9. 2. Communication with Press Frontex is strongly committed to the principle of transparency. Therefore , as a rule, media should be granted access to operational areas. Participants of the JO are allowed to talk to the media only within the limits set by specific guidelines for the participating officers and following a briefing by Frontex Media and Public Relations Office. Each team participant taking part in the operation shall receive a laminated card with the specific guidelines. A network of responsible Media and Public Relations officers of all involved authorities will be established and all contact details shall be sent to the press.office@frontex.euro pa.e u email address . A compiled list will be distributed to all parties involved. The approach to communication on border control activities on the territory of Italy is common for Frontex and the host MS. Frontex and Italy shall nominate Media and Public Relations officers , who will be entirely responsible for coordination of all matters related to interview requests, press visits to the operational area and any other press-related matter related to JO . Press visits of international media will be facilitated by Frontex in coordination with the Italian authorities following established procedures with the Italian NFPOC. Frontex Media and Public Relations Office may arrange, upon agreement with the host MS , the deployment of a Field Press Coordinator. Embedment of journalists on board of Frontex assets will be planned in ad vance between Frontex Media and Public Relations Office , Ministry of Interior of Italy and JO Themis Operational Team, giving priority to the operational needs. Frontex communication policy , rules and guidelines for handling media requests are available in the Handbook . The contact details of Frontex Media and Public Relations Office members (Spokesperson) and the relevant Media and Public Relations Officers of the national authority of the host MS are available on FOSS . 10. REPORTING 10.1 . Reporting in JORA The information is collected within the framework of the joint operation via JORA by officers assigned by the host MS or deployed in the operation by other participating MS, as follows: Border-related incidents occurred in the operational areas are reported via the Incidents template; Incidents outside the operational area , but particularly relevant for implementation of Frontex mandate; Screening, registration , fingerprinting and documents forgeries' detections are reported via the Identification and Registration template; Debriefing interviews are reported via the debriefing template. Intelligence report template for information and operational personal data related to suspects of cross-border crime, including terrorism, that are collected in operational activities, other than debriefing 21 /35

In case the system is unavailab le to users, the ICC shall immediately report the unavailability to the FSC. A decision will be promptly made in Frontex and communicated back to the users. JORA actors, reporting structure and timelines are described in Annex 11 . JORA incident template attributes list, comprehensive information on JORA and the examples of reporting templates are provided in the Handbook . JORA Guidelines and the reporting templates in Microsoft Office Word format are available in FOSS . Commented [KB21] : The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would - jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law ■                                                   enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. - 22/35

Commented [GDC[23]: The non-disclosed part contains - detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as -- regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid - down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Commented [KB22] : The non -disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 . -                                -■ - Reporting Procedure for Incidental Sightings of Potential Marine Pollution from Ship Source and/or Offshore Installations during Frontex Maritime Joint Operations is available on FOSS . All templates of operational reports of participants are available on FOSS . 23/35

Commented [KB24]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods The Daily reporting package shall be prepared by the ICC Staff and shall consist of the reports indicated      used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would in the chapter above.                                                                                          jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and The ICC is responsible for the dissemination of the Reporting Package                                          trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article   4(1 )(a ) first indent of Regulation 10.4. Serious incident reporting                                                                              (EC) No 1049/2001 . The reporting of serious incidents (SI) must be in line with the reporting structure of the operation. Type of report                                 Description                             Responsibility Initial Serious Incident A Serious Incident                                              All participants of Report                                                                                   the JO caused by human action , may negatively affect, or be relevant to a particular Frontex activity, the safety and security of participants in Frontex activities , the Agency's mission and reputation , or any combination thereof. Sis also include situations of possible violations of European Union (EU) acquis or international law, in particular related to Fundamental Rights (FR) and international protection obligations. Finally, Sis include any violation of the Frontex Code of Conduct (CoC) applicable to all persons participating in Frontex operational activities. A formal SIR shall be reported in JORA and sent as soon       possible, and at the latest within 24 hours, via Commented [KB25]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by email      to   the law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials ' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks The Serious Incidents Reporting procedure including Serious Incidents Catalogue is available in the            involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in Handbook .                                                                                                     human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid 10. 5. Intelligence Report                                                                                    down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 /2001. The Intelligence Report allows officers deployed in the JO to report to Frontex information and operational personal data related to suspects of cross-border crime, including terrorism, that were collected during the operational activities. The report can be produced by any participant of the JO for the exception TC Observers. Frontex and Italy as the host MS have agreed that the TM deployed in this JO will be able to use the Intelligence Report on the categories of operational personal data that will be collected and reported to Frontex. All experts using the Intelligence Report will collect information only in accordance with the activities assigned for their profile and only under the supervision of the host Member State authorities. 24/35

Commented [KB26]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law . The  enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As reports containing operational personal data will undergo a Legality check conducted by the PeDRA team.     disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not Depending on the results of the checks, the reports will be either accepted and the data will be further    disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation processed or rejected back to the Intelligence Officer with the request to remove the operational personal  (EC) No 1049/ 2001 . data that are not in line with the annex on the operational personal data collection Annex. The operational personal data will be processed by Frontex for the following purpose 10.6. Frontex Document Alerts Frontex Document Alerts (FDA) shall be reported by the FDA Initiator, acting on authorisation from the hosting authorities. The FDA initiator can be any participant of the JO from host and participating MS, as f,.,el as TC Observers under instructions from and in the resence of the relevant officer of the host MS ,   Commented [KW27]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers who meets the requirements of deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information Document experts from the Frontex Centre of      would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and Excellence for Combating Document Fraud may also act as FDA Initiators when deployed to Joint               strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result , the course of ongoing and future Operations or field missions.                                                                                similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049 / 2001. Commented [GDC[2B]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings . In con sequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation In order to determine the existence of the aforementioned conditions, the FDA initiator shall consult the   (EC) No 1049/ 2001. 1 respective local officer of the host MS, check existing alerts and databases and assess the case using his / her personal experience , knowledge and skills (expert judgement). There are three categories of Frontex Document Alerts that shall be reported using the following three templates: 25/35

Commented [GDC[ 29]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working met hods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross- border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public secu rity and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 1 FDAs shall be completed only in English and shall not contain any personal data (those shall be redacted). The FDA is reported in accordance to chapter 10.2. Compiled FDAs are vali dated by the Frontex Centre of Excellence for combating Document Fraud. The FDA HelpDesk is available via phone                                         and via email to support FDA initiators. All templates for reporting FDA are available on FOSS . Contact details of the FDA HelpDesk are available on FOSS . ·s the Frontex document specimen and forgery library containing up-to-date infor mation on travel and identity documents and border stamps to first and second line officers. More information on FDA and                             is available in the Handbook 1°. 10.8. Frontex lrepor -c__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~~ - Commented [KB30]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing th is information would undermine the protection of - the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement -- officials ' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) fi rst indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. '° More information is available in the Handbook. 26 / 35

-- Commented [KB31]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not -- disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 . The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' wo rk in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 . - - 27 /35

11. WORKING CONDITIONS AND LOGISTICS 11. 1. Working conditions and working environment of the pperational are.,__ _ ____                    Commented [GDC[32]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As The working conditions and environment vary according to the place of deployment (ICC, EURTF, hotspots ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing and other deployment areas within the operational area).                                               details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to • disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001 1• The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and / or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence , it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus , cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 / 2001. I The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result , the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/ 2001. Detailed information on each of the workplaces of all main locations within the operational area of the JO are available at FOSS. 28/35

11 . 2. Working time 11.2.1.       Team Members The working time of the Team Members (TM) of the JO is managed by the host MS, which is in charge of issuing instructions to the participants of the JO during their deployment to the operational area, according to the Regulation. The working time rules shall be in full compliance with the relevant EU legislation. Host MS prepares the duty rosters or equivalent defining the working time and the days off and keeps the relevant records. These records shall be made available to Frontex and the respective participating MS upon request in accordance with the relevant data protection provisions. Taking into account the nature and scope of the JO, the deployed TM are requested to acknowledge the need for flexibility in case of unprecedented migratory flows or other unforeseen operational needs. 11.2.2.      Interpreters The number of wo rking days and conditions for interpreters directly contracted by Frontex is reflected in the Framewo rk Contract (FWC) for provision of interpretation and cultural expertise services. For Interpreters deployed directly from participating MS the rules for Team Members apply. Taking into account the nature and scope of the JO, the deployed Interpreters are requested to acknowledge the need for flexibility in case of unprecedented migratory flows or other unforeseen operational needs . 11. 3. Safety and health 11.3.1. Frontex "'Occupational health and safety - deployment information" Basic sanitary behaviour is crucial especially for avoiding the exposure to infectious diseases. Therefore , each participant of the JO should follow the eight 'Golden Rules' defined in Frontex provided brochure "Occupational health and safety - deployment information" available on FOSS. Participants of the JO are expected to show up on duty physically and mentally fit for duty, in order not to jeopardise the safety and health of themselves or others. Frontex closely monitors any development in the field of safety and health and will provide additional information in case of need. Frontex brochure "Occupational health and safety - deployment information" available on FOSS . 11.3.2. Usage of Frontex provided sanitary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) While on duty, participants of the JO should use Frontex provided sanitary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) including basic First Aid kit. Each participant of the JO has to be aware about their personal responsibility as a last resort of ensuring proper occupational safety and health protection , including the usage of PPE and service gear. 11.3.3. Vaccination Vaccination is a basic tool in the prevention of contagious and infectious diseases. Based on the epidemiological situation, international recommendations and experience gathered from operational areas, vaccination against the following diseases is highly recommended for all participants of the JO: 29 / 35

Poliomyelitis, Diphtheria , Tetanus, Pertussis, Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, seasonal Influenza , Measles / Mumps / Rubella, Varicella / Chickenpox and Neisseria meningitis ACWY. For duties with increased risk of contact with Tuberculosis (e.g. hotspots, mass-migration-management settings) also vaccination against Tuberculosis is recommended. 11.3.4. Access to health care and public health events Sick and / or injured Frontex deployed personnel shall have equal access to all necessary medical and psychological support , regularly facilitated by the European Health Insurance Card scheme (EHIC ) or equivalent , as equally provided to the host MS officers. Participating MS / TC are responsible for adequate insurance coverage for their respective deployed personnel, while Frontex covers such costs via the applicable financing scheme based on daily rates / unit costs , in accordance with chapter 11.3.6. For seconded Team Members the European Commission complementary mission insurance is applicable (CIGNA/ AIG policy No 2.004.760). Host MS shall guarantee that in case of any potential public health event , also Frontex deployed personnel is taken into account for any envisaged measure (e.g. vaccination campaigns, health risk awareness campaigns). 11.3.5. Medical evacuation Medical evacuation of the deployed personnel falls under the responsibility of the participating MS/TC. Participating MS / TC are responsible for adequate insurance coverage for their respective personnel, covering medical evacuations. For seconded Team Members the applicable European Commission complementary mission insurance (CIGNA/ AIG policy No 2.004.760) is covering medical evacuation. 11.3.6. Safety and health related costs The daily rates paid by Frontex to the participating MS include inter alia the costs for health care , insurance and additional vaccinations. Participating MS are , therefore , encouraged to utilise them also for this purpose. 11.4. Logistics Prior arri val, Team Members and Interpreters deployed by the MS, via respective NFPOC , are advised to contact their colleagues already deployed in the operational area to arrange the transfer to the hotel. If this solution is not possible the NFPOC should contact the respective FSO and request support. The Interpreters deployed under the Frontex Framework Contract (FWC) by the contractor shall follow the provisions of the relevant contract. FSO contact details can be obtained via the [operational team at         L------ Commented [GDC[33]: The non-disclosed part contains or accessible on FOSS.                                                                   detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and 11.4. 1. Registration of deployed resources in Opera                                                              harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information Prior to the deployment the participating MS shall introduce all information required for issuing would undermine the protection of the public interest as identification document for participants as well as relevant information for the deployment of TE in the              regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid Operational Resources Management System (Opera). In addition , when deploying assets, NO , CO ,                       down in Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049 /2001. crewmembers and BSO for terrestrial assets have to be registered in Opera , too (respective HR and TE pools). TC deploying observers shall provide information required for issuing identification document via e-mail , unless they have access to the OPERA system . 30/35