A Standard Operating Procedure consists the details of the process, followed by its integration in the provisions of the OPLANs. The Serious Incidents Reporting procedure including Serious Incidents Catalogue is available in the General part of the Operational Plan and Handbook that are shared and formally accepted by the host Member State and applicable to all participants in the activities. A SIR aims to inform the Frontex Executive and Senior Management, the Member States, the Frontex Management Board (MB) and other relevant stakeholders, as soon as possible, about the occurrence of a SI as defined in the “Frontex Serious Incident Catalogue”. The production and timely dissemination of a SIR contribute towards enhancing situational awareness and increasing Frontex reaction capabilities. The dissemination of a SIR is the first internal step for possible follow-up measures. Every participant shall report immediately serious incidents (SI) to Frontex, in case he/she witnesses, is involved, or has grounds to suspect about the occurrence of an incident representing a possible violation of fundamental rights or international protection obligations (Category 4 of SI Catalogue). SI involving allegations on possible violation of fundamental rights and/or CoC can be reported via standard SIR procedure in accordance to the SI reporting lines defined in the operational plan or the exceptional reporting mechanism explained below. An exceptional reporting mechanism can be applied, for example when the reporting person has concerns that the disclosure of sensitive information on possible violation of fundamental rights or the CoC via the SIR mechanism could have consequences on their or others’ integrity, reputation or deployment. After acknowledgement of such information, the participant shall immediately report such incidents to the FSC. A Serious Incident must be reported through an initial SIR as soon as possible and preferably within the first 2 hours after such knowledge has been attained. The initial SIR shall contain a summary of the information known at that point of time. This initial SIR serves as preliminary information to obtain immediate knowledge about the incident, and does not need, at this stage, a specific confirmation of the incident. The initial SIR is not bound by any form and can be reported to the FSC using any available means of communication. Serious Incidents are clustered into four main categories (SI-Catalogue):  Category 1 - Situations of high political and/or operational relevance especially with the potential to affect EU border management of one or more MS/SAC including crisis situations;  Category 2 - Incidents occurring in Frontex operational and non-operational activities and not related to Frontex staff and/or other participants in Frontex activities;  Category 3 - Incidents involving Frontex staff and/or other participants in Frontex operational and non-operational activities;  Category 4 - Situations of possible violations of Fundamental Rights or international protection obligations. The SIR Mechanism does not exclude the possibility of consultation at the initial stage of first assessment between FSC and other internal actors, allowing for the most appropriate further action, for the escalation of an event as Serious Incident and the proposal of the SI Coordinator. Due to the possible impact and the multilateral issues generated by a specific SI, a SI-Coordinator shall be assigned upon respective proposal by the FSC, according to the SI categories illustrated in the SI-Catalogue. The SI-Coordinator is responsible for the follow up, the coordination and the closure of the SI. It is the responsibility of the FSC to trigger the SI Reporting procedure by identifying and contacting the responsible unit/sector and proposing the role of SI- Coordinator based on the SI categories illustrated in the SI-Catalogue. Such a proposal is done at the stage of the initial SIR. Upon receiving the proposed nomination as SI-Coordinator by the FSC, the relevant Frontex entity shall assess the proposal and confirm to the FSC within one working day the acceptance of his/her role as SI-Coordinator for the respective incident. In case the proposed SI-Coordinator does not confirm his/her role, the decision making process shall be escalated to the appropriate senior management level depending on the category of the SI. SIRs are distributed in line with the distribution list for each category that is approved by senior management. Category 4 SIRs are distributed to internal stakeholders that include the following distribution lists and functional e- mail addresses: DIEC, DORD, DSAM, Executive Director, FMM, FSC-SDO, HoO.BRU, HoO.MPR HoO.FRO, HoS.Hub, HoU.CGLE, HoU.FDU, HoU.LOU, HoU.RAU, HoU.LPU, DCBD, DCGO. 11/18

Reporting during Frontex Surveillance Aircraft missions: In the period between April and September 2020, three Frontex Surveillance Aircraft (FSA) were deployed in the Aegean Sea (under the framework of Joint Operation Poseidon), respectively in the islands of Kos, Chios and Lesvos under the coordination of the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) in the International Coordination Centre (ICC) Piraeus. All aerial surveillance activities were planned by ICC Piraeus in term of timeframe and areas to be patrolled. During the flights, a representative of HCG was present physically in the European Monitoring Room at the Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) in Warsaw, or remotely from ICC Piraeus when the restrictions related to COVID-19 started. The real- time video is streamed to the respective National Coordination Centres. The role of the HCG liaison officer is to provide guidance and real-time instructions regarding the flight activities, including:     flight plan,     flight pattern,     schedule (decided by the International Coordination Centre),     live activity including instructions on -    which exact area/activity needs to be surveilled -    when to stay or fly away from any activity / geographical area -    tactical control of the asset upon detection of an incident. In addition to having the representative of the HCG present during each Frontex Surveillance Aircraft mission a mission report is prepared and shared directly with the following stakeholders:     External: o Hellenic Coast Guard o ICC Piraeus o Joint Rescue Coordination Centre – Hellenic authority o Hellenic Navy o Contractor of the aircrafts     Internal: o European Monitoring Team o Pooled Resource Unit o Operational Response Division:     Field Deployment Unit     Frontex Operational Coordinator o Risk Analysis Unit 11. How was the Fundamental Rights Officer involved in each of these instances? Concerning Category 4 Serious Incident the Fundamental Rights Officer was informed and/or proposed to act as SI- coordinator (please see below) via the distribution list – approved by the senior management - includes the Head of the Fundamental Rights Office. 12. Have you received any reports or complaints from other internal or external sources making allegations of breaches of fundamental rights relation to Frontex activities? If yes, how have these been treated? The following Serious Incident Reports – all categorised as Category 4, possible violation of fundamental rights – and incident reports can be considered: 1)   SIR 11860 Category: 4 Situations of possible violations of Fundamental Rights or international protection obligations. Description:     On 27.07.2020, National Official (NO) of the Danish HELO deployed to JO Poseidon 2020 informed FOC in ICC about ambiguity of the location of a detected migrant boat.     FOC advised DNK NO and the HELO CO to get in contact with ICC Coordinator in order to clarify the necessary details.     On 28.07.2020 the incident has been discussed (FCO/FOC, HCG, DNK NO) in ICC Piraeus.     The event was registered as “Prevention of Departure” by ICC Piraeus. HoS.OIS is the SI Coordinator for this case. 12/18

As a follow up of the SIR, a letter from ED to the Commandant of the HCG was sent on the 06.08.2020, requesting the investigation of the incident. The HCG replied to the ED letter on 14 October 2020. SIR Status: on-going 2)   SIR 11934 Category: 4 Situations of possible violations of Fundamental Rights or international protection obligations. Description:     On 05/08/2020, at 01:41 LT, Frontex Surveillance Aircraft (FSA) Metis sighted a migrant boat with approximately 30 people on board, east of Lesvos in Greek territorial waters, towed eastwards towards Turkish territorial waters by a Greek Coast Guard patrol vessel. At the time of the sighting the convoy was located approximately 1,2 NM inside the Greek territorial waters;     The event had been registered as a “Prevention of Departure” by ICC Piraeus. HoU.FDU was proposed to act as SIR coordinator (accepted by FDU). Upon request from FDU, FSC provided detailed information about the event on 14 August. No further information is available in FSC. SIR Status: on-going FSA was deployed under JO POSEIDON from 01 March 2020 – 07 September 2020. 3)   SIR 12604: Category: 4 Situations of possible violations of Fundamental Rights or international protection obligations. Description:     On the 30.10.2020 04:50LT, SWE CPB intercepted a vessel and found out that it was an inflatable black rubber boat, with an outboard engine, transporting around 20 migrants     The rubber boat stopped when it was 1.5 NM from the border line     The rubber boat was fully operational and the assessment was that they weren’t in distress     The Greek Liaison on board contacted the Hellenic Coast Guard, which dispatched a patrol boat to the scene     The SWE crew was informed by the Hellenic authorities that they were excused from the scene, once the HCG was taking over the situation     Nevertheless, the SWE crew continued to monitor the situation and they saw the echo of the HCG patrol boat moving towards the border line, where it stopped moving.     No SAR operation was initiated and no migrants’ boat arrived to Chios on 30.10.2020. DORD was assigned to coordinate it from the operational perspective; in parallel, FRO was assigned to coordinate it from the perspective of fundamental rights. FRO inquired Hellenic authorities about this event and received feedback. Incident reports pending validation: During the validation process of the incidents (IV) reported in JORA for the Rapid Border Intervention (RBI) in Greece, FSC detected discrepancies between the information present in JORA and the information provided by other coming from assets deployed at the location and time of the incidents. These discrepancies were found on 05 specific incidents. The overall issue has been addressed and explained twice to the Greek authorities. Firstly, during the “Bilateral Meeting with Host Member State – Greece: Planning operational activities 2021” that took place on the 24th of September. Secondly, by an email sent on the 28th October to ICC Piraeus. On the 3rd November, ICC provided their reply and comments to each specific case. Apart from providing comments, ICC Piraeus also clarified that in what concerns the references to Persons On Board (POB), the numbers provided when addressing Prevention of Departures are approximate figures (realistic assumptions). As such, the numbers provided by maritime assets are generally preferred over the ones provided by aerial assets. Incident 407401 (09JUN20): According to Frontex Surveillance Aircraft (FSA) Mission Report 351, the number of migrants differ (25 POB in FSA Report) and 50 in the JORA incident. The coordinates also differ: 38°52’ 30‘’ N 026°35’ 13/18

03‘’ E in FSA Report vs 38°48’ 42‘’ N 026°39’ 36‘’ E (JORA Detection by Hellenic Coast Guard Coastal Patrol Boat 137), 38°49’ 30‘’ N 026°36’ 48‘’ E (JORA Interception By Turkish Coast Guard) Incident 407466 (12JUN20): The DETECTION which was conducted by METIS according to Mission Report 364 is not mentioned in JORA. Incident 407467: According to Mission Report 364, METIS observed a probable Migrant Boat (MB) in vicinities of 39° 26’ 32” N 026° 03’ 46” E, heading 176° at 4kts - METIS remained in over watch, a TUR patrol vessel arrived and began rescuing the migrants. Incident 410811 (28JUL20): Frontex and the Greek authorities received a SIR from the Danish HELO concerning this incident, and the Modus Operandi in JORA only provides two lines about the incident. Incident 411632 (05AUG20): There is information provided by FSA Metis indicating the location of the migrant boat 1.2 NM inside Greek Territorial Water (within the operational area of the JO Poseidon). In JORA, the incident was reported as a Prevention of Departure, specifying that "At 02.00 migrants' boat reiterated consecutive efforts to avoid HCG operational means and exited HTW." 13. Have you received any allegations of an involvement of Frontex staff in illegal activities of the Hellenic Coast Guard? If yes, what has been done to follow-up? No. 14. With reference to the statement made by the Swedish representative at the MB extraordinary meeting on 10 November 2020 (ie that a SE vessel crew submitted a SIR on 30 October but was later advised by the Frontex coordinating officer that it should not do so), are you aware of any other cases where the Agency’s staff could have influenced the submission of Serious Incident Reports? Following the statement made by the Swedish representative at the MB extraordinary meeting on 10 November 2020, Frontex has initiated an internal inquiry with the Frontex officers concerned, in order to establish the exact circumstances of the event, and also asked for the interviewing the Swedish crew. At this stage, Frontex awaits evidences proving the allegations mentioned at the MB meeting, since the available written communication presented by the Frontex staff does not substantiate the statements. 15. Did any of the incidents referred to under numbers 1 to 13 above occur in the framework of a joint operation/rapid border intervention? All incidents occurred in the framework of JO/RBI. 16. If yes, which ones? N/A, please see the answer to question 15. 17. Have you, as the Executive Director, in respect of all cases and without delay, taken any of the measures set out in Article 46(4) of the EBCG Regulation, i.e. suspended or terminated the activity concerned? If not, who decided this and on the basis of which reasoning? For all mentioned SIR cases the relevant Greek authorities have been informed and have been requested to launch internal investigation. The evidence from these investigations did not suggest any irregular/unlawful activities by the Hellenic Coast Guard. Therefore, no measures, as set out in Article 46(4) of the EBCG Regulation, have been taken. 18. Has the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer and/or her office been informed by you of any such allegations? The Fundamental Rights Officer has been informed through the existing reporting channels within the Agency about relevant allegation and Incident Reports and/or Serious Incident Reports with regards to alleged violations of fundamental rights. On 16 September the Executive Director held a meeting with Associated Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO a.i. at the time) to discuss cases escalated to the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy of Greece (letter dated 8 May 2020) and the Commander of the Hellenic Coast Guard (letter dated 6 August 2020). Documents related to these incidents (SIR 11095/2020 and 11860/2020) together with the letters from the Executive Director and the reply from 14/18

the Greek authorities on the first letter (reply to the letter dated 6 August 2020 was received only on 14 October 2020) were shared with Associated Fundamental Rights Officer by email. 19. Has she been informed by other parties? The Fundamental Rights Officer has received information from internal business entities as well as reports and footages from external sources, including the Frontex Consultative Forum. Additionally, it is important to highlight that no complaints have been received by the FRO through the established complaint mechanism with regards to the alleged pushbacks in Greece. 20. How many files have been submitted to the Fundamental Rights Officer, including those where FRO acted as a SIR coordinator in total and how many this year? What has been the follow-up? As reported during the Extraordinary MB meeting, where the European Commission was among the participants, three SIRs were received by FSC as entry point to be coordinated by FRO as per SIR SOPs (Category 4, fundamental rights concerns) but not related to alleged pushbacks in Greece. FRO was provided information on several SIRs concerning alleged pushbacks from Greece in the Aegean thus related directly to fundamental rights matters, however was not assigned as SIR coordinator. In addition, on the 21 November a category 4 SIR was submitted to Frontex (12790/2020 - status ongoing), to which FRO was assigned to coordinate it with close support by ORD. 21. Have there been any instances where, based on the original assessment of a responsible Frontex coordinating officer, you as Executive Director considered that the Fundamental Rights Officer would or should have been consulted on an incident but where this consultation did not take place for any reason? No, there was not such a case. As indicated in the above answers, all SIRs in question were distributed to FRO via the existing reporting channels and according to the appropriate procedure. Moreover, the Executive Director have shared with Associated FRO the relevant exchange of letters between Frontex and the Greek authorities during a bilateral meeting on 16 September. 22. How were you informed of such incidents and who took the decision to consult or not the Fundamental Rights Officer for each of the incidents? In particular, what was the situation in relation to three SIRs related to the fundamental rights which were not assigned to FRO as a SIR coordinator but rather handled by you directly (as reported by FRO ad interim at the MB meeting on 10 November)? Who took the final decision as regards the classification of the incidents? The reason for not assigning the FRO as a SI-coordinator to all ongoing SIRs is that there are several operational issues that need to be clarified and to collect all the operational information to allow for a proper assessment of the SIR. Once all the information is available, and in case there is enough evidence to suspect an alleged violation of fundamental rights, the FRO will be informed and consulted accordingly. When it comes to the one SIR case which was closed (SIR 11095, from 18 April 2020) and where the FRO was not assigned as SI-coordinator, the incident was finally not classified as a violation of fundamental right, hence was not further consulted with the FRO. At the same time FRO received the SIR as HoO.FRO was in cc when distributing the SIR 11095/2020. 23. What are the internal control mechanisms in place to ensure the full application of international and European law, as well as the Frontex Regulation? The requirements for the internal controls are specified in the Internal Control Framework adopted by the MB decision 32/2017 of 22 November 2017. The principle 3 requires that: Management establishes, with political oversight, structures, reporting lines, and appropriate authorities and responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives. As an evidence for this control - Frontex internal structure and rules of procedure (FISROP). 15/18

24. How many internal and external audits are pending and what is their scope and timeline? The table below contains all ongoing internal and external audits: No     Audit Type      Scope                                 Timeline                      Status 1      IAS             2014 - A442825                        Original deadline:            Ongoing 23/12/2015 Revised deadline 31/12/2020 2      IAS             IAS.A-2015-W FRONTEX-002 - Audit      Original deadline:            Ongoing on Data Validation and Quality        31/12/2019 Assurance for the Risk Analysis Revised deadline 30/09/2020 3      IAS             2017 - IAS.A2-2017-W FRONTEX-002      Original deadlines:           Ongoing Contract Management                   30/09/2019; 31/03/2020; 31/12/2020 (varying per recommendation) Revised deadlines: 30/06/2021; 30/06/2021; N/A (varying per recommendation) 4      IAS             IAS.A2-2018-W FRONTEX-001             Original deadline:            Ongoing 30/06/2021; 31/12/2020 IT Governance and Project Management                            Revised deadline 31/12/2021; 30/09/2021 6      IAS             IAS 2020 risk assessment in Frontex   Field work/online             Ongoing - it serve as a basis for the         09-13/11/2020 preparation of the new Strategic Internal Audit Plan (SIAP) covering the period 2021-2023. 7      ECA             Performance audit on ECBGA            First audit visit 4-8.11.2019 Ongoing (if Frontex effectively supported     (also BCP in Dorohusk and the MS in implementation of           Terespol). January 2020 European Integrated Border            visit to Italy, DG Home and Management)                           EP Second audit visit – due to pandemic made online in March/April 2020 Clearing letter received 15/07/2020 Frontex replies to CL sent on 15/09/2020 8      ECA             DAS 2020 audit M1                     Field work/online – 12-       Ongoing 16/10/2020 ECA to provide the preliminary findings 9      ECA             Performance audit on migrant          Notification letter received  Ongoing smuggling                             22/10/2019; updated notification letter (to assess the effectiveness of       received on 15/05/2020 Europol support to Member States 16/18

in combatting migrant smuggling since 2016; Frontex included in the scope). 10     ECA              Performance audit on EU                  Notification letter received    Ongoing readmission arrangements with 3rd        04/11/2019; countries (to assess the EU progress since         Series of interviews held; 2015 in concluding relevant              various documentation readmission agreements or similar        provided to the auditors arrangements with priority third countries, and the EU action to facilitate effective implementation of third countries' readmission obligations; auditees include: Frontex, EEAS, SG, DGs HOME, DEVCO and NEAR) 11     European         DG Defence and Space (DEFIS) –           Field work/online 16-           Ongoing Commission       audit of Copernicus Delegation           20/11/2020 Agreement – AIR 2019 12     European         DG NEAR 2020 Residual Error Rate         Field work/online               Ongoing Commission       Study – audit done by a private          November-December 2020 audit form BDO LLP – Frontex Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management Capacity included in the sample Concluding Remarks The considerations and facts described in the report above and passed audits prove that the currently implemented reporting system works and is effective. With due regard to new developments, Frontex is working towards improving the efficacy of the system, including as a part of a holistic process towards the digitalisation of the work of the Agency and the utilisation of new tools. One such tool is the evolution of the Eurosur, which is moving towards becoming the most comprehensive system of collecting of different type of information at the external borders. At the same time, the JORA already represents an upgrade to the reporting system and has brought about significant improvements. Further investment is needed into the integration and upgrade of these existing systems and processes and the Agency is currently working on a comprehensive information management policy and processes. This area of activity is proposed to be reinforced and structured within the organizational model of the Agency under the direct supervision of one of the Deputy Executive Directors, which will significantly enhance the Agency’s performance in this area and quality of the service towards the MS/SAC. In addition to investing into new tools, Frontex has implemented improvements as regards the dedicated human resources at HQ level. JORA events are validated in HQ by a specialized team of experts and that has been an important step in the communication with the host MS authorities and professionalization of the process. Furthermore, Serious Incidents Reports (SIRs) can be launched by any participant in the process, and Frontex has noted the effectiveness of this procedure. The SIRs are categorized in four categories and there is a procedure relevant to each of those categories. As a part of the processing of SIRs, escalation procedures are also in place. Such escalations have already occurred based either on discussions held at the ICC, or stemming from questions asked during the validation process of JORA incidents. There have also been instances where the Executive Director has addressed the Commander of the HCG and the Greek Minister in writing as described several times in this report to reinforce the timeliness and efficiency of reaction on Frontex side. It is important to highlight that access has never been denied to the FRO in the distribution list when communicating internally on SIRs; to the contrary FRO was always included in any SIR with a potential FR component. While exploring ways to improve the reporting systems, the four SIR categories as well the assignment of coordinators, as described in the report may need to be revised to take into consideration the occurrence of situations that might be related to a possible threat to the national security or national defense of the Host Member State or any Member State participating in a joint operation. This is particularly important as Frontex and its MS/SACs partners operate in a geopolitical context at the external borders of the EU. 17/18

In terms of accuracy of the reporting, it is noteworthy that many pending incidents either in JORA or SIR are related to the notion of “prevention of departure”, which is to be interpreted in conjunction with the provisions of Regulation 656/2014, in particular Articles 6 and 7. All of the above observations are intended to serve as input for the further analytical work to be carried out by the Working Group planned to be established by the Management Board with the view for the Group to be able to cover and thoroughly consider all aspects of the processes at stake. It is the Agency’s intention to support the work of the Group in all areas of its activity and to take benefit of its recommendations to further improve the system of monitoring and reporting applicable in Frontex. 18/18