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SE FRONTEX Ill EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY Serious Incident Report no. 18 Reporting date: 10/04/2015 11:21 AM Last modification date: 29/12/2016 10:54 AM . Text Removed - Reportmg person: Justification 1 Las t mod 1·t·,ea t·,on d one by: Justification Text Removed - 1 FSC SIR Category 2 Fundamental Rights Subject Alleged violation of Fundamental Rights Type of SIR 4 Final SIR JORA Incident number (if any) Joint Operation ·Focal Points 2015 Land Frontex SIR Coordinator .FRO Incident date/time 1 11 /02/201 5 12:00 AM Detection date/time 13/02/2015 12:00 AM Original source of the information Text Removed - Justification 2 Location of the incident Text Removed - Justification 3 Is latitude unknown Yes Latitude Is longitude unknown Yes Longitude Reference to the operational area No Frontex resources involved (Human resources I co-financed technical No equipment) Type of resources / involvement Text Removed - Justification 2 Dead persons Injured persons Missing persons
Information/allegations Today 13/02/2015, ), the Text Removed - Justification 2 Elhovo, comprised of Text Removed - Justification 2, performed an interview with an Iraqi national apprehended two days ago at the Text Removed - Justification 3 for carrying a forged passport while travelling by bus with destination Romania in Elhovo (distribution centre). During the interview the migrant requested that the BGR officer would exit the room; the BGR officer exited the room and the Text Removed - Justification 2 expert received the following information / claim from the migrant: During the border check, the migrant left the bus and was asked to get his passport by a Bulgarian Border Police officer. The officer's uniform was described as being green and having written "Border Police" on the jacket's forearm. According to the statement, while being outside of the bus and alone with the Bulgarian Border Police Officer the migrant was asked to pay 400$ to avoid passport control. When the migrant said he just had 200 S the officer started hitting him (several slaps in his face and kicks in the back). Afterwards he was taken into the facilities of the BCP and put alone inside a room. Further details concerning the time of the incident and the exact circumstances have not been provided. The migrant does not wish to make an official complaint or any further claim against the Border Police Officer. Measures Local authorities and Text Removed - Justification 2 were informed about the case and afterwards Text Removed - Justification 2. Text Removed - Justification 2 provided the information to the ICC (Text Removed - Justification 2 JO FOA 2015 land). Incident is reported as an alleged Violation of the Frontex Code of Conduct Text Removed - Justification 3, 4, 5. There is no indication that Text Removed - Justification 2 were present in the BCP during the time of the incident. Assessment Final outcome
~ FRONTEX Ill EUROPEANBORDERANDCOASTGUARDAGENCV Serious Incident Report no. 48 Reporting date: 12/05/2015 02:24 PM Last modification date: 13/02/2020 12:56 PM . Text Removed - L t od"f" t· d b Text Removed - Reporting person: Justification 1 as m 1 ,ea ,on one y: Justification 1 FSC SIR Category 2 Fundamental Rights I Subject Claimed violation of fundamental rights Type of SIR 1 Initial SIR 'JORA Incident number (if any) Joint Operation , FOA 2015 land on border surveillance / SE Frontex SIR Coordinator ,FRO Incident date/time 06/05/2015 12:00 AM Detection date/time 12/05/2015 12:00 PM 1 Original source of the information Text Removed - Justification 2 Location of the incident ,Text Removed - Justification 3 Is latitude unknown Yes Latitude Is longitude unknown ,Yes Longitude Reference to the operational area \No Frontex resources involved (Human resources / co-financed technical ' No equipment) 1 Type of resources I involvement r ' Dead persons Injured persons Missing persons
Information/allegations • On 11.05.2015 the Text Removed - Justification 2 in Orestiada, comprised Text Removed - Justification z performed an interview of a male Syrian national (claimed), aged 26 who had been apprehended during the previous night in the area of the trilateral border (Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey), close to Text Removed - Justification 3 (BGR - GRC). The interviewee claimed to traveling with his family, his wife and a baby. • During the course of the interview, the migrant provided information of what it appears to be a violation of Fundamental Rights. More specific, the migrant claimed during the interview (extract from interview report):" ... By 00h00 whole group has crossed the river. The interviewee stated again the target / final destination was reach Text Removed - Justification 5. He never knew in what country arrived after crossing the river. Text Removed - Justification 5. Measures Text Removed - Justification 2 Text Removed - Justification 3, 4 are informed about the allegations of the migrant. Assessme nt - it is unclear when the group was detected for the first time by the police and at which country they were detected and divided as a group. The interviewee could not identify the nationality of the officers to whom the group addressed to for help but he was confident they were not from the Hellenic Police who stopped him and his family at later stage. Final outcome
Disclaimers of Non-disclosure 1 Personal Data The non-disclosed text contains personal data, in particular the names of individuals. Its disclosure would affect the privacy and integrity of the individuals and is therefore precluded pursuant to the exception laid down in Article 4(1 )(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049 /2001. 1 2 Number and profile of Human Resources The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049 /2001 2 • 3 Reporting tools and methods used by The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law law enforcement officials enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 3• 4 Operational Area of Joint Operation The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the 1 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31 .5.2001 , p . 43) . 2 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001 , p. 43). 3 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p . 43) .
protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1 )(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 4 • 5 Sensitive operational information The non-disclosed text cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1 )(a) fi rst indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The information related to this non-disclosed text is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain insights into this decision making process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making-processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present case, information pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 4 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43) .