MSP 2. ANNEXES 1-7 JO Alexis I 2014 Operational Plan LEG.pdf
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~ FRONTEX ANNEX 2 - OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS Under the umbrella of the Frontex Programme of Work 2014 this activity is going to contribute to the following corporate goals and prioritized key objectives, as set in the Frontex' Strategy and Multi Annual Prog ramme 2014 - 2017 as well as in concrete in Programme of Work 2014: ■ Goal 2: Supporting response, Key Objective nr. 1: Coordinate activities sustaining an operational presence in areas at the external borders exposed to specific and disproportionate pressure as well as facing significant uncertainties; including the implementation of procedures for operational response based on the impact levels on EUROSUR; ■ Goal 3: Emergency response, Key Objective nr . 1: Develop operational contingency modules to shorten the response time in case of emergency situations; The objectives of the activity are, as follows: 1. Enhance exchange of knowledge among officers (Frontex and MS & SAC) 2. Enhance border security (Frontex and MS & SAC) 3. Enhance efficiency of border security (Frontex and MS & SAC) 4. Enhance operational cooperation (Frontex and MS, SAC & Third Countries) This activity is expected to deliver the following main benefits: ■ Tailored operational support and capacity building strengthening MS/SAC operational capabilities at perceived vu lnerabilities/needs ■ Effective and efficient operational response at perceived vulnerabilities corresponding to European Situational Awareness indications (existing threats) enhancing security of external air borders ■ Increased response capaci ty to e mergency situations The objectives are meant to be achieved by the following activities: Goals/Key Objectiv objectives es of the Activity Indicators of achievement activity Deployme nt of officers wit h specific Number of man-days deployed profile' during the operation Number of ma n-days deployed 1,2,4 De ployme nt of SGOs Supporting during the operation Response Key Objective Number of man-days deployed Deployme nt of TC observers during the operation nr. 1 Number of reinforcing actions (e.g. gate check, doc checks Supporting targeted response with Ref Man experts or any 2 focusing on perceived other action what the vulnerabilities / needs particular vulnerability req ui res) Implement coordinated operational Number of airports 3 actions according to the operational participating plan 1 Corresponding to the tackled vulnerabiliti es and in line with the MB decision nr. 11 12012 . 12/ 27
~ FRONTEX Emergency Further develop quick response Response elements Number of new quick response 4 elements learned with the use of Key Objective SGO mechanism nr. 1 13/27
~ FRONTEX ANNEX 3 - STANDARD OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES (SOP) ON THE BASIS OF VEGA HANDBOOK The aim of JO Alexis I 2014 is to enhance capabilities of EU airport border guards to detect and react on abuses made by irregular passengers and facilitators within the transit areas of Schengen and non- Schengen airports (Third Country airports inclusive) by applying Alexis I Standard Operational Procedures according to the needs. 1. 1. [Transit area abuses at Schengen and non-Schengen airport ~ - - - - - - - - - Commented [A29]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding document abuse at Schengen and the ■ Undocumented passengers non-Schengen airports with detailed data on modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1)(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A30]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding document abuse at Schengen and non- Schengen airport s wi t h detailed dat a on t he modus operandi of cri minal networks. Its disclosure would j eopardize t he work of law enforcement officials and harm t he course of future and ongoi ng operat ions, and t hus facilitat e irregu lar migration. Therefo re, public securit y will be affect ed. In light of t he above, t he text is not disclosed pursuant t o t he excepti on laid down in t he fi rst indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulati on No 1049/2001 re latin g t o the prot ection of t he public interest as regards public security. Commented [A31]: The blanked out part s contain det ailed information rega rding document abuse at Schengen and non- ■No Schengen airport s and non-Schengen airpo rts with det ailed Show~ dat a on t he modus opera ndi of criminal net works. Its disclosure would j eopardize t he work of law enfo rcement officia ls and harm t he course of future and ongoing operat ions, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public securi ty will be affec ted. In light of t he above, t he t ext is not disclosed pursuant t o the excep ti on laid down in th e first indent of Arti cle 4( 1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to t he protect ion of t he public int erest as regards public securi ty. Commented [A32]: The blanked out pa rts cont ain detailed info rm ation rega rding document abuse at Schengen and non- Schengen airports and non-Schengen airports with detailed data on the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the cou rse of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the e xception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/ 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 14/27
~ FRONTEX --- Commented [A33]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding document abuse at Schengen and non- Schengen airports and non-Schengen airports with detailed data on the modus operandi of criminal networks. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 1. 2. Basic l ndicatorsj relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . Commented [A34]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding criteria to identify migrants' facilitators and traffickers of human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration . Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. - 15/27
~ FRONTEX Alexis I Standard Operational Procedures (SOP) Whatever type of border control is carried out, it should be done fully respecting human dignity. Based on the VEGA handbook (uploaded in FOSS) the following recommended operational procedures and countermeasures enhance capabilities to detect the above listed transit area abuses in the short term period. Commented [A35]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/200 1 re latin g to the protec tion of the public interest as regards public security. ' Legal Basis: Council Directive 2004 / 82 / EC af 29 April 2004 an the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. At this stage, it should be highlighted that since the Council Directive required Member States to enact legislation in order to adopt and brins this Directive into force, its implementation may vary from Member State to Member State. 16/27
~ FRONTEX Commented [A36]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A37]: The blanked out part s contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders . Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected . In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 17/ 27
~ FRONTEX Commented [A38]: The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations , and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. Commented [A39] : The blanked out parts contain detailed info rm at ion rega rding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during bord er cont rol at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcemen t officia ls pa trolling t he area and harm t he course of f uture and ongoing operat ions, and t hus f acilit ate irregular --- migrati on. Therefore, public securit y will be affect ed . In light of the above, t he text is not disclosed pursuant t o t he except ion laid down in the first indent of Art icle 4( 1)(a) of Regulati on No 1049/200 1 relat ing t o t he prot ecti on of th e public interest as regards public security. Commented [A40]: The blanked out parts cont ain det ailed informat ion regarding t he modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border contro l at the air borders. It s disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling t he area and harm t he course of futu re and ongoi ng operat ions, and thus facilit at e irregular migration. Therefore , public security will be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the except ion laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 18/ 27
~ FRONTEX Commented [A41] : The blanked out parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security will be affected . In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a ) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security . Commented [A42]: The blanked out part s cont ain detailed info rmati on regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials pa trolling t he area and harm t he course of futu re and ongoi ng operations, and t hus facilit ate irregular migrat ion. Therefore, public securi t y will be affect ed. In light of t he above, t he t ext is not disclosed pursuant t o th e except ion laid down in the first indent of Art icle 4(1)(a ) of Regulati on No 1049/200 1 relat ing t o t he prot ecti on of th e public interest as regards public security. Commented [A43]: Th e blanked out parts contain det ailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border control at the air borders. Its disclosure would expose law enforcement officials patrolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoing operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration. Therefore, public security wi ll be affected. In light of the above, the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049 / 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 19/27
~ FRONTEX --- - Commented [A44]: The blanked out parts cont ain det ailed informat ion rega rdin g the modus operandi of law enforcement officials during border contro l at t he air borders . It s disclosure would expose law enfo rcemen t officials pat rolling the area and harm the course of future and ongoi ng operati ons, and thus facilitat e irregu lar migrat ion. Therefore, public security will be affec t ed. In light of th e above, th e t ext is not disclosed pursuant t o t he excepti on laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 20/27