New Information on Cold War CIA Stay-Behind Operations in Germany and on the Adolf Eichmann Case Timothy Naftali University of Virginia Central Intelligence Agency materials released since mid-2005 have been historically significant and highly relevant to the IWG's congressional mandate. This report will highlight two kinds of revelations received thanks to the efforts of Senator Mike De Wine and Representative Carolyn Maloney, as well as of the IWG's three public members, and the Archivist of the United States Dr. Allen Weinstein, and due to the cooperation of the CIA under the leadership of Porter Goss. These are preliminary findings and in the months to come further releases are expected that should allow scholars, journalists and the interested public to probe more deeply into these matters. I. We have received information that reveals additional US intelligence programs involving former Nazis, some of whom were war criminals. *Between 1949 and 1955, the Central Intelligence Agency organized stay-behind networks of German agents in southwestern Germany and Berlin. The programs, known as Pastime (Berlin) and Kibitz (Southwestern Germany) were designed to provide a source of intelligence from behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion of West Germany. These agents were trained to use radio-sets and the CIA

buried radio-sets, money and some ammunition at secret dumps for the use of these agents in wartime. *The Kibitz operation involved at least two fonner members of the SS--Staff Sergeant Heinrich Hoffmann, Lt. Colonel Hans Rues-and Lt. Colonel Walter Kopp, whom the CIA referred to as an "unreconstructed Nazi." *Most of Kibitz was dismantled in April-May 1953 in the wake of public concerns in West Germany about the resurgence ofneo-Nazi groups. The large Kibitz-15 network, "a group with Nazi tendencies" run by Walter Kopp, had become a potential political liability for the US government. "No doubt you are aware of the political hay that the opposition party could make of our Kibitz-15 net if they managed to roll it out on the front page of the German press, " wrote CIA headquarters in April 195 3. "The present furor in Western Germany over the resurgence of the Nazi or neo-Nazi groups is a fair example-in miniature-of what we would be faced with. " In 1952, the CIA estimated that there were 125 agents in Kopp's network. In CIA reports, Kopp, a former German army officer in the Balkans, is described as an ardent National Socialist with neo-Nazi connections. * The CIA disposed of at least one member of the Kibitz-15 network in Canada. His name was Horst Otto Herbert Ims and little evidence has turned up thus far on what he did in World War II, though it appears he was not an SS-man. On October 13, 1952, a CIA officer wrote, "the man was recruited as WT [radio] operator and 2

dropped, but we know virtually nothing about him, his staybehind work, or the reasons for and security and other circumstances of his release." The CIA decided on the basis of his behavior that Ims was a security risk, especially as the Agency had already decided to trim Kopp's stay-behind network and he knew many of the remaining agents by name. "It was felt," wrote a CIA officer in October 1952, "[that] emigration was the best solution to our security problem." See attached document. The Ims case reveals that in the early 1950s, the CIA ran a program to resettle some of its problem agents in Australia and Canada. According to this program, Australia offered to pay the travel costs of these people, while the CIA provided a resettlement "bonus." The Agency arranged a meeting for Ims at the Australian Consulate General on October 13, 1952. CIA noted that ifthe Australians refused to take him, "the HARV ARD Unit will attempt to emigrate him to Canada or possibly to the United States." As it turned out Australia did refuse to take him and so he was given to the Canadians. It is not known whether Ottawa paid for Ims to go to Canada. Exactly two years later, on October 13, 1954, a Canadian government official identified only as "the Canadian Minister" was to meet with Allen Dulles to discuss 35 ex-CIA assets that had been resettled in Canada, including Horst Ims. On October 7, a CIA officer wrote "Canadian minister to see Dulles - Tuesday- Oct. 13 - re immigration ofintell agents in Canada. EE/DE [querying} field (HARVARD) and 3

various desks for names (Minister supposedly will present 35 names to Dulles). " See attached document. The available declassified materials do not indicate the other 34 names, nor do they contain a list of names of ex-CIA agents resettled in Australia in the early 1950s. There is also no evidence in the Kibitz materials on the outcome of the meeting between Allen Dulles and the Canadian representative. However evidence from 1955 suggests that at least Ims stayed in Canada. In May 1955, a "GFM" noted that the CIA's Canadian desk (WE/6) had taken Ims' file because "WE/6 is having the files of all ex-agents who were immigrated to Canada consolidated." *In April 1953, the CIA briefed Hans Globke, Konrad Adenauer's chief national security adviser, in general terms on US stay-behind operations in Germany. With the exception of the few remaining Kibitz agents that the CIA kept running, the US government pledged to leave this activity to the Germans themselves and to finance a West German stay-behind system. * The Kibitz project was formally dropped in 1955, though three stay-behind agents remained active. Detailed information on the CIA's Pastime stay-behind operation in Berlin has yet to be declassified. II. Some of the releases have added significant detail to previously released files. As a result of these releases we now have information that suggests that West German intelligence could have captured fugitive war criminal Adolf Eichmann in the 1950s 4

but feared the consequences of what he might say about State Secretary Dr. Hans Globke, a highly-placed former Nazi in the Adenauer government. As a member of the "Jewish Affairs Department" of the interior ministry in the 1930s, Globke had assisted in the writing of the Nuremberg laws. In postwar West Germany, Globke was effectively Konrad Adenauer's national security adviser and the chancellor's principal contact with US intelligence. • In March 1958, the West German foreign intelligence service (the BND) reported to the CIA that since 1952 the notorious Holocaust administrator Adolf Eichmann had been living in Argentina under the alias CLEMENS. Eichmann's actual alias was Klement but the BND's information was close enough phonetically to have been used to find him. As it was not then US policy to pursue Nazi war criminals, the CIA did not act on the report. Although West Germany would attempt to extradite JosefMengele from South America in 1959, it did not make a similar attempt to get Eichmann. Tragically at the moment the CIA and the BND had this information the Israelis were temporarily giving up their search for Eichmann in Argentina because they could not figure out his alias. Published memoirs by members of the Israeli intelligence service agree that as of September 1957 the Israelis suspected Eichmann was in Argentina but their source did not know what name he was living under. Neither the BND nor the CIA, it appears, provided the CLEMENS lead to the Israelis. See attached document. 5

• In September 1960, at the request of the West German government, the CIA persuaded Life magazine to delete any reference to Hans Globke from excerpts of Adolf Eichmann's memoir that the magazine had purchased and was preparing for publication. Eichmann had been captured earlier in the year by the Israelis in Buenos Aires and his family had sold the rights to his memoir to pay for his defense. On September 20, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles reported to Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the BND: "Life believes have entire material amounting to 600 pages, 40 in Eichmann handwriting. Life contract allows resale as they see fit except to Israel. Life has not advised Israel, apparently does not intend to. Entire material has been read. One obscure mention of Globke which Life omitting at our request. " See attached document. Life published the excerpts in November and December 1960. • Fearing what Eichmann might say at his trial about Globke, Gehlen came to the United States in April 1961 to report in person to Allen Dulles that he had sensitive evidence from Eichmann's defense team that the Nazi war criminal had "converted" to communism while in Israeli custody. The West Germans hoped the US would use this information to launch a worldwide campaign to denounce Eichmann as a tool of Soviet propaganda. CIA analysts rejected the allegation as implausible. June 6, 2006 6

.. ... . ' VII\: .. AIR DISPATCH NO. __Ei}...:.FJ.A:-"'-""Jl2=---- .. • ("""""' AJR ORSEA l'OOQI) SE TO Chief 1 : RITY INFOW\:1ATION REF: : CLASSIFICATION EE ()Disposal of ATTN: ; ·' DATE: FROM~ef FHB SU~ GE~~AJ..~ OPERATIONAL/CASE SPECIFIC- _..::: t 24 October 1952 ':::t KIBITZ~l 71 EGFA-313 1. KIBITZ-171 was a W/T instructor in the KIBITZ-15 Net from October i951 until June 1952. He was originally- recru.ited b7 KIBITZ-15 and C ::i • Prior to his employment as a tuD.time "lf/T instructor 'for KIBITZ, subjec't was employed by Rhille lli.litary Post, Kaiserslautern in the Signal Section. At the ti.too of his employ;uent, arrangements were ma.de with Rhine Post to have him rehixed by them '1'hen he trould no longer be of operational use to us. Such arrangements were laid-on through .ID EUCOll. In :fune of this ;rear, we decided that subject was unsuitable !or intelligence oper- ations and should be dropped. 2. 3, June, .r~ and .August of this vear were suent trying to have KIBITZ- 171 reh:ired· b;r Rhine Uilitary Post. fl:. carried on all dis- cussions with theChiei' of Personnel, Rhine Post. Due to the cut-down of indigenous personnel e;iployed by military installations in Germany and the fact that KIBITZ-17l's ina~quacies were also known by the Signal Section at Rhine Post, we were told - despite their promise to rehire him - that Rhine Post could ~ot re-employ KIBITZ-171. -:J 4, The uno'"'"''; =iAri t.heti took the KIBITZ-171 case to the HARVA.'iID Unit and spoke wif.h C .::11, In September, RAnVARD was asked (EGFA-95, to COY only) to try to get KIBITZ-171 a job in Gernany and at the same time lay on necessary arrange::ients for possible emigration. It = .,.~i+. +lu•t. emigration 'l!'aS the best solution to our security problem. t- :::l , during September, sair a chance to have l~ITZ-171 emigrate to Australia. · (Their attempts to get him a job on the German economy were not started due to the chance of his possible emigration in the very near future.) 0 5, 8 October, 1952, L On :J, under the alias of Mr. Hendricks, An excellent,"sales job" on why KIBITZ-171 should emigrate to Australia,,. had been d0 ne at undersigned's direction pre- viousll' by KIBITZ-15. KIBITZ-171 was agreeable to emigrating to Australia., only questioning the job and personal security situation there saying that he did not want to become just an ordinary laborer, but. wanted to st.Er in his nl"'ofession - the Radio/Electronic field. Arrangements were ma.de by l [. ...J to have KIBITZ-171 meet the Australian Consulate General in Frankfurt on 13 October 19>€. Thia KIBITZ-171 did an:l we are· i19~ ~aiting the results !Ult KIBITZ-171 for the first time. VEE-3 COM-3 FOAM ND. MAR, 1949 HA.~VARD-1 i tor A~ACH· 51-2 l' ' f'. d SECRE!l ·coPY :CURIT&Al~~R,!WIATf 0 N ,..' - I "". : 1'111 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) g/ (2)(A) Privacy (2 ) (B) Methods/Sources 1z.J (2 ) (G) Foreign Relations 0 Declassified and Approved for Release by the central Intel Ii gen~ Agency crate: ~~

SECRET !lcCURITY INFORMATION - 2 - of his emigration application. If the Australians do not take KIBITZ-171, the HARVARD Unit llill attempt to emigrate hU. to Canada or possibly to the United States. If KIBITZ-171 emigrates to Australia, his passage rill be paid by the !u.stralian Government in connection with PICME. Passage to other countriro:: will be taken care of by HARVARD or countries involved. In addition, C :l has intimated to KIBITZ-171 that he 'Ifill be given a small "bonus" upon emigration to aid hi.Jll to start his new life, 6, Reasons for disposal of KIBITZ-171 are: a. Subject is imna.ture and has a personality not suitc.d to clandestine activities. His main faults are his lack of regard for money and his traction to nembers of the opposite sex. a~ b. Original control of subject and his operational. activities are not co!lllidered to have been secure in that subject learned too many true identities of his students (other W/T op'3rators in the KIBITZ-15 Met). c. Operationally, the KIBITZ-15 Net i.s being slowed down and we have no further need of subject 1 s services. d, Because of the sensitive nature of the Staybehind Program and (a), (b) and ( c) above, subject 1 s evacuation fr an Germany would have to be accomplished at the outbreak of hostilities, For better security now and elimination of evacuation problems, it is recommended that he be emigrated at once. 7. JITBITZ-171 knc:ws the folloring: W/T Operational Data: DYCL.UY W/T procedure and training methods. (He1ias instructed some 14 W/T agents in the KIBITZ-15 Net.) He is familiar lrlth TR-1, RS-6, RS-1, Bud Oscillator, AdK, !!P-1 SX-71, Halli- crai'ter, crypto system and signal plan system. NCYI'E: All equipment that was used by KIBITZ-171 tn his duties as instructor,. has been taken away from him. a. staff W T instructors: .J \ - alias . _1 .J c. Sub~ect also knows the follawin2 staff personnel: as Nicho as Kessler; [. as F.ciward Hartman; and [.... f-" 01l!l. ·C 'J. i as Dennis H. IiOnn; , t:.. :J as George, Sub ect knO'i'i's safe houses - all of which are going to be vacate y ldthin the ne month: Heidelberg - Rohr- bacher Strasse 56; Ulm - Galgenbergweg 20; Unterschondorf -- Bahnhof Str. 10. d. c c "- Subiect kn01Vs operatio::i.al vehicles nf: [ ""'] and .:J , as ire 1:! as C_ TS. Also the one used by ~ which (. ] now haa, .J SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

l ''\ SECRET t,i~fURITY_ 1 N!9~MATI(?,,~ 3 £. Subject knavrs: t.:: ;..::\. as Mr. Hendricks who will be the only staff personnel seeing subject frol'l now on. g. Subject knows KIBITZ-15 by true name and aJ.l personal data, and exactly what KIBITZ:]$ is doing for us. h. The wife of KIBITZ-136 is KIEITZ-171's sister. KIBITZ-1J6 is one of KIBITZ-15's favorite nteam leaders" and confidant. KI:aITZ-171 knows that llBITZ-1)6 is in the KIBITZ-15 Net and vice-versa. i. KIBITZ-171 also knows tile foll ents in the KIBITZ-15 Net: (other than -1 a..'1d KIBITZ-1 , it is believed that oost of the agents listed below know KIBITZ-171 as Hans Schaeffer~ KIBITZ-15o - by true name and all personal data by true name bnt not address by true name but not address by first name only by true name, but not address by true name and address KIBITZ-127 - KIBITZ-156 - D:liITZ-161 - KIBITZ-173 - KIBI'i'Z-177 - KIBH'l-180 - by KIBITZ-182 -- by KIBITZ-190 - by KIBI'l"..-192 - by KIBITZ-197 - by KIBITZ-198 - by KIBITZ-199/200 - KIBITZ-145 & 185 first name sight sight full name end all personal data sight true name and all personal data by true name and all personal data - by true name; hcwever, these agents have been dropped l I ~ I KIBITZ-171 has not seen anyone in KIBITZ-15 Net, other than KIBITZ-15, since June, when he gave basic li/T instruction to KIBI'i'Z-199/200. T!us 4-month period has probably dulled his memor-J somewhat of names etc. In addition, RIBITZ-15, whom KIEITZ-171 respects quite a bit, has given him a severe security lecture and collected all notes, etc., he could from KIBITZ-171. 8. In EnFA-197, we requested a name check from CLS on subject and also necessary action by CIC that they would rithholc knowledge of subject 1 s intelligence activities from the Australians or other countrv requestirul: a check in regard to RIEITZ-171's emigration applicaticns. C:. · _:i , Chief CLS, informed undersigned vel'bal.lJ'" that CIC had no record {other than his kIBITZ activities) of subject and that they would so state when any inquiries regarding bis ellligration were made. 9. Subject had false documents furnished him by :.Il.'TOPAZ in the name of Hans Schae1'fer. These 1rere a Kennkarte and driver's license, These have been taken up and are now held in his file here. Subject realizes that his employment as W/T instructor was a temporary position. It is not felt that SECRET SECURITY INFORMATIO~! l I 1 J

S~CRET SECURITY _l~~ORMATION there will be any proble!J! with subject, security-wise, i l we keep our portion of the agreement with him; that is, getting hil!1 another job or, according to recent developments, help him to emigrate and get a new start in life. KI~·ITZ-171 did not sign a contract for his employment as W/T instructor in KIBITZ-15 Net. Files herp indicate (UGKA-3.3041, 25 September 1951) that subject was hired by verbal ag:reel:'lent fnT' J.r10 mr nP.r month with periodic increases up to 6oo DL! per month by C:: -::i :. He, how- ever, received only one increase and has been paid only 4$0 DY per month Plus 26. Q(l rnx f'r:>r Krankenkasse payments s~ca Jin uar;r 1952. We will request C- :l of HARVARD to obtain a qui\. claim fron subject once he is on his way to the boat and/or resettled on German EconO!!!Y· HARVARD w..J.l continue to pay him until he is emigrated or resettled. 10. A copy of HARV.ARD•s ffiQ Part,e - on disposal cases) is attached fer EE files. is forwarded by EGFA-313. (detailing personal data A copy oi' HARVARD' s PRQ Part I II .J HGS/cfp ,J APPROVED: ' [ SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION