

Breaking Hitag2

Hacking at Random 2009

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August 15th 2009



Hitag types

- ▶ First step: Google (or bing :-) for information
- ▶ Results:
 - ▶ Data sheet HT2 DC20 S20, HITAG™₂ Transponders
 - ▶ Data sheet HITAG S HTS IC H32/HTS IC H56/HTS IC H48 Transponder IC
- ▶ Hitag 1, S and 2
- ▶ Hitag S seems to be an update of Hitag 1: more complex protocol compared to Hitag 2, with anticollision etc.




Hitag S: memory

- ▶ 32 bit, 256 bit or 2048 bit memory size
- ▶ organized in pages of 4 byte each, first (page 0) is 32 bit UID
- ▶ first few pages store 48-bit key for reader authentication and 24 bit password for tag authentication



Hitag S: radio

- ▶ operating frequency 100...150 kHz
- ▶ data transmission reader to tag: 100% ASK binary pulse length coding
 - ▶ 0 bit: field off for $4 \dots 10 \frac{1}{f_c}$, field on for $18 \dots 22 \frac{1}{f_c}$
 - ▶ 1 bit: field off for $4 \dots 10 \frac{1}{f_c}$, field on for $26 \dots 30 \frac{1}{f_c}$




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Crypto



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 - ▶ reader to tag: 5.2 kbit/s on average
 - ▶ tag to reader: 2, 4 or 8 kbit/s
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Hitag S: commands (excerpt)

- ▶ UID REQUEST Adv: 1100xb
- ▶ Anticollision sequence: <bit position of collision><k bits of UID><CRC8>
- ▶ Select: 00000b<UID><CRC8> (tag responds with configuration)
- ▶ Select but stay quiet: 00000b<UID>0b<CRC8>
- ▶ Authentication (when configuration indicates authentication mode): <32 bit RND><32 bit secret data> (tag responds with encrypted password)

etc. pp.



Hitag 2: Memory

- ▶ 256 bit of memory in 8 pages of 4 byte each
- ▶ page 0 stores UID
- ▶ page 3 stores 1 byte configuration, 3 byte tag password
- ▶ password mode: page 1 stores reader password
- ▶ crypto mode: pages 1 and 2 store 48 bit key
- ▶ pages 4 thru 7 are for user data



Hitag 2: Configuration

- ▶ Biphase or Manchester modulation
- ▶ TTF public modes A (MIRO, EM H400x), B (ISO 11784) and C (PIT compatible)
- ▶ Crypto mode or password mode
 - ▶ Password mode:
 - ▶ “mutual authentication” through passwords: reader sends reader password, tag responds with tag password
 - ▶ Crypto mode:
 - ▶ reader sends 32 bit nonce, 32 bit authentication token
 - ▶ tag responds with encrypted configuration and tag password
 - ▶ all further communication is encrypted
- ▶ lock bits



Hitag 2: Commands

- ▶ Activation procedure (password mode):
 - ▶ R→T: 11000b
 - ▶ T→R: <UID (e.g. page 0)>
 - ▶ R→T: <reader password (e.g. page 1)>
 - ▶ T→R: <configuration, tag password (e.g. page 3)>
- ▶ Activation procedure (crypto mode):
 - ▶ R→T: 11000b
 - ▶ T→R: <UID (e.g. page 0)>
 - ▶ R→T: <32 bit random><32 bit authenticator>
 - ▶ T→R: ENC(<configuration, tag password (e.g. page 3)>)
 - ▶ all further communication encrypted with the cipher stream



Hitag 2: Commands (cont.)


- ▶ Read page: $11b\langle 3 \text{ bit page number} \rangle 00b\langle \text{INV}(3 \text{ bit page number}) \rangle$
- ▶ Write page: $10b\langle 3 \text{ bit page number} \rangle 01b\langle \text{INV}(3 \text{ bit page number}) \rangle$
Tag repeats command (possibly encrypted!)
Reader sends page content (32 bits)



Sniffing

- ▶ 125 kHz carrier, max 8 kbit/s data rate with manchester coding → highest frequency is 16 kHz
- ▶ Simple diode detector for demodulation
- ▶ Soundcard as A/D
- ▶ A couple lines of C for decoding

- ▶ Reused hardware from <http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/~ploetz/analyzing-an-unknown-access-control-system.pdf>



RFID sniffing with baudline

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The screenshot displays a software interface for signal analysis. At the top, a waveform window shows a signal with a series of vertical pulses followed by a modulated wave. Below it, the 'baudline' window shows a spectrogram of the signal with a red cursor indicating a frequency of 31.25204026 Hz. To the right, an 'input devices' dialog box is open, showing a list of devices including 'i8086' and 'HD4-Intel Analog Devices AD1981'. The 'Device' column is highlighted in blue. The 'Sample Rate' is set to 96000. The 'Decrease By' is set to 'none' and 'Down Mixer' is set to '0.000000'. The 'Gain' is set to '0.000000'. The 'Information' column shows 'HD4-Intel Analog Devices AD1981' and 'calibrate Sample Rate 96416.435414'. The 'OK' button is visible at the bottom of the dialog box.

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(live demo)



Recording a trace and decoding it

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```
henryk@dawn ~/prog/hitag $ arecord -c 1 -f S16_LE -r 48k foo.wav
Recording WAVE 'foo.wav' : Signed 16 bit Little Endian, Rate 48000 Hz, Mono
^CAborted by signal Interrupt...
henryk@dawn ~/prog/hitag $ ./Debug/hitag t foo.wav
55470:   RWD, 0, 5  11000
55594:   MC,  4, 0  00110101001100110111000000010001   35337011
56198:   RWD, 4, 0  01001101010010010100101101010010   4D494B52
56583:   MC,  4, 0  00000110101010100100100001010100   06AA4854
```

(live demo)



Example of a write transaction

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```
henryk@dawn ~/prog/hitag $ ./Debug/hitag t tag1_getsnrreset+write3+write1_nocrypto.wav
273281:   RWD, 0, 5  11000
273406:   MC,  4, 0  00110101001100110111000000010001  35337011
274008:   RWD, 4, 0  01001101010010010100101101010010  4D494B52
274394:   MC,  4, 0  00000110101010100100100001010100  06AA4854
275875:   RWD, 1, 2  1001101100   9B
276051:   MC,  1, 2  1001101100   9B
276432:   RWD, 4, 0  00000110101010100100100001010100  06AA4854
277770:   RWD, 1, 2  1000101110   8B
277946:   MC,  1, 2  1000101110   8B
278327:   RWD, 4, 0  01001101010010010100101101010010  4D494B52
```



Example of an encrypted read transaction


```
henryk@dawn ~/prog/hitag $ ./Debug/hitag t tag2_getsnrrest+fullread_crypto.wav
233119:   RWD, 0, 5  11000
233258:   MC,  4, 0  10100100001111010111000000010001   A43D7011
234132:   RWD,  8, 0  1110001011110010100111010111011110101001010001111011110010011010
                                     E2F29D77A947BC9A
234846:   MC,  4, 0  00111100010000110100111111010011   3C434FD3
382263:   RWD,  1, 2  0101011000   56
382436:   MC,  4, 0  01110101001100010100111110100010   75314FA2
383990:   RWD,  1, 2  0101111100   5F
384168:   MC,  4, 0  01100110100111100000010000011101   669E041D
385743:   RWD,  1, 2  1100100101   C9
385918:   MC,  4, 0  01110000101010110010100001111100   70AB287C
387719:   RWD,  1, 2  0011001110   33
387894:   MC,  4, 0  11101010111010000111010011111110   EAE874FE
389464:   RWD,  1, 2  0011001011   32
389640:   MC,  4, 0  11110101101101011011111000011001   F5B5BE19
391198:   RWD,  1, 2  1110110100   ED
391377:   MC,  4, 0  11101100011111100110100000100111   EC7E6827
392889:   RWD,  1, 2  0001111000   1E
393062:   MC,  4, 0  00001011110101110000010010110111   OBD704B7
394637:   RWD,  1, 2  1001110110   9D
394815:   MC,  4, 0  11111011010100110010000110010101   FB532195
```



Crypto

- ▶ Look what we found on the net:
<http://cryptolib.com/ciphers/hitag2/>

Hitag2 Cipher



$$f_a^4 = 0x2C79 = abc+ac+ad+bc+a+b+d+1$$

$$f_b^4 = 0x6671 = abd+acd+bcd+ab+ac+bc+a+b+d+1$$

(by I.C. Wiener 2006-2007)