All reports produced by the crew of the intervention vessel from Denmark in Joint Operation Poseidon Sea on 2 March 2020 and the responsible officials of the country of operation (Greece), as well as the Daily Reports received by Frontex from the International Coordination Centre (ICC) and the Frontex Situational Centre (FSC), in particular: Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO) Daily Report, Frontex Support Officer (FSO) Daily Report, Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC) Daily Report, Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) Daily Report, Team Leaders (TL) Daily Report, Technical Equipment (TE) Mission Report, National Official (NO) Daily Report, Intelligence Officer (IO) Daily Report, Commanding Officer (CO) Daily Report. As further specified by you: perhaps I am mistaken and there is no Daily Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) Report, but only if there is an incidence. If that is the case for this particular day, please provide it. If there isn't, I'm ok with that. Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01

Please be informed that Frontex identified four documents falling within the scope of your application, access to which has to be refused as they contain: -    information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorised border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001;1 -    information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorised border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001; -    details of the operational area. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorised border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001; -    sensitive operational information and details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would ultimately put the lives of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Moreover, the above-mentioned risk analyses constitute a specific form of internal decision- making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain insights into this decision-making process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external 1 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01

pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex’ internal decision-making processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present case, information pertaining to this variable cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. A partial release of the documents could not be undertaken, as their redaction would be disproportionate in relation to the parts that are eligible for disclosure, simultaneously undermining the principle of sound administration. More specifically, the administrative burden necessary to identify and redact the releasable elements would be disproportionate to the interest in the disclosure exercise itself, while the released documents would not convey any informative value due to their significantly reduced form. Consequently, a partial disclosure of the documents at issue must be refused owing to the particular circumstances of the present case. Pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, within 15 working days of the receipt of this letter, you may submit a confirmatory application to Frontex to reconsider its position. Based on Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, Frontex will reply to you within 15 working days from the registration of such application. You can submit your confirmatory application by post or electronically. Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency www.frontex.europa.eu | Pl. Europejski 6, 00-844 Warsaw, Poland | Tel. +48 22 205 95 00 | Fax +48 22 205 95 01