FER - JO Focal Points 2019 Sea
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Consultant conducted 9 workshops in the operational area.II However, time constrictions and lack of Commented [KB10]: The non-disclosed part contains personnel limited the mentoring capacity in debriefing and screening activities provided by Operational detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast Team (OT). guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Additionally, on job trainings for drafting operational reports were provided by the deployed experts to thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- the local officers. border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the Exchange of best practices should be significantly enhanced, particular through the implementation of Staff public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Exchange activities, which were not possible in 2019, due to national constraints. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 3. Link to other Frontex activities and best practices • To facilitate the organisational arrangements and logistics related to the deployment of resources, information about the hosting MS and the operational area of the Activity was uploaded on FOSS. 4. Assessment of joint operational activities 4.1. Supporting Response 4.1.1. Operational concept During the implementation of the Activity, Frontex provided support in migration management activities to Cyprus through screening of nationality and documents checks of irregular migrants arriving to the island, including information gathering from the operational area. Commented [KB11]: The non-disclosed part contains sensitive information obtained in cooperation with a Member Due to the absence of a SOP regarding the migration management process in Cyprus, the operational State of the European Union regarding the effectiveness of border security measures. The disclosure of such information activities were performed with various rates of success influenced by factors such as: timeline set for the would reveal existing vulnerabilities which, once public, process upon disembarkation of migrants, rigid and exhaustive format of the national screening form, etc. could be explored by criminal networks involved in migrant In order to address some of these challenges, a Working Group involving representatives from Frontex, smuggling, trafficking in human beings and thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public Europol and EASO, was assigned to develop, in close cooperation with the Cypriot Authority and under the security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of coordination of the European Commission, an SOP regarding the first reception capacities and procedures Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . in Cyprus. Additional challenges were also imposed by the expansion works done in the Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia (Pournara) aiming to ensure an adequate infrastructure, improved accommodation and working conditions in the Centre. Under these circumstances, the registration and identification procedures were mainly carried out at the premises of the Aliens and Immigration Unit in Nicosia, at landing locations and only partially, at the Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia (Pournara). In these conditions, the deployment of Screening experts and Interpreter with extensive experience in migration management activities at the hotspots in Italy and Greece had a high positive impact on the activities implemented, assisting and advising the local authority to enable an adequate level of operational response. Thorough document checks were performed by the ALDO in order to support the detection of forged / falsified documents in the possession of irregular migrants arriving to Cyprus, thus providing significant support to the host MS’s forensic/investigation teams. Concerning the debriefing activities, the Debriefing experts supported by the Interpreter were able to collect valuable information from the operational area in terms of identifying current migratory threats towards the island, thus contributing to an improved situational picture on the Eastern Mediterranean Route. 11/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Daily and ad-hoc exchange of information was carried out between Frontex, the operational actors and external stakeholders involved, with valuable support provided, in particular by Europol officers present on spot. All participants in the Activity were instructed by the OT to pay particular attention to the identification of persons in vulnerable situations and to refer them to the Cypriot Team Leader (TL). 4.1.2. Operational results Since the beginning of the Activity on 14 August 2019 until 29 January 2020, the Cypriot authority reported 3 574 irregular migrants (approx.) in the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN), while only 1 440 irregular Commented [KB12]: The non-disclosed part contains migrants have been reported in JORA. This means that only 40% of the actual figures reported during the detailed information related to reporting tools and methods implementation of the Activity were inserted in JORA. In addition, 94% of the data was reported JORA used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would starting from November. For these reasons, the data below does not indicate the real picture of the illegal jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future immigration in Cyprus nor the operational results during the implementation of the Frontex Operation. operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law During the implementation of the Activity, the Cypriot authority reported a total of 238 incidents, as enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As follows: disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is Detections related to illegal immigration: not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. • 238 incidents of illegal border-crossing, involving 1 434 migrants. The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational • No people smugglers were arrested. area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to • 1 280 irregular migrants were detected inside the national territory (meaning they cross the green cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational line from the occupied areas to the territories under the effective control of the Government of areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of the Republic of Cyprus), while 4 irregular migrants were detected crossing the Green Line. play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their Cross-border crime: modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and • No incidents of smuggling of goods were reported. future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of Moreover, 407 travel and other identity documents were examined by the ALDO. Out of these documents, surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border 9 ID Cards were considered forged (Syrian and Cameroon ID Cards). crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection In addition, as a result of the extensive cooperation work of the Cypriot authority with Europol and Frontex, of the public interest as regards public security in the sense potential foreign fighters have been detected by the Cypriot authority, raising concerns about the impact of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No of illegal immigration on the security at the EU external borders. Nonetheless, these cases were not inserted 1049/2001 . as incidents in JORA. Commented [KB13]: Information cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop EU added value of the Activity risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and The added value of the Activity was reflected in the vital support provided to the migration management Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external activities and building the operational capacity of the Cypriot authority in light of the increased migratory borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially pressure in the island. those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Cooperation with the European Commission and other EU Agencies, such as EASO and Europol was enhanced Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public and further developed throughout the implementation of the Activity. interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 4.1.3. Operational coordination structures Commented [KB14]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers The operational coordination structures were established in accordance with the Specific Activity Plan. deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and The FP Nicosia situated in the premises of the Alien and Immigration Unit, in Nicosia played a key role in strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future the daily cooperation, allowing operational activities to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating the Specific Activity Plan. their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure The Cypriot authority appointed one FP Coordinator responsible for leading and coordinating the daily of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article operational activities to ensure the proper implementation of the Activity. 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . 12/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA A Cypriot TL was nominated to ensure the coordination of migration management support activities in the area, including document checks and debriefing activities. Commented [KB15]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers Regular meetings were organised between the FP coordinator, the TL and Frontex staff, in order to provide deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and information and updates on the latest incidents, findings and operational developments and to address any strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their particular operational challenge, thus contributing to the proper implementation of the operational effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future concept. similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Two rented mobile offices were deployed by Frontex to the Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the (Pournara), serving as premises for Frontex staff to perform their activities on the spot. public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 4.1.4. Resources deployed The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Human resources Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and During the Activity, a total number of 6 officers and 1 Interpreter were deployed by Frontex, amounting in capabilities of the equipment and would enable third total 698 deployment days. parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and Participating MSs: movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations • 1 Advanced-Level Document Officer / 143 deployment days are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit • 2 Debriefing Experts / 170 deployment days criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus • 1 Frontex Information Management Officer / 75 deployment days operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course • 1 Interpreter / 161 deployment days of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to • 2 Screening Experts / 149 deployment days counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would Assessment of capacity and performance of human resources undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of The FP coordinator was an experienced Cypriot officer who, as former head of the Cypriot NFPoC was highly Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. familiar with Frontex operational cycle and requirements, thus ensuring the effective implementation of The non-disclosed part contains detailed information the operational activities on spot. regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control [and/or coast guard duties]. The appointed TL was responsible of the coordination of migration management activities, including Disclosing such information would expose the working debriefing activities. Since the TL was not entirely dedicated to the Activity and had to attend concurrent methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border tasks, on occasion his availability to support the deployed Team Members, along with additional English crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it language communication difficulties, affected to some extent the integration of the deployed experts into would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed the overall migration processes (especially in the absence of an SOP for migration management activities). pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. In order to properly support the local authority and ensure the effective implementation of the operational activities, experienced sTMs with extensive knowledge were selected. Their experience proved valuable in assisting the local authority in managing the activities. The Screening experts, assisted by the Interpreter contributed to the establishment of the presumed nationality of the irregular migrants apprehended in Nicosia district after having crossed the buffer zone (green line) as well as those having arrived by boats directly from Turkey. However, the experts often did not have sufficient time to collect the necessary data to fill in the extensive screening form used by the national authority and, since an SOP in this regard was not established, the screening activities depended largely on the Team Leader’s guidance. In terms of debriefing activities, the collection of preliminary information after the disembarkation or apprehension of irregular migrants, supported the national efforts in terms of criminal investigations. The first Debriefing expert deployed by Frontex in the area was a highly experienced Greek Seconded Team Member, with extensive knowledge in irregular migration issue. The performance of the Greek Debriefing expert was highly valued by the Host MS since, apart from overcoming the language barrier he was able to use his skills and knowledge not only in collecting valuable information but also in familiarizing the local officers with the migration management practices implemented at the Greek hotspots. With the support of the Interpreter, the Debriefing experts assisted the local authority in collecting relevant operational information oriented towards the identification of migratory risks and threats in the area, along 13/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA with numerous evidences regarding the human smuggling networks. Valuable work was also done in terms Commented [KB16]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law of collection of information on a number of suspected Foreign Terrorist Fighters identified among the enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast irregular migrants arriving to Cyprus, which was reflected also in detailed landing reports provided by the guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Debriefing experts. thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In Nonetheless, the lack of an initial proper coordination during landings hampered the activity of the consequence, it would undermine the protection of the Debriefing experts. Moreover, due to the national procedures in place, the Debriefing experts were public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be requested by the national authority to focus mainly on Syrian nationals and their possible links to Foreign disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), aspect which reduced Frontex’s efforts in gaining a complete picture in terms of situational awareness on the island. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement These limitations were often mitigated by the OT through field visits, meetings and awareness sessions. officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the The OT and the Cypriot authority successfully addressed these challenges by allowing the Debriefing experts implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings to choose candidates, under the mentoring of the Cypriot TL and perform interviews with irregular migrants as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be of various nationalities. significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards The Debriefing experts cooperated closely with the Europol staff present on the spot in regards to the public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article detection former Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF). It should be highlighted that Cyprus faces significant 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . challenges regarding security since the share of ex-fighters from Syria targeting the island is relatively high. The information related to this variable is also used for the In light of the recent developments in the Syrian conflict, the number of ex-fighters and radicalised jihadists development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the arriving to Cyprus may increase in the future. intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and The deployment of the Arabic – Kurdish Interpreter was highly appreciated in the frame of the Activity due future operations. Being an important base for determining to his extensive support provided in both screening and debriefing activities. the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for The ALDO was deployed in the operational area to support the detection of forged / falsified documents in Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain possession of the irregular migrants arriving in Cyprus, reporting on a weekly basis throughout the insights into this decision making process and, with implementation of the Activity. The expert assisted in the examination of 407 travel and other identity ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the documents detecting 9 forged ID Cards (Syrian and Cameroon ID Cards). possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In The deployment of one FIMO was done in the mid-implementation period in order to address the JORA sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making-processes. As no overriding reporting challenges faced at local level. The FIMO provided trainings and constant guidance to the local public interest that is objective and general in nature and staff in terms of JORA reporting procedures. Considering the increased number of data reported in JORA, not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present his work provided significant added value in the framework of the Activity. case, information pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No The Frontex Support Officer for Logistics and Deployment deployed in the frame of JO Poseidon was 1049/2001. appointed to provide remote support for logistic related issues for the Operational Activities in Cyprus. The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational Technical Equipment area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex During the implementation of the Activity, Frontex deployed two fully equipped mobile offices at the operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia (Pournara), in order to ensure proper working conditions hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and for the deployed experts. prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information Some challenges were identified during the installation process of the mobile offices, due to the different would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first electric system used on the island. Therefore, even though the mobile officers were deployed on time, they indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. were not fully operational from the beginning of the JO. As a result, within 15 days from the effective deployment date, the Agency amended the contract and ensured the instalment of a second electrical line The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by inside the mobile offices. Due to further local technical requirements, the Electricity Authority of Cypriot Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information could not connect immediately the mobile offices to the Cypriot electric network, leaving them out-of-use would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third for a period of approximately 3 months. It should be highlighted that, the representatives of the Alien and parties, e.g. by combining this information with other Immigration Unit provided their full support in facilitating the process and, while the mobile offices were sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and not fully operational, an adequate office space was assigned to Frontex team members in the headquarters movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations of the Alien and Immigration Unit, in Nicosia. are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit Once operational, the mobile office were effectively used by the Frontex staff when performing activities criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus in the Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia. operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to ... 14/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA 4.2. Situational Awareness 4.2.1. Threats and Risks, modus operandi and trends identified Between 1 January and 31 December 2019, 7 730 irregular migrants arrived in Cyprus. This equates to a 66% increase compared to 2018, when 4 662 irregular migrant arrivals were reported. In terms of nationalities reported, 31% of the arrivals were Syrians, 15% Cameroonians, 12% Pakistanis and 12% Bangladeshis. In addition, a wide range of other nationalities (26%) were reported. The vast majority of irregular migrants arrived to the territories under the effective control of the Commented [KB17]: Information cannot be released as it Government of the Republic of Cyprus by crossing the green line from the occupied territories. Arrivals in refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Cyprus reached a peak in May and June, when Syrians could fly from Turkey directly to the occupied Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop territories. risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and The introduction of visas for Syrian nationals flying from Turkey to occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus, jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external led to a dramatic drop in the number of Syrians arriving. Constrained by the visa restrictions, smuggling borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially networks adapted to the new situation and started to promote trips via the sea route for Syrians. By the those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. end of 2019, all Syrians arriving to Cyprus travelled by boat, disembarking both on the occupied area and in Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this the territories under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused The routes from Syria to Turkey are the same as those used by Syrians heading to the Greek islands. The based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No main illegal immigration hub in Syria is Idlib and its vicinity (i.e. Bab Al Hawa and Khirbet Al Jawz) from 1049/2001. where they arrange their illegal border-crossing into Turkey. Once in Turkey, smugglers transport the The non-disclosed part contains detailed information irregular migrants in taxis, vans or trucks to Mersin and its districts. regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human Smuggling networks organise trips from Mersin to Cyprus, by boats or ferries. Smugglers usually disembark beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of the migrants in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus and return to Turkey. Regarding ferry trips, ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the there are two ferry companies operating daily from Turkey to the northern part of Cyprus. Migrants usually activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their hide in containers or vehicles loaded onto the ferries. Once reaching the occupied area of the Republic of purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure Cyprus, migrants only have to cross the Green Line. From Lebanon to Cyprus, migrants travel by boats, would thus undermine the protection of the public interest which are usually bought by the migrants themselves. As a common practice, one of the migrants pays his as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . share by skippering the boat (no facilitation involved). The main points of departure from Lebanon are the beaches near Tripoli (i.e. Qalamoun beach). Boats from Lebanon usually head directly to Cyprus. Fees for crossing the Turkish-Syrian border range from USD 500 to 700 (same as the ones reported in JO Poseidon). In addition, migrants must pay USD 4 500-5 000 to reach the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus. Despite the high prices this is seen as a very popular route. For this reason, people smugglers continued to find alternatives for reaching Cyprus, despite the introduction of visas for Syrians. The efforts of the national authority, supported by Frontex and Europol resulted in the detection of a significant number of former foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). Cyprus faces significant challenges regarding security due to the relatively high share of ex-fighters from Syria targeting the island. In light of the recent developments in the Syrian conflict, the risk of ex-fighters and radicalised jihadists arriving to Cyprus may increase in the future. The rest of the nationalities arrived in Cyprus by plane. Even though there are some differences between the documents or modi operandi of different nationalities, approximately all of them arrive at Ercan airport, situated in the occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus from which they are facilitated across the Green Line. Cameroonians are facilitated by a specific network which seems to have connections with universities in the occupied territories. The smuggling network arranges fake university diplomas and academic records from Cameroonian universities to be used to obtain a student visa thus allowing them to get into the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus. The total smuggling fee (EUR 3 800) includes documents and all arrangements needed to reach the occupied territories. 15/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA As migrants tend to stay in Cyprus, local smuggling networks are continually developing new strategies. For Commented [KB18]: The non-disclosed part contains instance, marriages of convenience between Cameroonians (and other African migrants) and Romanian or detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants Bulgarian nationals (mainly of Romani ethnicity) or even Cypriot drug addicts were reported. and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a People-smuggling networks promote the route to Cyprus and provide detailed information about the hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed advantages, including the asylum procedure and other official support programs (i.e. that the Identification at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross- and registration procedures are fast, the asylum policy in Cyprus is favourable or that migrants are entitled border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border to a generous subsidy during the examination period and until the final decision on their asylum claim). crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the ----------- protection of the public interest as regards public security as It is expected that the number of irregular migrants arriving in Cyprus from Syria, Cameroon and/or other laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 . African countries, as well as from Pakistan and Bangladesh will increase, as there are well established criminal networks organising the illegal travel and stay of these nationalities in Cyprus. 4.2.2. Information gathering and exchange Operational reporting and information exchange During the Activity, constant information gathering and monitoring of the situational picture was provided, using standardized reporting forms and channels. The deployment of human resources in the frame of the Activity enabled the collection of operational -- Commented [KB19]: The non-disclosed part contains information and intelligence through operational reports, providing overviews on the daily and weekly detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast activities performed on spot, however, with inherent difficulties. guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, Thus, some challenges were experience when collecting the overall statistical data through the operational thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- reports, in particular for the daily activity reports regarding the migration situation on the island (total border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the number of migrants detected, total number of asylum claims, etc.) since the information made available by public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be the Cypriot authority was centralised and updated only on a monthly basis. disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. At the same time, the data provided in the screening reports reflected only the information available as a result of the screening interviews performed by the Frontex deployed experts, which was occasionally The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement hampered by the national focus mainly on Syrians by the authorities. officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the During the implementation of the Activity, there were no Fronted Document Alerts issued, mostly due to ---------- implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus the low-quality of the forgeries detected. facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be Debriefing and landing reports were produced by the Debriefing expert. The deployment of an experienced significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards Debriefing expert resulted in high qualitative information gathered through debriefing and landing reports. public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . Based on the information collected through the operational reports, RAU issued analytical findings and recommendations related to the resources deployed. The document was uploaded to FOSS and disseminated among the participants in the JO. Reporting of personal data related to suspects of crime The collection of personal data was carried out using the standardized JORA reporting templates. Personal data were processed and transmitted to Europol in accordance with the process defined within the Specific Activity Plan. During the implementation of the Activity, Frontex transferred to Europol a total of 31 personal data packages containing personal data, related to 64 suspects of migrant smuggling and 49 means of communication, however, the transmitted data generated 0 hits within the Europol databases. Reporting in JORA JORA was used to report operational information within the Activity, making use of a standardized Incident Report. 16/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA The Activity in JORA along with the incident template for the data collection were created and used but significant challenges were experienced in regards to reporting in JORA throughout the implementation of Commented [KB20]: The non-disclosed part contains the Activity. detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast One specific issue was that an intermediate validation level for incidents, equivalent for “JORA ICC level”, guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the was not assigned by the Cypriot authority. As a temporary solution, FSC was assigned to validate the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- incidents from the "JORA ICC" level. In addition, significant delays were recorded on the local level border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In validation of debriefing reports, averaging at 40 days. These delays can be largely attributed to the lack consequence, it would undermine the protection of the of staff allocated for the validation of debriefing interviews at the local level. public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of At the same time challenges were raised due to the lack of consistency in reporting data in JORA, since Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. most of the data reported in the frame of the JO was based on the incidents detected only within Nicosia The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related district, while information from other districts was not systematically reported. This resulted in to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal discrepancies revealed when comparing the JORA data with the information available via FRAN. The activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the information inserted in JORA was also, at times, incomplete and not always satisfactory, especially the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus information related to migrants’ nationalities, places of departure and results from the screening activities. facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be In order to address these specific challenges, the Cypriot authority was asked to provide information significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards regarding the detections of all irregular migrants using an excel file template provided by Frontex. On the public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article mid-term, Frontex and the Cypriot authority agreed on, and delivered, training for several local JORA 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. officers from each of each reporting station. Starting with 15 November 2019, a Frontex Information Management Officers (FIMO) was deployed in the operational area to further support the local officers with JORA reporting. As a result, the Cypriot authority started delivering data to the FIMO, on a monthly basis. Thus, significant improvements in terms of JORA reporting were noted since in November 2019, 66% of the monthly data had been reported in JORA; 88% in December 2019 and 80% in January 2020. During the Activity, remote support in regard to JORA application was also provided by JORA Product & Service Management from Information Fusion Centre (IFC). Enquiries related to Incident Template or validation of incidents were timely directed to relevant units within the Agency. Frontex-One-Stop-Shop (FOSS) During the implementation of the Activity, FOSS was used as the main platform for sharing operational- related information between all participants involved. Serious incidents reporting (FSC - overview) FSC was responsible to provide a prompt response on serious incidents, based on information received through JORA, operational reports and open source information, however, during the implementation of the Activity, no Serious Incident Reports (SIR) were reported. 4.3. Development 4.3.1. Operational cooperation Cooperation between Hosting and Participating MS The cooperation between hosting and participating MS was performed on a very good level. The participating MS showed a strong level of commitment in supporting the implementation of the Activity and reached the required flexibility in case of urgent needs. The host MS demonstrated strong commitment in hosting the Activity and the deployed experts, along with high flexibility and dedication in addressing any challenges raised during the implementation of the Operational Activities in Cyprus. 17/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA Cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or international organizations The cooperation with the Commission, EASO and Europol has been developed as follows: Commented [KB21]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law • The European Commission: The Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs of the enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the European Commission (DG HOME) deployed a staff member in Nicosia, to support the Cypriot working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, authority in migration management activities, with whom Frontex has maintained regular contact thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- and worked in close cooperation on the ground. A working Group (WG) reuniting representatives border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the from Frontex, EASO and Europol was also established under the coordination of the European public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be Commission, to support the Cypriot Authority in developing an SOP for first reception capacities disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. and procedures in Cyprus, with Frontex providing specific technical support in drafting the document. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement • EASO: The commonly developed tool on access to asylum procedures (guide, booklets, leaflets officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal and posters) was published on Frontex website, presented to the participants and distributed to activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus the operational areas. The representatives of both Agencies met regularly at the deployment sites facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings and exchanged information. In addition, an EASO representative attended regularly the Frontex as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would operational briefings organised on spot in order to present the mandate of EASO and the activities undermine the protection of the public interest as regards implemented on spot. public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. • Europol: Cyprus has been hosting Europol guest officers since April 2019, in order to assist the national authority in secondary checks of irregular migrants arriving on the island. In this regard, the ALDO and Debriefing expert deployed by Frontex cooperated intensely with Europol representatives, exchanging information in accordance with the Specific Activity Plan. Frontex transmitted to Europol all operational personal data received from the Cypriot authority. In 2019, Europol provided Frontex with limited information related to the cross-border crime threats affecting the operational area of Operational Activities in Cyprus 2019. Europol shared with Frontex weekly intelligence notifications that contained mostly basic information about migrant smuggling events detected and reported by Europol. Europol representative attended regularly the Frontex operational briefings organised on spot, presenting the mandate and the activities of the Europol officers in the area. In addition, Frontex in close cooperation with Europol, initiated the development of a set of joint advices for daily cooperation, which is expected to be finalised on 2020. Cooperation with Third Countries Cooperation with Third Countries was not foreseen during the implementation of the Activity. Frontex coordination role The Operational Team (OT) was composed of members from Field Deployment Unit, as follows: 1 Senior Commented [KB22]: The non-disclosed parts contain Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO) and 1 Operational Manager (OM) from Operational Planning and information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information Evaluation Sector (OPES) and 1 FCO and 1 OM from Operational Implementation Sector (OIS). would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their The team was completed by the Operational Analyst (OA) and the Debriefing Advisor (DA) from Risk Analysis effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future Unit. similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Moreover, staff from the Operational Divisional Support Office supported the overall financial management unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the of the Activity. public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. The OM from OPES was responsible for the overall planning, monitoring and evaluation of the Activity, occasionally visiting the operational area in order to assess the situation on spot from the planning perspective, while the OM from OIS was responsible for the implementation of the Activity, according to the provisions of the Specific Activity Plan. The FCO (OIS) ensured the implementation of the Activity through constant cooperation with the host MS, occasionally travelling to Cyprus, in order to facilitate the communication with the national authority, 18/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA maintaining links with the local officers and addressing particular challenges faced during the ongoing operational activities. Commented [KB23]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers OA monitored the performance of the debriefing and screening activities and issued an analytical product, deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and presenting analytical findings and making recommendations related to the resources deployed, aiming to strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their enhance the operational results. effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating During the implementation of the Activity, the Operational Analyst have been in regular contact with the their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and debriefing and screening experts, the FIMO and the TL, actively cooperating, advising and guiding the unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the participants in regard the information gathering and reporting. Moreover, the TMs have been also briefed public interest as regards public security as laid down Article on specific topics by the OA and the DA, via regular video-conferences. 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 4.3.2. Operational briefing / debriefing Four operational briefings were provided to all participants of the Activity, during the first day of the deployment, by Frontex and the Host MS representatives. All participants were debriefed at the end of their deployments, at local level, either by the FCO or the FP coordinator. The report from participant also facilitated to obtain feedback from the deployed experts. EASO and Europol representatives complemented the Frontex operational briefings by providing up-to-date information on their activities in the area, thus maintaining the awareness of the agencies’ mandates and responsibilities in the island. 5. Main conclusions and recommendations Conclusions Recommendations Supporting Response Commented [KB24]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Via the established Focal Point in Cyprus, Frontex The Activity should continue to be implemented in enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the provided operational and technical support, 2020. working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, including operational capacity building to Cyprus. thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the Considering the dynamic of the migration situation For the upcoming operational year, any additional public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be in the islands, there is a need for a flexible deployment of resources should be based on the disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of approach in terms of increasing the hosting evolution of the operational situation in the area. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. capacity of the Host MS. Insufficient knowledge of the situation in the area Close cooperation with the Host MS to be lead to a challenging and difficult planning process, maintained throughout the planning and considering also that no operational framework has implementation process, in order to expand the been developed prior to the implementation of the operational framework according to the actual JO. needs and address any potential challenges. All the experts were redeployed from other JO, due To ensure a sufficient level of participation in the to the very tight timeframe for setting up the Activity, via the regular operational planning cycle. Activity. The deployment of experienced sTMs provided To guarantee a minimum level of sTMs deployment constructive support to the local authorities, in the area, in order to effectively support the Host particularly in terms of gaining knowledge on MS authority, in terms of operational knowledge Frontex operational procedures. and exchange of best practices. 19/69
JO FOCAL POINTS 2019 SEA The lack of an SOP for the migration management The SOP currently under development, under the activities led to the challenging practical coordination of the European Commission and in implementation of the Activity. close cooperation with the EU Agencies present in the area, should be put into force as soon as possible, in order to effectively manage the migration related process in the island. The nominated TL was not fully dedicated to the Cypriot authority should assign a permanent English operational activity, facing high workloads and speaking Team Leader, fully dedicated for the subsequent language communication issues, which coordination of the operational activities on spot. affected the integration of the deployed experts in the migration management process. In order to expand the hosting capacity, the Frontex to continue the deployment of two fully Temporary Reception Centre in Kokkinotrimithia furnished mobile offices in the Temporary (Pournara) underwent extensive reconstruction Reception Centre, in order to provide adequate works which generated certain difficulties in terms working conditions for the deployed experts. of working conditions for the deployed experts. Even though 9 forged documents were detected CED to contribute to the operational briefings and during the implementation of the Activity, Frontex perform operational field visits on spot, in order to Document Alert were not produced, mostly due to guide and provide specific information to the deployed ALDOs. In case of fraudulent detected the low quality of the forgeries. documents, Frontex Document Alert should be produce, in order to report the type and quality of the forgery as well as Modus operandi cases. Situational Awareness Commented [KB25]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law The information inserted in JORA was incomplete To monitor, advise and support Cyprus authority on enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the and not always satisfactory, especially the JORA reporting. The FIMO should compare the data working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, information related to migrants’ nationalities, inserted in JORA with the actual irregular migrants’ thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In place of departure and results from the screening arrivals. Cypriot authority should continue to send consequence, it would undermine the protection of the activities, which hampered the analysis of the to RAU the data in the excel format, as collected public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be data. Efforts from both Frontex and the Cypriot and reported in FRAN. This will allow the OA to disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. authority notably improved the reporting in JORA. double check the data reported in JORA. However, it was still not sufficient enough to get a The information related to this variable is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific complete situational picture. form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing Cypriot authority concentrated their efforts on The Cypriot authority should continue using best activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and debriefing Syrian migrants thus affecting the practises for debriefing activities, such as future operations. Being an important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to process of selective the participants for the supporting the Debriefing experts on conducting conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for debriefing interviews. After the mid- interviews, allowing Debriefing experts to choose Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain implementation period, however, the debriefing candidates and conduct interviews with flexibility, insights into this decision making process and, with experts were given complete access to the allowing them to prepare other situational reports ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the migrants and were able to conduct interviews in a such as landing reports and monthly debriefing possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In flexible manner. reports. sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making-processes. As no overriding The flexibility of Cyprus authority in implementing The implementation of landing reports, which is public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for information collection in different reports (i.e. considered a best practice, should continue in the the release of this information is ascertainable in the present landing reports) resulted in high quality and framework of the Activity. case, information pertaining to this variable cannot be relevant information collected. released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The total number of interviews reported in PeDRa During the operational period, the Cypriot (43) should be further increased in 2020, by authority transmitted to Frontex a total of 43 20/69
