White_Paper_Dec_2019

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By 2015, Libya had become a main launching point for mixed migration® to
Europe along the so called ‘Central Mediterranean Route’. Currently, it is
still one of the main transit and departure points in terms of irregular
migration to Europe, but the numbers of migrants crossing to Europe has
alleviated.

A key point in the flow of irregular migrants towards the Libyan territory is
the direct contact with the ECOWAS treaty member countries, an area of
free movement of persons for more than 114 million inhabitants.
Furthermore, the whole of the Western and Central African area around
Libya has a total of 425 million inhabitants. The population of Horn of Africa
countries adds an additional 138 million persons. A significant proportion of
them are youth who could potentially exert dramatic demographic
pressure northward.

Irregular migration can legitimately be viewed as undermining the exercise
of state sovereignty, as Libya has the right to control who crosses its
borders and who is resident on its territory. The irregular migrants either
have crossed a border without authorisation, or remained or worked
without permission. For example, since 2011 substantial numbers of sub-
Saharan migrants continued to flow into Libya, some in search of
employment, and some to raise funds for their onward journey to Europe.

Failing to control and manage migration can undermine public confidence
in the integrity of Libyan government policy. In addition to the human
suffering caused to the victims of such crimes, organised crime networks
involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking pose a genuine
threat to law and order. This is compounded when such activities intersect
with the movement of illicit goods, including weapons and drugs. The
arrival of large numbers of migrants, especially from very different social
or cultural backgrounds, can also pose serious challenges to Libyan social
cohesion. This can have practical implications for the Libyan state, for
example, regarding the allocation of resources, for security, and also for
the models of social integration and national identity.

1.3 Current Border and Migration Management Institutions

The responsibility for border and migration management in Libya is shared
mainly by several ministries and their relevant administrations:

- The Ministry of Interior coordinates four main entities with border
and migration responsibilities: The General Administration for the
Security of Border Crossing Points; the General Administration for
Coastal Security; the Passport, Nationality and Foreigners Affairs
Authority; and the General Directorate for Combatting Illegal
Migration

® Mixed migration refers to cross-border movements of people including refugees fleeing
persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking and people seeking better lives and
opportunities.

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- The Ministry of Defence coordinates the Border Guards and the
Coast Guard and Port Security

- The Ministry of Finance coordinates the Customs Administration

- The Ministry of Transport, through the Port and Maritime Transport
Authority, administratively manages the air and sea ports of entry.

The above-mentioned entities are the main actors in the management of
the Libyan border, sometimes with overlapping mandates. There is also a
recognition of other ministries and their relevant entities which play a
supporting role in the broader border security and management system.

Staff figures mentioned in the described entities below are numbers of
personnel on respective pay-rolls. A great number of those have been
employed after 2011 and comes from the integration programme. It is
evident that many of the individuals have no sort of professional training
and proficiency.

1.3.1 General Administration for the Security of Border Crossing
Points (Mol)

GASBCP has the overall responsibility for security and protection of all
BCPs in Libya. It manages the BCPs and oversees the activities of other
authorities operating there.

The GASBCP headquarters is located in Tripoli, while each of the BCPs is
considered to be its own security directorate. Across the country there are
27 official international BCPs (9 land, 10 air, and 8 sea). However, some of
the BCPs along Libya’s southern border are closed either fully (two BCPs)
or closed partially i.e. closed to travellers other than Libyan citizens or
citizens of the relevant neighbouring country (three BCPs).

The GASBCP has approximately 3,850 employees. GASBCP staff
deployment appears to be partial; for example, personnel are not deployed
fully in the southwest region i.e. while staff are present, a full command
and control function is absent.

To achieve its role, GASBCP needs at least equipment and basic working
infrastructure. Moreover, training capacity, an increase of its situational
awareness, command and control, cooperation with both internal and
relevant external actors, information exchange, and uniform reporting is
required.

1.3.2 Passport, Nationality, and Foreigners Affairs Authority (Mol)

PNFAA is responsible for issuing passports, nationality, and the residence
status of foreigners in the country. It is in charge of border checks at all
air, land, and sea BCPs. PNFAA can carry out investigations on cases of
illegal border crossing at BCPs and overstay in Libya. Recently the PC/GNA

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signed an agreement with IOM to install the MIDAS? entry, exit and
migration management system initially at seven BCPs starting with Mitiga
and Misrata airports.

The organisational structure includes a headquarters in Tripoli, two
regional branches (Tripoli and Benghazi) and local offices throughout the
country, some of which are located at BCPs.

PNFAA has approximately 12,200 staff on their payroll. Reportedly, it is an
institution with almost full presence both in the west and east of the
country. Nevertheless, at some BCPs there is no PNFAA staff. Like many of
the Libyan border security and management institutions there is a need for
training of the personnel. Between 2017 - 2019 the Dutch Authorities,
facilitated by EUBAM Libya, delivered training on falsified and counterfeit
documents in which 57 PNFAA staff participated.

In terms of infrastructure, there is a general need for renovation and
refurbishment of buildings and offices, particularly at the BCPs. The PNFAA
needs equipment for document inspection, data registration systems,
communications, and also staff training.

1.3.3 General Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration (Mol)

DCIM was set up in 2012 as an emergency solution for detecting,
detaining, and investigating irregular migrants. In addition, it carries out
the return of migrants to their countries of origin and well as deportations.
DCIM is responsible for managing the RCs across Libya, which also serve
as detention centres, and continues to be its main activity at present.
Reportediy, when DCIM was set up in 2012 it also absorbed the so called
“Patrolling Department” of 5,000 staff. The patrolling department
previousiy had jurisdiction all over the country and was considered to be
an efficient law enforcement instrument until it was integrated into DCIM.

it is understood that DCIM controls only a few of the 24 officially
established RCs. Reportedly, there are a number of detention centres that
are operated illegally across the country.

DCIM staff are made up of by approximately 8,000 staff of both police (80
%) and civilian employees."

The infrastructure and management of the RCs needs serious
improvement, to ensure proper registration, screening, aid and humane
conditions for migrants, and to collaborate with other national authorities
and international organisations (e.g. UNHCR, Red Crescent, IOM etc.). The
mandate and area of responsibility of DCIM are in conflict and overlap with
those of PNFAA. It is recognised that PNFAA is the responsible entity to
ensure the enforcement of the law on foreigners and migration. This

® MIDAS isa on Information Data Analysis System” ge by om
t Hi

 

10 The er derived fra 2016.

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suggests a need to review the DCIM mandate and its implementation to
bring both in line with accepted standards, and to resolve the current
overlap.

1.3.4 General Administration for Coastal Security (Mol)

GACS is a law enforcement entity with maritime responsibility extended up
to 12 nautical miles in Libya’s territorial waters and 30 km inland along the
coastline. GACS is mandated to perform coastal patrolling and coastal land
surveillance to counter illegal activities in its area of responsibility,
including irregular migration. GACS has a responsibility to conduct search
and rescue at sea and, in appropriate cases, handing over migrants to
DCIM. It is also in charge of detecting violations of any administrative
regulations within the territorial waters and along the coastline.

GACS has five central departments and 10 operational regional sectors. At
the local level there are maritime stations but not all of them are
operational. Simple facilities, dispersed along the coast, are used for
operational purposes by regional sectors and maritime stations.

GACS has approximately 5,000 employees on the payroll, many of them
without specialised training. No training centre is currently operational,
nevertheless more than 100 staff for patrol boats of different sizes were
trained in cooperation with the Italian Ministry of Interior between 2017 -
2019. Moreover, in 2019, through the “Joint Pilot Project”, a joint venture
between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (“Frontex”), the
Italian Mol, and EUBAM-Libya, 24 staff received maritime training.

GACS lacks proper infrastructure and offices. The available maritime and
inland assets, such as boats, vehicles, and fixed technical means for
surveillance on land, are very limited. GACS’ maritime assets amount to
eight vessels of which three are in Tunisia for maintanence. Reportedly,
two of the five vessels in Libya are at present operational. Moreover, the
mandate and area of responsibility of GACS are in conflict and overlap
those of CGPS."! It is recognised that the CGPS is the responsible entity to
patrol the territorial waters and coastlines to ensure the enforcement of
the law and search and rescue. This suggest a need to review the GACS
mandate to resolve the current overlap.

1.3.5 Coast Guard and Port Security (MoD)

CGPS is responsible for ensuring the sovereignty of Libya within its
territorial waters, in accordance with national and international legislation.
The duties include surveillance of the national waters, fighting illegal

!! The overlap in mandates should be viewed in light of the history of the coast guard

moving between the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior. Prior to 1996 the coast
guard function was conducted solely by the Libyan navy. In 1996 the coast Guard was
created as a separate organisation under the Ministry of Defence. In 2005 the Coast
Guard was transferred to the Ministry of Interior but in 2008 it was returned to the MoD.
Atthe same time, the GACS, falling under the Ministry of Interior, was created.

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activities at sea (smuggling, illegal migration, pollution, fishing etc.), and
search and rescue.

The headquarters is located within the Libyan Navy premises at the Tripoli
harbour, while the CGPS Operational Maritime Centre (a joint operational
room), which coordinates all operational activities, is located in the Tripoli
city centre. In addition, the organisational structure of CGPS is made up of
six sectors, but there is no unified command and control for the western
and the eastern located sectors. A Maritime Rescue Centre is under
planning and its principal will probably be the Ministry of Communication.

CGPS has approximately 3,500 employees on the payroll. This total
includes staff who have not attended any maritime or law enforcement
training.

The maritime assets amount to nine bigger vessels, six ships and three
patrol boats, of which two ships are not operational due to maintanence
needs. Moreover, the coast guard have also a number of smaller inflatable
rubber boats.

Currently, none of the CGPS training centres are functional. Since 2012
some officers have been trained under the Libyan Navy and international
community programmes. For example, to date, 219 staff from CGPS has
been trained by EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia. However, a plan to re-start
the Naval Academy is in its drafting phase, with a proposed first focus to
be on officers who have never completed their training. It is unclear who
will be the future principal of the Academy, the Navy Chief of Staff or the
Ministry of Transport.

Due to the limited capacity of the CGPS, at present it only conducts partial
coast guard functions with a focus on search and rescue operations, which
are generally conducted in coordination with EU authorities and
international organisations.

1.3.6 Border Guards (MOD)

BG was established in 2006 and is the 5" branch of the Libyan armed
forces; however, it is both a para-military and a law enforcement
organisation in its nature. It is tasked to surveil the country’s land borders
and to contribute to securing the land BCPs. The military structure of the
BG should enable this organisation quickly to deploy staff in remote and
hostile environments and to ensure an adequate surveillance of Libya’s
borders.

BG headquarters is located in Tripoli. Organisationally, the BG is divided
into six border sectors, however, it faces challenges in exercising its
authority in some border regions. Each sector is supposed to have two to
three battalions depending on size and topography.

BG has two training facilities, of which one is currently operational.

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BG has approximately 18,000 commissioned and non-commissioned
officers and staff, including administrative functions, on the payroll.

BG is facing vast internal and external challenges. Internally, BG is
required to reorganise and redeploy their staff based on the current needs.
International standards and best practices suggest that the border guards
should be a law enforcement organisation under civilian command.
Moreover, they should be trained and equipped to face multifaceted risks,
threats and tasks (e.g. different types of smuggling, search and rescue in
the desert, care and processing of migrants etc.), and environments.

1.3.7 Customs Administration (MoF)

CA contributes to implementation of the economic policy of Libya, ensures
that revenue (taxes and fees) is collected, prevents the import and export
of illicit and restricted goods, and thereby contributes to the protection of
the public health and environment. CA has authority throughout the whole
territory of Libya.

The headquarters of the CA is located in Tripoli. CA is divided into general
directorates, offices, and nine regional customs houses.

CA has on the payroll approximately 16,000 employees (both customs
officers and civilians); of these, 9,000 were hired after the 2011 Libyan
revolution.

The infrastructure at the BCPs, which are used by CA, needs improvement.
More vehicles and IT equipment would better ensure efficient anti-
smuggling activities and the collection of customs duties. Improvements
are needed in the legislative and institutional framework, organisational
structure, and human resources. In this regard, the CA has developed a
business strategy in cooperation with EUBAM (2015 - 2020), which has
been approved by the Ministry of Finance and is still under implementation
in synergy with the White Paper process. The structure and the mandate of
the CA show that it is a complex institution, with an important role in
revenue collection. It is currently in a process of reassessment of its
legislative and institutional framework. The outcome of that reassessment
will influence the future of the CA’s role and position within Libya border
security and management.

1.3.8 Airport and Port Authority (MoT)

Two administrations under the Ministry of Transport have close links to
border security and management.

1.3.8.1 Port Authority

PA is responsible for all administrative issues at seaports, while the PNFAA,
CGPS, GACS and CA are the security operational bodies in charge at those
ports. Additionally, the PA has a role in developing international

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agreements regarding the territorial waters, contiguous zone and
economic zone, environment control, and implementation of ISPS Code.

The main tasks of the PA are planning and developing Libyan port and
maritime transport activities, regulating specific maritime activities in
Libyan ports, activating the country’s investment programmes in the ports,
and implementing training programmes. PA has around 700 staff.

1.3.8.2 Aviation Authority

AA, a subsidiary part of CAA, is responsible to implement, operate, and
manage infrastructure and local procedures in compliance with national
and international law and policy at all local and international airports in
Libya.'? They are tasked to ensure that safety procedures at airports are in
line with international standards (ICAO, IATA etc.) in coordination with
other relevant Libyan authorities.

AA operates from its headquarters in Tripoli. In the country there are 17
recognised airports (10 international, 7 local). AA has around 270 staff.

12 The responsibility for the development of national law and policy is the Aviation
Authority. In addition, the Aviation Authority represents Libya at international aviation
forums, where international legal and policy standards are developed and agreed.

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2. THE VISION OF REFORM
2.1 The Need for Reform

The process of reforming the area of border security and management
including migration governance is a comprehensive process that requires a
broad spectrum of change. These changes need to include structures,
legislation, practices, and procedures. The reform of the border institutions
requires a balanced approach between effectiveness, legitimacy,
performance, security, and a human rights centred approach. Operational
continuity must be upheld during the reform process itself, exploiting
existing professionalism and good practice, pending full implementation of
the reform.

2.1.1 Borders

Border security is a matter of national security for the Libyan state; secure
borders are a precondition for Libyan sovereignty, stability, and prosperity.
It is the responsibility and commitment of the Libyan state towards its
citizens and neighbouring countries to ensure that Libyan borders are
secure and no harmful activities are conducted across them. Secure
borders depend primarily on the ability of the Libyan state to enforce the
rule of law, to strengthen control over its borders, and to ensure that its
integrated border security concept is developed and implemented in a
free, democratic, and human rights-compliant manner.

In the context of the general policy of the Libyan government to
restructure and reform state institutions, special attention has been given
to reforming the area of border security and management. A number of
reasons underpin the urgency of this reform, as described below.

The threats and challenges across the Libyan borders have increased
dramatically since 2011. The revolutions and uprising in North Africa and
the Sahel region in 2011 have revealed and imposed a new reality directly
impacting regional security. The crises in the region have aggravated the
security challenges. Weapons have been proliferated, oftentimes to be
used by organised criminal networks and terrorists active across the
borders. The states of the region, including Libya, have to reassess the
entire security situation and review their strategies and plans to tackle
cross-border crime and terrorism in a more effective manner.

Libya has long borders with several unstable countries, which are not able
to exercise an acceptable level of border control. As a consequence, there
is more pressure on Libya to increase its efforts and allocate resources to
promote and advance border security cooperation with its neighbours. This
is particularly so with those countries who are not in a position to give
sufficient priority to their own border security. This heightens Libya’s need
and responsibility to strengthen its security at the Libyan frontier.

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Currently border security and management in Libya are shared
responsibilities between several ministries and their administrations, both
civilian and military. Some of the relevant agencies have overlapping
mandates. In this regard, an efficient level of coordination and co-
operation among the agencies responsible for border security and
management has proved difficult to achieve in practice.

The existing arrangement of border security and management agencies
and their overlapping mandates remains a significant obstacle for the
Libyan state to maintain effective control of its borders. The high number
of agencies responsible for border security and management also limits
the effective exercise of competencies and coordination, both on a regular
basis and in crisis situations. At the tactical and operational levels, the
agencies suffer from a lack of infrastructure, equipment, and internal
procedures to be able to respond properly to day-to-day tasks as well as
new requirements. The design of command and control and the whole
concept of operations must be re-evaluated. The remedy to these
obstacles will necessitate relevant legislation being reviewed. That review
should bring the existing (or new) legislation into line with international
standards and best practices of IBM to ensure effective organisation and
delivery of border security and management.

Human resources issues within the existing border security and
management organisations pose specific barriers to their effective
operation. Conservative estimates suggest that approximately 49,000
persons are currently on the payroll of border agencies. Overstaffing by
unqualified and non-trained staff hampers the effective management of
day-to-day operations. De-commissioning of staff who wish to return to
civilian life would allow greater focus to be placed on remaining staff,
through training, career development, and improved conditions of
employment. Recruitment of any new, qualified staff (including a suitable
vetting process of candidates), and their subsequent training, should lead
to developing greater specialisation and competence of the workforce as a
whole. An increased ratio of female staff in Libyan border and security
management organisations should improve the level of citizen-oriented
services and a human rights based approach, especially at border crossing
points, and at reception and detention centres, while significantly
improving the operational effectiveness. A clear and strict vetting
procedure and reassessment of staff, together with a new selection and
recruitment process, remains to be one of the main challenges for the
future.

In addition, improved integrated border security and management must be
paired with local and regional community development programmes,
which will directly and indirectly contribute to its overall sustainability.

Taking into account the above-mentioned challenges, it is obvious that the
security and management of Libya's national borders needs to be urgently

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addressed. Effective border security and management can only be
delivered against a clear and unified national vision of what the border
security system is required to achieve. Therefore, this paper has been
drafted in a flexible manner to allow future amendments and for its
recommendations to be adopted to reality. Further, a multi-year national
border security and management strategy should be developed to
establish effective and accountable border security and management
institutions. These institutions must uphold the rule of law, respect human
rights, and have the confidence of Libya’s people. Such a strategy should
ensure coherence of what is to be achieved, and how it will be delivered.
This requires a clear vision, aims and objectives, and consideration of the
institutional and legislative framework, policies and procedures, human
resources, training, communication and information exchange,
infrastructure, and equipment.

2.1.2 Migration

Libya faces an immense challenge from the flow of migrants into the
country, who, to a large extent, intend to use Libya as a transit route to
Europe. The influx of migrants and refugees into the country has
complicated an already fragile political situation and is among a number of
factors undermining the security, stability, and social wellbeing of the
Libyan state and society. These factors, including migration, need to be
addressed alongside the wider efforts to build a stable Libyan state.

Border security and migration are very much inter-related areas. In this
context, the NTBSM, in partnership with international organisations, has
been working on this issue; particularly through the migration governance
project “Strategic and Institutional Management of Migration in Libya” with
ICMPD. The institutional assessment developed within the project has
reconfirmed the viewpoint that an improvement of border security without
tackling the challenges in migration governance will significantly diminish
the effects of any reform.

The analysis of the various institutions involved in migration governance in
Libya has revealed a number of gaps and underline the urgency for
reform.

There is no common understanding or a unified vision of migration and
what needs to be included in a system of migration governance. This can
largely be attributed to the negative connotations attached to migration
within Libyan society. Migration today is perceived more bluntly as a
matter of national security. Less focus is placed on the nuanced issues of
migration governance including internal migration, integration and social
services, emigration of qualified workers, the diaspora, asylum etc. For
example, irregular migrants are regarded as illegal immigrants, which with
| existing legislation is considered a criminal offence. The Libyan Law

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