Nachrichten für Luftfahrer 2021 Teil 2 (weicht ggf. von Druckversion ab)
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sending information directly to the manager of the certification office, send it to the attention of the
person identified in Related Information.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a
principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district
office.
(h) Related Information
(1) For more information about this AD, contact Paul Rau, Aviation Safety Engineer, Wichita
ACO Branch, FAA, 1801 Airport Road, Wichita, KS 67209; phone: (316) 946-4149; fax: (316) 946-
4107; email: paul.rau@faa.gov or Wichita-COS@faa.gov.
(2) For service information identified in this AD contact Garmin International, Garmin Aviation
Support 1200 E. 151st Street, Olathe, KS 66062; phone: (866) 739-5687; website:
https://fly.garmin.com/fly-garmin/support/. You may also view this service information at FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust St., Kansas City, MO 64106.
For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (816) 329-4148.
Issued on April 7, 2021.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2021-07422 Filed 4-9-21; 8:45 am]
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Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisung Luftfahrt-Bundesamt
- Sachgebiet T12 -
D-2021-132 38144 Braunschweig
EASA AD 2021-0126 vom 10.05.2021 Fax: +49-531-2355-5197
email: AD@LBA.de
LEONARDO 19.05.2021
Betroffenes Luftfahrtgerät:
Art des Luftfahrtgerätes: Drehflügler
Inhaber der Musterzulassung: LEONARDO S.p.A.
Hersteller: AgustaWestland S.p.A.,
vormals Agusta S.p.A., Agusta un’azienda di Finmeccanica S.p.A., Costruzioni
Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta
Muster: AB212 / AB412
Baureihen: AB212, AB412 und AB412EP
Werknummern: Alle
Gerätenummer: 3064, EASA.R.114
Revisionsstand:
Originalausgabe
Airworthiness Directive der ausländischen Behörde:
EASA AD 2021-0126 vom 10.05.2021
Genannte Airworthiness Directives unter dieser Rubrik, die nicht durch die EASA herausgegeben worden sind,
wurden durch die EASA über die Entscheidung Nr. 2019/018/ED übernommen und sind somit ebenfalls Airworthin-
ess Directives der EASA.
Die genannte Airworthiness Directive wird im Luftfahrt-Bundesamt unter der Nummer 2021-132 geführt.
Betrifft:
(ATA 28 / 79) Fuel / Oil - Check Valves - Inspection / Replacement
Anmerkungen:
Gemäß der EU Verordnung Nr. 1321/2014, Anhang I, Teil M, Unterabschnitt C, M.A.301 5.i) und M.A.303 dür-
fen Luftfahrzeuge nach dem in der Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisung angegebenen Termin nur in Betrieb genom-
men werden, wenn die angeordneten Maßnahmen ordnungsgemäß durchgeführt worden sind.
Die Europäische Agentur für Flugsicherheit (EASA) hat die oben referenzierte Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisung
EASA AD 2021-0126 vom 10.05.2021 herausgegeben oder per Entscheidung Nr. 2019/018/ED übernommen.
Gemäß § 14 Abs. 2 der Betriebsordnung für Luftfahrtgerät (LuftBO) sind diese Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisun-
gen direkt in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gültig und bedürfen keiner Umsetzung durch das Luftfahrt-
Bundesamt.
Mit Hilfe dieser Übersichtsseite veröffentlicht das Luftfahrt-Bundesamt ebenfalls die über § 14 Abs. 2 direkt
gültigen Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisungen der EASA in den Nachrichten für Luftfahrer und im Internet unter
www2.LBA.de/LTAs/. Dieser Service dient reinen Informationszwecken und liegt keinem Verwaltungsver-
fahren zu Grunde. Rechtsmittel sind damit ausgeschlossen.
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EASA AD No.: 2021-0126
Airworthiness Directive
AD No.: 2021-0126
Issued: 10 May 2021
Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with
Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the
European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that
Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.301,
the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to
which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014
Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Article 71 exemption].
Design Approval Holder’s Name: Type/Model designation(s):
LEONARDO S.p.A. AB212 and AB412 helicopters
Effective Date: 24 May 2021
TCDS Number(s): EASA.R.114
Foreign AD: Not applicable
Supersedure: None
ATA 28 / 79 – Fuel / Oil – Check Valves – Inspection / Replacement
Manufacturer(s):
AgustaWestland S.p.A., formerly Agusta S.p.A., Agusta un’azienda di Finmeccanica S.p.A.,
Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta
Applicability:
AB212, AB412 and AB412EP helicopters, all serial numbers (s/n).
Definitions:
For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:
The applicable ASB: Leonardo Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 212-211 (fuel check valve), ASB 212-212
(oil check valve), ASB 412-166 (fuel check valve) and ASB 412-167 (oil check valve), as applicable.
Affected part: Oil check valves, having Part Number (P/N) 209-062-520-1, and fuel check valves,
having P/N 209-062-607-1, manufactured by Circor Aerospace (marked “Circle Seal”), which exceed
the dimensions specified in Part I of the applicable ASB, except those which have a “TQL” marking
(identifying the use of the correct torque level).
Serviceable part: Any oil or fuel check valve, eligible for installation, which is not an affected part.
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An agency of the European Union
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EASA AD No.: 2021-0126
Groups:
Group 1 helicopters are those that have one or more affected part(s) installed.
Group 2 helicopters are those that do not have an affected part installed.
Reason:
An occurrence was reported where, due to the application of an incorrect torque level during the
assembly process, certain oil and fuel check valves are susceptible to cracking, which may lead to
fuel or oil leakage.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to a lack of engine lubrication and/or
loss of fuel supply to the engine, possibly resulting in uncommanded engine in-flight shut-down
or fire and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
To address this potential unsafe condition, Leonardo published the applicable ASB, as defined in this
AD, providing inspection and replacement instructions.
For the reason described above, this AD requires repetitive inspections and removal from service of
the affected parts, as defined in this AD. This AD also prohibits (re)installation of affected parts.
Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):
Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:
Inspection(s):
(1) Within 25 flight hours (FH) or 3 months, whichever occurs first after the effective date of this
AD, inspect the helicopter in accordance with the instructions of Part I of the applicable ASB to
determine if the helicopter is Group 1 or Group 2, as defined in this AD.
(2) For Group 1 helicopters: Before next flight after the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of
this AD, and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 25 FH or 3 months, whichever occurs first,
inspect each affected part in accordance with the instructions of Part II of the applicable ASB.
Corrective Action(s):
(3) For Group 1 helicopters: If, during any inspection as required by paragraph (2) of this AD, any
crack is found on an affected part, as identified in the applicable ASB, before next flight, replace
that affected part with a serviceable part in accordance with the instructions of Part III of the
applicable ASB.
Replacement:
(4) For Group 1 helicopters: Within 300 FH or 12 months, whichever occurs first after the
inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, replace each affected part with a serviceable
part in accordance with the instructions of Part III of the applicable ASB.
Terminating Action:
(5) Replacement on a helicopter of each affected part with a serviceable part, as required by
paragraph (3) or (4) of this AD, as applicable, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive
inspections as required by paragraph (2) of this AD for that helicopter.
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An agency of the European Union
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EASA AD No.: 2021-0126
Part(s) Installation:
(6) For Group 1 and Group 2 helicopters: From the effective date of this AD, do not install an
affected part on any helicopter.
Ref. Publications:
Leonardo S.p.A. ASB 212-211 original issue dated 30 March 2021.
Leonardo S.p.A. ASB 212-212 original issue dated 30 March 2021.
Leonardo S.p.A. ASB 412-166 original issue dated 30 March 2021.
Leonardo S.p.A. ASB 412-167 original issue dated 30 March 2021.
The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned documents is acceptable for
compliance with the requirements of this AD.
Remarks:
1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative Methods of
Compliance for this AD.
2. Based on the required actions and the compliance time, EASA have decided to issue a Final AD
with Request for Comments, postponing the public consultation process until after publication.
3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section,
Certification Directorate. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.
4. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be
similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD, and which may occur, or have occurred on
a product, part or appliance not affected by this AD, can be reported to the EU aviation safety
reporting system. This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than
those covered by the design to which this AD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or
may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be
installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate
(STC) or other modification.
5. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please
contact: Leonardo S.p.A. Helicopters, Customer Support & Services, Product Support
Engineering & Licenses DPT, Via Giovanni Agusta 520, 21017 Cascina Costa di Samarate (VA) –
Italy, Tel.: +39 0331 711429, Fax: +39 0331 915145,
E-mail: absereng.AW@leonardocompany.com.
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Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA-Internet/Intranet.
An agency of the European Union
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Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisung Luftfahrt-Bundesamt
- Sachgebiet T12 -
D-2021-133 38144 Braunschweig
FAA AD 2021-07-17 - Amdt. 39-21494 Fax: +49-531-2355-5197
email: AD@LBA.de
BOEING 19.05.2021
Betroffenes Luftfahrtgerät:
Art des Luftfahrtgerätes: Flugzeug
Inhaber der Musterzulassung: The Boeing Company
Hersteller: The Boeing Company
Muster: BOEING 737
Baureihen: 737-900ER
Werknummern: Alle
Gerätenummer: EASA.IM.A.120, FAA TCDS A16WE
Revisionsstand:
Originalausgabe
Airworthiness Directive der ausländischen Behörde:
FAA AD 2021-07-17 - Amdt. 39-21494
Genannte Airworthiness Directives unter dieser Rubrik, die nicht durch die EASA herausgegeben worden sind,
wurden durch die EASA über die Entscheidung Nr. 2019/018/ED übernommen und sind somit ebenfalls Airworthin-
ess Directives der EASA.
Die genannte Airworthiness Directive wird im Luftfahrt-Bundesamt unter der Nummer 2021-133 geführt.
Betrifft:
(ATA 24) Electrical Power - Main Landing Gear Wheel Well Electrical Connectors - Inspection
Anmerkungen:
Gemäß der EU Verordnung Nr. 1321/2014, Anhang I, Teil M, Unterabschnitt C, M.A.301 5.i) und M.A.303 dür-
fen Luftfahrzeuge nach dem in der Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisung angegebenen Termin nur in Betrieb genom-
men werden, wenn die angeordneten Maßnahmen ordnungsgemäß durchgeführt worden sind.
Die Europäische Agentur für Flugsicherheit (EASA) hat die oben referenzierte Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisung
FAA AD 2021-07-17 - Amdt. 39-21494 herausgegeben oder per Entscheidung Nr. 2019/018/ED übernommen.
Gemäß § 14 Abs. 2 der Betriebsordnung für Luftfahrtgerät (LuftBO) sind diese Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisun-
gen direkt in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gültig und bedürfen keiner Umsetzung durch das Luftfahrt-
Bundesamt.
Mit Hilfe dieser Übersichtsseite veröffentlicht das Luftfahrt-Bundesamt ebenfalls die über § 14 Abs. 2 direkt
gültigen Lufttüchtigkeitsanweisungen der EASA in den Nachrichten für Luftfahrer und im Internet unter
www2.LBA.de/LTAs/. Dieser Service dient reinen Informationszwecken und liegt keinem Verwaltungsver-
fahren zu Grunde. Rechtsmittel sind damit ausgeschlossen.
27.05.2021
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[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 74 (Tuesday, April 20, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 20445-20448]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-08058]
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2019-1071; Project Identifier AD-2019-NM-165-AD; Amendment 39-21494;
AD 2021-07-17]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company
Model 737-900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of significant corrosion of
electrical connectors located in the main landing gear (MLG) wheel well. This AD requires repetitive
records checks to determine exposure to certain deicing fluids or repetitive inspections for corrosion
of the electrical connectors, and corrective actions if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to
address the unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective May 25, 2021.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain
publication listed in this AD as of May 25, 2021.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule, contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57,
Seal Beach, CA 90740-5600; telephone 562-797-1717; internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You
may view this service information at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety
Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material
at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2019-1071.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA-2019-1071; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5
27.05.2021
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any
comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of
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Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Julio C. Alvarez, Aerospace Engineer, Systems
and Equipment Section, FAA, Seattle ACO Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198;
phone and fax: 206-231-3657; email: julio.c.alvarez@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding
an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company Model 737-900ER series airplanes. The NPRM
published in the Federal Register on January 10, 2020 (85 FR 1290). The NPRM was prompted by
reports of significant corrosion of electrical connectors located in the MLG wheel well. The NPRM
proposed to require repetitive records checks to determine exposure to certain deicing fluids or
repetitive inspections for corrosion of the electrical connectors, and corrective actions if necessary.
The FAA is issuing this AD to address corrosion and subsequent moisture ingress that may lead
to electrical shorting of the connectors and incorrect functioning of critical systems necessary for safe
flight and landing.
Comments
The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The
following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.
Support for the NPRM
Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) and two other commenters supported the
NPRM.
Request To Revise Resistance Values
Boeing requested that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 1, dated July 10,
2003, which incorrectly specified a maximum electrical bonding resistance of 5 milliohms for
aluminum and 10 milliohms for stainless steel, be replaced with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
24A1148, Revision 2, dated September 14, 2020, which updates the maximum allowable resistance
values to 3 milliohms for both aluminum and stainless steel, per AWL No. 28-AWL-04, as identified
in Subsection G of Boeing Temporary Revision (TR) 09-020, dated March 2008, to the Boeing 737-
600/700/800/900 Maintenance Planning Document (MPD), D626A001-Certification Maintenance
Requirements (CMR), Revision March 2008. Boeing also advised that operators who have
incorporated Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2003, should
restore the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) aluminum and stainless steel connectors to a
maximum resistance of 3 milliohms at the next inspection interval per Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
737-24A1148, Revision 2, dated September 14, 2020. Boeing observed that the maximum allowable
resistance values of 5 milliohms (aluminum) and 10 milliohms (stainless steel) specified in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2003, are greater than the values
specified in AWL No. 28-AWL-04, and that the proposed AD is in conflict with AD 2008-10-10 R1,
Amendment 39-16164 (75 FR 1529, January 12, 2010) (AD 2008-10-10 R1), and AD 2018-20-24,
Amendment 39-19458 (83 FR 51815, October 15, 2018) (AD 2018-20-24), both of which reference
27.05.2021
AWL No. 28-AWL-04. ADs 2008-10-10 and 2018-20-24 currently require revising the
Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness by
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incorporating new limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation
No. 88 (in 14 CFR part 21) for FQIS connectors in unpressurized area. The critical design
configuration control limitations (CDCCLs) require that if the FQIS connector D4850 is disturbed or
repaired, the electrical bonding resistance value from the backshell to the structure must be 3
milliohms or less.
The FAA agrees with the request to require the revised service information, which updates the
maximum allowable resistance values to 3 milliohms. These values are consistent with AD 2008-10-
10 R1 and AD 2018-20-24 and SFAR No. 88 requirements. The FAA has revised paragraph (g)(2) of
this AD to specify Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 2, dated September 14,
2020, and has also updated the “Related Service Information under CFR part 51” paragraph in this
final rule.
Request To Specify Initial Compliance Time
Delta Air Lines (DAL) suggested that paragraph (g) specify the compliance time as within 24
months of issuance of the original certificate of airworthiness or 12 months after the effective date of
this AD, whichever comes later. DAL noted that newer airplanes having accumulated less than 24
months since the issuance of the original certificate of airworthiness should not require inspection
prior to the accumulation of 24 months since the issuance of the original certificate of airworthiness,
because these aircraft were in a known corrosion-free condition upon completion of production. This
condition, DAL asserted, is equivalent to an aircraft that has just been inspected as required by this
AD. DAL maintained that because the repeat interval after initial inspection given in the proposed
rule is 24 months, an equivalent level of safety would be provided if the initial inspection were
accomplished within 24 months of delivery or 12 months after the effective date of this AD,
whichever occurs later.
The FAA agrees with the request. An affected airplane that has just received an original
airworthiness certificate or original export certificate of airworthiness is in a condition equivalent to
that of completing the repetitive inspection; therefore, conducting an initial inspection within 24
months is appropriate to address the concern of the AD for that airplane. The initial compliance time
specified in paragraph (g) of this AD has been changed to include this information.
Request To Modify Compliance Times
DAL suggested that paragraph (g)(2) of the proposed AD be changed to add a new paragraph
(g)(2)(iv) specifying “If connectors or contacts show signs of corrosion or connector resistance
measurements are greater than the specified milliohm limit given in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
737-24A1148, Revision 1, accomplish appropriate corrective action(s) prior to further flight in
accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 1.” DAL observed that the
applicable times specified in paragraphs (g)(2)(i) through (iii) of the proposed AD are specific to
corrosion of the backshells, and that the proposed AD does not clearly define corrective actions for
the connectors and contacts, which would also be inspected in paragraph (g)(2) of the proposed AD.
DAL contended that the intended action of the proposed AD is for discrepant connectors and contacts
to have corrective action accomplished prior to further flight.
The FAA disagrees with the request to modify paragraph (g)(2) of this AD. The service
information adequately specifies when to perform corrective actions for connectors and contacts. The
FAA has not changed this AD with regard to this request.
Request To Address Discrepancies in NPRM
DAL noted the following discrepancies with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148,
27.05.2021
Revision 1, dated July 10, 2003: The Work Instructions, paragraph 3.B of the Accomplishment
Instructions, indicate that the accomplishment instructions are divided into two parts; however, they
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are actually divided into three parts. Also, part 3 of the Work Instructions does not give the
instruction to remove electrical power from the airplane, yet Figure 5, Step 10, of the ASB instructs
to restore electrical power. DAL noted that if electrical power was not removed, it cannot be restored.
The FAA infers a request to address the discrepancies in the proposed AD.
The FAA agrees with addressing the stated discrepancies in this AD. The 57 discrepancies have
been rectified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 2, dated September 14, 2020,
and this AD has been changed to reference that revision.
Request To Include AMOC Notices
DAL requested that the proposed AD be revised to include references to two FAA-approved
AMOCs to the mandated service information: AMOC Notice 737-24A1148-AMOC-01, dated May
06, 2013, and FAA AMOC Letter 130S- 09-9, dated April 28, 2009. DAL observed that the AMOCs
are applicable service documentation that should be specifically included in the final rule to facilitate
operators in correctly incorporating the requirements of the final rule.
The FAA partially agrees with the request. To facilitate operators in correctly incorporating the
requirements of the final rule, paragraph (i)(4) of this AD has been changed to include reference to
FAA AMOC Letter 130S-09-9, dated April 28, 2009. However, Boeing AMOC Notice 737-
24A1148-AMOC-01, dated May 6, 2013, has been incorporated into the revised service bulletin that
is mandated by this AD and therefore is not included in paragraph (i)(4) of this AD.
Request To Give Credit for Previous Actions
United Airlines (UAL) generally supported the NPRM and requested that credit be given for
actions previously accomplished in their maintenance inspection program per their publication EA
2400-01516, addressing Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 1, dated July 10,
2003. UAL stated it has incorporated inspections of its 737-900ER fleet starting May 2010, using
their publication EA 2400-01516.
The FAA agrees that operators should get credit for performing actions of Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2003, referenced in the NPRM. As stated
previously, this final rule has been revised to refer to the latest service bulletin, Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 2, dated September 14, 2020, which contains updated service
information to address the unsafe condition. Operators who previously performed the work before the
effective date of this AD using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, dated December 6, 2001,
or Revision 1, dated July 10, 2003, may receive credit for accomplishment of the initial detailed
inspection specified in paragraph (g)(2) of this AD; however, the updated FQIS connector D4850
resistance values must be used at the next repetitive inspection interval, in accordance with Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 2, dated September 14, 2020. The FAA has added
paragraph (h) of this AD to provide credit for Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, dated
December 6, 2001, and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-24A1148, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2003.
Effect of Winglets on Accomplishment of the Proposed Actions
Aviation Partners Boeing stated that the installation of winglets per Supplemental Type
Certificate STC ST00830SE does not affect the accomplishment of the manufacturer's service
instructions. Blended winglets are part of the production type certificate for the 737-900ER and are
not an STC installation.
The FAA agrees with the commenter that STC ST00830SE does not affect the accomplishment
of the manufacturer's service instructions. Therefore, the installation of STC ST00830SE does not
affect the ability to accomplish the actions required by this AD. The FAA has not changed this AD as
27.05.2021
a result of this comment.
4
