cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first armpit. indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 65",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p65-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 66,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in Mistake 2. Legs not fixed prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Standing position – against the thus obstructing their effectiveness wall, step 1 (sensitive). in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their Standing position – against effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime the wall, step 2 (sensitive). and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 66",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p66-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 67,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials Standing position – performing border control.at the Disclosing such information patrol car, step 1 (threatening). would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus Standing position – at the obstructing their effectiveness in prevention patrol car, step 2 of cross-border crime and unauthorized (threatening). border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1) (a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention Standing of cross-border crime and unauthorized position– on the patrol border crossings. In consequence, car, with handcuffs, step 1 it would undermine (threatening). the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 67",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p67-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 68,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus –obstructing Standing position on the patroltheir effectiveness in car, with prevention of cross-border handcuffs, step 2 crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in Standing position – on the patrol prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized car using handcuffs, frisk the border crossings. In consequence, it would covered parts, step 3 undermine the protection of the public interest as (threatening). regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in Standing prevention position of – on the cross-border crime and patrol car, step 1 (sensitive or unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it threatening). would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 68",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p68-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 69,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their Standing position – on the patrol effectiveness in prevention of cross-border car, step 2 (sensitive or threatening). crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Standing position – on the patrol car thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. __________________________________________________________________________________ 69",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p69-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 70,
"content": "ANNEX III SCENARIO I PACK Checkpoint – trafficking in human beings 1. General information 2. Situation/order 3. Imaginary history 4. Material and personnel needs 5. Assessment checklist __________________________________________________________________________________ 70",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p70-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 71,
"content": "1. General Information Topic Suspicious case of THB Communication • Safety and security measures Aims of Training • Lawful BG measures • Detecting case of THB • Reporting 1 patrol Personnel needs 2 actors (male/female) The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi Officer: of law enforcement officials performing border control. Patrol equipment (Basar), Vehicle, radios, baton, flashlight, Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus mobile phone, pepper-spray, handcuffs (steel), training obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized pistolcrossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public border interest Opponent as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article person: Material needs 4(1)(a) first indent(ID, of Regulation Documents driving (EC) No 1049/2001. license, documents for vehicle) Other: Civilian vehicle Locality Training area at the compound Communication According to communication plan 2. Situation / Order The patrol is assigned to perform intensified control at check point B. General Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border Information crossings in the area especially clandestine entry and some smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol). Specific In the last week several times local citizens informed BG Information authority about the presence of unknown vehicles in the area. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the Reach check point B and perform intensified control on working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in suspicious prevention vehicles: of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would Orders • Report undermine the protection anyofirregularities the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. • Take immediately necessary actions __________________________________________________________________________________ 71",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p71-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 72,
"content": "3. Imaginary history Description of situation Expected Measures Behaviour of opponent / remarks Announcement of specific Following the Trainer’s safety Following the Trainer’s safety rules rules safety rules The non-disclosed part contains detailed information Description of Situation: • Suspicious vehicle is regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials approaching the check • Driver will performing border control. Disclosing such information would be • The patrol is point B cooperative without expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future stationary at the • Proper stop of the any kind of check point B operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness resistance in prevention moving vehicle • of cross-border crime and unauthorizedpresenting border crossings. In The suspicious • Proper approach to vehicle vehicle is consequence, it would undermine the stopped vehicle the protection and of the public personal moving on the interest as regards • Introduction public security and thus, documents cannot be road in the disclosed pursuant to Article • Conduct the check of 4(1)(a) first • indent Driver isofa Regulation bit verbally vicinity of the (EC) Nothe 1049/2001. person (driver and aggressive to the border line passenger) passenger in order to towards the • Safety search of the keep silence patrol driver (search also • Passenger will not • The passenger is in possible to find ID present any the back seat of the documents) documents claiming car • Vehicle check that the driver • Safety search of the possesses his passenger (search documents possible also to find • Driver claims that he ID documents) – only has no documents woman- woman from the passenger • Report to CC • Passenger states • Request support that the driver in order to promised her a job transport in a restaurant in separately Amsterdam. • Transport the • Documents of the persons to CC passenger will be under suspicion of with the driver THB __________________________________________________________________________________ 72",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p72-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 73,
"content": "Patrol Number: The NEEDS non-disclosed part contains detailed INFORMATION INFORMATION information FOR regarding INFORMATION the modus operandi PLACE of law END enforcement OF THE officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in FOR THE THE ACTORS FOR THE POLICE WHERE THE SCENARIO COMMAND OFFICERS SCENARIO IS ongoing and 1. 3 BGs – future operations, CENTRE thus obstructing 1. he is a driver, welltheir effectiveness in prevention GOING ON of cross-border crime 1. The security and unauthorized patrol, border crossings. In consequence, dressed, arrogantitbut would1.undermine the protection of the public patrol is stationary interest as measures regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) equipped 1. if they ask for cooperative towards o at the check 1. check point should be with radios, police officers. point B always followed No 1049/2001. pepper- the additional car-they can 2. driver is a bit verbally 2. suspicion vehicle B located in the parking 2. The body and spray, get it. aggressive to the is moving on the on the Good car search handcuffs 2. if they call for passenger in order to road in the vicinity Hope Path, should be (steel), the backup- keep silence of the border line close to the conducted training they will get 3. driver claims that he towards the lake. 3. The team should pistol, it. has no documents from patrol. 2. Civil car is discover hidden baton, 3. if they ask the passenger. located on passport vehicle about 4. driver possess in the the road belongs to 2. Civilian personal gloves compartment of behind trafficked person vehicle details of the vehicle 3-4 different building 4. Involved 3. two actors involved passports, and also in number 13. persons should (male and persons – no the pocket one hidden 3. At the be separated female - alerted passport (original instructor sign and transported bad information passport for female civil car is to the station for English can be found passenger) start moving further speaker) in a 5. if they ask for forward to the investigation. 4. 3-4 Third database. documents – he will check point 5. The team should country 4. Female’s present his own B. reveal the case documents, original passports of the THB ID, driving passport 6. if they ask him to open 6. The command licence, located in the boot-driver will centre should be documents driver’s open updated all the for vehicle pocket is 7. she is Russian, she time about the alerted as a has small luggage, no case missing money, she is verbally developments person. The aggressed and order to information keep quiet by the can be driver. provided to 8. She is in the back seat the patrol. of the car. 9. She will not present any documents claiming that the driver possesses his documents. 10. She states that the driver promised her a job in a restaurant in Amsterdam. 11. if they ask the female actor to present documents – she will answer with Third country accent “Amsterdam... work... restaurant” pointing scared to the driver. 12. In case of not discovering any clue or there is no suspicion of about THB case- female actor will ask whispering for help __________________________________________________________________________________ 73",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p73-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 74,
"content": "AIMS Performance Name: Name: Name: MINOR POINTS Using proper equipment in proper way (i.e. stop signal, reflector vests, etc) Delegation/Division of tasks Reporting to CC in front of the client - discrete surveillance Communication with the opponent Internal and external communication Finding evidence / gathering and protection Separating facilitator from victims Explaining measures Proper reporting CRITICAL POINTS Officers safety andpart The non-disclosed security (neglect contains detailed information traffic regarding the for stopping carmodus operandi oflife and causing law enforcement officials performing border control. danger) Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future Officers operations, safety and security, thus obstructing which in their effectiveness prevention will lead toof cross-border life dangercrime and unauthorized (examples: border crossings. of transportation In aconsequence, unchecked itperson; would undermineapproach un-safe the protectiontoofthe the clients; public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be misuse of coercive or authority/ disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of exceeding Regulation (EC)theNo use of force or violation 1049/2001. of individual fundamental rights; not separating searched from unsearched person; no checks of ID in database) __________________________________________________________________________________ 74",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p74-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 75,
"content": "ANNEX IV SCENARIO II PACK Rucksack – smuggling case 1. General information 2. Situation/order 3. Imaginary history 4. Material and personnel needs 5. Assessment checklist __________________________________________________________________________________ 75",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p75-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 76,
"content": "1. General Information Topic Left suitcase with smuggled goods, intelligence gathering Communication • Safety and security measures Aims of Training • Lawful BG measures • Reporting 1 patrol (by foot) Personnel needs 1 actor Officer: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandiequipment Patrol of law enforcement officials (Basar), performing radios, borderflashlight, Baton, control. Disclosing mobile such information phone, would expose thehandcuffs pepper-spray, working methods applied (steel), in ongoing training and future pistol operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border Opponent person: crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine Material needs Tourist withofIDthe public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot the protection be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Equipment: 1049/2001. / suitcase with smuggled goods Luggage Locality Training area at the compound Communication According to communication plan 2. Situation / Order Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border General crossings in the area especially clandestine entry and some Information smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol). Specific In the last week several times local citizens informed BG Information authority about the presence of unknown people in the area. The non-disclosed You are patrolling part contains today in detailed information the green regarding border areathe modus operandi between of law enforcement Point A and Point officials B. performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized Orders You borderare carrying crossings. out surveillance In consequence, duties. the protection of the public it would undermine • as interest regards any Report publicirregularities security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) • Take immediately necessary actions No 1049/2001. 3. Imaginary history __________________________________________________________________________________ 76",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p76-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 77,
"content": "Description of situation Expected Measures Behaviour of opponent / remarks Announcement of specific Following the Trainer’s safety Following the Trainer’s safety rules rules safety rules The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding Description of Situation: the •modus operandi procedure of law to check theenforcement officials performing border luggage control. Disclosing such information would expose the Totally cooperative - patrol finds a luggage / • working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, communication with behavior. If he is suitcase with smuggled questioned or thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- Command Center goods inside close to the required: border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In border consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public - Police Officers interview • Explains from where interest as regards public security and thus, cannot he comes be disclosed person - Person appears pursuant to Article - communication skills 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation • Shows ID and (EC) No walking around the area 1049/2001. explains what he is • Introduction doing in the area; • check of the person can provide name • Report to CC and address of including description apartment / Hotel. of two suspects (info • Is giving description from tourist) of two suspects he has seen couple of minutes ago in the area running away __________________________________________________________________________________ 77",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p77-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 78,
"content": "The non-disclosed NEEDS part contains INFORMATI detailed INFORMATIONS information regarding the modus operandi INFORMATI PLACEof law ENDenforcement OF THE 5. one actor (male- ONS FOR FOR THE ACTOR ONS FOR WHERE officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in SCENARIO communication THE THE POLICE THE ongoing and future skill – English operations, thus COMMAND 13. obstructing their he is a effectiveness in OFFICERS prevention of cross-border SCENARIO 7. police crime and unauthorized speaker) border crossings. CENTREIn consequence, it birdwatcherwould undermine the protection of IS GOING the public interest decision as regards publicIDsecurity 6. original for and thus, cannot 14.be disclosed pursuant he is living in to3.Article they 4(1)(a) firstON indent of Regulation that tourist(EC) No 1049/2001. actor 5. if they Germany patrols in isn’t quilt 7. Backpack for the ask for 15. he was born the field 4. between 8. left tourist the car- in Lithuania between A A and B luggage- 8. Backpack for the they can 16. he is here for and B 5. (it will be backpack left luggage get it a vacation 4. your route shown on they will 9. Blanket for the 6. if they 17. he stay in the is through the map) take it to fence call for hotel in the centre the Main 6. part of it the 10. goods the of Vilnius road, than will be Command (cigarettes, backup- 18. he has a Major mark with centre (not alcohols and bottle they will backpack with Square tape – leaved at of water and get it water and food for and than STOP(to the field) sandwich) 7. if they the whole day through make it 9. they didn’t 11. binocular ask for 19. he has a ticket the Sport easier for find 12. gloves the dog- for the plane street and the report suspicion 13. one picture of only for 20. on this field he through writing) persons two friends to put it the came by bus the 10. they in the backpack protecti 21. he will give National need to (Jochen and on-no information’s and Stadion write a Mirjana) drugs descriptions of the notes with 14. brochures from dog, and two guys he saw the details the hotel(Jochen it will be (just if the police of the and Mirjana) available officers ask him) tourist and 15. air ticket only in 22. if they ask him with the (Jochen and one to open the bag- description Mirjana) hour actor will ask for of the 16. wallet(Jochen 8. if they which reason i suspect and Mirjana) ask to need to open my persons (ID take a backpack of tourist bag to 23. he will have and check the hotel brochures all the comman with him in the information’ d canter- backpack s in hotel they can with 9. if they command ask if this centre and man is description register of the in the suspicion hotel-yes persons) he is __________________________________________________________________________________ 78",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p78-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 79,
"content": "Patrol Number: AIMS Performance Name: Name: Name: MINOR POINTS Delegation/Division of tasks Finding evidence / gathering and protection Communication with the opponent Proper reporting/ In time in order to initiate follow- up measures Internal and external communication Reporting to CC in front of the client - discrete surveillance Identifying the umbrella as a possible threat Explaining measures Implementation of structure The non-disclosed part contains detailed information CRITICAL POINTS regarding Detectingthethe modus operandi smuggling case of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing Implementation of theand futureleads structure operations, thus to life danger obstructing of all team their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of Officers safety and security, which will lead to the public interest as regards public security and thus, life danger (examples: transportation of a cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first unchecked person; un-safe approach to the indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. clients; misuse of coercive or authority/ exceeding the use of force or violation of individual fundamental rights; not separating searched from unsearched person; no checks of ID in database) __________________________________________________________________________________ 79",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p79-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 80,
"content": "ANNEX V SCENARIO III PACK Asylum seeker – first aid 1. General information 2. Situation/order 3. Imaginary history 4. Material and personnel needs 5. Assessment checklist __________________________________________________________________________________ 80",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p80-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 81,
"content": "1. General Information Topic Asylum Seekers Communication • Safety and security measures during ID Check • First Aid Aims of Training • Lawful BG measures • Communication skills • Reporting • Initiating Asylum procedures 1 patrol (by foot) Personnel needs 1 actor Officer: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement Patrol equipment officials performing (Basar), borderBaton, radios, control. flashlight, Disclosing such information mobile would phone,expose the working methods pepper-spray, applied (steel), handcuffs in ongoingtraining and futurepistol operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and Material needs Opponent person: unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection 1 the of actor withinterest public bags,asno ID documents regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant 1 dummy to Article 4(1)(a)Aid for First first (medical indent of Regulation support(EC)byNoPA)1049/2001. Locality Training area at the compound Communication According to communication plan 2. Situation / Order Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border General crossings in the area especially clandestine entry and some Information smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol). The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus Specific operandi In the lastof law week enforcement several times officials performing local citizensborder control. informed BG Disclosing Information such information authority aboutwould expose the of the presence working unknownmethods applied people in in ongoing the area.and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. You are patrolling today in the green border area between In consequence, it would undermine the protection Point A and Point B. of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Orders You are carrying out surveillance duties. • Report any irregularities • Take immediately necessary actions __________________________________________________________________________________ 81",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p81-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 82,
"content": "3. Imaginary history Description of situation Expected Measures Behaviour of opponent / remarks Announcement of Following the Trainer’s safety Following the Trainer’s specific safety rules rules safety rules The non-disclosed part contains detailed information Description of Situation: • Providing regarding the modus operandi ofFully law cooperative enforcementbehavior: officials first aid to Patrol is approaching performing border dummy control. Disclosing such • He states information following situation: would expose (breath the working kiss methods applied in that both ongoing and One person (irregular future operations, thus obstructing their and heart effectiveness in are brothers migrant) is trying to give prevention of massage) cross-border crime and and unauthorized from border first aid to another person crossings. •In Report consequence, to it would Syriaundermine the on the ground (dummy). protection of the CC in public orderinterest as• regards Asylum public security seeking When the migrant see and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to request • Cannotto Article 4(1)(a) the patrol he is calling first indent of Regulation medical (EC) No 1049/2001. present them for help. support any • ID Check docume (migrants nts without documents • Search of the persons and bags • Follo wing Asylu m proc edur es __________________________________________________________________________________ 82",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p82-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 83,
"content": "The non-disclosed NEEDS partINFORMATI contains detailed information regarding INFORMATIONS the modus operandi INFORMATIONS PLACEof law enforcement END OF THE officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods ONS FOR FOR THE FOR THE WHERE SCENARIO applied in ongoing and THE future operations, ACTOR thus obstructing POLICE their effectivenessTHEin prevention of cross- 17. 3 BGs – patrol, COMMAND OFFICERS SCENARIO 11. FA dummy border crime equiped withand unauthorized CENTRE border crossings. 24. He is SYR In consequence, it would undermine IS GOING the protection will receive of the public interest as regards public security radios, pepper- withoutand thus, cannot be disclosed 5. patrolling route: pursuant ON to Article 4(1)(a) medical first spray, handcuffs assistance. indent of Regulation (steel), training (EC) 10.No if 1049/2001. they ask documents. HQ-Frontex 12. FA dummy – 25. He stays down, Street-Main pistol, for the car- 7. performan picked up by next to F.A. Road-Street of 18. one actor (male- they can ce area: paramedics. dummy and Europe-Welcome communication skill get it green plato 13. Patrol will screams for help. Sqare-Jules – English speaker) 11. if they call between report the 26. When patrol Verne Street- 19. one first aid for the Gourmet incident to arrive he stated Market Place for dummy backup- Path and Command that his friend (FA Vehicles- 20. 2 bags: 1 wearing they will Power Centre. dummy) was Gourmet Path by the migrant get it Plant. 14. Luggage will feeling seek and and back. (actor) and 1 on 12. if they be searched. he just fall down. the ground by the request for 15. Migrant 27. He stated to the dummy (personal an (actor) will patrol that he items inside) ambulance receive safety request asylum. 21. 1 box of protective - they will check. 28. if they ask him to gloves get it 16. Procedure open the bag- 22. desinfection 13. if they according to actor will do it. liquide. request for asylum paramedic seekers. s – they 17. Write shift will get it. report + SIR. __________________________________________________________________________________ 83",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p83-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 84,
"content": "Patrol Number: AIMS Performance Name: Name: Name: MINOR POINTS Following the MARCH protocol [M – Massive Bleeding; A – Airway; R – Respirations; C – Circulation; H – Head] Using gloves Identity of injured people Communication with the opponent Internal and external communication Delegation/Division of tasks Reporting to CC in front of the client - discrete surveillance Following asylum procedures (reporting to CC) Knowledge about doctor/hospital the people are transported to Explaining measures CRITICAL POINTS The non-disclosed Not providing any part contains support / Firstdetailed Aid information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such Not requesting ambulance information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus Officers safety obstructing their and security,inwhich effectiveness will lead prevention of to cross- life danger (examples: transportation of a border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In unchecked person; un-safe approach to the consequence, it would undermine the protection of clients; misuse of coercive or authority/ the public interest as regards public security and thus, exceeding the use of force or violation of individual cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first fundamental rights; not separating searched indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. from unsearched person; no checks of ID in database __________________________________________________________________________________ 84",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p84-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 85,
"content": "ANNEX VI COMPLEX SCENARIO PACK Asylum seekers with first aid __________________________________________________________________________________ 85",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p85-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 86,
"content": "1. General Information Border crossing of a group with the need of first aid / medical support for one person. Group is seeking for asylum. Topic Communication skills Closing an area (border guard tactic skills) Aims of Training Searching an area (border guard tactic skills) First aid skills Initiating asylum procedures patrols (needed for closing and searching an area) 1 actor as an injured irregular migrant Personnel needs actors as irregular migrants The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus Officer: operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information Patrol equipmentwould expose (Basar), the working Vehicle, methods radios, Baton, applied inmobile flashlight, ongoing and future operations, phone, thushandcuffs pepper-spray, obstructing(steel), their effectiveness in prevention of cross- training pistol border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermineperson: Opponent the protection of the Some with public small bags,interest as regards public security Material needs and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of 1Regulation (EC) Nowith person injured 1049/2001. open wound Locality Green border training area Communication According to communication plan 2. Situation / Order Risk assessments indicate attempts of illegal border General crossings in the area especially clandestine entry and some Information smuggling cases of goods (cigarettes, alcohol). Last two weeks, this area has been identified as an illegal Specific border crossing hotspot for irregular migration. Several Information groups of 3-6 migrants crossed the border illegally. __________________________________________________________________________________ 86",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p86-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 87,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi You areofpatrolling law enforcement today in officials performing the green borderborder areacontrol. betweenDisclosing such information Point A and Point wouldB.expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- Orders border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would If you have contact to illegal activities: undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security - report to Command Center and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of -Regulation Take immediately necessary (EC) No 1049/2001. actions on the spot 1. Imaginary history Description of situation Expected Behaviour of opponent / Measures remarks Announcement of Following the Following the Trainer’s safety specific safety rules Trainer’s safety rules rules The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement Description of Situation: officials performing border control. Disclosing such • interview the • Totally cooperative information would expose the working methods applied • Patrol will detect in ongoing person behaviour and future operations, thus obstructing their injured irregular • safety and • when the person will be effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and migrant security interviewed he will tell the somewhere unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would tactics patrol, that he was not undermine the protection of the public interest as near the border. • gatherin alone and they have regards gpublic security andcrossed thus, cannot be disclosed the border with pursuant to Article informati 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation three more individuals (EC) No 1049/2001. on about • He shows the direction the where the other migrants circumst are ances • communicati on skills • person is • First Aid • He is asking for help injured and measure cannot walk s (if possible) , call emergen cy __________________________________________________________________________________ 87",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p87-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 88,
"content": "The non-disclosed part contains detailed information • group of 4 • • Group is trying to escape, regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement Report to irregular Command after warning by BG migrants in short officials performing border control. Disclosing such Center officers cooperative information would expose the working methods distance to the • Use behavior in action applied in ongoing and future operations, thus accident place; border • Verbally moving towards obstructing guard their effectiveness in prevention aggressive, but of cross- inside of the border tactics crime and unauthorized border cooperative crossings. In country consequence, (close it would undermine the protection • Group is not presenting of the public and interest as regards anypublic security and thus, documents cannot search be disclosed pursuant • Group to isArticle 4(1)(a)that giving hints first indent an of Regulation area) (EC) Nothey 1049/2001. are in need of • Use security International tactics protection (Asylum • interview the Seeker) persons • communi cation skills, especiall y coordinati on in acting with other patrols who are involved in case • Transport ation of persons __________________________________________________________________________________ 88",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p88-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 89,
"content": "NEEDS INFORMATIONS FOR INFORMATIONS INFORMATIONS FOR PLACE END OF THE THE COMMAND FOR THE ACTORS THE POLICE OFFICERS WHERE THE SCENARIO CENTRE SCENARIO IS 1. 1 actor as an 6. To patrol with 3 cars in GOING ON 3. All The non-disclosed part contains detailed Injured illegal person at14. if 1 patrol doesn´t totally personinformation is regarding the field according to the modus operandi of law persons enforcement (asylum seekers the borderline, officials performing border control. find injured person in cooperative. He is Disclosing the day plan. such 1 information patrol in would 8. in the field and expose the facilitator) working methods who is injured 5 applied minutes in after ongoing and asking future for help operations, second linethus andobstructing 2 near their to effectiveness who are involved in with open exercise start – give patrols in first line. prevention wound of cross-border and the crime and during unauthorized the border crossings. In borderconsequence, line in this itcase wouldare information (real or fake) discovered and undermine cannot the about walk protection of the interview. injured person public interestHe will as regards public 9. security and thus, it will be treated cannot be as disclosed (leg) pursuant to Article to the patrols 4(1)(a) firstforindent (from ask asylum.of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. shown on the necessary. 2. Original ID for locals) When the person map during actor (injured15. if group of migrants the briefing 4. ?? facilitator´s car will be is stopped and person). ID will be discovered 10. Patrols will doesn’t give before injured person interviewed he checked be provided maps5. Asylum permission for - give the will tell the patrol seekers with legal staying in information bot that he was not (copy). and facilitator are country. injured person (from alone and they prepared for 3. Small bag with locals) to the patrols have crossed the transportation to personal 5 minutes after border with four command center possessions of group of migrants injured person. discovered more individuals. 6. Injured person is 4. 1 first aid bag in16. if patrols ask for the He will tell about provided with first patrol car aid for waiting for dog- it will be it u 5 minutes 5. 4 actors as available only in one after ambulance they migrants who hour discover him if 7. All personal crossed illegally17. if patrols ask for belongings they will not ask border with first ambulance - it will be collected and are actor (injured available only in one him earlier about ready to be person) and hour it. transported to moving inside of18. to transport a bag or He shows the command center the country. persons to the direction where (not leaved at the They location command centre - the other field) about 1km away they can migrants are from the place19. to check any personal they leave data Group of – nothing injured person. special, not migrants is trying 6. At least 2 bags criminals, no to escape, after with personal permission for legal warning by BG belongings for staying in country officers’ - the group of20. ??? Data of facilitator cooperative migrants. - facilitator has 7. 3 patrol cars for permission for 1 year behaviour in patrols. At least to stay in country. action. Verbally 1 radio in each Facilitator´s country aggressive, but car. of origin is the same cooperative 8. 1 car for actors, like migrant´s one. Group is not to bring them to presenting any the place 9. documents 10. 1 car for Group is giving trainers and for hints that they are the medical in need of officer International 11. 1 car for protection facilitator ??? 12. 1 map (route (Asylum Seeker) and directions ??? They show at on it) of action the facilitator who aria for is moving with the facilitator car near the place 13. where migrants 14. will be stopped. __________________________________________________________________________________ 89",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p89-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 90,
"content": "15.The ID fornon-disclosed facilitator part contains detailed They information will regarding the modus operandi of law and the car. OK. 16.enforcement Red armbands –officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the recognize him like a person who working for actorsmethods and applied in ongoingshould and future to operations, pick thus obstructing their effectiveness in cars prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized them up to move border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest inside the countryas regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first ??? indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Fasilitator trying to avoid BG officers and stopping the car. He is totally cooperative in action and verbally. He pretend to be a person who just driving the car. He pretend that he doesn´t know migrants and know nothing about this case. __________________________________________________________________________________ 90",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p90-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 91,
"content": "AIMS Patrol: Name: Name: Name: Briefing/Divided tasks INJURED Proper approach/Safety- Security measures Providing First Aid March Protocol Report to C.C./Request medical support/Transportation Search irregular migrant and bags Collect info/ Share info/Pass to C.C. Following Asylum procedure GROUP Find group-treated as necessary -/ Report to C.C. Safety-Security search separately Internal-External communication Find map/Connection with facilitator Multi-patrol leader FACILITATOR Find him/Stop properly/C.C./Find map/Connection with group Critical points The non-disclosed Officers safety part and contains detailed information regarding the security, which will lead to modus operandi of law life danger (examples: enforcement officials performing transportation border of a control. Disclosing such information uncheckedwould expose person; un- the working methods toapplied safe approach the in ongoing and future operations, thus clients; misuse of obstructing their effectiveness in coercive or authority/ prevention of cross-border crime exceeding and theborder unauthorized use of force crossings. In consequence, or violation it of individual would undermine fundamental the protection rights; not of the public interest as regards public separating searched security and thus, cannot be from unsearched disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) person; first indent no of checks Regulationof(EC) ID No 1049/2001. in database) __________________________________________________________________________________ 91",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p91-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 92,
"content": "ANNEX VII RADIO COMMUNICATION EXERCISE PACK __________________________________________________________________________________ 92",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p92-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 93,
"content": "Patrol Location I Location II Location III Location IV Location V Location VI Patrol 1 Radio check 5 (16:10 – 2 (14:25 – 3 (14:50 – 1 (14:00- 4 (15:15 – (Alpha 1) exercise 16:25) 14:40) 15:05) 14:15) 15:30) Patrol 2 4 (15:15 – Radio check 3 (14:50 – 1(14:00- 5 (16:10 – 2(14:25 – (Alpha 2) 15:30) exercise 15:05) 14:15) 16:25) 14:40) Patrol 3 5 (16:10 – 1(14:00- Radio check 2(14:25 – 4 (15:15 – 3 (14:50 – (Alpha 3) 16:25) 14:15) exercise 14:40) 15:30) 15:05) Patrol 4 1(14:00- 3 (14:50 – 4 (15:15 – Radio check 2(14:25 – 5 (16:10 – (Alpha 4) 14:15) 15:05) 15:30) exercise 14:40) 16:25) Patrol 5 3 (14:50 – 2(14:25 – 5 (16:10 – 4 (15:15 – Radio check 1(14:00- (Alpha 5) 15:05) 14:40) 16:25) 15:30) exercise 14:15) Patrol 6 2(14:25 – 4 (15:15 – 1(14:00- 5 (16:10 – 3 (14:50 – Radio check (Alpha 6) 14:40) 15:30) 14:15) 16:25) 15:05) exercise Trainer Trainer Trainer Trainer Radio exercise starts at 13:30 till 14:00: First tasks for the patrols task will be to move to appointed locations and report to command centre when they arrived. Second task will be to contact each other and see if they can reach all locations. After this they will return to command centre for feedback. Radio communication exercise will start at 14:00 till 17:00: Patrols have to go randomly to locations, send by command centre and fulfil tasks at the spot. After finishing the task, they will receive the next task from command centre to move to a new position. When they reached the position they will receive a new task. During the radio communication exercise there is the possibility to move 5 times and receive 5 tasks depending on the time schedule. Patrols continue with moving and tasks as explained before, at 16:35 all patrols will move back to command centre for feedback session. __________________________________________________________________________________ 93",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p93-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 94,
"content": "Trainer 1 Task location I in combination with location II, which is without trainer. Patrol 4 (Alpha 4) (14:15-14:30) Contact with patrol 3 (Alpha 3) • Alpha 3 – here Alpha 4: Alpha 3 can you pass the following information to the command Centre … The registration plate and type, colour of a car … (up to trainer) • Alpha 3 have to pass this information to CC - CC will answer that the car is not in the system • Alpha 3 send to Alpha 4 that car is clean Patrol 6 (Alpha 6) (14:40 – 14:55) Contact with patrol 5 (Alpha 5) • Alpha 5 – here Alpha 6: Alpha 5 can you pass the following information to the command Centre … The registration plate and type, colour of a car … (up to trainer) • Alpha 5 have to pass this information to CC - CC will answer that the car is not in the system • Alpha 5 send to Alpha 6 that car is clean Patrol 5 (Alpha 5) (15:30 – 15:45) Contact with patrol 4 (Alpha 4) • Alpha 4 – here Alpha 5: Alpha 4 can you pass the following information to the command Centre … The registration plate and type, colour of a car … (up to trainer) • Alpha 4 have to pass this information to CC - CC will answer that the car is not in the system • Alpha 4 send to Alpha 5 that car is clean Patrol 2 (Alpha 2) (15:55 – 16:10) Contact with patrol 6 (Alpha 6) • Alpha 6 – here Alpha 2: Alpha 6 can you pass the following information to the command Centre … The registration plate and type, colour of a car … (up to trainer) • Alpha 6 have to pass this information to CC - CC will answer that the car is not in the system • Alpha 6 send to Alpha 2 that car is clean Patrol 3 (Alpha 3) (16:20 – 16:35) Contact with patrol 1 (Alpha 1) • Alpha 1 – here Alpha 3: Alpha 1 can you pass the following information to the command Centre … The registration plate and type, colour of a car … (up to trainer) • Alpha 1 have to pass this information to CC - CC will answer that the car is not in the system • Alpha 1 send to Alpha 3 that car is clean __________________________________________________________________________________ 94",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p94-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 95,
"content": "Trainer 2 Task Location III Patrol 6 (14:30 – 14:45) • Alpha 6 have to send the passport number to CC and ask if the document is in SIS - CC will ask back to Alpha 6 were the passport was issued - CC will say that documents is not in the system Patrol 1 (14:55 – 15:10) • Alpha 1 have to send the first name, last name and date of birth (from pp) to CC and ask if the person is in the SIS - CC will ask again for the given names - CC will say that the person is not in the system Patrol 2 (15:20 – 15:35) • Alpha 2 have to send the first name, last name and date of birth (from pp) to CC and ask if the person is in the SIS - CC will ask again for the given names - CC will say that the person is not in the system Patrol 4 (16:55 – 16:20) • Alpha 4 have to send the passport number to CC and ask if the document is in SIS - CC will ask back to Alpha 6 were the passport was issued - CC will say that documents is not in the system Patrol 5 (16:30 – 16:45) • Alpha 5 have to send the first name, last name and date of birth (from pp) to CC and ask if the person is in the SIS - CC will ask again for the given names - CC will say that the person is not in the system __________________________________________________________________________________ 95",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p95-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 96,
"content": "Trainer 3 Task location IV Patrol 2 (14:30-14:45) • Alpha 2 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre - CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border Patrol 3 (14:55 – 15:10) • Alpha 3 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre - CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border Patrol 1 (15:20 – 15:35) • Alpha 2 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre - CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border Patrol 5 (16:05 – 16:20) • Alpha 2 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre - CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border Patrol 6 (16:30 – 16:45) • Alpha 2 has to give a description from the person you see on the picture to the command centre - CC will ask all stations to look out for this person because he was probably irregular passing the border __________________________________________________________________________________ 96",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p96-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 97,
"content": "Trainer 4 Tasks location VI in combination with location V, which is without trainer Patrol 5 (Alpha 5) (14:30 – 14:45) Contact with patrol 1 (Alpha 1) • Alpha 1 – here Alpha 5: Alpha 1 can you pass the following information to the command centre: There is a tractor coming from the forest in the direction of the border. On the tractor are three persons. • Alpha 1 forward this to CC - CC is answering that the farmer has informed the CC about his work on that day and the number of workers. No further action needed • Alpha 1 forward this info to Alpha 5 Patrol 2 (Alpha 2) (14:55 – 15:10) Contact with patrol 4 (Alpha 4) • Alpha 4 – here Alpha 2: Alpha 4 can you pass the following information to the command they see 20 people in the forest near the border with green uniforms. • Alpha 4 forward info to CC - CC was informed about an exercise of Border guard school near the border. No further action • Alpha 4 forward this info to Alpha 2 Patrol 3 (Alpha 3) (15:20 – 15:35) Contact with patrol 6 (Alpha 6) • Alpha 6 – here Alpha 3: Alpha 6 can you pass the following information to the command centre a there are three trucks going in the direction of the border, the trucks are not following the official road but going through the field • Alpha 6 forward info to CC - CC was informed that some workers forester / forest guards cleaning the area around the border • Alpha 6 forward the info to Alpha 3 Patrol 1 (Alpha 1) (16:05 – 16:20) Contact with patrol 3 (Alpha 3) • Alpha 3 – here Alpha 1: Alpha 3 can you pass the following information to the command centre we saw a helicopter crossing the border from Usanski to Europia • Alpha 3 pass info to CC - CC answers that it was a medical flight and there was a permission • Alpha 3 forward the info to Alpha 1 Patrol 4 (Alpha 4) (16:3020 – 16:45) Contact with patrol 2 (Alpha 2) • Alpha 2 – here Alpha 4: Alpha 2 can you pass the following information to the command centre a group of 10 people moving towards the border from Usanski. - CC answers that they will send three patrols cars to the position of the people • Alpha 2 pass the info to Alpha 4 __________________________________________________________________________________ 97",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p97-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 98,
"content": "ANNEX VIII SIRIOUS INCIDENT REPORT Template __________________________________________________________________________________ 98",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p98-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 99,
"content": "Serious Incident Report no. 1. Reporting date: Last modification date: Reporting person: Last modification done by: The FSCnon-disclosed SIR Category part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus Subject obstructing Type of SIR their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public JORA Incident number (if any) interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Joint Operation Frontex SIR Coordinator Incident date/time Detection date/time Original source of the information Location of the incident Is latitude unknown Latitude Is longitude unknown Longitude Reference to the operational area Frontex resources involved (Human resources / co-financed technical equipment) Type of resources / involvement Dead persons __________________________________________________________________________________ 99",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p99-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 100,
"content": "Injured persons Missing persons Fact of the case Measures Assessment __________________________________________________________________________________ 100",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p100-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 101,
"content": "ANNEX IX SHIFT REPORT Template __________________________________________________________________________________ 101",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p101-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 102,
"content": "SHIFT REPORT The non-disclosed part contains detailed information Date____________, related time __:__ to to reporting tools and methods __:__ used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure Names and would jeopardize nationality the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus of TMs:___________________________________ facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would ___________________________________ undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not ___________________________________ disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. BCU:________________________________________________________ Technical equipment:__________________________________________ Weather conditions::___________________________________________ Vehicle_________type_________number plate_______driven km______ Operational performance: Operational intelligence: Human resources: Notice/ recommendation: __________________________________________________________________________________ 102",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p102-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 103,
"content": "ANNEX IX SQF Alignment __________________________________________________________________________________ 103",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p103-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 104,
"content": "Single Module Course Design Template Course Title: EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Training Aim of the course: Preparing EBCGT pool members for their deployment as Border Surveillance Officers – Land Operation Target group and entry requirements: Officially assigned as Team Member by national authority to the EBCGT pool as Border Surveillance Officer – Land Operation Constraints: Financial resources: Frontex training project Time: Approx 8 hours of independent learning and 5 working days of contact learning phase Participants: 18 students from MS/SAC; in exceptional case also from Third Countries Approx: 7 trainers are necessary to run the course Logistics: This course requires vehicles, radios, maps, actors, personal equipment (handcuffs, batons, etc.), first aid training dummy, etc. Facilities: 1 conference room, outdoor training environment, preferable Border Guard Training Institution Job Competences (JC): On completion of this course, participants will: Have a knowledge or understanding of: (L5) • ethical codes, values and professional standards during Frontex organised Joint Operations SQF JC: SQF Level 5 JC: • Data handling together with procedures such as form filling; SQF JC: SQF Level JC: • A defined range of EU and international policies and procedures related to land border surveillance SQF JC: SQF Leve 5l … Be able to: JC: __________________________________________________________________________________ 104",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p104-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 105,
"content": "Search persons, vehicles and objects in their possession in joint teams according to legal regulations whilst respecting each individual’s fundamental rights SQF JC: SQF Level 4 JC: Demonstrate situational awareness in an operational border control context as part of a joint team SQF JC: SQF Level 4 JC: Communicate effectively with individuals and groups in predictable land border surveillance contexts. SQF JC: SQF Level 5 JC: Conduct border surveillance in a joint team, selecting appropriate methods, tactics and techniques of best practices at land border SQF JC: Take responsibility for: JC: Completing duties safely and responsibly SQF JC: SQF Level 4 JC: Identify and report misconduct during mission SQF JC: SQF Level 4 JC: Ensure that individual and tactical responses to threat during mission are fully compliant with international and European conventions and fundamental rights. SQF JC: SQF Level … Learning Outcomes: On completion of this course the learner will be able to… SQF Level K Demonstrate effective communication skills and techniques as part of a joint team S during a Frontex operation and apply them in an articulate coherent detailed and RA 4 accurate manner, in all written and oral interactions SQF LO: Demonstrate effective communication skills and techniques and apply them in an articulate coherent detailed and accurate manner, in all written and oral interactions in a range of L5 GBG border guarding contexts. K Demonstrate land border surveillance tactics and techniques to gather information, S 4 Responsibility and autonomy, according to European Qualifications Framework (EQF). In the SQF for BG still under the title Competence (following the EQF 2017). SQF for BG will be updated and will follow the same. __________________________________________________________________________________ 105",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p105-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 106,
"content": "RA prevent and detect illegal border crossing, cross-border criminality and irregularity as a member of a joint team SQF LO: L4 BC Demonstrate border surveillance tactics and techniques to gather information, prevent and detect illegal border crossing, cross-border criminality and irregularity. K Apply land border procedures in order to ensure security and safety of persons and S objects in their possession in compliance with fundamental rights during a joint RA operation. SQF LO: Apply a range of skills to ensure security and safety of persons and property in compliance with L5 BC fundamental rights. K Apply rules and procedures according to operational plan relevant to a land border S surveillance officer. RA SQF LO: Apply a broad range of national, EU and international law, rules and procedures relevant to a L5 BGB range of border guarding activities. Course SQF Level: : 5 __________________________________________________________________________________ 106",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p106-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 107,
"content": "Cross Reference Table Job competences vs. Learning outcomes JC LO LO1 LO2 LO3 LO4 Demonstrate Demonstrate land Apply land Apply rules and effective border border procedures communication skills surveillance procedures in according and techniques as tactics and order to to operational part techniques ensure security plan of a joint team to gather and relevant to a land during information, safety of persons border a Frontex operation prevent and and surveillance and apply them in an detect objects in their officer articulate coherent illegal border possession in detailed and crossing, compliance with accurate cross-border fundamental manner, in all criminality and rights written irregularity as a during a joint and oral interactions member of a joint operation team JC1 ethical codes, values and professional standards during Frontex organised joint operations JC2 data handling together with procedures such as form filling; JC3 a defined range of EU and international policies and procedures related to land border surveillance. JC4 search persons, vehicles and objects in their possession in joint teams according to legal regulations __________________________________________________________________________________ 107",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p107-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 108,
"content": "whilst respecting each individual’s fundamental rights; JC5 demonstrate situational awareness in an operational border control context as part of a joint team; JC6 communicate effectively with individuals and groups in predictable land border surveillance contexts; JC7 conduct border surveillance in a joint team, selecting appropriate methods, tactics and techniques of best practices at land border. JC8 take responsibility for completing duties safely and responsibly; JC9 identify and report misconduct during mission; JC10 ensure that individual and tactical responses __________________________________________________________________________________ 108",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p108-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 109,
"content": "to threat during mission are fully compliant with international and European conventions and fundamental rights. Learning Strategy: This programme’s teaching, learning and assessment strategies are designed to support the trainees in attaining the required standard to achieve the course outcomes through a formative assessment and a blended approach to learning which uses learning instruments such as practical exercises, workshops, case studies and simulations. The learning strategy follows two inter-connected phases of learning and combines the learning of the theoretical knowledge with the development of the practical skills and competences. The pre-reading phase (online-course) enables the participants to gain the foundation information on which the skills and competences will be built during the contact phase. The contact phase develops and enhances the skills and competences described in the learning outcomes as well as the participants’ social and interaction skills, while integrating an array of training and learning methods and techniques with opportunity for critical, yet constructive, peer-review and feedback. The learning strategy is focused mainly on practical exercises, scenario-based exercises, simulation of a joint operation to facilitate the skills /competence development in a practical training approach. The simulation of a joint operation is based on three phases: preparation including briefing, operational phase and debriefing. The practical exercises will offer an opportunity for peer learning and feedback (continuous formative feedback as part of learning). Feedback will be provided by peers and trainers after each scenario. There will also be a summary feedback at the end of each training day including feedback concerning individual reports. Assessment Strategy: The course assessment strategy is designed to support the trainees in acquiring the required standards through their learning. There will be an on-going assessment strategy offering trainees a formative feedback during the week. The formative feedback aims to highlight the weaknesses, knowledge gaps in order to help trainees strengthen their understanding and improve performance. The assessment instruments include individual report writing, problem-solving exercises, peer __________________________________________________________________________________ 109",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p109-{size}.png"
},
{
"document": "https://fragdenstaat.de/api/v1/document/155453/?format=api",
"number": 110,
"content": "evaluation and group work. The assessment aim is to evaluate all the learning outcomes, hence contributing to the learning process. As entry requirement for the contact learning phase, all participants have to pass the current version of the pre-deployment online course and its own assessment strategy. During the contact-learning phase the trainee has to undergo three different scenarios (1x as team leader; 2x as Team Member). Each scenario is following its own assessment in terms of minor mistakes and critical mistakes, which are in general stipulated for respective scenario. Three minor mistakes will lead to a critical mistake. One critical mistake will lead to a failure of the scenario. Two failed scenarios will lead to a “referred pass” of the course and a re-sit, which will be organized after a profound feedback. The re-sit is a similar scenario in which the trainee has failed and should give the learner the possibility for presenting the achievements of the learning outcomes. Assessment Method Weighting Summative assessment 70% Formative assessment 30% Curriculum Outline with Indicative Content: Indicative References: EBCGT Land Border Surveillance Officer Handbook of best practice Frontex Code of Conduct Guidelines for Trainers Approximate Calculation of ECTS Hours Contact • Lecture 4 • Seminar 0 • Workshop 0 • Practical exercise 32 • Other Experiential (workplace) Learning Independent Learning 8 Assessment • Revision • Assessment procedures After each scenario approx. 15 – 20 Minutes feedback and assessment of the scenario. Total Learning Hours 44 __________________________________________________________________________________ 110",
"width": 2481,
"height": 3508,
"image": "https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/docs/0b/a7/f3/0ba7f36aa36e451aab41f5b3f2a4bf3d/page-p110-{size}.png"
}
]
}
