Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAI0/16 2, Mey 45 3, ROMMEL 1 S DEATH PW chims thnt ROMMEL ho..d plottod agn.in st HITLER in tho 20 July Putsch. On tho following day tho FUEHRER sont ·a high SS officor to ROMAEL with tho ardor o1thor to accept o.rrost nncl. trial or, n.s a spooirt.l privilege boca.ueo of his moritorious service, to shoot himself with tho pistol which wo..s handed to him Ftt tho aomo timo · Ho W::ts ri.llo\·md :f'ivo minutes in which to mako up his mind. ROMMEL cho so tho second a.l tornr1.ti vo. 4 · GOERING fill SCIENCE 1illQ INDUSTRY .. a) AT.QM SMASHING PW claims tho.t Gorman scientists hn.vo· inn.do troruc11dotis progross in r:ma.shing tho a.tom. Ho believes that this will bo tho rovolutiono.ry sour co of op orgy ·:fo tho·· ... futuro. Although ho was chairmo.n of tho Gc:rmnn Scivntists' Longuo, sourco docs not have an n.pprocinblo Billaunt of knowlodgo of tho field. Bo.sing his stn..tomont on n. booklet ho 01160 sr.i.w dorrling with tho sub joct,, PW cla:ims thz·.t /i.rnoricon rosori.rch in tho field of tho atoin is f'8.r bolow that of othor nations· b) ~ GERM.:'iN U-BO.;.T Source is vory proud of tho succoss which ho claims for o. now Gorman turbine-· driven subniariilo which "doos not nood to surfaco for air 11 • Only n fow of those subs wore ror1.dy in spring 45; ~n ln.rgo numbers thoy would i.1.QVO inflicted aorioua d".lllln.go on ,.',.lliod shipping. Their undo:c-t·mtor spood is cln.imod to bo almost na high ~s tho apood of tho fa.stoat aurfnco vessels· 5· GOERING 1 S ECONOMIC ST:..TUS n) RSGULJJ{ INCOME 1 !n tho Light of one of tho P11rty s foromo st early nims - 11ri:moly, that no ono ci;\I'n moro thnn Rl~ 1,000 per month - GOERING' a economic status is grotesque. In a,ncrwor to questions concor11ing tho source of his income, P':l replied that ho rccoivod "vory docont 11 wages e.s Prosidont of tho Pn1ssi'1.11 Ministry, r\nd that 11 11 la;r.go chocks wore pln.cod at his "disposaln (ZUR VERFUEGUHG) by tho mombor firms of tho Supervisory Council of Mnnufncturors (AUFSIOHTsR.lT VOl't F.'J3RIKUNTERNEHl'1UNGEN), !':l.lthough ho did not rocoivo a rogulo.r atJ.l~y ns hoad of this 1J.goncy. Ho would not mo.kc rJXJY prociso stn.tomonts n.s to tho total of his income, which would bo difficult to ostnbli ah, his reeourcos being in tho hand a of ::-. number of diff'cron_t b!'Jllking. institutions. · Exroninntion of a. bnnkbook, however, rovcalod tho f'olloNing informrrtion: Income aa Mini stor of :·..vin.tion 11 11 11 member of REICHSTAG" Spooin.l cxpon so o.ccount .from REICH$ n.pprox R.tvI 5500 per mo Oh~ncollory 1700 II 20000 II II Adding to this his o atim 'ltod sn.l n.ry of RM 25, 000 por UJ.onth n.a Pro sidont of' tho Prussb.n Mini etry, his total monthly income from tho n.bovo sour cos wo..s ovor RM 600,000 por yoa.r. In addition, thoro wore roguln.r chocks from tho EHER Party Publishing Hou so amounting to RM 120 ,000 per yooJ", for his writings on t-ho Four-Yo~.r-Plrin • .:\llowing f'or sn.ln.rios accruing from othor public positions, n. yo'1..rly incomu of R.t'\1 1,000,000 mr:iy be considorod n. fr\ir ostimn.to • \ -· b) ADDITIONAL !J.'fO~ Tho n.bove~montionod bccnkbook also ahows occ,,_sion.'.'.l chocks nnd crodits from lri.rgo firms - for oxoJnplc, semi-yearly nmounts of R.tvr ;oo ,000, Ri-1 250 ,000, otc. from tho REENTs;,r~·· Firm (Oigarottos), HAMBURG. Oi2.:!::.s..: Mini star of Fino.nee FUW...C SEORET Approved For Release 2004/02/T9: Cl~RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 .§!Q~!l! Rof No SAIC/16 23 May 45 ox1)ln.ina thcso Ol'llounte, etn.ting tho.t REENT~iMA wo.e involved in n. trial for ovaaioh of taxes amounting to sovor".'ll millions, from which i t was able to. oxiricA.to itself with,GOERING 1 s n.id.) As chi of .of tho Four-Yonr-Pl~, aourco was l'\blo to hnvo any 6i:nount of' money put e.t his diapoan.l, more or loss 11 voluntri.r·Uyrt. Thus it rn.ay bo ar:i.id thn.t for r.\ll praoticnl purpo soa, money w1;1.i:; not n. m!\"t.tor of con corn in P~J 1 s life· Quoationod about a. po ssiblo f'ortuno in foreign countrioo, source replied, "I cn.n a.wn.it nny revol'.'ttibns of your o.gontE1 concerning my 1 foroign fortunes'· with ::in untroubled mind. 11 (~~: It was po saiblo, however, to lc1arn from REICHSHUTISTER FUNK that GOERING hn.d probably smuggled money ~bron.d through MEDEL, a pnrtnor in tho WITZIG btmking concern. MEDEL, n. nC\tivo of Gorrnn.r:iy r:ti.1d n. ri . . tura.lizod Dutchl!lun, marriod to rt Swiss woman, workod for GOERING in some sort of illcgi timri.to donl a in foroigr currency. About throe to four months ri.go ho flew to Spain, pr.ob ably with a largo sh!'l.l'o of GOERING' a fortune, which was in n.11 likelihood to bo dopo si tod in , Portug':ll or South .t1J11orioa. .. I t mny bo notod that GOERING askod tho intorrognting officer ropoatcdly whether living conditions woro bettor in .iJ"gontinn., or .in Chilo· Dr FUNK explained that GOERING, "S dirc1ctor. of tho Four ..Ycar Plan, could dispoeo of foreign curronoios indop1,;~ . .:ontly, nnd tl1nt ho vsod. ·);ho~. unhesitatingly for hie own purposes, such o.o tho purchnso of n.rt troasuroa.) c) PRIVATE FORTUNE "'r·. ···. '""' .. ,• . PW 1 a fortune conai ste ma.inly in ob jocto of n.rt, whic.h ho rob bod from foreign countrida, bought, or a.ccoptod n.a rivolunt·tr·yn gifts~ .Souic of thi a f'ortuno como from towns such '1S ~EifJBERG, whi~h proson1:;od him with objects of nrt - jowolod d~gore, swords, boxqs wrought of gold, nnd. tho liko - nt ovary po saiblo occn.eion. Oth6r works of ~.rt C!!lll.O from for·oign n:i..tiono, ato.toamon, indua:trio.list: crnftemon, muaoumo, nnd from tho FUEHRIB. Thoy combined to fonu n collootion worth mn.ny millions, which, judging by hie ~notion in discussing it, ho wnntod to build up into tho ln.rgoat troo.suro in tho world,· something liko tho two fn.buloua hon.rd a of' Gormn.n folklore, tho NIE:BELUNGJ:NSOH..~TZ or tho WELFENSOH.~TZ. 6. VANITY OUTRJ.GED PW complained ab(.)Ut hie treatment ns n. prisoner, sl:"Ying tho..t it is uaunl for n ma.raho..l hwo a. house of hie own to livo in· Considering .his position !1S n N~i, however, ho thought ho would hn.vo to be anti af'iod to livo in tho al'IJ11o mtmnor na tho other officor PW• Ho snya ho o.skod tho .~orio>:ina for s11.fo conduct when he gri:vo'.himsolf up, n.nd now po finds him.self a prisoner of war .. Ho ie worried ri.bout his private poesQesiona. Judging by tho wny the !.llioE; h~wo boon do'1.ling with thom, ho anys, ho f'oata thnt one dny 11 thoy will take tho po.nta off mo 11 • to 4 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

25X1A ...Approved For Release 2004102119: c1A-RDPBJ-0041sRrs200030002-1 S E C R E T Ref No SAIC/11 2.4 May 45 __::;:::== - - - - - - ~"'t. "t\\--- ~ ).\\ t.\\ttt\':> '\\\\~ ''f f'.C' t-,1',\\ • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • n/\ ll!i\\ ui.·' "\J \1 . §_ ! 9. B. ! ! : Atith: CGp 7th Army: SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER: Init: f'. #' : APO 758 . US ARMY :_Date: 24 May 1945 s ...................... • I OBSERVATIONS ON ARMOH EMPLOYMENT (This Report is in answer to~u~nnaire, Hq Seventh Army, Office of the Armored Officer, dated 18 May 1945) .SOURCES i) GUDF.RIAN, Heinz, GENODST (Col Gen), Officers Repl Pool, OKH, former- ly C of S, German Ground Forces:, and Inspector ·of Armored Units. Appar.ently wantirig· to appear anti-Nazi, the General answered all ques- tions freely; he stated·emphatically, however, that he did so only because HITLER 1 s death freed him from his oath of allegiance. Rating:. B... 2 ,Interrogator: R. W. ii) VON GEYR, Leo t GEN D PlTR (Lt Gen), Inspector of Armored Units. Proud of his profession, of the old :Prussian general type, source gave information grudgingly; his personal pride borders upon the ridiculous. Having been Military Attache in LONDON for several years, source claims to have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs, Rating: B... 2 Interrogator: R. W. iii) DIETRICH, 11 .'3EPP 11 , OBSTGRUF ,col Ge~ of WAFFEN SS), CG 6 SS Pz··Army. Impressed by his own position and deeds, blaming everybody for lack of ceiurage, the n6torious SS General appeared to criticize Allied equipment and tactics because he thought it' was "expected of him" rather than as a result of actual experiences. He emphasized his 35-year-long Army affiliations. Rating: C-3 Interrogator: R.W. iv) HAUSSER, Paul, OBSTGRUF (Col Gen of WAFFEN SS), ex-CG, Army Group 1 J.G 11 • Source is a .firm believer in HITLER's theories, and attempted to justify most of the FUEHRER is deeds, but ·he talked freely on military matters. Formerly a Prussian general in the Army, source stressed the fact that he was primarily a military leader and not a politician. Rating: B-2 Interrogator: R.W. ANSWERS TO SPECIAL QUESTIONNAITIE 1. What do you think of the offensive fire power of the American tank and tank destroyers? t1lhile. Gen GUDERIAN and Gen Von GEYR felt that they were not sufficiently experienced to answer the question, the former because he did not command troops opposing American armor, the latter. due to the limi t.ed employment of armo!'. during the part of the Normandy campaign when he was in command, the two SS generals praised American tanks and tank employment. 11 SEPP 11 DIETRICH stated that in his opinion. the SHERIYJAN engine was very' good, but that a larger cal gun could be mou~_ted on the SHERMAN tank. The new American heavy tank, he said, was even more satisfactory and could be favorably compared with the best German tank. the Royal Tiger. Gen HAUSSER called the fire-power of American tanks "immensely strong". 1 /~FA)p,;oveti For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ret No SAIC/l'i ,' 2't·May 45 2. In general, what is our greatest weakness in armor and armored tac- tics? Gen GUDERIAN is of the opinion that the tracks on our tanks are too narrow, causing them to get sti.wk when operating in snovr or mud. Thus the American tanks are 11 Good . We . ther Tanks;; (SCHONl'JETTERTAI'f.K.L Gen von GEYTI thinks American armored te.,ctics :were good, given Ame.rican air superiority; when difficulties were encountered, air support wa.s called for and the matter taken care of. If called to fight an enemy with equal or stronger air power, however, American tank tactics would have tp be .more daring to be successful, Attacks v~ere not carried through to :the last. Flexibility of leadership (WENDIGKEIT DER F:UHHUNG) was some- times lacking when large tank .concentrations v1ere employed. Gen DIETTIICH points out erro.rs in armor employment, notably the fact that armor was not always employed in BUfficient masses. This, he. says, is a tactical error which results in lack of offensive power. In the case of large armor concentrations, th0 Germans were always· aware of them due to lack of proper security. Gen HAUSSER thought that a lower-echelon commander. would be better ncquaintcd with these pro·blems. He stated I however, ·that the iden of tank concentrations instead of individual tank employment was correctly recognized by. the Americnns and carrie.d out in 'the best possible way. The tendency to avoid frontal attacks hcts proven successful, · , 3. Wha.t· arc your views on effectively combat ting infnn try A/T inensures in the, use of th0 M PANZERFAUS~? Gen GUDERIAN thinks the: PAN.ZERFAUST an excellent weapon, easy to trnnsport.., cheo.p :-...nd ccsy to manufac-ture on et m~ss production basis• crnd easy ta hnndle in a fpxhole. Its disndvnntages, ns seen by Gen GUDERIAN, are its short range and the jet flame. Both DIETRICH and HAUSSER thin!.). that although invented as a result of the' A/T gun ·shortage, the PANZERFAUST has proven itself to a· point where it can no longer be regar·.' ~d as a pure llemergency. weapon". As Gen DIETRICH puts i t 1 even if he could obtain a·s many A/'r guns as he wanted, he would not like to omit the PANZERFAUST in organizing A/T defenses. · .. . . Gen von· GEYR regards the PAN6ERFAUST as an emergency weapon par excellence. His answer, in full:' "Faute de mieux, on se couche avec s~ femme ••• " 4. Have you found that the bridging problems for Pz Kw V and Pz Kw VI greatly limit their tactical ~ability? All sources answer thi(:I question in the affirmative, but all point out at the same time that, in general, the root of the problem lies in the specific types of German bridging equipment, and in supply difficult- ies. In this connection Gen von GEYR states flatly that, with the technical quality of American equipment, no difficulties whatsoever should be encountered. Gen GUDERIAN and Gen HAUSSER point to supply problems as the main difficulty. Gen· DIETTIICH thinks the K... type bridgin€ equipment insufficient, but the I-bridges very good, except in the case of ,large rivers, like the RHINE i 5. To what do you attribute German te.nk losses .. by percentages? Air, A/T 1 Arty and mechanicaJ._? Which was most feare,d by. tank er ewe? 2 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ..._ Ref No SAIC/17 24 May 45 Gen GUDERIAN: 60-70% throu~:n· ,~(!Jchanical ·failu?:.~~ (Eastex'n front) i 15% A/T; $%Arty; '.5% mines; -5% others'« (Note: figures ·are only a ve-ry rough approxima.tion; source was v:ery hes- itant .about answering this quest-ion) · · '' Gen von GEYR: Source could nbt give 'any approximate figure.a~ ·He thinks air•tank ~ooperation the most deadly combination. Air attacks are ve1·y effective and most feared by tank crews. · · . . . Gen DIETRICH z 30% mechanical failures;· 'io% air; 15% A/T; 45% tanks arrd · TDs. Losses due to arty are negligible. Most feared by crewst Allied tanks an~ TDa. , Geri HAUSsm: During long movements to the zone of action; 20-30% of all tanks en route fall out due to mechanical failures. Considering the remaindei· as 100%, 15% are lost .through mechanical failures i 20% tlu:·ough air attac~s-; .50% · through A/T defense; and 15% are knocked out by arty. Tanks and Tbs are feared most by German tank crews. · ,6, What 'developments have been mad.e in the use of Infra-Ray or similar ray devices for night operations by tanks? Where can technical data be found on the subject? Who were the ·manufacturers? What men de- velop•d this device? All sources agree tha. t these ue.velopments h:.oi.ve not yet·. passed the early experimental stages. Gen DIETRICH knov1s about. experiments carried ou,t at the TRUPPENtiBUNGSPLATl (Training Arca) PADERBOHN; Gen GUDERIAN th:j.nks the GAF was developing.similar devices• and heard about tests with PKWs, (passenger cars). , . Gen GUDE:RIAN thinks the ENT1GCKLUNGSSTELLE DES LUFTF'AiffiTMINISTERIUN'iS (Research Center of the Air Ministry) should know details; Gen DIETRICH refers .to t]le HEERES\JAFFENAMT (Army Weapons Dept), DEnLIN, as the place where d·etails might be found~ 'Gen van GEYR is of the opinion that the British lead in the fi.eld of Infra-Ray research, and mentions specific- . ally Prof LINDE1\1ANN, of bXFCJRD. He docs not know any details· as to . Ge±-rMm Infra-Ray d~velopments, and also ref era to the GAF tor details .. "7~ What. do, you think of American ~econnaissan~o t~ctics? Gen GUDERIAN thinks that Ah1erican tactics are generally the same ns those em:ploye d by German units. Advanced (VORGESCHOBENE) motorized ren with air support is very effective, he states• Gen von GEYR thinks that. the organization of Ame:rioa.h rcn units is superior to the. Ger.man, :partic'lllarly in the number of veh:i.eles • where the proporticm is 15: 1. The most dangcr0:us moment -!or. the .·oppon0nt is mass rcn after a. pone- tration1 he ... pointa. o\lt. ·.Gc:n DIETTIICH praises Amei'ico.n air rcn ( 11 e.xcell- ent11) t but .,'thi$s bur ~rbund tao tics lack aggr0ssi veness. Movements have to be e~ecuted ·in shorter. time• ho thinks. Gen Ht.USS.ER particularly lik.es Americc,n cav gr.oup9 i he thinks they are "very effectivcli because they are used to close dangerous gaps in addition to their rcn missions. The German Army la6ks a similar unit, he points otit1 and irt units which could per' form simi1a±-ly to oi.ir cav groups 1 eei,uiphteht is inferior. 8. • What do you think of American rdri equipment1 What arc its weaknesses? With the excoptitm of von GEYR, who cbims no knovjledg0 of the subject i :; Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 Ref No SAIC/l.7 24 May 45 all othar sources describe the lighi~ rcn· tank as 11 excellenP. Gen HAt1SSER also thinks the radio communication system and equipment is efficient; Gen DIETl1ICH thinks the rcn car is not heavy enough. Gen GUDEHIAN enviOusly admits t.hri.t''Germari equipm~nt is inferior. 9. Has much German technical data on armor been given to the Japanese? All sources except G~n GUDERIAN had no knowledge of the subject. Gen GUDERIAN thought that according to a statement by the FUEHRER, the Jap ... anese automatically received information on all German new developments. He could~ however, furnish no .details. 10. Do you know of any important developments in Japanese arr.1or? All sources claimed no knowledge of any such developments. 11. Approximately hov1 many tanks did Germany have operative on the Western front on 1 Mar 45? Gen GUDERIAN: Rour;h estimate: l-1-00.... 500. At the time of the beginning of the invasion a total of 1,200 tanks were operative, and losses could usually be replace.cl in time.. After Jan 45, the transportation breakdo\vn caused failure of delivery to units. The most acute shortage was in assault guns, and other SP guns. Ge.n von GEYR: Rough estimate: 200-300 •. Gen ·.DIETTIICH: 300 was the ·maximum, ac'cording to his estimate. Gen HAUSSER : Army Group nG 11 he.d approx 100 tanks and assault guns available. Estimate of the total, v1hich he believes probably incorrect: 1,000. 12. What is the total number of each of the following types, Mk V, Mk VI and JAGDTIGER w/128 mm? Gen GUDERIAN was the only one v1ho could answer the question at all, He did not know any total figures except in the cnse of JAGDTIGER. ,. which he stated to be not more than 100. 'rhe monthly production of Mk V was approx 300, on the average; Mk VI were produced at the average rate of 100-120 per month; JAGDPANTHER, fS mm: 50-70 on the average. 24 May 1945. m::VEUT H ARMY INTERR CGATI ON CENTER ,f?__ ('j ~. . /J. -I - v (.~ /( .c..c.A'·~ PAUL KUBALA, . . II Maj, i'iII, Commanding. Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

2sx1.A Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006210030002-7 Ref Ho SAIC/15 22 May·45 Yl' I..... . §_ ! Q !lli\l\S uu l\u1 sw·3mH APO i~.~~,~tnS\l~~ 't,L-_- - - - - - ................ s R Ut~ ~.'J~ 3 E 0 ,.~·· 3 T s :.Auth:-OG ,- th-Ar;n' : s !nit: . K· : iDa"l:,el 22 Aay 19 5 ~ ' •••••••••••• ,. ...... s ~RMY 758 He>dHig POTTJ.-fa.5T is an attractive woraan in her early ·t.~1~_;."ties, \·tho i:iight be ter;'.lled the prot,o·t.71.ie of the lfozi 11 !)~T}~SOE~ rt'HAG 11 • She z2 Y0 ·t.he Li1pnseion of bei11g an u:,1as~1.r.:~_;J'.!; '·'o::..\an rat.her than a force;cul or c.dc1.1ls:l:.j.:-~g ·type. I::it.erro.q;ator: · ..· •.. L.B. ~ o:E' In?or:·«1e.'.;..ion1 See Text, 1 !~!, HISTC!1Y Source ,.,2.s 1Joi·n .6 Feb 1912, in '.JCLC0~.rz, t:1e dau•:;ht.&r of a :lei-chant of' middle class fa:Jlil:r. s:1ei at·::..-:.,ndect school in ·i·.\I n, and ls:ter e·tt~died s:t the ZconOi'liC !netitue foi· I11te1·p.re·::,:;~e in :.~AF:-.rH~Vi, es.rnb:·; l1er deg1·e0 i.11 1953· Fro:n. 53-'4 ahe worked as a clo'.l":: :1.:.1 a govt offic.e Ll 'J03!JE:rz. . In the e.utmn1 o:':' 5.5 s:1e applied fol" "t.ransf'or t.o a pos·(, .i:1orc s'1e could utilize ho!' !::110~1loc\:~0 o? ~ngHsh, e.nd she '.Ja.s st1bsGc.:,,t~e::·::.1;, :o;iv,e11 a position in the }Te1·1epapor Dept o? t.l:.e '.c:::3TAPC Office i;:1 3~RLEJ, Eo·.·r0v :;r, s:1e still he.d no · opportLlnity -to :t'.',.1.:e L'S3 of :v~r -~;.1giis:1, e::d sl.,_,,, s.s\:Jc' :~o:,· s. tirand'or or for per,;:iiasion ·i:.o. i-es~.:.i;;.1. Sho •·re.s :1ot po1·>:.lit·i:.ed to loav<;3 ·t.} .0 G3':-STAPO 6o:rvico, bu.t was $iv;m a n::ii.r i)osi·~i<.m e.s privcte s0or;rte.r3r t.o HoL'l.•·ic~1 i:J::.J:·:IL::!!R, a post which eho, oeoupi.:id fl"o~:.i Jan 56 u;1t..il tho' bogi:111i1'l.3 of' 41. 1 11 1 Sourco st.ates -~:1a.t a'ho euporvisod ]L~ :L '.:B. s PJ1VAi' ~~~.r~ZL:.1:!' (Private Ohancollory) a~12. ·that i1or ': or\:: ··ms L1 :10 \ray co41oer:1ecl ·.-~i·th i1ie SS ac·i:;ivit.i:Js. 1 1 1 1 In' tho OOt'!'i?O o:':' SO'.'l:'CO 1-s '·!Ol"k "'ith m~.;:;ILI\ e.:.1 a·~·::.ac~:.:~o:,1t dovolopod ,.fhi-oh ovo;:rtua.lly lod ·to a soriou!; lo-;o affair,. 801.Jroo lo:'.'t :ic-:..· job in l9l}l to 1oad tho lU'o of' a loyal 1 dovo·t.~:d :11ieri;1·~se, aw:. s'1c. bo;.·3 t·.:o c:.1ildTon ·t,o :rLo::;..rt;:.,q i11 tho yoax-s Nhioh ?ollo•:iod. Tho allio.nc:i ·:re.& :1ot lo:;8.Hz.:id b:' :.1a;,·~·:iago o::ily hoeauso B.I~·~·l.t~.:1 :~olt ·the:t a dj_voroo :.i.1 -:.ht roeult in his •.rifo 1 r.; doath, as t~10 latter had boon vory ill over sinco ·t>,o birth o:c her o-:11',' c~1ild. In tho autu;m.1 of 42 eouroo ;aoYod. ·i;o 3!3.0~:n::;r.hD].-, •·1~1ol"J s~10 i·o mined 1. n-til jt>st bJforo tho Allied oooupation. 1 Souroo ste.tos ·t.he:i; tho le.st ·t.L110 sho se.w E!i-:-.:t~R '.!f'...S tkring ·t.ho ~-r1Jok 011ding 22 ~"laroh 45. At. ·t.:}<d:. t.imo T~L~~L !i-1 i.'ms co;:1fbocl to bod i;.1 e. :C.ospi tal at ::IOH.~N­ LU X::it:W noal:" 31i-E.r!'.:; sd'foring fro.a a:i c:t.taok o:: ~~rippo. _ .:.hilc visiting l1ii.l thoro souroo onoouutorod Foli:x IG:HSTEN of t!N'H3!Ct~TA£.: D, E:»'.i."OOIG-iOLlvI, a ;w..osage spooie.liet ;fho he.cl ·J0M troe:t.in:3 :f.IU:LJL ~.i £01• y~s:rs i. Dr I: l.\ST:iH -~old ho:r to call uptin him H' 0vor a:10 ;,1ocdod c.ny holp. (A •:ri:i.· o :l:'ro::..i. sou~·oe to Dr =~~181' lN •.nte intorcoptoc;J by All:i.od at'.t1~.odt.ios, discloe;i.n.?; sou:;:oc 1 s loc,_tio11 2.11d loading to~tM.a in-~or;.~ogo.~i:.ion). ·. · ':!hi}.~ s#o liyod in BJJ.ROHTWGAD~N, i:iho o sod to J.•cooiy? .~c.i,3.y .tolopl;tono CG.lle from I:t!tl·iL~h, t)DJ pr::Hrn°noe ·c.h;:i.t tho CF.'!.lls C8.:;J.(} from 3L\,;,,,I.:>:, out sh0, is not "orte.in. ·Tho la.st.. ·call ?ro;:o. him ce.mo on 19 April 45. As usual :n, discuss0d only porson2.l ::m:t:.·~ors ovor tho phonci, al-t.:1ot'~h ho :10:.Yi:.ior1od tho fa.et that tho situ2.tibn 1·:c.s ~,;o·~·t.ins :uoro difficult. ovor;y- dt\~r.. Bof'o;:oo saying "goodbye ho promised to co.ll c.~~c..in t.ho !:'ollo·:1in.,; dc.y 1 01.rt ::;ourco stc:t,:,s "th1:i.t she :'lever epoko to him o.ga:tn, A lot.tor fl'oi~ hi~a. arrived tl1.:: e0.::io do.y, ::10:.•ov~~·, c1olivoroQ. by l n:r Approved For Release 2004/02/19.: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 _.:::, S '1 ___ C R 3: _ T Rof' }fo SAIC/15 :?2 May 45 ono of'. Hbt,.IT/l:R's st.aft' officora. It eo:1t,C'.inod th0 usuC'.l po:cso11c.l ,ucsS~\gol!l, but ondod .·ri th e.not!1or phr:.so o.bout dH'"~iouHios n.nd ·:;ho hopa ·c.:10.t God \·rould protect 1 hor • tho ohi ld.r:i:.1. c.:,1d Gori''!.l:ti.1y. Tho lottor g c. vo no hi:..1.t, c.s -C.o r-rr:.:.iL~fi s p lc.11e, o.np no diroet:!.ons :for soureo. Sourco stc:tos positively ·t,hc.t, this was tho last word. cliroct, o:r indiroo"t., ·.-•hieh sho h~.s rocoivod :~ro;-u. hL:i. Proviou:s ';;.o tho i;1torrogr.tor 1 s o.rrivc.l, sotu·cc h:-.d bo.:.n sho 1.'rn 2. copy of 11 Sto.rs o.nd Stripos 11 , e1.nnouncj.ng :n . .LL1:.?\ 1 e co.ptur,;. ·.:iho o.;?pc.1·ontly b-:; liov::id this to be true, booc.Pso sho 1110.s obviotisl~,r do:oply co:1.c:n:1od :.:1d shocked whon i"!;. '·rc.s suggost.71d ·~:1c.t. :tho story mi.~h·~ •1ot b.J tru:J. 8!:10 could offor no opinion cu; to his whoroc,bouts 1 ~)ut by o. question r'JVonlod t:1f?..t sho t:1ou'::h'l:. ho ~1i~;ht 'oo in hiding eonio1fr10~·0, 11 ·ti-:,rin.; to i-Y:.vo so.;1.:ithing for G,r :i;-,;:i~r 11 • Gho cloos not boliovo thri,t ho ho.s :flod. ·C.o ::-..no·thor country t r:nd sho. clc.ias -011c:(; ho n:::ivcr grwo o.ny indie:.tion of h::'.vi;.1-:; o..;1~r pl'c.ns i11 c::-.so o:i:' o. Gormt..21 collo.ps:;. 1 ST.~F (SS Ool) a~\m,r:J:HT ."~etod as privr.to coi.,1 :d.or b.-:ituoon E!l.£..iL.S:il rmd source ST:.F (us Col) Dr BR.:~2·1DT Lt, Col o? Police SUOHi\l'B:l'~ OS'l1l'JF (1st Lt) CfT7TG'i:SEN ':!hon tho Alliod -'.".dv::'.l'lOG threw.toned 3l:l~C:qI' ~8G.1tnz:r, soc.1 :·0:;; .:.iov::;CI with hor ehildron :f'irst t.o 4\()I-:};,IITSJ:Ji, T:·rol, -.ncl su.bsoq1_.·o~x'c.ly t.o c.;:1o·t::.::;r 2.ck}r.Jss, '..<horo this 111t.:;no3~::t~:o:·:'l t,ook pbco ~ff't,:;r ropoc:todly protosting thC'..t sho h'-.d bL1 mod t:,11 :1c·~· 1:.;ttors :tro:u Hll-'ii:IL~l., source fL.1r.lly '.'.d:Ji"ttod t,lY't · sl1'J l1r.. cl btrcn:::d o:i1ly ''· s·1r..ll port.io;:1 o~ tilom, ::-.s sho couldn't 1:1c.-:.r -C.O destroy r.;.i:.;,thin.:_;; so pr.:.;cious ·:o 1K•:i.'• Approp:·ic.to ?.uthor- itios hr..vo bco;.1 no·i:.ifiod r:;'.S"·rdin·~ t.ho disposition of ·tlueo lott,:n·e. Source ot.r.tos t.l1.'.':t HLUL:;R nov ..::r discu:>s od politics o:· 88 c.c'l:.ivitio;;; ;ri th hor, r.,;.1Q. th::\·t. sl;.o :.12.S b.:;o:;.1. COnlJ?lot,oly 1..'!ti:..1:for~uod 011 t.h:::iso !i.1:-.t.t:i:cs sinco l'.)·".ving hor job. Sho consj.dors !!L~iL~.i\ r.:1 iclo:'.'.list ·.·ri'c.h tro.:i:;:1d.0tcs f'.'.'Yc.l1 in G:;r;ur.n.y tGtd :i.;:i tho ?U ~r:-::~ ~:l. Sho boliov.::s -~:0.o:i:. ovo1·ything ho did '.·rc.s for ·the sc.ko of: Cf;;r~::ic.ny. Ho 113Vor :;nrichod himself, ~:1d. n-:;v.::.r lr.opt V".lt.1c.'1l'.) pr0.::;?"1ts but ~~r.vo t,hoa to tho ::.s. His 011l:r property is ~1is house in G"iUND/'i' ~GENSEE. vrMch }1:, ·)ou;.ht o~y Et ~-Jortgn.go r:md po.id off ovor r. }?OJ.·:Lod of' ~r~:c.rs. HIHHL'i.:!i. :rr'.s p1·ivo:kl;sr opposoc1 to .'.:'. conti:1i.t~r..tio11 of' ·:;:1:.:) -:.·mr r.:::;o.inst tho 'Jostorn Alli::is. Ho ntt:ribtctos ·~ho :Co.ct thc-;t ~ng)r.;:1cl ·.:1c1 t:1c US fought }:-;r.;lc.ny to ;TOE 1IBJ3I·"l'R01? 1 s inoptitudo, '.~1d b.)lL::vos t~1~.t '.:'.:.~.o :~:1or F'oroig:.1 ~.;inistor :.ni;sht h:w? r.voidod emch :'. disc.st.or. 1 22 Mv.y 1945 2 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

25X1A ... Approved For ~ease 200410211 S: C1fR~,~~sii-~Rt11.-~~.--0-2--7-~---1 ,,.,/ ~: Y Rof' No SA!C/l!i 19.May, 1945 .J § S O R ~ iirT rr' i·~:· · .,.. - - - - SEVENTH ARMY nrrERROG AT ION CEHTER Aro 758 .· US Army . : S E 0 R E T :Auth:-CG,-th Afin ~ Ini t: ~~.¥..Ii!~"::' :Dato: 19 Mav l • e ••••••• e •••• ' •• D • . HE:RMA.1"\J'N etOER!NG- TALKING I •. SOURCE GOERING, Hcrmaxm, RE!OHSMAR.SOHALL. Sour co ia by no moans tho oomica.l figuro ho ha.e boon dcpiotod so mw.w times in nowepapor reports. Ho is noithor stupid nor a fool in tho ShakoepoeJ'Oan son so, but gonorally cool and calculating, Ho i a ab lo to grasp the fundamental i sauos undor di scuaaion immodio.toly. Ho is certainly not a men to bo undorratod. Although ho triod to aoft-potlnl nany of the ·.;1ost outrageous crimes oom- mittod by Germany, ho said enough to show tha.t ho is as :nu.ch :rosponsiblo f'or the policies within Gormo.ny o.nd for tho war i taolf 1 o.s 1myonc in Germany. GOERING took great prida in claiming thnt it WM ho who wO:s rosporisiblo for tho ph.nning and suo- ooasf'ul. oxocutioi'.1 9f tho pare.troop landing 'in Croto, tho.t it was ho who had drawn up tho plans for a oapturo of Gibraltar, o. plrm which 1·10.a novor carried oµt booauao HITLER we.a opposed to it at tho lo.at minuto, tho.t i"t wo.s ho 1·1ho was ro~ponaiblo for tho dovolopmont of tho Luf'·two.:f'fo. On tho othor hnrn! ho denied hs.v:i,ng hr;i.d anything to do with tho rnc~nl lo.we nnd with th.'.) c ....1crmtrc.Hon cDmps, with tho sscnnd tho a.trooitios co:i:nmittod both in Gcrniany and. out-3id . :i. GCHRI~TG is o.t all times an actor who dorJs not diso.ppoint his o.udicnco. His vunity oxt011ds into tho field of tho pa.th- ologieal, a.a i~ oxoruplifiod by tho poo.rl-groy uniform, tho heavy, r;iolid gold opo.ul .. ottoa and an onor:noua dirunond ring 011 his right hand_. ovon though his modo.le woro limited to tiwo, including tho Grund Crose of tho Knight 1 s Qrosa with Swords and Diamond$· Juat a.s ;nuoh a po.rt of GOERIFG aro two of his f.'l.idoa, OBST (Col) VON BRAUCHI'l'SOH, aon of tho Field Mo.r aht'.ll, ::nd HPTM (Ca.pt) KLAAS· GOJ:RING was only too ploasod to bo o.blo to diaousa tho history of tho pa.at 12 yee,rs, nnd ho gavo all information more thon willingly to n group of interrogators. II· .THE W@ Outbrogk And Tho Polish Oampqip;n aomnTG olo.ilna tho.t ho triod to provont HITLER from launchirlg tho Polish COll1paign, and whon ho did, ond Frc.nco o.nd Brito.in did not doclo.ro wo.r iinraadin.toly, ho a.ttomptod onoo moro to brin'g a.bout a poa.coful solution to tho pro.blcm • From l - ; Sopt 19;9 tho Gormti.n f'orooe waro ·o.dvo.ncing into Polnnd without o. doolo.ro.tion of' wo.r. GOERING roQoivod a. mosm:\go through his poraono.l courio:r in SllEDEH o.t noon on ; Sept from Visoount H.\LIFJ\X, in which tho lo.ttor aekod him onco mo1·0, oncl for tho lo.st timo, to ho.l t tho oporo.tione bof'oro :l.t wo.s too lo.to. OOZRING boggod HITLER to stop tho Gor-- motl forooa and t,o mo.kc an off or to Brito.in nnd Franco to tho offoct tho.t they would bo ldlling to aolvo tho problem poa.cof'ully, if thoy 11.fould bo o.llowod to keop tho territory 111roady oooupiod in tho f'i:r at throe day a of So pt. Tl+i a would ha.vo monnt the olitnin11tion of tho Polish corridor--all thie torritol;'y ho.d boon overrun in tho f'irst thro9 days--r.i.rid would ho.vo given GormMY nn aroa, which for n. long timo wae boing joo.lously wc.tchod and vory !'1.Uch covotod by Germ.any. GOERING fools that tho offor might ho.vo boon o.eooptablo to Brito.in end Frrmco. on tho grounds tha.t it Nould have loft, Polrmd ct bu:f'for ata.to botwoon Gormo.ny ro1d R1.tssin.· Bo~wvo~, boforo thoao propoeo,le oould bo oubmittod to ;Brita.in and Frru100, tho doolaration of war arrivod from both thoao oountrios. 'rho Invo.ei?B Q£ Fro.1100 AU,c! .!lE. Lowloode GOERING. orodits HITLER for tho plo.n of tho invo.eion of Fronce (\l'ld tho LowlMde • Or;i.gino.lly it wo.e intondod to invado Frr)Jioo o.t a much oa.rlior date, aomotirno during tho wintor Qf 19,9-40. HITLER o.skod. GOERrnG to inform him ae aoon n.s ,. ,_ porio'd of f'ino woo.thor wn.e in eight, ao that tho Lui'tw!-'..f'fo could bo conuni tted f'or o.t least fivo days i'n a rou, a period which i;10.s ooneiclorcd sulf.iciont to disorgnilizo the .Fronoh lino a and. to la1.111ch a powerful off on sivc, th.o ma.in of'fort of uhioh wa.a to come !U'ound N1J4Ul\. GOERl:NG claimed that n.t thA.t time ho WO.F.1 very rauc'1 op po sod to tho in- Vo.sion of Fr Mao, and ·euggosted ropoo.todly tho.t it bo po otpdnod until Spring. Ho l!Q~!! ~// ~ ~Afjloved For Release .2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 \ j l

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP8J..;00415R006200030002-7 wa.a in conata.nt f'on.r o.11 through tho winter thri.t a. poriod of fino woa.thor might pro- cipitnto tho offonsivo o.gcin at Frn.nco. It wo.o during tho winter of 19,?9-40 tha.t a. certain •nisho.p. occurred which almost rosul tod in GOERING' s ond, at least as a. poli tico.l figure, Md ::tight havo moant Gormany 1 s ond, if tho accido11t ,.,ould hr.vo boon oxploitod properly by tho Allios· A Gorrua.n courier 'l'Jn.s given tho comploJr,o plans for tho invasion of FrMco ond tho Low- lands, which woro to be dolivorod at a GoncrQ.1 Staff Oonf'oronco c.t Oologno. Tho pilot, n.ccord5.ng to GOERIJVG, got lost and landed in BELGIUM by mistako. The po.pore woro promptly captured, but everybody rcfusod to boliovo that they woro nnything but a fa.ko. Whon tho courior di scovo:·ou. tho mi stnko ro1d found th1;i. t tho pl a.no had londod, not on tho dostinod uirfiold on tho right bo.nk of tho RHINE, but in BELGIUM, ho inado an attempt to burn the: pc.por s, but ho succoodod only po.rtioJly, and mo st of them wore cn.pturod oi thor i.;1tact, or nt loo.st, in such L':trc;o fro.g;:Jonts, that tho ma.in gist of' tho documonts could not bo ra:L sto.kon. Whon ~h0 riowo hroko of what had happonod, HITLE'.R :r;rivod at GOiffiING ro1d tohl him thn.t tho Luf'twaffo Wn.s rosponaiblo • for this faux pns· G03RING told hio o.LJ~dicmoo how ho snt n.t homo by tho firosido Hith pa.pore trying to reconstruct what hri.d h11.pr1cmod, n.nd ho ovo11 burnt his fingers trying to find out whether or not the courier ho.cl. had time to burn moot of tho papors. At tho instigation of his wifo, ho caUocl in sovorn.l diviners nnd f'oi"tuno tellers who finally roached tho conclusior.1 that tho doto.ilod p8.!'t of tho plan for tho invo.eion muet huvo boon dogtroyod. Tho rosu.l t of r:i.11 this wn.s that 11. now plr.u1 wn.s drawn up, \·rhich 1·ras b ;,ttor than the fir :':ft, and which wo.s finnlly O}l'.ocutod, i .o · tho breakthrough at SEDAN. GOERING was very enthusiastic· D..bout tho wri:;1 in which HOLLIJ:W was conquorod, prid- ing h"msolf' o.gain and ,.,..go.in f'or hi a oHn ingrmui ty in this com1oc'do11. Ho tolls tho story of a Dutch first licut.:.m@t who told G.bout thin inpidont~ Gon WIFICELM.i!.NN, Oommando:r of t,ho Dutch ti.rmod Forcos 1 wo.s Cf.'.llod up on tho tolophonc by this Lt who wo.s holding n. certain bridge noo.r tho Albert Canal. Tho latter aakod him for per- mission to blow up tho bridge boco.ucu there wore 9araohutirrl:rs dropping down in tho illlmodiato vicinity. Gen WimCELi'liJiJI'<T refused to boliovo tho otory, o.nd told him to refrain from blo1ving up tho bridgo. A fow minutes 1'1.tor tho Lt co.llod again, ond again Gon i'!INK'9:Llv1ANN rofu0od to boliovo it, t1.11tl adding that ho rofusod to ho.vo two divisions cut off from rotroc>.t,--thoso divisions woro boi11g hounded by tho Gorma:ne from tho front--nnd t'10..t it 110,s o.boolutoly im.ponsiblo tk\t Ql'l.Y pa.ro.troopore would do.re to drop behind tho linoa. A few minutos ln.tor tho Lt cnllod for tho last timo, eeying 11 GonoroJ, I Ml a.bout to be n.rrost,;d 11 , ttnd o.t tho.t momont tho G0rr.ion para.- trooper o co.pturcd tho Lt Md tho bridge into.ct· Tho Bombing Q! ROTTERDti1 GOERING' o story of tho bombing of :ROTTERD~\.M wo.s vory much in divorgenoo with tho published otorice and the known fa.ots. GOERING clnims tho.t only ono wo.vo of 56 plnnoa on.rryi;pg inoondio.ry bombs, nono of which oxcocdod 50 kg, dropped its bombs. GOTERING booomo vory oxci t,ed \· hon ho wo.s' n.ekod for hi G oxpl nno.:tiori :for tho large' nUlll- bor of' don.d n.nd wounded. 11 1tfuat largo numbors of woundod? 11 ho cried. 11 I toll you what hn.pponod 1 tho fire b:rigndo wo.s so sen.rod to death (H~\.T SO EUTEI>T SCHISS Ga;11i'J3T) thnt it rof'utiod to movo out and do o.nything a.bout tho firo. Thc.t 1 s \1hy such o. lo.rgo po.rt of tho city burn~,do\m, Tho dbstruotion could hi:wo, boon rostrictod to a. very srnflll o.rca, if tho firo brigade would have taken n.ny rtction on it. You can o..sk tho BUERGERMEISTER of ROTTERDJ~i1 about tho.t, n.nd ho will toll you th.o s~no thing. All thooo stories of hundreds or thouo!:\;nds of doa.d 8.lld wounded etre juct invontiono o.nd fairy talos (ERFil\rDUNGEJ.1.T tP.ID Mli.EROHEN).. At tho mo st eomo tlront~r or thirty pooplo could have died fro:w fumes, \'rhilo they vrcro hiding in tho coll al"• When tho second wave QoJllO ovor, Gon STUDSNT ordered· a. :rod flare to bo fired to provont tho dropping of'mo~o bontba 1 Md this was dono, r.nd no furthor bombs were dropnod. 11 1 g9ERING 1 o Pln.n For. ~ho Modi torro.noan In 1941 GOERING had l111J.do plans for a masaivo offonsivo in tho Moditerra.noo.n. plon was about a.a follow::i: Throe JaJoy Groups woro to tako pr:i.rt in who:t W'\S Tho intondod tc. 2 ' l ' ·-"' Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 '-' \._I