Basis11620-KangarooGroupcontribution-consolidated-Redacted
Dieses Dokument ist Teil der Anfrage „meetings Safran Group since 2018“
Briefing for DG Guersent Meeting with the Kangaroo group 23 March 2021 In case of non-compliance with the prohibitions and obligations set out in the Regulation, there can be fines up to 10% of the gatekeeper’s total turnover. Also and as mentioned before, in case of systematic non-compliance, there is the possibility of imposing additional measures. The latter also includes structural measures as a last resort in cases where behavioural remedies cannot ensure effective compliance. Under the proposal, Member States will be consulted via an advisory committee prior to taking a decision. Moreover, Member States can also request a market investigation if at least three of them believe that the Commission should designate a provider of core platform services as a gatekeeper based on a qualitative assessment. 7. Future proofing Finally, we all know that these markets can move quickly – and that some of these gatekeepers can also be innovative when it comes to evading obligations. This is why the proposal also provides a future proofing mechanism to update the list of practices or core platform services by means of a market investigation. 8. Impact of the DMA on financial services After this introduction on DMA, I now address a question that may interest many of you: if and to what extent the DMA applies to financial services. In short, the answer is positive: the DMA will also have an effect on financial markets, many of which are sometimes also dependent on the presence of a gatekeeper in one of the core platform services. The financial services sector is an essential part of the digital economy. The digital transition of the EU economy is intrinsically linked to market evolution in the financial sector (the rise of cryptocurrencies, contactless payments, use of data analytics for product differentiation, credit score screening, trading etc.). While of course everything is subject to the discussions in Parliament and Council, the Commission proposal provides us with a number of elements allowing us to give you a general idea about the anticipated scope of application of DMA to this sector. a. The letter (and spirit) of the law To answer your question we have to - first and foremost -take a closer look at some of the key provisions of the DMA proposal. o While the list of “core platform services” does not explicitly mention financial services in the list in Article 2, recital 13 DMA clarifies that one of the listed services, i.e. “online intermediation services” (Art (2)(2)(a)) may cover financial services (“online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services; they may intermediate or be used to provide such services”). 5 Basis COMP/11620
Briefing for DG Guersent Meeting with the Kangaroo group 23 March 2021 o The DMA also provides guidance as regards the type of financial services which could qualify as CPS. Recital 13 DMA refers to Annex II of the Directive on Information Society Services (Directive (EU) 2015/1535). This Annex contains an indicative list, which includes financial services such as, investment services, insurance and reinsurance operations, banking services, operations relating to pension funds and services relating to dealings in futures or options. o Financial services may also fall under the regime of the DMA as so-called “ancillary services”. “Ancillary services” are services “provided in the context of or together with core platform services” (Article 2(14) DMA). o Also, under “ancillary services” the proposal explicitly mentions “payment services” and “technical services which support the provision of payment services”. As we all know, the provision of the latter is at times highly dependent on some of the core platform services to reach their users. The rationale for this inclusion is that gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their CPS to ancillary services. This may affect consumer choice and contestability of these ancillary services. Also recital 14 is very clear in this respect: “A number of other ancillary services, such as identification or payment services and technical services which support the provision of payment services, may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. As gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access, at least not subject to equal conditions, and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services, the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services, to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services.” b. So in light of this, what obligations will be relevant? Under the DMA different rules apply to CPS and ancillary services. CPS are subject to the directly applicable obligations for gatekeepers laid down in Articles 5 and 6 DMA. Whist Article 5 obligations are directly implementable, Article 6 obligations can require further specification with respect to their implementation. Ancillary services are not directly subject to the obligations but only to the extent mentioned, such as the interoperability requirement in Article 6(1)(f) DMA. It is clear that certain of the obligations in Article 5 and 6 may be of relevance, as regards the provision of financial services, and payment services in particular especially if they are provided via an app. Apart from the interoperability requirement in Article 6(1)(f), this includes for instance: o the prohibition to combine personal data from a CPS with personal data from other services offered by the gatekeeper (Art 5(a)), 6 Basis COMP/11620
Briefing for DG Guersent Meeting with the Kangaroo group 23 March 2021 o The possibility to uninstall preinstalled or side-load third party software (Arts. 6(1)(b) and (c)), o self-preferencing (Art. 6(1)(d)), and o fair, non-discriminatory access conditions to app stores (Art. 6(1)(k)). 9. Concluding remarks These are only my first thoughts on a very ambitious proposal, which is still to be discussed by the Council and Parliament. Regardless of what those discussions bring, it is clear that the DMA also aims to improve contestability in financial and payment markets. The proposal also reflects the reality that the boundaries between the digital and other sectors, such as the financial services sector have become increasingly blurred. Big Tech gatekeepers continuously expand their ecosystems into other adjacent sectors, while the financial services sector itself has also become increasingly digitalised. I would like to thank you for your attention and look forward to working with many of you on these files. Contact: 7 Basis COMP/11620