FER - JO Focal Points 2019 Sea
LIMITED ==: FRONTEX Iii EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY - Warsaw, 18/05/2020 LIMITED1 FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT JO Focal Points 2019 Sea Approved by / /2020 ....................................... Signature Fabrice Leggeri Executive Director 1 Information which is sensitive and limited for use within the European Union institutions, other offices and agencies established by virtue or on the basis of the Treaties, EU Member States and public administrations; distribution on a need to know basis. Not for public dissemination.
- Limited FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT JO Focal Points 2019 Sea Contents General part 3 I. Evaluation of Specific Activity Operational Activities in Cyprus 5 II. Evaluation of Specific Activity Multipurpose Maritime Operation in the Black Sea 27 III. Evaluation of Specific Activity Prevention and detection of cross- border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean (Azores) 48 IV. Evaluation of Specific Activity Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II) 56 Annex - Observations of Fundamental Rights Officer 69
- Limited FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT JO Focal Points 2019 Sea GENERAL PART 1. Background information In 2019, the Joint Operation (JO) Focal Points Sea was used as a platform for the implementation of specific and independent activities (the “Activities”) covered by the mandate of European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, in specific and distinct maritime areas (“Focal Points”), within the territory of the participating Member States (MS). The Frontex Evaluation Report of JO Focal Points 2019 Sea is composed of the General Part and the Evaluation of each separately implemented Specific Activity. During the implementation period of the JO, 4 different Activities have been implemented by activating various Focal Points, in locations not covered by the regular JO, as follows: • Operational Activities in Cyprus. • Multipurpose Maritime Operation in the Black Sea, in Bulgaria and Romania. • Prevention and detection of cross-border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean (Azores), in Portugal. • Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II), in Italy and France. 1.1. Operational aim The operational aim of the joint operation (JO) was to provide increased technical and operational assistance to the host MS by implementing coordinated operational activities in the areas at the external sea borders, which were not covered by permanent large-scale maritime joint operations or complementing them in order to control illegal immigration flows towards the territory of the EU MS, to tackle cross-border crime and to enhance European cooperation on coast guard functions and law enforcement activities. The operational aim was implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU and international law, guaranteeing the protection of fundamental rights, in particular the access to international protection and the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the Frontex Consultative Forum and the reports and observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer. 1.2. Period of implementation and operational areas Commented [KB1]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing 1.2.1. Period of implementation operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details Commencement 07 May 2019 of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, Termination 29 January 2020 enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature 1.2.2. Operational areas would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and During the implementation period of the JO, 6 Focal Points were activated within 4 different Activities, as unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the follows: protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No • Focal Point Nicosia within Operational Activities in Cyprus. 1049/2001 . 3/69
- Limited FRONTEX EVALUATION REPORT • JO Focal Points 2019 Sea Focal Point Burgas (Bulgaria) and Focal Point Constanta (Romania) within Multipurpose Maritime Operation in the Black Sea. • Focal Point Azores (Portugal) within Prevention and detection of cross-border crime activities in the Atlantic Ocean (Azores). • Focal Point Genova (Italy) and Focal Point Marseille (France) within Operational Activities Prevention and detection of FTFs and cross-border crime activities in the Mediterranean Sea (Neptune II). Commented [KB2]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide 1.3. Participants smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would The JO was hosted by Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania. ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature 9 Participating MS with 11 different authorities took part in the JO, namely: Austria, Bulgaria, France, would be hampered by depriving the operations of any Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romanian and Slovenia. strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1.4. Financial information 1049/2001. The estimated operational budget of JO Focal Points 2019 Sea amounted to 487,303 EUR. 4/69
LIMITED i:S: FRONTEXIII EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY I. Evaluation of Specific Activity Operational Activities in Cyprus JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Contents 1. Background information 7 2. Achievement of objectives 9 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices 11 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 11 5. Main conclusions and recommendations 19 FACT SHEETS – STATISTICS 22 1. Time schedule 22 2. Participation 22 3. Financial information 23 4. List of acronyms 26 6/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 1. Background information The Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea (JO) Sea is the platform for the implementation of specific and independent activities covered by the mandate of European Border and Coast Guard Regulation in specific and distinct maritime areas (Focal Points). The Operational Activities in Cyprus was implemented under the Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea. •'·1 ----1-------· 1.1. Brief risk assessment Irregular migrants traveling to Cyprus arrive mainly via Turkey, therefore this route is considered a sub- route of the Eastern Mediterranean route. Usually, the total number of arrivals to Cyprus is lower than on the other sub-routes in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, the impact of illegal immigration on Cyprus is high, given its small population, its vulnerability related to limited resources available to deal with incoming migratory flows arriving by sea or across the green line and the sensitive political situation, limiting the implementation of effective border measures. Moreover, irregular migrants who go to Cyprus tend to stay Commented [KB3]: The information related to this variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its for a long term, which increases the administrative burden of the local authorities. mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain insights into this decision making The geopolitical situation and the possibility to easily access the areas which are not under the effective process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, have made Cyprus attractive for illegal immigration. depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses Smuggling networks are taking advantage of this, by promoting Cyprus as a desirable and feasible wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information destination. Between 1 January and 31 December 2019, 7 730 migrants arrived in Cyprus. This equates to a would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making- 66% increase compared to 2018, when 4 662 migrant arrivals were reported. processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from In 2019, 31% of the main nationalities arriving in Cyprus were Syrians, 15% Cameroonians, 12% Pakistanis and individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present case, information 12% Bangladeshis. In addition, a wide range of other nationalities (26%) were reported, among the most pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on numerous being Georgian, Nigerian, Iranian, Congolese and Somali nationals. Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Up until June 2019, Syrians were by far the main reported nationality, usually arriving to the occupied areas The non-disclosed part contains detailed information of the Republic of Cyprus, by flying from Turkey. However, the introduction of visas for Syrian nationals regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human flying from Turkey to the occupied areas, led to a dramatic drop in the number of Syrians arriving by plane beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law to this part of the island. In June, the Cypriot authority reported 479 Syrian arrivals, while in July, there enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the were only 65. activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as Since stricter conditions were imposed on Syrians flying to the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure they have started arriving to the island, on board of fishing boats, departing from Turkey (Mersin) and would thus undermine the protection of the public interest Lebanon. Since they started travelling by sea, their number started to increase again. In September 2019, as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 114 Syrians were reported by the Cypriot authority, 120 in October (5% increase) and then 314 in November (162%). In December 2019 and January 2020, Cypriot authority reported 126 and 152 Syrian migrants ---------- respectively, showing a seasonal decrease in line with the sea wintry conditions. The increasing trend in arrivals to Cyprus is likely to continue along 2020. In January 2020, 152 Syrian migrants arrived to the island with 100 of them disembarking directly in the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Despite the fact that the number of Syrian arrivals is currently moderated, as soon as weather conditions allow for a safe travel by sea, a significant increase in Syrians arriving by boats from Turkey and Lebanon is expected. In 2019, a sharp increase in arrivals of irregular migrants from Africa was reported. With 1 124 arrivals, Cameroonians were the second-ranked nationality arriving in Cyprus, after Syrians. In 2019, the number of Cameroonians increased by 139% compared to 2018. The number of Nigerians increased as well by 286%, from only 84 arrivals in 2018 to 328 in 2019. Other African nationalities showed similar increasing trends. In addition, Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals more than doubled their numbers in 2019 compared to 2018. All these nationalities (with the exception of Syrians, after the introduction of the new visa policy) arrive by plane to the areas which are not under the effective control of the government of Cyprus (at Ercan airport). Later, they can easily cross the green line into the territories under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. Routes to Cyprus for these nationalities are safe, quick and cheap, which has resulted in an increase 7/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA in arrivals. The situation may continue in the future with more migrants from Africa adding their increasing number to the Pakistani and Bangladeshi migration flows. Commented [KB4]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of The presence of Frontex Screening experts, Advanced Level Document Officers (ALDO), Debriefing experts, criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would and Interpreters helped Cyprus increase its capacity in terms of verifying the real nationality of migrants, jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a in data and intelligence collection, training and the production of analytical documents, allowing for a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed better situational picture on the illegal immigration. This may also contribute to reduce the country’s at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross- vulnerabilities in the light of its Schengen accession procedure. border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as 1.2. Specific operational aim laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. To provide technical and operational assistance to Cyprus in migration management and information / Commented [KB5]: The non-disclosed part contains intelligence gathering activities. sensitive information obtained in cooperation with a Member State of the European Union regarding the effectiveness of The operational aim was implemented in full compliance with the relevant EU and international law, border security measures. The disclosure of such information guaranteeing the protection of fundamental rights, in particular the access to international protection and would reveal existing vulnerabilities which, once public, could be explored by criminal networks involved in migrant the compliance with the principle of non-refoulement and taking into account the recommendations of the smuggling, trafficking in human beings and thus undermine Frontex Consultative Forum and the reports and observations of the Fundamental Rights Officer. the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . 1.3. Period of implementation and operational areas 1.3.1. Period of implementation Commencement 14 August 2019 12:00 (local time) Termination 29 January 2020 11:59 (local time) I I The Operational Activities in Cyprus started on 14 August 2019, with an initial duration of three months. The Activity was later extended until the end of the operational year of 2019. 1.3.2. Operational area Commented [KB6]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details In order to implement the Operational Activities in Cyprus, Focal Point (FP) Nicosia was activated within of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing the Headquarters of the Aliens and Immigration Unit, in Nicosia. operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details Nonetheless, the operational activities were performed by the deployed experts in other locations as well, of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide in the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, such as landing smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, locations or local Alien and Immigration units. enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any 1.4. Participants strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and The Activity was hosted by Cyprus. unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the 5 Participating MS took part in the Activity, namely: Greece, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No During the Operational Activities in Cyprus, 7 experts from 7 different authorities of the listed participating 1049/2001. MS were deployed to the operational area, delivering a total of 698 man-days. Commented [KB7]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information 1.5. Financial information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their A budget of 162,832.00 EUR was allocated by Frontex, for the implementation of Operational Activities in effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future Cyprus in 2019. similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. , , - - - - - - - - - - - -~ --___J 8/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 2. Achievement of objectives • Enhance operational cooperation - High level of MS participation in the operational activities; Enhanced cooperation between the national authorities of the host MS as well as on an international level; Enhanced cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organisations in the frame of Activity. Achieved The Activity was the first time Frontex provided technical and operational support to Cyprus since the launch of the Agency. In this respect the activity provided new form of enhancing operational cooperation between Cyprus and other EU MS. Since Joint Operation Focal Points 2019 Sea was not a part of the annual operational planning process, the resources which were needed for the implementation of the Operational Activities in Cyprus were redeployed from other maritime Joint Operations. Representatives from the European Commission, EASO and Europol cooperated actively in the framework of the Activity, thus enhancing the inter-agency cooperation. • Support to migration management - Assisting in screening of nationality, document checks and debriefing of third-country nationals. Partly Achieved The absence of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) dedicated to registration and identification Commented [KB8]: The non-disclosed part contains procedures for third-country nationals in Cyprus, along with the existence of national measures in place, detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast requiring Cypriot authority to focus mainly on Syrian nationals arriving to the island, were the two main guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the challenges faced by Frontex experts, when supporting migration management activities in the area. Given working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- the reasons above, the support to migration management could have been further enhanced by additional border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In resources and support to the Cypriot authorities in creating the SOP and its implementation processes. consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be In terms of screening of nationality, only a limited number of irregular migrants detected on the island disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. were screened during the implementation of the Activity. Most of the migrants screened with the support of Frontex experts were only those apprehended in Nicosia district, who entered illegally in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus and then crossed the buffer zone (green line), as well as those arriving by boats directly from Turkey to the areas under the effective control of the Government of the Republic Cyprus. Similar challenges were faced in terms of debriefing activities, which were mostly focused on Syrian nationals, particular during the first implementation period of the Activity. Documents checks were performed by the deployed ALDO, who supported the local authority in verifying the authenticity of travel and other identity documents. The documents were inspected using also the light document checking devices provided by Frontex. • Enhance collection and exchange of information, including personal data - Collection of operational information in a timely manner from all operational actors involved, in particular information on incidents reported in JORA; Processing of personal data relating to individuals suspected of involvement in the migrants’ smuggling, traffic of human beings (THB), terrorism or other cross-border crimes at the EU level; Distribution of operational information to all operational actors through the respective authorized channels; Seeking standardized format and quality of the including debriefing interviews; Use of the “Guidelines for JORA Incident Template” giving detailed information on definitions and establishing a sets of priorities when selecting the appropriate attributes 9/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Partly Achieved With more than 48% of the incidents being reported in JORA with a delay of up to two weeks from the Commented [KB9]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law moment of occurrence, there is significant room for improving the timely transmission of operational data enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast to Frontex. In addition, 94% of the data was reported in JORA starting from November, which can be mostly guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the attributed to the activity of the Frontex Information Management Officer (FIMO) deployed in the area. working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- Even so, the information inserted in JORA was not always satisfactory, especially the information related border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the to migrants’ nationalities, place of departure and results of the screening activities. public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Personal data was collected during the debriefing activities with the use of PeDRA template in cases of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. suspects of cross–border crime such as migrant smuggling, trafficking of human beings (THB) or terrorism. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related During the implementation of the Activity, Frontex transferred to Europol a total of 31 personal data to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement packages involving personal data related to 64 suspects of migrant smuggling and 49 means of officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal communication, however, the transmitted data generated 0 hits in the Europol databases. activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus The debriefing information was inserted and validated in JORA, with significant delays at “Team Leader” facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be and “Intelligence Officer” level, requiring, on average, 40 days for the information to reach Frontex. This significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would delay is eight times higher than the average for all other Frontex joint operations, where debriefing undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article interviews are performed. 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. • Identify possible risks and threats - Carrying out debriefing interviews to collect operational information and personal data related to suspects of cross border crimes, to be further processed and analysed; Operational analytical products will be shared with relevant stakeholders to maintain and improve situational awareness and support operational planning and implementation; Detecting and reporting relevant cases of document and identity fraud, frauds concerning stolen transportation means and parts as well as modi operandi. Achieved Although the data collected in the framework of the Activity did not provide an accurate picture of the irregular migration situation in the island, the implementation of the Operational Activities in Cyprus facilitated the collection of important operational information. As such, valuable data on suspected FTF persons detected among the irregular migrants reaching the island was collected, particularly through high quality debriefing interviews. The information collected, together with the input provided by the Cypriot authority, was used to define basic indicators for irregular migration related threats in Cyprus. During the implementation of the Activity, the delivery of regular analytical reports was not possible due to difficulties in collecting reliable data in JORA, nonetheless, an analytical report, summarizing the migratory trends to Cyprus was produced and disseminated to all participants in the Activity. Even though forged documents were detected during the Activity, Frontex Document Alert (FDA) were not produced, mostly due to the low quality of the forgeries. • Establish and exchange the best practices - Delivering and supporting workshops, meetings, other networking events to participants; Delivering and supporting operational briefings/debriefing to all participants of the Activity, including information on the fundamental rights and access to international protection; Building on MS operational capacity by implementing other supporting activities; Supporting targeted training activities. Partly Achieved During the implementation of the Activity, four operational briefings were provided to the participants. The operational briefings were complemented by Europol and EASO representatives. All TMs were debriefed at local level, at the end of their deployment. Moreover, during each rotation, the experts were briefed by Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) representatives, via video-conference sessions and, to a lesser extent, in the field. In addition, the Debriefing Advisor and the 10/69
