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assessment mission was conducted to Ethiopia, in the context of 2022 cessation of hostilities
agreement. The first implementation report on the EU approach to cultural heritage in conflicts and
crises was presented. The EU continued to be very active on conflict prevention and mediation.
The first Annual Report on EU Peace Mediation was prepared while the EU engaged in mediation
and dialogue support actions in more than 20 peace processes across the world, and continued
assessing conflict risks. It also consolidated peace partnerships on conflict prevention and mediation
with the UN and the OSCE and established new ones with the AU and ECOWAS. Joint Progress
Reports were presented on Climate Change, Defence and Security and on the Joint Communication
on EU strategic approach in support of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of former
combatants. The Secretariat of the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel continued
its work on strengthening the capabilities of the G5 Sahel states’ armed forces and the Sahel
Coalition.

2022 was the last full calendar year to implement the remaining commitments of the first Civilian
CSDP Compact. All Member States continued this effort, leading to increased contributions to
civilian CSDP missions, where the representation of women increased from 24% to 28% in 2022.
The EEAS has developed so-called mini-concepts to allow civilian CSDP missions to better address
non-traditional security challenges and a working arrangement between Frontex and EUCAP Sahel
Niger was signed in July 2022. In 2023, Member States, the EEAS and the Commission entered the
final phase of the new Civilian CSDP Compact, adopted during FAC in May 2023, fulfilling a key
task from the Strategic Compass.

In 2022, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability underwent a comprehensive reform
process in order to improve its role and capacity to command and control civilian CSDP missions
and enhance the civilian CSDP contribution to EU foreign policy capability. The reform process
reinforced CPCC’s operational, coordination and expert capacities. This will allow civilian CSDP to
step up its contribution to security sector reforms and crisis management around the world. The
reform is the first step towards building a real civilian headquarters, which will be capable of
ensuring fast deployment of missions, in line with the Strategic Compass objective of deploying
200 staff in 30 days in complex environments.

Important advances have been made when it comes to space security and defence. In March 2023,
the High Representative and the Commission adopted the first EU Space Strategy for Security and
Defence. It will allow the EU to protect its space assets, defend its interests, deter hostile activities
in space and strengthen its strategic posture and autonomy. The work of the EU Satellite Centre has
gained renewed importance in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including by
providing geo-spatial intelligence.

The implementation of the 2020 Joint Cybersecurity Strategy progressed well, with the objective
to increase resilience and show leadership in cyberspace and strengthen capacities to prevent, deter
and respond to cyber-attacks. The Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox has seen multiple applications while
the work to revise its implementing guidelines continued. The EEAS hosted the second like-minded
exercise on cyber deterrence and policy responses and strengthened partnerships, including through
its cyber capacity building efforts. The High Representative and the European Commission


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presented a Joint Communication on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence in November 2022, thus
completing the EU’s full-spectrum approach to prevention, deterrence and response to malicious
cyber activities and cyber threat actors. It enables further investments in modern and interoperable
armed forces and technologies, enhances existing partnerships and allows the EU to build cyber
defence capabilities and strengthen shared situational awareness. The EEAS advanced work to
make the EU better able to detect, prevent and respond to hybrid threats. By the end of 2022, the
EU Hybrid Toolbox was established to bring together all the relevant internal and external tools for
responding and countering hybrid threats and campaigns in a more coordinated and coherent
manner.

The EU continued to reinforce its role in countering terrorism (CT) and preventing/countering
violent extremism (P/CVE). It did so as a donor of capacity-building projects around the world and
as a norm setter, promoting a rights-based and whole-of-society approach to CT-P/CVE within the
multilateral structures. This included coordinating a joint EU position in the biannual review of the
UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which is expected to be finalised by mid/late-June 2023. The
EU worked closely with third countries and international organisations, including through dedicated
Counter Terrorism Dialogues and cooperation on the ground, facilitated also through its Network of
Counterterrorism/Security Experts deployed in 20 EU Delegations. In September 2022, the EU took
over the co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), steering the work of the Forum in
line with its mandate and the EU’s vision for a rights-based and comprehensive approach, first
alongside Morocco and since March 2023 together with Egypt. The EU also continued to actively
participate in meetings of the Global Coalition against Da’esh, sharing its experience and
coordinating on stabilisation efforts.

The increasing strain on the global disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control
architecture was further amplified in 2022 in the wake of the Russian war of aggression against
Ukraine. EU efforts throughout the year focussed on upholding and strengthening the relevant
multilateral instruments and institutions, including through strong positions at notably the 10th
Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 77th UN General Assembly, and
the 9th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. On 21 March 2022,
the Council adopted Conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons
Convention. In 2022, the EU also launched a review process of Common Position 2008/944
defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. The EU
continued to provide significant political and financial support in 2022, including through 8
dedicated new CFSP Council Decisions on projects for an accumulated value of EUR 25,4 million
in support of its non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control priorities.

(4)    PRIORITIES FOR 2023

It is in the EU’s shared interest to deliver on the EU perspective of the Western Balkans. This
should include advancing in accession negotiations with Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia
and Serbia based on the implementation of EU-related commitments; encouraging full alignment
with CFSP, including on positions and restrictive measures taken following the Russian aggression
against Ukraine, implementing the Agreement on the Path to Normalization between Kosovo and


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Serbia and all past Dialogue agreements; supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina in advancing political
reforms in view of fulfilling the 14 Key Priorities laid out in the Commission Opinion on its EU
membership application. We should further enhance cooperation on CFSP/CSDP with the region,
based on a common vision of geopolitical challenges.

Looking forward, the EU is ready to engage with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible
manner in a number of areas of common interest, subject to the established conditionalities set out
in March 2021 and previous European Council Conclusions and to support all-encompassing
regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The EU remains committed to constructive cooperation with our Arctic partners, including
indigenous peoples, as well as other interested parties.

Based on the constructive experience of EU-UK cooperation on countering Russia’s war of
aggression against Ukraine, and following internal reflections in both the EU and the UK, informal
consultations on various topics are taking place with a view to deepening cooperation in areas of
mutual interest in the field of foreign, security and defence policy.

In response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and in coordination with its partners, the
EU continues to implement its war-time approach to Russia: to isolate Russia internationally, to
impose sanctions, to ensure accountability, to support our neighbours and global partners in
addressing the impact of the war and to enhance our own resilience. The EU will continue to
support Russian civil society, human rights defenders and independent media inside and outside
Russia.

The Eastern neighbourhood is the region most immediately exposed to Russian aggression and
will likewise remain a major focus of our work. We are following up on the outcome of the Eastern
Partnership Annual Foreign Affairs Ministerial of 2022 and the Senior Officials Meeting of 2023.
The Eastern partnership (EaP) multilateral cooperation will be implemented in an adjusted format,
and will continue, in parallel to the enlargement track, as envisaged by the EaP Annual Work Plan
for 2023.

In addition to our unwavering and massive support to Ukraine in resisting the Russian aggression,
the EU will remain committed to facilitate efforts of conflict resolution and peace-building in the
Eastern neighbourhood. The EU will also continue to support the right of the Belarusian people to
choose their own future and their democratic aspirations.

Central Asian states can count on the EU support when it comes to their efforts at preserving their
independence and sovereignty as well as progress on regional cooperation. The EU will aim to sign
the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with Kyrgyzstan, finalize
preparatory work towards signing the EPCA with Uzbekistan and rapidly progress in the on-going
negotiations of an EPCA with Tajikistan. It will also reinforce economic relations through a
dedicated Investment Forum, building on the outcomes of the second EU-Central Asia Economic


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Forum in Almaty (Kazakhstan) in May 2023, chaired by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis,
and political relations building on the second meeting between the President of the European
Council and the Heads of State leaders of all five Central Asian countries in June 2023.

Our cross-cutting priority in the Middle East and North Africa will be to address the
geopolitical consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and especially its political,
economic, strategic communication and diplomatic impacts. As the region is heavily targeted by
Russian foreign information manipulation and interference, it is important to demonstrate that the
EU remains engaged and active with its Southern partners and the Gulf and does not shy away from
its responsibilities.

Further developments in this regard will be of great importance in terms of other actors’ policy,
including the EU’s. Apart from helping countries in the region mitigate these existential issues,
building a comprehensive regional EU policy, fully integrating the EU’s global priorities, notably
the green deal/transition, the Global Gateway and the Strategic Compass/CSDP, will be a
priority for the EU. The EU shall also strive to reinforce its role in addressing ongoing crises and
conflicts and contribute to stabilisation processes in the region, using the full range of EU tools –
from diplomatic, economic, development and humanitarian approaches up to civilian and military
crisis management. Another key emphasis of our work will lie in deepening of the EU’s partnership
with the Gulf States, in line with the Joint Communication adopted on 18 May 2022. The
appointment of the EUSR for the Gulf and the proposed establishment of a structured EU-GCC
Security Dialogue will enhance the EU engagement in the region. Further action regarding a review
of the role, functioning and efficiency of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) will be done in
2023, together with the Jordanian Co-Chair and the UfM Secretariat. The EU will also continue its
work with the League of Arab States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for reviving the Middle East
peace efforts.

The EU will continue to follow the domestic and human rights situation in Iran as well as its
unacceptable military support to Russia, taking into account all options at its disposal, including
additional restrictive measures. The diplomatic engagement on the JCPoA and contributing to
regional cooperation in the Gulf will remain at the top of the EU’s agenda.

The African continent is of key strategic importance to the EU. We will strengthen and deepen
EU-Africa relations, with a focus on following up on the commitments of the 2022 AU-EU Summit
and through deepening AU-EU engagement on multilateralism. Delivering on concrete projects of
mutual interest through the implementation of the EU-Africa “Global Gateway” Investment
Package is critical to positioning the EU as the partner of choice for transformative projects
implemented under a responsible and sustainable partnership approach. The EU will pursue
geographic priorities on the regional level - focusing on the implementation of regional strategies on
the Sahel region and coastal countries, the Great Lakes region, and the Horn of Africa - and on the
bilateral level, focusing on key African partners with potential for deepened relations: Ghana,
Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa. To increase our footprint on the continent, the EU



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will strengthen its strategic communication towards key target audiences in Africa, particularly in
the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine.

In an age of increasing instability and geopolitical competition, the Indo-Pacific region is of key
strategic importance for the EU. In 2023, the EU will continue the implementation of both the Indo-
Pacific Strategy and the Global Gateway. About 25 Global Gateway flagship projects have been
launched and will be implemented across the Indo-Pacific during 2023 and beyond. We continue to
contribute to the stabilisation of the volatile security environment in Asia, with particular attention
on security of global supply chains (e.g. semiconductors). Following up to COP27 is a key concern
in the entire region, and the EU will enhance its partnerships with countries keen on stepping up
cooperation on topics such as deforestation and phasing out or down of coal. Afghanistan and
Myanmar will remain at the centre of our humanitarian efforts in the region.

The EU will continue the recalibration of its strategy vis-à-vis China, carefully articulating work on
strengthening resilience and de-risking, with robust and realist engagement with China. This will
be pursued through the consolidation of EU unity, focusing on the need to manage this complex
relationship, though: engaging while standing firm on EU’s principles, values and interests;
increasing resilience and addressing risks linked to excessive dependencies; and working with
partners.

The transatlantic partnership remains a key pillar of Euro-Atlantic security and of a rules-based
based international order, underpinned by multilateralism and democratic values. The EU will
continue to work with the US and Canada to sustain a united and closely coordinated response to
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including support to the future re-construction, while
addressing the wider geopolitical implications. The EU will continue to engage closely with both
partners to make progress on key shared foreign policy files, including on our respective
relationships with China, on the Indo-Pacific, Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhood, as well
as on Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Building on recent progress, cooperation on
security and defence will continue to deepen, and the EU will work to advance transatlantic trade
and investment, economic security and reinforcing the resilience of value chains in critical areas,
including under the EU-US Trade and Technology Council. The EU will continue to partner with
the US and Canada to ensure coordination at the G7 and G20, to work on ambitious outcomes in the
COP 28 climate conference and work towards establishing a green alliance and digital partnership
with Canada. The EU will engage with stakeholders across the political spectrum, solidify existing
mechanisms and work streams, to ensure that the transatlantic partnership remains durable.

2023 will be a key year for relaunching relations between the EU and Latin American and the
Caribbean. In June, the HR/VP and the Commission will issue a Joint Communication to the EP
and the Council ‘Towards a New Agenda for EU-Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
Relations’. The EU-CELAC Summit, to be held in Brussels on 17-18 July 2023, will be a political
milestone for renewing and recalibrating the bi-regional relationship in the changing geopolitical
context. The President of the Commission is scheduled to visit four countries in the region:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The key objectives of her visit will be to show the EU’s


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interest in revitalising relations, to set the stage for a successful summit and to make progress on the
pending agreements with the region. ‘The EU will continue its active support to the peace process
in Colombia in the context of the “Total Peace” initiative of President Petro, as well as efforts to
bring a peaceful and democratic solution to the crisis in Venezuela, while addressing the
humanitarian fall-out and the migration crisis. The reinvigoration of relations with Brazil should
allow the holding of an EU-Brazil Summit at the end of 2023 or in early 2024. The EU will
continue efforts to advance towards the finalisation of the modernisation of the EU-Mexico Global
Agreement, to successfully conclude the negotiations related to the EU-Mercosur Agreement and to
accelerate the signature and ratification of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement.
Executive Vice-President Timmermans is expected to visit Barbados, Guyana and Suriname in June
2023. The EU will continue to support efforts to promote democracy, stability and dialogue in Peru,
Ecuador and Bolivia.

Regarding multilateral relations, three priorities have been identified in the coming year. First, to
accelerate implementation of the 2030 Agenda and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). A key occasion for this will be the SDG Summit, to be held in New York on 18 September
2023. The EU will work collectively to ensure a successful outcome covering important issues
including ‘financing for development’, reform of the multilateral development banks and the UN
development system, as well as effective action on climate change, biodiversity and global health.
Second, the EU will contribute to efforts to strengthen global governance through ‘Our Common
Agenda’. This will involve work on initiatives such as the ‘New Agenda for Peace’, the ‘Global
Digital Compact’, the ‘Emergency Platform’, and the report of the High-Level Advisory Board,
making a strong connection from the SDG Summit to the Summit of the Future due to be held in
2024. Third, the EU is committed to renewing and building its partnerships with the whole of the
UN membership, including those countries most affected by climate change. This will involve more
active and sustained outreach to partner countries to promote truly inclusive multilateralism.

The EU will also continue its multifaceted engagement in other areas at the multilateral level. When
it comes to supporting human rights and democracy, the EU will further strengthen its human
rights and democracy action under the 2020-2024 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy
and continue developing a Framework for Business and Human Rights to ensure strong coherence
of our policies on responsible business conduct, in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights.

The EU will continue with its electoral observation activities where conditions allow and if
invited by national authorities with possible missions under consideration in Liberia, the Maldives,
Zimbabwe, Bangladesh and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The EU remains committed to
supporting and engaging with government authorities, political actors and civil society
organisations of partner countries to implement the missions’ recommendations. In this light,
Electoral Follow-up Missions will be organised in countries where Election Observation Missions
have been deployed in the last couple of year.




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In June 2023, work will start on identifying Global Gateway flagships for 2024. In the meantime,
at the EU-CELAC Summit on 17-18 July the EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda is to be
announced. There is also a plan to identify joint projects under the Connectivity Partnerships with
Japan and India as deliverables of the planned EU-Japan and EU-India Summits in 2023. In terms
of governance, the first meeting of the Global Gateway Business Advisory Group and the second
meeting of the Global Gateway Board are expected towards the end of 2023. When it comes to
communication, a high-level Global Gateway Forum hosted by President von der Leyen is planned
in the fourth quarter of 2023.

The EEAS will further develop digital diplomacy as an integral part of the EU foreign and security
policy, including relevant bilateral and multilateral engagements, responding to the digital
challenges through the promotion of European values and standards, and through regulation and
international partnerships.

The EEAS will continue outreach to promote global support and action towards a sustainable
green transition around the world. Regarding climate diplomacy guided by the Conclusions on
climate and energy diplomacy of March 2023, strengthened coordination and joint outreach with
EU Member States will continue, via both capitals and EU Delegations. Actions focused on
promoting accession to the UN Water Convention, the swift ratification of the BBNJ Treaty and the
implementation of the Global Biodiversity Framework will continue. We will engage with our
partners on the new EU Deforestation Regulation and in the ongoing negotiations for a future
Global Treaty on Plastics.

On energy diplomacy, the EEAS will prioritise outreach in the areas of the global energy
transition (through the Joint Energy Transition Partnerships, the Equitable Framework and Finance
for Extractive-based Countries in Transition), of the Energy Efficiency First initiative and of
Ukraine’s energy system reconstruction and EU’s gas diversification. The implementation of the
Just Energy Transition Partnerships, in particular with Vietnam and South Africa will continue.

On economic issues, the EEAS will continue to actively support the external dimension of the EU
Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism financing policies. With economic issues being
increasingly tied to security, the new Joint Communication on Economic security will be a key
aspect of foreign policy and of our relations with partner countries.

The EEAS will further contribute to the formulation, concrete operationalisation and development
of actions and funding under the external dimension of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in the
priority areas identified for specific countries. In the overall context of crisis situations, the EEAS
will also continue to proactively address the instrumentalisation of migrants through active
diplomatic engagement in selected third countries.

To further engrain gender equality, diversity and inclusion in EU political dialogues and
diplomacy, the EEAS will continue to reinforce its efforts to enhance gender mainstreaming and
gender responsive leadership as well as to implement the Agenda for Diversity and Inclusion. The


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EEAS will also continue actively with the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security
(WPS) commitments, leveraging further collaboration jointly with the EU Member States on WPS.

The past months have shown that information manipulation and interference have become part
of the arsenal that actors like Russia and China use in a strategic and coordinate manner to
destabilise countries across the globe, weaken international cooperation and threaten democracy and
security. These actors do not just target the European Union, the G7 countries or NATO, but as we
have seen with Russia’s attempts to manipulate and interfere in the debates around food insecurity,
it is a global threat. Such activity, the use of manipulative tactics, techniques and procedures to
distort and manipulate people for their own purpose, needs to be challenged by the international
community dedicated to uphold universal values and international law. While in most cases not
illegal, such manipulation has a harmful effect and should not be considered a legitimate instrument
in the foreign policy of a state. The EEAS will continue its discussions with international partners
and stakeholders to develop international principles on FIMI and information integrity. This is also
connected to the EEAS engagement with the United Nations on Global Code of Conduct for
Information Integrity, which aims to outline what is legitimate and illegitimate state behaviour in
the information environment.

In view of the new threat environment and growing number of security and consular crises facing
the EU, the EEAS will review and strengthen the EU’s crisis response processes. The creation and
ongoing setting-up of the EEAS Crisis Response Centre (CRC) is a key part of this effort and it is
essential that sufficient resources be allocated to this task.

Looking to the year ahead, the aim is to reinforce the security of EU Delegations in critical
locations, reflecting the evolving nature of threats; enhance crisis preparedness through tailored
trainings and exercises for both HQ and Delegation staff; turn the EU Situation Room into a 24/7
situational awareness and information hub in crises; and strengthen coordination with Member
States and partners’ crisis structures.

The EU will continue and accelerate the implementation of the Strategic Compass across all work-
strands. Continuing and increasing military support to Ukraine will remain a key priority. The EU
looks forward to an increased and strengthened European Peace Facility to not only support
Ukraine but also partners around the world as well as military CSDP missions. Existing and
upcoming military and civilian CSDP missions will be implemented and designed with a more
flexible, robust and partnerships-based approach. The EEAS will continue work on making the
Rapid Deployment Capacity fully operational by 2025, on strengthening the Military Planning
and Conduct Capability (MPCC), on reflecting on the scope and definition of common costs, and on
delivering the first ever EU live exercise in 2023.

On space, work will continue to implement the Space Strategy for Security and Defence and to
ensure the strengthening of the EU Satellite Centre to support decision-making political and
operational levels through geospatial analysis. On countering terrorism, the EU will seek to steer
efforts of the Global Counterterrorism Forum in particular to help tackle the scourge of terrorism in


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the countries facing the greatest risk, in particular in Africa. The EU will also aim to expand the
Network of CT/Security Experts in key posts to support this effort and advance the EU’s priorities.
Regarding disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control the EU will sustain efforts to
maintain the effectiveness and functioning of the existing architecture, including in the context of
the 11th review cycle for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Increased dialogue and consultation
on non-proliferation and disarmament issues with like-minded partners will continue while
internally, the EU will reflect on how arms export controls could address emerging challenges, to be
reflected in amendments in current legal framework scheduled for adoption in late 2024.

The EEAS will work towards the adoption by the Council of a revised EU Maritime Security
Strategy and Action Plan, on the basis of the Joint Communication presented in March 2023. After
the application of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea and in the
Northwest Indian Ocean, the EU should assess the opportunity of establishing new Maritime Areas
of Interest in other regions. The EU will also seek to conduct more joint naval exercises with
partners.

The EEAS is working on a pilot action to facilitate exchanges on countering hybrid threats with
partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Work on the establishment of the EU Hybrid Rapid Response
Teams will continue in 2023. Work will continue on advancing the common understanding of the
mutual assistance clause (art. 42.7 TEU) and on a Cyber Posture. Continued implementation of
the Cyber Posture is foreseen together with the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’ revised implemented
guidelines while continuing dedicated dialogues with partners. The implementation of the new
Civilian Compact will be pursued. It should ensure these missions have a real and tangible impact
and are able to swiftly adapt their tasks if so required. Tailored security and defence partnerships
with bilateral, international and regional partners will be further strengthened and developed, on the
basis of shared values and interests. The EU will seek to reinforce the operational dimension of
such cooperation. The second edition of the Schuman Security and Defence Forum in 2024 will also
be prepared.


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