........ ~ FRONTEX -Reg. No - OPERATIONS DIVISION Joint Operations Unit Air Border Sector Annexes of the Operational Plan Joint Operation Alexis 2014 2014/ABS/06 - European Agency for the Management of Operationa l Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union www.frontex .europa.eu Rondo ONZ 1, 00 -124 Warsaw , Poland Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 Fax +48 22 205 95 0 1

........ :::::: FRONTEX INDEX ANNEX 1 - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION     3 ANNEX 2 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS           12 ANNEX 3 - STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES (SOP) ON THE BASIS OF VEGA HANDBOOK                          14 ANNEX 4 - OPERATIONAL BRIEFING                            22 ANNEX 5 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SCHEME                      23 ANNEX 6 - JORA                                            24 ANNEX 7 - CONTACT DETAILS - FRONTEX                       27 ANNEX 8 - OPERATIONAL AREA - LIST OF PARTICIPATING AIRPORTS AND AIRPORT CONTACT DETAILS                     28 ANNEX 9 - INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES (DEPLOYMENT LIST)                                           30

~ FRONTEX ANNEX 1 - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION 1. 1. Introduction Joint Operation Alexis 2014 has been conceived to support EU and Schengen Associated Country airports in respect of their own perceived vulnerabilities/needs concerning operational activities. The process by which airports have identified these and the methodology for the selection of common vulnerabilities needs to which Frontex provides the requisite operational support is described in detail in the Operational Plan. Airports in conjunction with Frontex decided to select the following as their vulnerabilities /needs where a joint activity could be launched in participating airports with the provision of appropriate human assets:· ■  Undocumented passengers ■  Transit without Visa Abuse ■  No shows at departure gates ■  Documents Swapping in Schengen and non Schengen airports ■  Interception and interviewing of inadequately documented passengers on being removed or refused entry by a non EU country This briefing document has been created in order to provide an overview of the risks and threats presented at the external air borders of the EU in respect of the above identified vulnerabilities/ needs. The document will assess the general threat and risks as well as the more specific ones associated with the airports which have agreed to participate or are considering their participation in the operation at the time of the drafting of this document. 1. 2. Airports in the operational area The foll owi ng a re the airports that have agreed or a re considering ta king part in the operation a t the tim e tha t t his docume nt was created : ■  Am ste rd a m (AMS) • Athe ns (ATH) ■  Barcelon a (BCN) ■  Be rga mo (BGY) • Bratislava (BTS) ■  Brusse ls (BRU ) ■  Bucha rest (OTP) ■  Buda pest (BUD) • Geneva (GVA) ■  Lisbon (LIS) ■  Luxembourg (LUX) ■  Lyon (LYS) ■  Madrid (MAD) ■  Milan (MXP) ■  Paris · Charles De Gaulle (CDG) 3/27

~ FRONTEX ■  Paris - Orly (ORY) ■  Prague (PRG) ■  Riga (RIX) ■  Rome (FCO) ■  Sofia (SOF) ■  Timisoara (TSR) ■  Vienna (VIE) ■  Vilnius (VNO) ■  Warsaw (WAW) 1. 3. Data sources and measurable indicators The following indicators can be measured by reference to Pulsar Data for all the above airports except Lyon and Timisoara which do not report in Pulsar: ■  Undocumented migrants/ Failure to detect airport of embarkation All Pulsar Data is taken for the whole period 01.01.2014 to 06.04.2014 The following data cannot be measured from Pulsar Data and can only be obtained by reference to operational information reported in JORA and only when an airport is taking part in an operation: ■  Transit without Visa Abuse ■  Documents Swapping The source of information in relation to t he above two indicators is therefore JORA. • No shows at departure gates Is not measu red in the collection process , but is effectively a consequence of documents swapping a nd transit with out visa abuse. 1.4. General overview of the external EU air border in respect to identified vulnerabilities/needs • Undocumented Passengers Migrants seek to arrive at airports undocumented in order to disguise their own nationality and routing, t hereby making the ability of t he borde r authorities a nd immigration services harder in seeking to identify the origin of t he migrant a nd to seek t heir late r repat ri ation when or if req uired. In gene ral t he number of undocumented arrivals recorded at airports is generally low ac ross Sche ngen airports with about 20 recorded a week. This is probably due to the fact t hat border authorities are generally good at identifying local high risk flig hts and usi ng ma nifest profiling and surveillance activities to be able to ide ntify passengers a nd t he fl ights on which they have arrived . • [Failure to detect airport of embarkation[                                                                          Commented [Al]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information rega rding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU' s ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 4 / 27

~ FRONTEX Commented [A2]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. • Document Swapping Involves a migrant arriving with one set of travel or identity documentation and then using another set of documentation to seek entry to the Schengen area, or instead to enter into the transit area to 5/ 27

~ FRONTEX use documentation that allows them to appear to be eligible for entry to another country and therefore to board a flight to that country. Document swapping can also relate to migrants choosing to switch documentation at airports outside of the EU whilst in transit. As mentioned, Frontex does not habitually gather statistical information from airports in respect of the phenomena essentially because it is hard to prove and is usually only apparent after debriefing of the migrant, enquiries made with Check In staff and also possible examination of visual surveillance recording in the transit area. A result of the fact that data is not habitually obtained means that it is not possible to clearly identify the extent or level of the threat posed by the phenomenon. In general most cases where a forged or counterfeit passport is used or documents abuse takes place may be an indicator that document swapping has taken place. Where incidents have been detected, information suggests that large hub airports outside of the EU have been associated with migrants being provided with alternative documentation whilst in transit to board flights to the Schengen area. ~his                                                                      Commented [A3]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. • [T'our group~                                                                                                  Commented [A4]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's ext ernal borders. Its disclosure wou ld jeopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of f uture and ongoing operat ions, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected . In light of the above, the t ext is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in t he first i ndent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. • Interception and interviewing of inadequately documented passengers on being removed or refused entry by a non EU country - 1. 5. Airpo rts • !Amsterdam (AMS)L   1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Commented [AS]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migratio n. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 /2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 6/ 27

~ FRONTEX Commented [A6] : The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A7]: The blanked out part s contain detailed info rm ati on regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU' s ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoi ng operat ions, and thus facili tate irregular migrati on. Therefore, public securi ty will be affected. In light of the • :earcelona (BCN)[      above, th e t ext is not disclosed pursuant t o t he exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating t o th e prot ect ion of th e public int erest as regards public security. Commented [AS] : The blanked out part s cont ain det ailed informati on regarding vulnerabilit ies and needs at th e EU' s external borders. It s disclosure would jeopardize the work of - • :eergamo (BGY)[        law enforcement officials and harm the course of futu re and ongoing operations, and t hus facili tat e irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affec ted. In light of the above, t he text is not disclosed pursuant t o the exception laid down in the first indent of Arti cle 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating t o th e protection of th e public interest as regards public security . Commented [A9]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the - above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 7/27

~ FRONTEX Commented [AlO]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 /2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [All]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . >                                                                 < Commented [All]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the • :e udapest (BUD)!        above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . > Commented [A13] : The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of • ~eneva (GVA)[            law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . >Commented [A14]: The blanked out parts contain          detailed ' information regarding vu lnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 /2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 8/ 27

~ FRONTEX Commented [A15]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.                    C Commented [A16]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 /2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A17]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A18]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of • !Paris - (COG) Charles De Gaulle [        law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest >as regards public security .                                   c=; Commented [A19]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU 's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus faci litate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the • !Paris • Orly (ORY)l                      above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to th e protection of the public interest as regards public security .                                   c=; Commented [A20]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security .                                   C =Commented [A21]: The blanked out parts contain detailed       ~ • prague (PRGI)                             information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.                                    C 9/ 27

~ FRONTEX Commented [A22]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A23]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure wou ld jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A24]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vu lnerabilities and needs at the EU 's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.                                      ~ Commented [A25]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would j eopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migrati on. Therefore, public security wi ll be affected. In light of the above, th e t ext is not disclosed pursuant to the exception • [T"imisoara (TSR)[                                                            laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to th e protection of the public interest >as regards public security.                                       c=; Commented [A26]: The blanked out part s contain detailed information regarding vulnerabili ti es and needs at the EU 's • ~ienna (VIE)]                                                                 ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize th e work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoi ng operati ons, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Th erefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the t ext is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Ar ti cle 4(1 )(a) of Regulati on No 1049/2001 relating t o th e protection of th e public interest as regards public security. Commented [A27]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's ext ernal borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize th e work of • ivHnius (VNO)[                                                                law enforcement officials and harm th e course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migrati on . Therefore, public securi ty will be affected. In light of the above, th e t ext is not disclosed pursuant to the exception - laid down in the first indent of Ar ti cle 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. =Commented [A28]: The blanked out parts contain detailed         = information regarding vulnerabilities and needs at the EU's external borders. Its disclosure would jeopardize the wo rk of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and • iwarsaw (WAW)~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~      ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security.                                      C 10/27