Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 24 May 45 Gs No, that is a lot of rlonsense. + + + HERi'11ANN'' I ONLY HERMANN! NEVER ANYTHING ELSE DUT HERlY1ANN ! TO DE CALLED BY ONE 1 $ FI.rtST NAIYiE - !ill!! IS THE HEIGHT OF POPULAI<ITY. G: THE "1'EOP'LE NEVER CALI.ED ME ANYTHING ELSE BUT 11 ·J: '? . 2.4 May 45 SEVEN'l'H ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER p,.v.J2 ~~~'1.j?-..._.€4 . PAUL KtJilALA, Maj, MI Commanding. 11 9 Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

·~1'H~-~-~-~pn---,n·~-'!'""'"""""'*h ~ • ;W*fh:Hlh# 1 . App roved For '·r-- COi .., .... ...,~5X1A Jt.+iA ~\4102~1J: CIA-RDP83-00415R00;..;:6~2~0~00;;..;3;..;;0~0..;;..0=2-..;;..7_ _ _ ____, \\. . \ l ## 4'J'\'WllW............~4 ! ...,. rl ucLos~Qt1~~ ·, '1! Mtll rlucn ... ----. -............ " .i~ !. ::. ;Auth~ , i Ini t: • . r·) ;;·, t . .; .. - ' ' I . • &~.f..B!!: CG, ?th Arm.y · ·:1v1vo 'r. :Pate: 28: ~ay i9~: I f • • .. , • •.f, , • 'fll . . . . f • '! • • • t . SEVENTH ARMY lNTERRQGATION CENTER · . APO 758 , US A~MY . :I .·\ .. . . 1 lf ,the inforlilation contain~d in thi~ report is, required for further distribution·, it should be so. paraphrased _that no r;1ention is made of the prisone?'s • .names QJ- of th;e methods by which t.he information has been obtained. f ' ' . ' ' i The. fc;illowing are t.he' nalnes and sec~et numbers of the prisoners r:!en- tioned ill- thi.s rep9rt1 : • \ .I ~ GUDERIAN, Rank~ Jlositio.~ ;. l , Secret _·N~ G~n) FU~HRZRRESERVE (Offieers ~o.o,l), Formerly Chief o.f .Stt?.ff German.. Ground Forces and 45/1559 GENOBST (C9l Heinz In1wec.tor Generp.l of Armored Un;i. ts • • ' i 'i • . GEN: P,,P4TRUPP;E!, lLt Gen), Inspector of Ar~.ored uni t,s,. formerly German ·, Mil A:tt?,~h~ in f.ON.POH •. ; : " .,.. VON GEYR , 1 Leo ~ ' 45/1562 •,, OBSTGRUf (Col,·G~n o.f WAFFEN SS), ex":-·CG1 A:rr:nY Group i•G 11 ~ · ~ HAUSS~, Paul 45/1561. , ·I 1 ' \ '· (' ~ t ! . ~ : .f 'i,, .. l .f; t I. t t ! \. i f ~ ; .. ! f "" b stQ,, rt . b l'·.t : n ~ I J : l Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 ' 25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 b J -2 28 May, 45 I• .!!!E. RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN GUDERIAN: Everything went welf at the start. After the fall of SMOLENSK 9ur high command was faced with the same choice of decisions as NAPOLEON in 1812; Should I fi;rst ~o to MOSCOW, or should I first con- quer the UKRAINE and occupy Russia's national granary,: ....... ~ .... . or should ! go to conquer LENINGRAD in order to get the Baitic ~ea under my control. This problem had been considered earlier, be'cause everyone knew that such a decision would have to be made sometime .. Even l;lefore this campaign the FUEHRER had decided to take LENINGRAD first, in order to have the entire Baltic Sea under hi"s control, and ,thus establish a naval base supporting the German le!t flank. At the time when Qu;r troops stood at the gates of LENINGRAD, and when the drive wa~ held up at KIEV., on our right flank, he suadenly chang- ed his mind, He abandoned the idea to take LENINGRAD first--an attempt which could have succ~edecL Nor did he attempt to take MOSCOrv' as NAPOLEON had done--in spite of our firm conviction that MOSCOW could be taken.. In fact, ! had already given orders for an attack on MOSCOW for 15 Aug with PANZER Army. Instead he decided, after weeks of thought, to conquer the UKRAINE first. Thus, on 2.5 Aug, t had to'head back in a soutnwesterly direction toward KIEV, instead of being allowed to ,_:tart'my drive toward MOSCOl'i. Well, at least the capture of KIEV resulted in the isolation and surrender of an: army group. But it set us '.back 4 weeks in our advance toward MOSCOW. It got us into the muddy season, where the mud made traffic on ordinary roads impossible, and'retarded it very much even on hard- surfaced rpads. It was w;i..nter be~ore ~ t got too cold~ You in.;istn 1 t underestimate MOSCO\v's importance. MOScrn; is not only the capital of Buss.ia, but CO!).Sidering the conditions of 1941, it was the hub of Russia's communication system. Ail the connections between North and .South whicb were still. usable, al~ double-track railroad line 1 all the main t~legraph and telephone lines, all canals and navigable ;rivers, .... everything :passed throuih MOSCOW. WJ;loever controlled MOSCO\V also controlled the politic al affairs, a powerful armament industry, and a traffic and communications center of that nation, and could split Russia into two parts: -I personally presented this case to the FtJE~RER on the night of 23°Aug 1941. Then he was still un- decided. Later the order was giv eri to take the UKRAINE. I was called to h~m to present my plan for the attack on MOSCOW once again. And io.nce, again I tried to change his ~ind. At that time he still could . control hiqiself sufficiently to listen to me and let' me finish my story. Once more l pictured the vital importance of MOSCOW to us and e.xplained to him, that if we could capture MOSCOW in the early f'all toward the end of September, we could cut Russia in two parts. And t'hen we could still de'c;Lde whethe~ to occupy the southern or the Northern half first. That v1as th~ purely military angle of the affair. Now let us consider the Eolitical angle, which was equally iinportant. It was believed that ~h~ S'.tALIN ree;ime would break dovrn politically. But in order to bring this regime to a collapse it Vias necessary to occupy MOSCOW. l'fo should have pursued a policy of con- vincing the Russian people that they would get better deal if they cooperated w.ith us. We should not have said, as we did: 11 \Ve shall cut Russia into ~:m<:!.ll pieces. We shall divide it ond make a German colony out. of it. n Thus the Russ~ans. even those who were against STAL!N, the White Russians, said: "No, we v1on 1 t have that. 11 This wM our gr~a.t political error. The d'ecision to take the UKRAINE first t .which resulted' in the unsu~cessful winter camJ;>aig~ 'against MOSCOW, and.the misguided policy t.oward the Russian people--these tvro were the reasons why vie did not find the ne Ci:>~,,,,,.,..,. _support among ..t ________'f ! ·\ d my a L \ Approved For 1 2 _j Reis~ 20Q~2/1~: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 tlKt _ - ~-~-~-~-~-··-----~

''''''.. = 4t1 "f - s ••t*•••••••f*'"'T"'*" ... ,. ~ ·- ·.' ~· '·* • . •lnll:llC<= ~~-- Ap~roved For ReleasatBi~~: CIA~RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 .·,- ~ 2.S Ii I 45 -......_ May ii '•;the population, rior-'the military• strength to f.inish this campaign ·-as quickly ,as pbssible. And 'this 'was so essen.tial, becau_se tl';i.ere . stil'.l was an undefeated enemy. in the West. On. top of v:l."erything, . Japan and. ~edca came. _to 'grips_,~ and VJe though,t we might have to tn.ter 'that conflict - too. So we '-issued a new declaration of war, which' addeCl America· to the. side ·of 6ur enemies •. I don 1't know the rea.$OfiS 'tor' thiS last decision . . 'But I vras at the frqnt I commanding -·:~..:.tnY arl)3:y',Jarid thu's couldn't far.1iHarize myself Vtith every detail. . 't . , , t i' +\l ,r • ' I ... ~ . (Rel Why' KIEV was taken i'frst' arid, ,_ot. n;!~C ; •{ · .... ' ' . · ' . ·. f l-~OSCO~V) 1! c;onf'errea with the. FtJEfttrE.rr tv;iJe about, this. que~hon ;.·once on 3 Aug 1 ·~d,',:oI1C~ 23 Aug.'' At that tir:le the ger{eral staff, too, was in . "_.fayor Of, attacking MOSCOW first.' . GUD; ·'t·• on. \~en th~t ~ANZER dlttn: rfnal~; Army GU.DERIAN did attack, we ho.d a temper- ~tuie o( 35 deg· (C) below and- an icy ~.,ind...... At that time the (>l'/.ly way to employ armored divisions _was to gather the tanks of a lj\\iii,per o'f different' divisions. Tha't' shows how few tanks we had left • . T'here was no' time for· repairs, nor did we have the necessary .• quipmerit and spare parts. My ovm division, which I had led up to " that carnj>aign, was reduced to 12 tanks at i·.~oscow. ~NTE~OGJ.rrt'NG OrFICE~; H~v,-\1igh do you lstimate the casualties at t~aft:ime? GUD: buring, the winter";a~paigh of~ 1~41 .they ,;1~re not,· too: high. Our <principal losses were caused through the cold. But to be honest, ~9JJ..r casu'.a.ltie s weren 1 t abnormally high until vie came to STALINGRAD. ~ho&e were our fir st c'atastrophlc losses. Then Vie had these ·terrific envelopinentS: ... tve had ~oome 300 ,ooo casualties there. From the.n on~ with these continued' ei1veloprhents of large uni ts' we suff- eret;i our first irrevlacable los~ses. Th:.it :·ras also where the German eoJd.ier f's mora·le staH'ea 'its 'dovniward slide. There he lost his -~~n~e of ~nvincibiJit~ •. _-Our mer1 took part in practically every '&.t.:taek, 'Vlithout cori1pla:U:lt. Bi.i.f' in this final c~\mpaign ·we no longer · ,. eould attack. None of our ·a.tt~fcks succeeded~ And before that, not even out most difficult attacks failed • .,.;.,:' .. : . •.:}. . (Re; ..'•) ·+ + .,-I Count VON~SCtruLENBURd) \· ~. ·< ; . .; ' .. -.. j·-- . . .. ' 'i .. GUD; He was ~ native of l'WSCt>W, went to school there, and was said to be exceedingly well acquaint v1Hh the country. From a military point of view, he was one c>"t the bes{ authorities on nussian t~ctics, and ·1n addition to th!=l:t he ~ad· ved g~od. connections in"Rµssian military . ¢~CleS! . knew that for a Certainty, .. I.le operD.ted JU St like a R\jesia,n, The Russ~a.ns were. more open .J.M more friendly . toward him thap t.hey were. towar(i' most• £dreigners, Thus we al1!1ay s were Well #formed~ . Nobody cai:·; a·ay that 'his r~ports _were incorrect, but no one wouf.d believe t~em. · . ' ' · ea· + ;' ' : . i. t " +-~ • . ' J . . , ~' .; GUD; If fewer of our ou.tstanding, strategists. h.;id been ai~n1issed in 1943 .S,t),,d at the" end of .1941t ~Je would. have fo{ight an entirely different ··wir. r' myself~. w&s 're1ioveq _or .mY c0.mm8-nd on the basis or false reifort which a senior. gener~l ~ad m~de"'about 'm~ In. Ja~ 1942, ~fter . r~turninG from nussia, ..I demanaed"an'investigation l:Jy a military court. It was my intention to'have the facts straightened out. My a I ,.- l J l ' . j t ~J Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 3

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 stOi\ .. . \ ·----~~--d 28 May 45 ' ' . Il,ot request was . grante<i. . I In the case of another general, an in- Ve$t~p;ation was. also refo13ed.. ¢n~ general filed a suit, v1hich, how- (i!Ver., .. Vlf-S hOt carried. thr,ough. ·In the fcillowing spring a law was passed·which susp~nded the iegu1ar courts. Thus the dictatorship was ;fj,rrnJ..y entrenched in the army. From then on it was imposs- ible ~o file a suit, or to dema~a a trial. Later, when the law was intensif;i.e<jl, it even becari1e "'~mpossible to resign. My predecessor as Chief of the General staff handed in his resigno.tion five times, but :l.t. was p~ve;r ~ccepted~ When I ~12cs assigned to the. Genernl Sta.ff without peing consulted about the assignment, I v1as received with tJ:i.ese~ ..words: 1'I d.o ,n9t want yoU: to st~~rt out by tendering your res- ignation.. It wouldn't be granted anyv1ay. I t is up to me (HITLER) whether ¥.au stay in' your offiCe ·or not-your wishes are of no con- sequence. I alone am responsibie for what happens--not you!h ... , II. m IO: +~)+ . +++f INVASION' Th~re bet~een isl a $harp d:i'fference the tank battles on the Eastern front, those of the Western' front. Those in the EAST were al- ways on ~ larger scale.· and GEYR: TP.at is just what we wanted. \Ve wanted. to spare our' tanks, in o:i;:~er to Qe a.'ple ~o engage the Ar;1ericans and fhe English in a real fight where we could put our e~eriences of the Eastern front to good ~se. I was of a. different opinion than ROi,,MEt. I expected your ;!.a~ding to 'be successful. The Anglo-Saxon vrnrld had prepared itself for·· a' J.,aridi.ri.$..:.;.and we 'could not' stop the guns of· the Anglo-American fl.e~t anp. its ai:rcover with merily -~ few mines. The troops· v;·ould ~;imply w~lk ashore~ There V/O..S our one chance to enga~e the Allies in a real' tank battle, while PATTOtl' was still assembling his units. It would ha'l(e .been a boon to my'.old days, i f ! had' another chance to fight with the divisions ! had trained myself. But fate wouldn't hav,e it po~ ..... ROMMEL's armc,rea:d:i,visions were largely dispersed, and under constant AT fire. . IO.i But ;),.t · w~s ,.almost 2. mont"hs t4rou~h AVPu1.NCHES. at .... GEYR: Th;~t mad:~. IO: He our mis:take i afte~ the invasion before PATTON broke l a worse oje ~et. forced yoti .~int~"'a"very small; pocket. . .· . . . . f GEYR: That is the reason ·why I was retieved. After CHERBOURG was taken, -everyone realized, including MA~SCHALL HUNDSTEDT that the CAEN bridge head, wou).q have to be vacated. proposed tnat in order save the a.tmc>:red ..divisions, so 'that I co~ld let them ge't some rest and. then eonunit thc111 on the left flank, 'Every .would-be officer realized that ~he Americl:!-ns vrould down ffom CHERBGURG to break. through our 7th Army positions. I had the divisions (to stop them) but was not l'ermitted to emJ?loy them in this manner. ·r to come IO: H -wa~· t~o . iatE?' even then~ l ~v~ ~ a.lready . had "cHt:n.tfotrnG. t GEYR: There wap slim chance of suc~e9~~ .~., 971r chance,s woulq h~ve b~en m\teh bet'._~r ~t AVRl~~CIIES. ~~ tr.t t.inw_y.ou co,17ld have been defeated. !Os I still fCllle,mby,r ~hat thef ~. vr~~j ar:L?red di vis.ions 1opposing us. we a1V1ays y.r?ndcred ~when tl~'l( be committed. Approved For Release 2po,4t02/1 \· : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 And 4-

~144¥#44 -·~ ; """""""'_.1!1!'911--..,.,_.,,.,..,,...:z .._._ . 4 ¥ :#44H _,. l 4 ii • A ,, ....... .... ; ,,.•.,.._ _ _'"""'"'·""'' .·~·'"'"""'· • Ap~rove\For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-~DP83-·oo415R006200~30002-7 \..., .._•1!1111!'---!"---...... 28 May 45 " ·.' , ·, -~ i G~YR: "~ I : ·...- . ; / ':· . . . . ~;" . .< '. .. :J ·.,·'' . . . ,l can. tell you exactJ,;y, which divisions. I had.in store for you. The 17 SS· Di~:l~ion and the diviSion 11 tiAS 'RE!CH, i: a first rate cu tfit, viere ie$er\red tho Ar11erica'ns~ "T}leh' vie. had saved for you the 1 11 1 >,\ ~J~~UJ'l~RTE and ~1t,:tt'L}El<JU9ENP~' d:i.;visions and large components '·o? the 2'1 ~rmored a?ld. the 5" Armor~d. , Tha. t was ('1Ui te a far cry from t,h.e 011erst;ra:i'..ned '17 Division.. They were a brave new unit, more or. ·l~,ss. the oply ·.ones i!l, the ~rml. sector 11iho fought brilliantly. . . ·;~:i.~.el? thp. t thc:r.e .. wq},~~'~ fav.o. me~}um-sized El.rmorcd 'Uni ts whiCh did ·I\,6t:. bsloAg to tho 7 Army sector. for i HAUSS~:R{ ~here'' v1~s' also , ,. iig~f Yi~nk. the . ~ £k~:R divisio~~ ,, . . ; ,~ . -: It ~as furth0; back. on tho . i .. . .· + l. t . .' . . .. . . GEYRi According to the o~i~inal J{lan, tte (PANZ.Eh) Wm di'vision ·was not to b~ corom'itte~. But"! cou1cl not~ wi fhdraw it from the vicinity of BAYEUX exc~pt .·by vacating· the.· CAErl bridgehead. That bri'dgehead was "1;i.P t~11ger 'of any use to us 'r -;way: The time for throwing the Brit- 1.Sb.1 frQm t.)ie. bridgehe'ad." back into· the sea had long passe·d. It was ·only 8.: .mat:ter, of· h?1.~i.~i _a~'fev1 'pl~in ~ields •• .'. ~nfort~.nately ·r W'a~- !1.9t J;p; h:~:ye the I!1~..~.!5ure of c_;ossin~ svJOrds with General PATTON. I really would have enjoyed that. It was beyond.me, why we could n,pt. hav~ 9,ommitt~d a ;t>~1.Z~1< arm~ ~n this deci_si.ve battle against your, f-orces. Then at leai?t we would have fought on an even basis. ++ ') .; . . . G;.iY:R: 1'1J,e si tuat.,ion at. CAEt~ .was. as follows: On· the 'inorning after the ~t~~9k, t,he'r_e were l;)~t; .)00 men left w~tb the. surviving commander of the aivisionwhich had ~een hit on the coast! That is vihat I found w~~~. '.h. t?qk. qv~~ t.vt~,;:t;\f:~~ :. ia,\er, !iavin,g. misi;>ed ~he ~-egi~n_ing. T~e :re1Jlal:1<ier ;of. ~h~· d;iy~s.~gn.,!'.;0..d beep def?troyed .b.:f. the alhed ~arships ;·p;.f."v~h;i.,ch.,You knovv more ,than I do.. But I knov1 how effective they are I :An.d.~the.n on~ v1anted to believe· us. when vie told them how farin- •.. ; ~~#~". ~-~~- ~~s .of thes~'.'yja.!6.hips c~uld fire~· ·They "just iuouldn' t be- ll~.ve our ,reports. There I had b,ut one reply: ' 1.Gentlemen, just .,tand t·h~r;e for, a whi:J.~ ap.d you 1 11 find out how far they can fire. 11 ~·>'. "'J ·; i '": ,. ·';; '·•;: .. ·: 1' -~c~. ' · (.ttlpi !~ 9~ rei:iorts to he~.d,q,u.arters tl}ese and many •other descriptions were · · t&i.t:nPl:Y" not believed-•.. Tnat was our bard luck •. Our misfortune in · thi.$ v1.ar, one of many, vuis 'that the niajor:l.ty of our lead;ing person- ali tie~ never had any front line commands during. the war'. \'ihen it ytas l".eported, for example, that the British fleet was outside CAEN t t·hat they C.Ould fire c~S ')0• km inland, and that therefore it W~tlld ~ensele.~s to l~ay~ qur a.:r~or.ed 'tlivi~o,nswithin :the range of the:!.r. art~lle.rY-:.-someon~ wcmld ·simply maintain that they couldl'l 't 'f~r~ ~hat far. J.1,qd t,~e.;£," }'0,''-'-d cl~im n.~x'f;. ~ th~t. Just th~~e . last 3 Q'r 5 km wo,uld make . all th~ ,difference.. The people v1ho made these ~tateri1ents, ne;v~r too~ ?.,:g ..?-Qt:iX~ 'in the war themseives. They got all their ,experie!fce at ·~~s's.io~s ~round .con'ference tables~ . no ... ·:\.'' ; . · . \ ,{. . as''far be ·part ~ TFh i, ' - I IO: I J '{ l ' ' .<• \·~~ <;L01.ll~ ttot' und~rs:t~nd,,. vrl,ti .the i:nv~~~on in the South 'of "France .$'U~C\9~d..~d, s¢ eM'.?-lY •.. You must hav~ been prepared. After all, you llCJ.4 dai~ 'reconnaissance ~is-~ions' over CorsiCa, North 'Africa, and I~.~y. You must have sus_veCted .·. s~omething.. A!ld you· must have seen · 9ur 9oats 'wl:lk,~ were·;. o!f.'re'Qqnna~is;sance . ·,patrol along' the 'coast. '51:,tmi.·, . . ~\.-1 1 l L . c, .. ;,~ i '{ j Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 .'

Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 l !8 May . a!'' . SfJ 6ur' '- 45 } , CiUD; The, r~ason for this fies ·in' p~culiar evaluation of defensive stren,gth, which is indicative 'of our strategy during the last year o't this v.rar, It v1as :purelyastrategy of lines (LINEAR-STRATEGIE). O~r system of fortifica'tions was arran~ed along a number of lines. First. th~ WESTWALl., which \r1as onlJ. one line . for. all practicall pur- poses. The line behind it had not been completed. Then the ATLANTIK- WALL was built, again nothl.ngbut 'one line. And this was the line in wnich all available divisions committed. When it was suggested to assemble our armored divisions \ehfod it, as a mobile reserv-e which could 'l;>e us~d to oppose Jttack, regardless .where i t may CO?Ife tr.om, we were told: aNo, they 'would be too· 1ate, everything will have to 'be thrown ::i,.nto the front ~ine. 0 ROMMEL was the main propon- ent of this ~t+ategy. ~ · · were an of i IO: How is it, that ROMMEL favored such a theory? his les~o.i:1 in North Arrica. ,j 'i\" Re should have learned , ' , l -: ,. ,. . ·. C)UD: .ROMMEL was the princlJ?a1 :proponent of this theory in France. - Later on KLUGE fol).owed suit •.. And it vvas. impossible f'or me to do anything against it. A fortress such as A~TWERP, for example, was not util- ized •.. It had neither ammunition or ar.mament worth mentioning. Th&.t wa;s thE).. worst blunder we could po4sibly have made. 'And vie did not fortify PARIS! Nor did vie repair· the fortresses VERDUN, EPINAL, })],:LFORT, Mt'l'Z, or STRASSBURG so· tnat they c'ould be used. \'Je simply had tv~o lip.es: the· ATLAN,'!'IKWALl--v}hich Vias expected to fail like. any ·other insfa.llation of its kind wherever the enerny v10uld attac),q ·and then the \VEST\'JALL--ano.t~er line Vl~ich' was ex~ected succ~nb w~er- eyer. the ep.emy would concentrate all his efforts. · t,o ',, ! , ' H: ROMMEL and' I wer'e at odds about this for r:any n1onths. Th,en G·~neral' <lUDERIAN himself 'came' t.o France order t? ba~k me up. But un- forlunately it was imp.ossible to ~chieve anything. ' . j ' GUD: I was sent to ROi;1MEL for that particular purpose. But HITLER told m~: 11 1 can't tell the Fieldmars:hai .in comm8.nd how to run his bus- iness.11 ' ( . '' ' .J ' . H: We. knew eXfiCtly, even before· the invasion started, that the ratio of allied. art ored rec n cars (PAN?.ER.SPAEH'1'vAGEN) to ours was 15 to l; ·tanks, 10 to l; and plan~s, 30 or'50 to 1. And in view ·of this sit- uation our only hope for victory lay with mobile warfare. in . ·- ~-·n .. 1 GEYR: R0MMEL was a fafr'ly '"'goo·d t. . l ._, , tacticia~, but he ' . , didn •t have the faintest idea about. strategy. GUD: ROMMEL was excellent as high up ~~ a corps commander. He vias a' first rate divisioq.al commu.nder, 'because he was courageous, went to the front, and partici:pa ted in everything. .8ut later, v1hen he commanded an army, using the same technique~ he lacked the vision which is essential .for such a task. You knoVI, i t takes time to learn to lead l~rge and fast armored uni ts. · .l\na ROl,;MEL was not a tank expert. Aftor all, you can't suddenly replace years of schooling by intuition. I<0}1J11:gt ).ost some' o·f his nerve in 'Africa. . IO: GUD: Wh~t do '/ ', . ;i . - -. ~ . yo~ think of our General PATTON? ~ G'e,nera:l'PA~TON didwh~ t vie v;b"uld t~_ve hk~a to- have d~ric- and 'vrha t we used to do'. He was very f?.~b,' v1hich 'could a1ready be seen in HOR- ?r'JANDY. I was with the FUEi!RER-vih.t:n PATTON's drive started. He said: - SECRl1 . Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 6

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Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 L 28 May 45 - • SAAR territory was to be undor American jurisdiction. No European can be unbiased about these questions, not even the British. The idea of a 11 Balance of Pov1er 11 is of prime importance to the English- man. There was a bitter struggle between EDEN 1 s and SAl\:UEL HOATIE•s schools of thought concerning this point. England under her present leadership is not i.n the position to be as impartia.l toward European problems as the United States would be. One must look at this realistically. A farreaching and fair solution of Europe's economic problems is possible only under the le<-'1. dership of the United States. + + + (Re: DACHAU) GUD: We can't understand that. Even our own circle was affected. The chief of my operational depae"tr.1ent was in DACHAU. I never isot any news from him. My wife coulc'"1 1 t utter a word, or she t too, would have been sent to DACHAU. We knew of a few of these clirty affairs in the concentration camps. IO: Couldn't you go ther~ youself? GUD: No, that was impossible.· •••• HI!uMLER was responsible for all the atrocities. + + + GEYR: I was with RIBBENTROP for one year as a military attache. I only stayed with him out of a sense of duty. He was ~o professional diplomat who knew his business. He had lived in Canada for a while, and thought that the British were just like the Canadians. But they are qui~e different--you can't compare the tVIo nations. And guided by his ignorance he believed that he understood the English people. ++ + GUD: In the Summer of 1 43 and the Fall of 1 44 our generals explained to our Foreign Minister that a two-front war v:ould be impossible. The front in the Eall?t could be he.ld only if the ~Jest could be pacified. We would have to be free on one side. I presented these ideas not only to the Foreign Minister, but also to the FUEHRER. It was im- possible to get theili to consider these questions seriously. + -:- + GUD: During the Polish campaign, the FUEHRER was with me, only 50 meters behind the front line--he v1as still with me in France--but never in Rus.sia. IO: He would stay ar:ound as long as everything v1ent v1ell, but no longer. GUD: That was not the reason--he left because he had to fly South. Only a few ·weeks ago he was still vdth some divisional. headquarters near the ODER, He was not to be blqmed himse:J,.:f; the FUEHRER was no coward. But the fault lay with his friends, ·.VTho kept him more and more in the dark, vii thout themselves knowing anything about warfare. ·roo bad he d-idn 't follow my advice to join his men. H!'.rnever, his heal th wasn't up to standard a~ere actually v1ere some men in his I l . .. Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 8

i l ' 2B Approved For May Releas~2004/02'19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 45 . circle, men of Supreme Headquarters such as JODL, ZEITZLER or BOR- MANN. who never came anywhere near the front. GEY:Eh At,Jeast ZEITZIER commanded a Corps at one time. H: But he never left his he·~dquarters to go forward. He never came closer to the front than his corps hec,dquarters. I remember him . :Crom the French campaign with the PAN.0ERGRUPPE KLEIST, where he was my superior. Not once during the entire campaign did he come to my headquarters. was + + + GUD; I never heard anyone present a viewpoint at the FUEHRER HQ which differed ~ram that of the FUEHRER. . ' . ' . IOi That is not what GOERING told.us. He claimed that he had numerous quarrels with HITLER about the employment of the air force. GUDt That is unquestionably true~ They argued at every meeting ••. but those were onesided arguments, +++++++ 28 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER Pc;..,..J. PAUL 11~J,.,.r~.. , KUBALA, Maj; MI, p Comrn~ndin~. SECRET 9 c Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7