RAMB     LL manner. The stories shared by migrants allow the RAU to identify and analyse modi operandi, trends, push and pull factors, and how this information can help implement the JO more effectively. These reports help steer the JO and were also reported by MS to be used to provide them and the officers they deploy to the JO with situational awareness of the JO. The biweekly reports summarise the identified trends of relevance for the migratory pressure on the external border in the area of relevance for the JO, as well as the findings of operational and debriefing activities from the past two weeks. Based on these the reports offer recommendations – e.g. the debriefing teams are advised to focus on obtaining information alternative routes for reaching the EU that are offered to migrants by facilitation 16 networks. Recommendations are also directed to the project manager for the JO, advising them liaise with MS authorities for the collection of data of relevance for the JO – e.g. pictures of the wooden boats from which migrants are rescued, in order to establish their 17 country of departure. Another example of the utilisation of risk analysis data can be found in the operational decisions taken in order to prevent the re-use of boats from which migrants are rescued. In the context of JO Hermes, the JO forces noted that wooden boats from which migrants are rescued are often left adrift, which creates a problem for the navigation of other vessels, but also an opportunity for facilitation networks. The water stream would often push the empty boats towards to Libya where fishermen would specialise in collecting them and reselling them to facilitation networks. While border control forces have been aware of this, it was necessary to collect sufficient evidence of the consequences of this practice in order to take measures to address it. Thus, boats which cannot get destroyed upon apprehension would be marked with a sign and date and eventually a trend of the reuse of the boats was noted. Since Italian legislation posed obstacles to the systematic destruction of such boats, with the support of Frontex an arrangement was reached that would see the boats get towed to Malta and destroyed there. Since January 2015 wooden boats have therefore been systematically destroyed and now there are fewer boats available and the JO ICC reports of a corresponding reduction in flows. In addition, RAU prepare Analytical Warning reports in order to provide situational awareness and operational recommendations to the latest modus operandi noted in the JO. For example, in the context of JO Aeneas in 2014, an analytical warning was issued with regard to a newly detected modus operandi for smuggling migrants from Greece to Italy by 18 speed boat. The assessment featured detailed (but not personal) information regarding the facilitation network in Greece, the modus operandi for transporting migrants to the point of departure, their transport over the Ionian Sea to the point of disembarkation on the Italian coast. The assessment concluded with concrete recommendations for the ICCs in Italy and Greece for the coordination of the air and maritime patrol schedules and the investigation of the facilitation network. 16 Biweekly Analytical Report Joint Operation Hermes 2014 Weeks 28 & 29 (7-20 Jul 2014), RAU/S2/DM/BS, Ref. 13110/2014 17 Biweekly Analytical Report Joint Operation Hermes 2014 Weeks 28 & 29 (7-20 Jul 2014), RAU/S2/DM/BS, Ref. 13110/2014 18 Analytical Warning for Operations - Latest Modus Operandi reported in Calabria, Warsaw, 30 June 2014, Reg. No 11364/2014, RAU-S2-EC/DAC 11/15

RAMB    LL 3.4    Results 3.4.1  Strategic Risk Analysis results The evidence collected in the case studies confirms that strategic risks analysis products serve as a basis for strategic and operational decisions that contribute to optimal allocation of resources for border checks and surveillance. Products such as ARA, AOD and FRAN Quarterly provide both Frontex and Member States with up-to-date information regarding the magnitude of threats and vulnerabilities at the external border and recommendations on how these can be mitigated. The risk analysis guides both the Agency and individual MS in their decision making process regarding the allocation of the resources at their disposal and increase the 3.4.2  Operational Risk Analysis results The evidence collected in the case studies confirms that operational risks analysis products serve as a basis for operational decisions that contribute to optimal allocation of resources for border checks and surveillance. In face of vast areas that need to be covered through surveillance and monitoring and the limited availability of human and technical resources, operational analysis products were assessed by all stakeholders to enable authorities to plan their operational activities strategically to target the areas and modi operandi that pose the biggest threat to the security of the external borders. 3.5    Horizontal issues The horizontal issue that emerged over the course of the analysis is the mandate of Frontex with regard to the processing of personal data collected during the debriefing activities in Joint Operations. Until 2011, Frontex was limited in what it could do with the data collected by its screeners and de-briefers. Under an amendment to the founding regulation in that year, however, Frontex was empowered to make much greater use of it. For example, information on a person suspected, by local border authorities, of being involved in cross-border crime, such as smuggling or trafficking, can be analysed and securely transmitted on a case-by-case basis to EU law enforcement agencies, including Europol. At the same time, this information must remain carefully protected, in line with European data protection legislation and Frontex’s duty to safeguard personal data. Frontex can also use personal data to enhance its own risk analyses, the results of which are depersonalised, and it is not permitted to conduct its own investigations, which remains a matter for member state police authorities. The final arrangements for implementing the infrastructure and procedure for the use of personal data are currently underway, but feedback from stakeholders is that additional 12/15

RAMB        LL legislative clarifications on the scope of the mandate of Frontex for working with personal data are needed. 4.          Analysis The table below provides an assessment of the evidence for each link in the contribution chain (as introduced in the beginning of the case study). Contribution element              Assessment/Conclusion                                  Validity IF    FX    develops      and     Documentary study and feedback from MS                 Strong evidence in manages       FRAN       AND      stakeholders confirmed that Frontex’s Risk Analysis    support    of   the develops and implements           Units (RAU) implements its activities on the basis of  assumption of the contribution chain CIRAM       AND      gathers      the CIRAM and manages the FRAN in an effective information from MS, EU           manner. bodies       and        other international organisations,          THEN actionable intelligence is available. IF actionable intelligence        Findings from the documentary study and concrete       Strong evidence in is      available        AND      examples offered by Frontex and MSs during             support    of   the incorporated             into     interviews confirmed that this contribution takes      assumption of the contribution chain strategic risk analysis,          place. More specifically: THEN       strategic      and         1) Joint Operations are planned on the basis of operational decisions are                 the strategic risk analysis produced by the made on the basis of                      Agency. evidence-based                        2) European cooperation in integrated border intelligence.                             management, through e.g. the decisions taken on the Frontex Programme of Work, are taken on the basis of the strategic risk analysis produced by the Agency IF actionable intelligence        Findings from the documentary study and concrete       Strong evidence in is      available        AND      examples offered by Frontex and MSs during             support    of   the incorporated             into     interviews confirmed that this contribution takes      assumption of the contribution chain Operational risk analysis         place. More specifically: AND these are used in                 1) Joint Operations are planned on the basis of the     development         of            strategic risk analysis Operational Plans, THEN               2) Joint Operations are implemented in line operational decisions are                 with the outputs of operational risk based on evidence-based                   analysis. intelligence. IF       strategic        and     Findings from the documentary study and concrete       Strong evidence in operational decisions are         examples offered by Frontex and MSs during             support    of   the made on the basis of              interviews confirmed that this contribution takes      assumption of the contribution chain evidence-based                    place. More specifically: intelligence THEN there               1) Strategic risk analysis enables MS and is optimal allocation of                  Frontex to direct their efforts to sections of resources      for    border              the external boarder most susceptible to 13/15

RAMB           LL checks and surveillance.                  irregular migration pressure. 2) Operational risk analysis enables the implementation of JO in the most cost- effective way. IF    there       is    optimal   The findings from the case study offered evidence         Strong evidence in allocation of resources           that high quality risk analysis contributes to the end    support      of  the for border checks and             goal of ensuring uniform level of control along the       assumption of the contribution chain surveillance              THEN    external boarder, but due to the dependency of this efficient        high       and   impact on multiple other activities and their results, uniform level of control          the magnitude of the contribution cannot be along       the        external   assessed. border is ensured AND bona-fide                border crossings are facilitated. 5.            Conclusions At activity level, the Agency has successfully developed and implemented the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model and developed processes and practices for collection of information from operational activities and from the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). These activities are run in a timely manner and produce high-quality outputs in the form of actionable intelligence. At outcome level, this intelligence is processed and presented in the form of strategic and operational risk analysis products which inform the strategic planning and operational implementation of border management activities along the external border of the EU. The evidence collected through this case study, in the form of concrete examples of causal links and qualitative assessments of the validity of these, provides a basis for confirming the assumption that the risk analysis activities of the agency ultimately lead to the efficient allocation of resources for border checks and surveillance and henceforth the achievement of efficient high and uniform level of control along the external border and facilitation of bona- fide border crossings. 6.            Annex      List of interviewees      Reference List 6.1           Lists of interviewees Table 1: List of Interviewees Name of Interviewee                  Position                       Organisation Denis Destrebecq                     Analyst                        Strategic Analysis Sector Risk Analysis Unit Frontex Antonio Saccone                      Head of Operational Analysis   Risk Analysis Unit • Operations Division Frontex 14/15

RAMB         LL Miguel Nicolau                     Operational Officer            Sea Border Sector Joint Operations Unit • Operations Division Michael Juritsch                   Controller                     Planning & Evaluation - Executive Support Frontex Paolo Casselini                    Intelligence Officer           Polizia di Stato Italy C.P. (Dirk) van den Broek          Dutch representative for the   Section Intelligence Frontex Risk Analysis Network  District for National and Global Operations Royal Netherlands Marechaussee The Netherlands Jussi Wacklin                      Finnish representative for the Risk Analysis Network Frontex                        Analyytikko Sisäministeriö Rajavartiolaitoksen esikunta Tilanne- ja riskianalyysikeskus Finland 6.2          Reference List    Frontex 2012, Guidelines for risk analysis units    Annual Risk Analysis 2014    Assessment of Operational Deployment 2015, Reg. No R098/2014,RAU/S2    FRAN Quarterly Q3/2014    Tactical Focussed Assessment on Irregular Migration towards the Italian Sea Borders of Apulia and Calabria (Ionian Sea) Warsaw, 21-05-2012, Reg. No 6956, RAU S2/EC/DM    Biweekly Analytical Report Joint Operation Hermes 2014 Weeks 28 & 29 (7-20 Jul 2014), RAU/S2/DM/BS, Ref. 13110/2014    Analytical Warning for Operations - Latest Modus Operandi reported in Calabria, Warsaw, 30 June 2014, Reg. No 11364/2014, RAU-S2-EC/DAC 15/15