international law and respect for fundamental rights under the coordination of the responsible RCC. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found. 4.3.3. Advanced documents checks Advanced-Level Document Officers (ALDOs) can be deployed for thorough examinations of all kinds of documents relevant to border control tasks. The ALDO will collaborate with the local authorities - The main task of deployed ALDOs is to support local authorities on assessing the authenticity of inspected documents, to establish whether those are presented by the rightful holder and to provide support to the first and second line officers or screeners. In line with the applicable Standard Operating Procedures on the reporting, validation and dissemination of Frontex Document Alerts, deployed ALDOs might be requested by the hosting authorities to produce document alerts with the aim of reporting information on relevant cases to the Agency for further dissemination. Commented [GDC[S]: The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Disclosing such information wou ld expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this were to happen , public security would be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 4.3.5. Collection of information through debriefing of migrants and operational reports In view of the multi-purpose 11 /3 5

Commented [GDC[9]: The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Di sclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this were to happen , public security would be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. -   4. 3.6. Preventing, detecting and combating cross-border crime including the cooperation within the EU Policy Cycle / EMPACT Given its activities at the external borders , Frontex operational activities should contribute, where it is appropriate for it to act and where it has obtained relevant information through its activities, to preventing , detecting and combating serious crime with a cross-border dimension, such as migrant smuggling , trafficking in human beings and terrorism , All operational activities of the agency contribute to the detection , prevention and combating of various types of serious crime with a cross-border dimension that is committed or attempted at , along or in the proximity of the external borders. Those activities include Coast Guard Functions at the maritime domain. 12/35

Operational activities by Frontex support the implementation of the strategic and operational objectives of the EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime related to European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). This could include, inter alia, implementation of the EMPACT Operational Actions by means of different activities by Frontex entities, Frontex's support in initiating, organising and facilitating of the planning, implementation and evaluation of Joint Action Days (JAD) and EMPACT Action Days (EAD) as well as Frontex's participation in their implementation by Joint Operations. Additional support could be provided by Frontex in facilitating and organising visits of relevant experts other than Members of the Teams . For JADs/EADs implemented within this framework, an Action Plan will be prepared and disseminated to the participants. In the framework of the above mentioned Joint Action Days and EMPACT Action Days Frontex may cooperate with the variety of eligible partners, especially law enforcement agencies from EU Member States, other EU Agencies and relevant international organizations. JADs may be implemented under two or more of the respective EMPACT Priority Operational Action Plans (OAP) 2020 in which Frontex participates (Facilitated Illegal Immigration; Trafficking in Human Beings; Cocaine, Cannabis and Heroin ; Synthetic Drugs and New Psychoactive Substances; Environmental Crime; Organised Property Crime; Firearms; Excise Fraud; Non Cash Payment Fraud) as identified as operationally necessary during the Joint Operation. JADs may also be implemented under the cross-cutting Document Fraud EMPACT Priority in combination with at least one of the above priorities. The aforementioned activities shall be planned in close cooperation with the Italian Mai. 4.3.7. Multinational border and coast guard teams/ crews During the JO the multinational border and coast guard teams I crews composed of the officers from several MS may be deployed to the operational area, if agreed by the respective MS and Frontex.The multinational coast guard crews would be deployed on the asset of the respective participating or host MS. In addition, the European Coast Guard Functions Officers deployed by Frontex, and/or representatives of other Agencies engaged in implementation of European cooperation on coast guard functions (EMSA, EFCA) can be deployed in the International Coordination Centre (ICC) or on board of the respective assets to facilitate the implementation of the European cooperation on coast guard functions. 4.3.8. Contributing Frontex projects, products and services The JO will serve as a platform for implementation and integration of other Frontex activities and capacity building initiatives contributing to the operational activities, after consultation and approval by the host MS. 4.3.8.1.   Staff exchange Staff exchange will be implemented in the framework of the JO in order to enhance netwo rking of the officers from the MS and TC to acquire knowledge, experiences and best practices abroad by familiarizing / working together with the respective personnel of the host MS and TC and the deployed officers. Commented [GDC[lO]: The non-disclosed parts contain detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials when performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing them and the efforts made by the EU and its Member States to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. If this we re to happen, public security would be affected. In light of the above , the text is not disclosed pursuant to the exception laid down in the first indent of Article 4(1 )(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 relating to the protection of the public interest as regards public security. 13/35

4.3.8.3.    VEGA Handbook: Children at sea borders - Children at risk on the move - Guidelines for Border Guards More emphasis to be put on protecting children and unaccompanied minors rights at the external maritime borders as well as ensuring special needs of persons in need of international protection , persons in distress at sea and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation. In this regard , "VEGA Handbook: Children at sea borders - Children at Risk on the Move. Guidelines for Border Guards" to be fully utilized. This Handbook focuses on how to detect children at risk of being trafficked or smuggled through seaports or following the rescue operations at sea, aiming to identify the best practices and recommendations for the border guards in this regard and to refer the respective children to welfare and child protection agencies by applying the standard operational procedures at seaports , landing points and Identification and Registration Centres. VEGA Handbook: Children at sea borders - Children at risk on the move - Guidelines for Border Guards are available on FOSS . 4.3.8.4.    Handbook on Risk Profiles on Trafficking in Human Beings More emphasis to be put on victims of trafficking arri ving at the external maritime borders as well as increase the possibilities of Team Members to identify potential cases of THB. The Handbook is developed to support officers deployed to the JO , with the early identification of victims of THB , but also perpetrators crossing an external border together with the victims. The aim is to support local authorities in the identification of victims of these nationalities, and provide the overview of the trafficking process, starting with the information on the recruitment of victims , modus operandi of the criminal networks, and the victims ' situation in the EU . The Handbook on Risk Profiles on Trafficking in Human Beings is available on FOSS. Commented [KWll]: The non-disclosed part contains 4.3.8.5.                                                                                          detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law Eurosur Fusion ~ervice ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties . Disclosing such information would e xpose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, The Eurosur Information Services                                                                               thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of c ross- are available via the Eurosur Network and the JORA Visualization Module.       border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public may be activated to support the maritime surveillance activities after    interest as regards public security and thu s, cannot be consultation and approval by the host MS.                                                                      disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )( a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001. Commented [GDC[12]: The non-disclosed part contains 4. 3.8.5.1.  Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance services.                               detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of thi s information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and In 2020 and in the broader context of European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) , Frontex will             harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at continue to guarantee an appropriate level of situational awareness in the EU pre-frontier areas, by           curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks in volved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in ensuring the provision of common application of surveillance tools - Eurosur Fusion Services.                  human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as Among others , one of the aims of these surveillance tools is to provide an early warning mechanism , in       regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No order to facilitate / enhance the reaction capability put in place by the adjacent JO.                         1049 / 2001 1• The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the One of these services with particular relevance for the pre-frontier surveillance , is the                     technical equipment deployed in the operational area. - - service. Using Frontex aerial surveillance capacities , Frontex shares the information                     Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing collected -        in real-time with the neighbouring Member States via the official EUROSUR channels.         the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result 1 the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered , In case of sighting of a distress situation , the SAR Convention 1979 is applied and the responsible Maritime  ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) is directly notified. In addition, the neighbouring MRCCs may be             Consequently, the disclosure of such information would informed.                                                                                                      undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/ 2001. Additional information on EFS can be received [via email                                   and is available in the Handbook. 14/35

More information on other Frontex projects, products and services is available in the Handbook . 4.3.8.6. Pilot Project on testing a new model for the deployment of members of European Border and Coast Guard teams to external borders The JO may serve as a platform for implementation of the Pilot Project on testing a new model for the deployment of the Team Members of the European Border and Coast Guard, seconded to the Agency (sTMs). The deployments of the sTM shall be accomplished in accordance to the provisions of the operational plan and the rules for the deployment of sTM. 5.     IMPLEMENTATION 5.1. Period of implementation Commencement              29 January 2020                   12:00 (local time) Termination               27 January 2021                   11 :59 (local time) REMARK: The Regulation provides for the establishment of a European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps. The deployment of the operational staff of the Standing Corps in the operational areas (in MSs and! or in TCs) shall take place as of 1 January 2021. The relevant provisions shall be introduced as an amendment to this operational plan before their deployment. 5.2. !operational areas.L_________________________~~                                                       Commented [GDC[13]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature wou ld be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1 1049 /2001   • ■ Detailed information regarding operational areas is provided as Annex 5. 5.3. Host and Participating Member States, third countries, other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations Host Member State                        Italy Participating Member States              Austria, Belgium , Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia , Finland, France , Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,    the   Netherlands, Norway ,   Poland , Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain , Switzerland Third Countries                          Not foreseen 15/35

The European Commission (COM), European Asylum Support Office (EASO) , the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) , the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) , the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL) , the Other Union institutions, bodies , European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) , the offices and agencies European Union Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) , the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) , European External Action Service / Common Security and Defence Policy Mission (EEAS / CSDP Mission) EUNAVFOR MED International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), United International organisations Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) REMARK: Any changes related to the involvement of the entities above, with t he exception of the Host MS , occurring in the course of the JO do not require the amendment of the Operational Plan . Any change will be agreed between Frontex , the host MS and the respecti ve new parties during implementation phase of the JO. It is noted that the United Kingdom may withdraw from the European Union in 2020. Detailed information regarding the initial plan of deployed resources is provided as Annex 7. 5.4. Operational briefings / ldebriefing_' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----                             Commented [KW 14]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tool s and methods All participants taking part in JO will receive the Operational briefing (during the first days of             used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal acti vities . Its disclosure would deployment) and debriefing (last day of deployment) delivered by rep resentatives of Frontex and national      jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future authorities of host MS. The debriefing can be covered by filling and sending the template                      operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of Detailed information regarding operational briefing and debriefing is provided os Annex 8.                     the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001. 6.      COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, OTHER UNION BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 6. 1. Cooperation with third countries Frontex may invite border guards / coast guards / police officers etc. from third countries (TC) , to be deployed as TC observers in the JO , after the prior consultation and agreement of Italian authorities and according to Article 78(2) of the Regulation. TC observers , who have no executive powers and , who are not authorised to take any measures , will recei ve appropriate operational briefing and debriefing delivered by Frontex. TC observers shall not transmit to the deploying TC authorities' personal data to which they had access while acting in their observer role. Staff Exchange (4 .3.8.2) contains a possibility to invi te TC border guards / coast guards / police officers etc. to attend short-term visits to the operational area , without operational tasks . 16/35

6. 2. Cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organizations Detailed information about cooperation with other Union agencies and bodies or International organizations within maritime domain is provided as Annex 9. 7.     COORDINATION STRUCTURE 7. 1. Partnership Frontex coordinates the JO via a Coordinating Officer who is acting on behalf of the Agency in all aspects of the deployment of the European Border and Coast Guard teams. The Ministry of Interior, as National authority in charge for the coordination of the Italian Polizia di Stato, Guardia di Finanza , Guardia Costiera , Arma dei Carabinieri and Marina Militare as regards immigration matters , is the direct partner of Frontex and responsible for all border related activities within the JO. The mentioned national law enforcement authorities are directly responsible for their operational implementation within the mentioned coordination. The participating MS will support the achievement of operational objectives and implementation of activities by deploying their resources to the defined locations of the operational area in particular periods of time. All the acti vities are coordinated by the International Coordination Centre (ICC), according to the allocation of tasks by the NCC in accordance with the Regulation and existing agreements and national law provisions in matter of fisheries control and environmental protection , without prejudice to the prerogatives of the national operational chain of command and control specific to each participating MS. In case of SAR incidents, the activities will be executed under the planning, coordination and guidance of competent Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC). 7. 2. Hotspots Commented [KW15]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As A Hotspot means an area in which the host MS, the European Commission , relevant Union agencies and ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as participating MS cooperate with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory       the operations conducted in preceding years , disclosing challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arri ving at the external         details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide borders.                                                                                                      smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi , which would The European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF), coordinated by the European Commission,                  f    ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature established in - • Italy, and serves as a platform for the European Commission, EASO, Europol,                would be hampered by depriving the operations of any Eurojust and Frontex to coordinate their actions in close cooperation with the national authorities.          strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of document s containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information 7. 2.1. Migration management support teams                                                                regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties. Migration Management Support Teams (MMST) , composed of experts from MS and deployed by Frontex,              Di sclosing such information would expose the working the EASO , Europol or other relevant Union agencies , are deployed at the hotspots.                           methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effecti veness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence , it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus , cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)la) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001. 17 / 35

7. 3. Main operational structures/ actors and their tasks 7. 3. 1 . Member States National Coordination Centre (NCC) - International Coordination Centre ( I ~ ICC Coordinator - Officer of Italian Guardia di Finanza (GdF) National Official (NO) - Officer of home MS deploying maritime and aerial assets Intelligence Officer (10) - Officer of Italian Polizia di Stato (PdS) Intelligence Officer (10) dedicated to PeDRA - Officer of Italian Polizia di Stato (PdS) Joint Coordinating Board (JCB) - ICC Coordinator, 10, NO , OLO , FOC, etc. Team Members (TM) - officers deployed by the participating MS Officers of the host MS - at the central and local levels Commanding Officer (CO) - Commander of assets JST I JDT Team leaders - Officers of Polizia di Stato (PdS) Interpreters Local Coordination Centre [(LCC) ~                                                                  --- Commented [GDC[16]: The non-disclosed parts refer to LCC Coordinator - Officer of Italian Guardia di Finanza (GdF)                                           details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as Italian Guardia Costiera Operational Liaison Officer (OLO) - Officer of Italian Guardia Costiera        the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing (GC)                                                                                                    details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide Italian Navy Operational Liaison Officer (OLO ) - Officer of Italian Navy (Marina Militare )            smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, Italian Carabinieri Operational Liaison Officer (OLO) - Officer of the Italian Carabinieri (CC), in     enabling them to change their modus operandi , which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, case of need. the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature Operational Liaison Officer for Technical Equipment (OLO/TE) - Officer of Italian Guardia di            would be hampered by depriving the operations of any Finanza (GdF) and if necessary from the Guardia Costiera (GC).                                          strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and Team Leaders - Officers of Polizia di Stato                                                             unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in 7.3.2. Frontex the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Frontex Coordinating Officers (FCO)- Field Deployment Unit (FDU)                                        1049/2001 Operational Managers (OM) of 015 and OPES and Operational Team (OT) - FDU Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC) Frontex Support Officer (FSO) Frontex Information Management Officer (FIMO) FSO for Logistics and Deployments (FSO-FLD) European Coast Guard Functions Officer (ECGFO) Operational Analyst (OA) - Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) Personal Data Analyst (PDA) - RAU Debriefing Advisor (DA) - RAU Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) Information Fusion Centre (IFC) Centre of Excellence for Combating Document Fraud (CED) Field Press Coordinator (FPC) Frontex Liaison Officer in Italy (FLO) Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) Operational Liaison Officer at the EUNAVFOR MED Operational HQ (OHQ) in Rome European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF) in - Team Members Seconded to Frontex (sTM) Descriptions of the tasks and specific instructions to the members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams including Rules on Use of Force are defined in Annex 6. General tasks and roles of operational structures I actors are defined in the Annex 10. Contact details of main operational actors are available on FOSS . 18/35

8.     COMMAND AND CONTROL Commented [GDC[17]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1) (a) first indent of Regulation (EC ) No 1049/2001. In case of requested support from a competent Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) during a SAR event, the coordination of the participating unit is transferred from the ICC to the responsible RCC. The participating units shall inform ICC as soon as possible about any contact with the RCC and actions taken by them. ITCG Fisheries Control Centre will send instructions to the participating units during a fisheries control activity via ICC Rome. In case of pollution report, the competent National Authority (Operational Room of ITCG HQs) shall be informed promptly by ICC Rome. -          based in the ICC, as regards to the deployment of the maritime and aerial assets in the operational area, are under the command and control of the respective participating MS. 8.2. European Border and Coast Guard Teams (Team Members and other relevant staff) Command and control of Team Members remain with the competent national authority of the host MS. The host MS nominates officers (Team Leaders) who are in command of the teams. Team Members will carry their duties under the instructions of the officers of the host MS, who have the operational responsibility for the teams assigned. EBCGT members under                                             perform their tasks under the instructions , command and control of Frontex in close cooperation with the host [Msc.·__________________                   Commented [KW18]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. 19/35

Commented [GDC[19]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 9.    COMMUNICATION 9. 1. Operational communication Communication flows for operational activities in the operational area communication flow is as follow~:LI- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --~---- Commented [KB20]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information Communication betw een the ICC and Frontex w ill be accomplished via videoconference, e-mail ,     would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and mobile and fixed line phones and with satellite phones .                                           harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks Communication between all participants of the JO will be accomplished via e-mail, mobile and       involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in fixed line phones and video-conferences.                                                           human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as Communication between the actors within the central (ICC) and local authorities (LCC / TL) will be regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid accomplished via e-mails, mobile and fixed line phones as well as through video-conferences .      down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No Communication betw een all assets deployed as well as betw een assets and operational structures   1049/2001 . will be accomplished in accordance with the International Radio Procedure. Furthermore, any other available tool enabling communication among all participants and coordinating structures will be used. Access to the respective JO area on FOSS is granted according to the FOSS access procedure : o   Team Members receive access to FOSS after their introduction in Opera; o   other participants, who are not introduced in Opera, receive access after submission and authorization of the FOSS User Access Request Form; o   sTM to Frontex are granted FOSS access by default, unless otherwise is requested by the . . . FCO/Operational Manager. Detailed information about communication and FOSS is provided in the Handbook . 20/35